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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2006-3615 Civil EDWARD FRED DAVIS, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : TERRY EUGENE MOYER, : DEFENDANT : 06-3615 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., August 2, 2010:-- Before the court is defendant, Terry Eugene Moyer's motion for partial summary judgment against plaintiff, Edward Fred Davis. Defendant seeks to preclude plaintiff from introducing paid medical bills at trial so as to prevent a double recovery. Following briefing by the parties and argument en banc, we grant defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. I. Background This matter arises from a 2004 automobile accident in which defendant turned left in front of plaintiff forcing him to lay down his motorcycle to avoid a more serious collision. Defendant concedes liability for the accident but disputes plaintiff's asserted damages. Specifically, defendant contends the Motor Vehicle 06-3615 CIVIL TERM Financial Responsibility Law (Law) precludes plaintiff from receiving compensation for medical bills already paid by his private health insurer. See 75 Pa. C.S. §1722 (Preclusion of Recovering Required Benefits). For his part, plaintiff contends because he “is not eligible to receive benefits under the [Law] he is not precluded by the provision of the same.” Pl.'s Br. at 2. We disagree. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is properly granted only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035. Here, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment presents a question of statutory interpretation where the relevant facts are not in dispute. As such, the instant matter is ripe for resolution via summary judgment. B. Statutory Offset Section 1722 of the Law prevents a party from recovering damages from a tortfeasor when a collateral source has already compensated the party for his injuries. The Law reads, in relevant part: In any action for damages against a tortfeasor, or in any uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the coverages set forth in this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this subchapter, or workers' compensation, or any program, group contract or other -2- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1722 (emphasis added). Restated, this subsection allows an insured's recovery from a tortfeaser to be offset by the amount of compensation he receives from certain collateral sources of benefits so long as they are not subject to subrogation. Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Insurance Co., Pa. , 992 A.2d 859, 869 (2010). C. Statutory Interpretation Plaintiff claims the statutory offset does not apply to motorcyclists because motorcyclists are ineligible for first-party benefits under the law. See 75 Pa. C.S. §1711. We disagree. Section 1711 reads, in relevant part: Required benefits (a) Medical benefit.-- An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except recreational vehicles not intended for highway use, motorcycles, motor- driven cycles or motorized pedalcycles or like type vehicles, registered and operated in this Commonwealth, shall include coverage providing a medical benefit in the amount of $5,000. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a) (emphasis added). Although the General Assembly chose to exclude motorcyclists from the requirement that first-party benefits be provided, it does not follow that motorcyclists are exempt from the statutory offset provision. In fact, a plain reading of the Law compels the conclusion that motorcyclists are not exempt. “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it -3- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). We must “listen attentively to what a statute says[; however, we] must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 567 Pa. 514, 525, 788 A.2d 955, 962 (2001) (citation omitted). “[I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a court has no power to insert a word into a statute if the legislature has failed to supply it.” Vlasic Farms, Inc. v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 734 A.2d 487, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), aff’d, 565 Pa. 555, 777 A.2d 80 (2001); see also Girgis v. Bd. of Physical Therapy, 859 A.2d 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (we may not insert a word the legislature failed to supply into a statute). Here, our General Assembly applied the statutory offset broadly to damages “arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1722 (emphasis added). A motor vehicle is defined as “[a] vehicle which is self-propelled except an electric personal assistive mobility device or a vehicle which is propelled solely by human power.” 