HomeMy WebLinkAbout2002-907 Civil
JEANNETTE M. COLLEGE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION—LAW
:
GLEN E. COLLEGE, :
Defendant : NO. 02-907 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PETITION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J., June 30, 2010.
In this domestic relations case regarding the issue of whether alimony payments
should be modified, terminated, or remain the same, Defendant (former husband) has
filed a Petition To Enforce Settlement Agreement, seeking to terminate or, alternatively,
modify alimony payments agreed to in a Marital Settlement Agreement that are owed to
Plaintiff (former wife), based on a prospective change in Defendant’s employment
status—specifically, Defendant’s contemplated retirement. A hearing was held on May 6,
2010.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, Defendant’s Petition To Enforce Settlement
Agreement will be granted to the extent that the amount of alimony will be reduced.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, Glen E. College, is an adult individual residing in Harrisburg, Dauphin
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County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff, Jeannette M. College, is an adult individual residing in
Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ¶1, filed Feb. 2, 2010; Notes of Testimony,
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1-2, May 6, 2010 (hereinafter N.T. _____)
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Gulf Breeze, Santa Rosa County, Florida. As of the hearing, Defendant and Plaintiff
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were sixty-six and sixty-five years old, respectively. Defendant and Plaintiff married on
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October 3, 1981 and were divorced on December 11, 2002. At the time of their divorce
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in 2002, the parties had been married for twenty-one years.
The Decree in Divorce incorporated, but did not merge, a Martial Settlement
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Agreement, which, among other obligations, committed Defendant to pay alimony in the
amount of five hundred dollars bi-weekly until the death of either party or Plaintiff’s
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remarriage. Paragraph 11 of the Marital Settlement Agreement regarding Defendant’s
alimony obligation contained a clause permitting modification of such obligation upon a
change in Defendant’s employment status that read: “Modifications may also be made
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upon change of employment status.”
The Marital Settlement Agreement also contained provisions for the distribution of
property, whereby: (1) the marital home situated in Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania, owned by the parties during the marriage as tenants by the entireties, was
Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ¶2, filed Feb. 2, 2010; N.T. 16; Plaintiff’s
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Exhibit 1.
N.T. 2, 23; Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Jan. 31, 2003 (Oler, J.).
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Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ¶3, filed Feb. 2, 2010; Defendant’s Exhibit
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1, attached to Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, filed Feb. 2, 2010
(hereinafter “Decree in Divorce”); N.T. 3.
See N.T. 2-5.
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Decree in Divorce.
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Defendant’s Exhibit 2, attached to Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, filed Feb.
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2, 2010 (hereinafter “Marital Settlement Agreement”).
Marital Settlement Agreement, ¶11.
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2
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acknowledged to have already been sold and the proceeds equally divided; (2)
Defendant was to retain sole and exclusive ownership of a certain 1995 Jeep Cherokee,
and assume responsibility for all outstanding encumbrances on it, and Plaintiff was to
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retain possession of a certain 1997 Geo Tracker, also assuming the same; (3) joint bank
accounts were acknowledged to have been closed or divided to the mutual satisfaction of
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the parties; and (4) the parties acknowledged that they had already divided all other
items of tangible personal property not specified in the agreement to their mutual
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satisfaction.
The Marital Settlement Agreement also provided for the distribution of obligations
on certain debts jointly incurred during the parties’ marriage, whereby Defendant would
assume $80,769.00 (approximately 80 percent) and Plaintiff would assume the remaining
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$20,934.00 (approximately 20 percent) of the jointly held marital debt. Lastly, the
Marital Settlement Agreement provided for the disposition of Defendant’s pension and
retirement benefits he had acquired through his sixteen-year employment with Tyco
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Electronics International, Inc. as a senior assistant analyst. The paragraph relating to the
Tyco pension benefits provided that Plaintiff was to receive $10,000.00 from that 401K
plan, and Defendant was to otherwise retain ownership of the pension, which was
Marital Settlement Agreement,¶4.
