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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2001-351 Civil JOSEPH A. LUISI, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Appellant : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : CIVIL ACTION COMMONWEALTH OF : PENNSYLVANIA, : DEPARTMENT OF : TRANSPORTATION, : Appellee : No. 351-2001 CIVIL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 OLER, J., June 24, 2010. In this license suspension appeal case, a motorist appealed to this court from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation as a result of his conviction for driving under 1 suspension. Following a hearing, the court affirmed the Department’s 2 suspension. From the order affirming the suspension, the Appellant has filed an appeal 3 to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. The bases for Appellant’s appeal have been expressed in a five-page statement of errors complained of on appeal as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. On December 27, 2008, Appellant was pulled over for a speeding violation (hereinafter “Violation One”). 2. Appellant did not receive a citation for this violation on the day of the incident, in the mail or otherwise, nor did the police officer who made the stop require Appellant to sign any documentation. 3. Appellant’s failure to receive this citation denied Appellant important due process considerations because he was unaware of his rights as they relate to Violation One, the procedure for pleading guilty or not 1 Petition To Appeal Driver’s License Suspension, filed January 13, 2010; see Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 (Notice of Suspension dated December 18, 2009); Hearing, April 14, 2010 (hereinafter Commonwealth’s Ex. 1). 2 Order of Court, April 15, 2010. 3 Notice of Appeal, filed May 12, 2010. guilty, and the consequences of various actions taken (ie: not responding at all). 4. In August 2009, Appellant discovered that his Driver’s License was suspended due to a “failure to respond” to the citation related to Violation One, despite the fact that he never received notice of Violation One. 5. After learning that Violation One existed, Appellant paid the fine for Violation One on August 18, 2009. 6. Appellant never received the Notice of License Suspension from PennDOT, because it was discovered that PennDOT had the incorrect address for Appellant in its records due to a typographical error by PennDOT. 7. Failure to receive this Notice of Driver’s License Suspension denied Appellant due process, because he was unaware of his rights and was not provided with notice that his payment of the citation for Violation One was essentially pleading guilty to the charges against him and, accordingly, would not automatically reinstate his driving privileges with PennDOT. 8. On October 20 2009, Appellant was pulled over for driving with a suspended license (hereinafter “Violation Two”). 9. The license suspension was a consequence imposed for Appellant’s alleged failure to respond to the citation associated with Violation One, which he never received from PennDOT. 10. The underlying basis for Violation Two (driving with a suspended license) ceased to exist when Appellant paid the fine for Violation One on August 18, 2009. 11. Prior to pleading guilty to Violation Two, no notice was given by the police officer that would indicate that Appellant’s driving privileges would be revoked as a result of Appellant’s payment of the fine. 12. The only underlying basis for Appellant having a suspended license was that he failed to respond to the citation for Violation One, which he never received from PennDOT or the police officer. 13. The only underlying basis for Violation Two was that Appellant was driving with a suspended license, which was caused by Appellant’s not responding to Violation One, which could not have been responded to by Appellant because he was not made aware of it. 14. Although Appellant pled guilty to Violation Two, driving with a suspended license, the underlying basis for said violation was applied erroneously because he never received notice of Violation One and could not have responded to the same. 2 II. MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL The following errors on appeal are being stated generally because Appellant can not readily discern the basis for the Court denying Appellant relief. The matters complained of on appeal are: 1. Whether the Trial Court erred in affirming PennDOT’s Official Notice of the Suspension of Driving Privileges because Appellant’s driver’s license suspension was imposed for his failing to respond to a citation for Violation One which he never received and which was sent to a wrong address by Penn DOT. 2. Whether the Trial Court erred in affirming PennDOT’s Official Notice of the Suspension of Driving Privileges despite the fact that Appellant was denied important due process rights as a result of not having received a citation for Violation One. 3. Whether the Trial Court erred in affirming PennDOT’s Official Notice of the Suspension of Driving Privileges and failing to hold that Violation Two was based on the legal fiction that Appellant failed to respond to Violation One, despite the fact that Appellant neither received Violation One nor the Original Notice of License Suspension for failure to respond to Violation One from PennDOT. 4. Whether the Trial Court erred in not holding that the underlying basis for Violation Two (driving with suspended license) was based on a legal fiction because Appellant could neither have responded to Citation One nor have knowledge about the suspension of his driving privileges because Appellant never received notice of the same. 5. Whether the Trial Court erred in affirming PennDOT’s Official Notice of the Suspension of Driving Privileges despite the fact that all events subsequent to Appellant’s failure to receive Violation One and the Original Notice of License Suspension are based on the legal fiction that Appellant either failed to respond to Citation One or continued driving although his driving privileged were revoked. 