75 Pa. C.S. §102. Specifically, a motorcycle is defined as “[a] motor vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 75 Pa. C.S. §102 (emphasis added). Thus, because the Section 1722 statutory offset provision applies to motor vehicles, and motorcycles are a subset of motor vehicles, the provision applies to motorcycles. In drafting Section 1722, our General Assembly omitted exclusionary language regarding motorcycles; as such, we decline to supply it. Vlasic Farms, 734 A.2d at 490. Notably, elsewhere in the Law, where our General Assembly -4- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM 1 sought to treat motorcycles differently, they did so explicitly. We find further support for our conclusion in our Supreme Court's interpretation of “motorcycle” under the Law's predecessor, the No Fault Act. There, our Supreme Court reasoned that motorcycles were motor vehicles required to be registered under the Act and, [t]his conclusion is not altered in this case by the provisions of § 103 of the No-Fault Act that preclude the operator or passenger of a motorcycle from recovering basic loss benefits. The exclusion was established because of the greater risk of injury attendant to operating or riding on a motorcycle. It was not intended to exclude a motorcycle from the definition of a motor vehicle or to release a motorcycle insurer from the responsibility for the payment of basic loss benefits to a person injured in an accident involving a motorcycle. Mitchell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 522 Pa. 545, 553, 564 A.2d 1232, 1236 (1989) (emphasis added). The same reasoning applies to the Law now in effect. Where the Law excludes motorcyclists from receiving a certain class of benefits, it does not then relieve motorcyclists of all obligations arising from the Law. This is essentially what plaintiff would have us conclude. As he states in his brief, 1 See 75 Pa. C.S. §1711(a) (“An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except … motorcycles ….”) (emphasis added); 75 Pa. C.S. §1712 (“An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title, except ...motorcycles ....”) (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1714 (“An owner of a currently registered motor vehicle who does not have financial responsibility or an operator or occupant of a recreational vehicle not intended for highway use, motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, motorized pedalcycle or like type vehicle required to be registered under this title cannot recover first party benefits.”) (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1752 (“A person is eligible to recover benefits from the Assigned Claims Plan if the person meets the following requirements: ... (7) Is not the operator or occupant of a … motorcycle, motor-driven cycle or motorized pedalcycle or other like type vehicle required to be registered under this title and involved in the accident.”) (emphasis added) . -5- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM “[b]ecause the plaintiff is not eligible to receive benefits under the [Law] he is not precluded by the provision of the same. It simply does not apply to him or his claim of damages.” Pl.'s Br. at 2. To be sure, the beauty of plaintiff’s argument lies in its simplicity. Nevertheless, absent clear statutory language to that effect, we cannot endorse such a broad exemption for motorcyclists under the Law. Finally, we note our Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the policy goals reflected by the enactment of Section 1722. In Tannenbaum v. Nationwide Insurance Company, ___ Pa. ___, 992 A.2d 859 (2010), our Supreme Court concluded Section 1722, on its face, reflects the Legislature's intent to shift a substantial share of the liability for injuries caused by uninsured and underinsured motorists from automobile insurance carriers to collateral source providers … obviously with the aim to reduce motor vehicle insurance premiums. Whether or not this is wise social policy, manifestly, it is the policy presently reflected on the face of the [Law]. Id. at 866 (emphasis added). Though our Supreme Court's holding dealt with uninsured (UM) and underinsured motorists (UIM), the same reasoning applies to the instant matter because, by its terms, the statutory offset applies equally in the tort context. Thus, plaintiff's suggested interpretation of the Law not only goes against the plain language of the Law, but would directly frustrate our General Assembly's intent to divert liability from a tortfeasor's automobile insurer to a victim's collateral sources of medical benefits. III. Conclusion In sum, we conclude that, on its face, the Section 1722 statutory offset applies to all actions for damages against a tortfeasor, “arising out of the -6- 06-3615 CIVIL TERM maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,” including those arising from the use of a motorcycle. 75 Pa. C.S. §1722. We also note this interpretation is in accord with that section's clearly expressed public policy goal as described by our Supreme Court. Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff is precluded from recovering medical expenses already paid by his own health insurance policy and grant defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of August, 2010, the defendant’s motion IS GRANTED. for partial summary judgment, By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Plaintiff Seth T. Black, Esquire For Defendant :sal -7- EDWARD FRED DAVIS, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : TERRY EUGENE MOYER, : DEFENDANT : 06-3615 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of August, 2010, the defendant’s motion IS GRANTED. for partial summary judgment, By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Plaintiff Seth T. Black, Esquire For Defendant :sal