6. Whether the Trial Court erred in holding that Appellant was not denied important due process rights when his license was suspended for failing to respond to Violation One despite the fact that he never received notice of Violation One. 7. Whether the Trial Court erred in holding that Appellant was not denied important due process rights despite his receiving no notice that his driving privileges would be revoked after payment of Violation Two. 8. Whether the Trial Court erred in holding that Appellant’s having paid the fine for Violation Two acted as an independent ground to ratify his license suspension (for failure to respond to Violation One), despite the fact that the suspension was a result of Appellant’s having never received notice of Violation One. 9. Whether the Trial Court erred in affirming PennDOT’s Official Notice of the Suspension of Driving Privileges where Appellant was denied due process when PennDOT failed to send Violation One and the 3 Original Notice of Driver’s License Suspension to Appellant’s correct address and all events occurring after that denial of due process were based upon Appellant’s not having received sufficient notice of Violation One 4 and the suspension. This opinion in support of the order appealed from, affirming the suspension of Appellant’s operating privilege, is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). STATEMENT OF FACTS On a license suspension appeal, “[d]eterminations as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight assigned to the evidence are solely within the province of the trial court as fact-finder. As fact-finder, the trial court may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.” Reinhart v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 954 A.2d 761, 765 (Pa. Commw. 2008). The evidence found credible at the hearing in this case may be summarized as follows: 5 As the result of a driving incident on October 20, 2009, Appellant pled 6 guilty on December 9, 2009, to driving under suspension. This conviction was 7 never appealed. Upon receiving notice of the conviction, the Department of Transportation notified Appellant, by a mailing dated December 18, 2009, of its imposition of a suspension of his operating privilege for a period of one year, as 8 mandated by Section 1543(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code. Additional evidence at the hearing, emphasized by Appellant, purported to show that (a) the initial suspension which was an element of the driving-under- suspension charge to which he pled guilty had not been made known to him by the Department, because the Department had an incorrect address for him in its 4 Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to PA.R.A.P. 1925(b), filed June 7, 2010. Date stamp June 8, 2010. 5 Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 (“Conviction Detail”). 6 Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 (“Conviction Detail”). 7 See Notes of Testimony 25-27, hearing, April 14, 2010 (hereinafter N.T. ___). 8 Commonwealth’s Ex. 1 (Notice of Suspension, dated December 18, 2009). 4 9 records, (b) the underlying basis for that suspension (failure to pay a fine and costs) also had not been made known to him, because the magisterial district judge 10 having jurisdiction over the case also had an incorrect address for him, (c) he eventually discovered that his license had been suspended for such failure, convinced the magisterial district judge to dismiss the prosecution that had occasioned the fine and costs, corrected his address with the Department, and 11 assumed that the suspension was no longer in effect, (d) thereafter, while the suspension was still in effect due to his not having paid a restoration fee, he was 12 cited for driving under suspension, (e) he paid the restoration fee a few days 13 later, and (f) he ultimately pled guilty to the driving-under-suspension offense after receiving bad advice from the police officer as to the effect of such a plea on 14 his license, thereby precipitating the Department’s action in suspending his operating privilege for an additional year. With specific reference to the incorrect address contained in the Department’s records for Appellant, the evidence showed that, at the time of the offense which resulted in the initial suspension of his operating privilege for failure to pay a fine and costs, the address of record and the correct address were, respectively: JOSEPH A LUISI JOSEPH A LUISI 4902 CARLISLE PIKE 4902 CARLISLE PIKE APT PO BOX 121 APT 121 121 MECHANICSBURG PA 17050 MECHANICSBURG PA 17050 Although it was not clear to the court from the evidence how the extraneous post office box had become part of Appellant’s address of record with the Department, it did seem clear that Appellant bore considerable responsibility for 9 N.T. 15-17. 10 N.T. 16. 11 N.T. 16-17, 20. 12 Com. Ex. 1 (“Driving History”); N.T. 17. 13 N.T. 22. 5 its remaining in the record as of the time of the citation that he claimed not to have received, inasmuch as the driver’s license that he was carrying at the time showed 15 that address. DISCUSSION Under Section 1543(c)(1) of the Vehicle Code, “[u]pon receiving a certified record of the conviction of any person [for driving under suspension], the department shall suspend . . . that person’s operating privilege . . . for an additional one-year period.” Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, §1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1543(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Department’s duty in this regard is mandatory, not discretionary. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. Ford-Bey, 142 Pa. Commw. 345, 597 A.2d 267 (1991). On a challenge to a suspension resulting from a conviction, the effect of the conviction for purposes can not be defeated by a collateral attack upon it. See Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994); Shaulis v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 162 Pa. Commw. 74, 638 A.2d 362 (1994); Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Grubb, 152 Pa. Commw. 178, 618 A.2d 1152 (1992). This well-established rule is obviously predicated upon considerations of statutory construction, judicial economy and the impracticality of requiring the Department of Transportation to reconstruct a criminal prosecution in a subsequent civil proceeding. In the present case, although the points raised at the hearing by Appellant might or might not have had an effect if they had been raised in his driving-under- 16 suspension prosecution, that prosecution was instead concluded with a guilty- plea-based conviction that was not appealed. Under these circumstances, Appellant’s challenge to the Department’s action in the present license suspension appeal represented an impermissible collateral attack upon the conviction. 14 N.T. 18, 20-23. 15 N.T. 10, 16-17. 16 Cf. Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1975). 6 For the foregoing reasons, it is believed that the affirmance of Appellant’s suspension was properly entered. BY THE COURT, _________________ J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Ashley M. Galloway, Esq. Evan C. Pappas, Esq. P.O. Box 88 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorneys for Appellant Philip Bricknell, Esq. Assistant Counsel PennDot Office of Chief Counsel Riverfront Office Center 1101 South Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17104-2830 Attorney for Appellee 7