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Marital Settlement Agreement,¶6.
10
Marital Settlement Agreement,¶9.
11
Marital Settlement Agreement, ¶5.
12
Marital Settlement Agreement, ¶7.
13
3
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accomplished through a Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order. At the May 6,
2010 hearing, Defendant testified that he expected to receive monthly income from two
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other pensions, one from a company known as McCory and a second from a company
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called AMP, neither of which was mentioned expressly in the Marital Settlement
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Agreement. As reflected in his expense/income spreadsheet prepared in anticipation of
the hearing, Defendant expected, upon retirement, to receive roughly $1,482.17 in
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aggregate monthly income derived from his three pensions. Defendant also expected to
receive approximately $2,380.00 per month in social security income, according to his
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testimony. While Defendant’s retirement could be expected to produce a significant
reduction in his income, a precise figure in this regard was not discernable from the
record.
Since the parties’ divorce, Defendant testified, he had fulfilled his obligation to
satisfy the portion of debt assumed by him pursuant to the Marital Settlement
Marital Settlement Agreement, ¶8. The value of the account for equitable distribution purposes as
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of June 24, 2002 was $27,792.34; N.T. 3; Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Jan. 31,
2003 (Oler, J.).
N.T. 9; Stipulated Qualified Domestic Relations Order, Jan. 31, 2003 (Oler, J.). Paragraph four of
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the January 31, 2002 Order indicates that the Plaintiff’s interest in the Defendant’s Tyco
International, Inc. Retirement Savings and Investment Plan shall be $10,000.00 as of December
11, 2002. Paragraph seven of the Order entitled Plaintiff to earnings from December 11, 2002
until the date the $10,000.00 is segregated from Defendant’s account.
Defendant’s Exhibit 3. Defendant expected to receive $325.00 in monthly income from the
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McCory pension.
Def.’s Ex. 3. Defendant expected to receive $307.14 in monthly income from the AMP pension.
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N.T. 14-15. Defendant testified that the reason for not referencing these two pensions in the
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Marital Settlement Agreement was that Plaintiff’s lawyer decided that the income resulting from
these two pensions would be so low that it “was not worth pursuing.” N.T. 15.
See Def.’s Ex. 3.
19
N.T. 10; Def.’s Ex. 3.
20
4
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Agreement. Furthermore, Defendant testified that he had fulfilled his alimony
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obligations for approximately eight years post-separation. Although Defendant had as
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of the hearing been employed full time at Tyco for the preceding sixteen years, due to
his obligations under the Marital Settlement Agreement, living expenses, and health care
costs, Defendant testified that he has been unable to keep any substantial amount of
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savings for his retirement. Defendant testified that he owned and lived alone in a two-
25
bedroom townhome. Defendant also testified that he suffered from numerous health
2627
issues, such as pulmonary embolisms, high cholesterol, three different forms of
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cancer, and high blood pressure, and had recently been diagnosed with a “stroke in
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[his] left eye,” resulting in a 50-percent loss of vision in that eye. With regard to
healthcare expenses, Defendant claimed to spend roughly $85.00 per month on
N.T. 7.
21
Defendant’s Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, ¶12(a), filed Feb. 2, 2010; Plaintiff
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testified that her 2009 tax return reflected receipt of $12,000.00 in alimony payments, which she
indicated at the May 6, 2010 hearing should actually be changed to reflect receipt of $13,000.00
in alimony payments from Defendant.
N.T. 2, 14.
23
N.T. 7.
24
N.T. 2.
25
N.T. 11. Although Defendant had recovered, he remained on medication for blood clots, according
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to his testimony.
N.T. 11. Defendant was on medication for high cholesterol, according to his testimony.
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N.T. 12.
28
N.T. 12. Defendant was on medication for high blood pressure, according to his testimony.
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N.T. 13. This condition cannot be repaired, according to his testimony.
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medications, $260.00 per month on medical expenses, and $275.00 per month on health
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insurance.
Defendant prepared a spreadsheet based on his basic expenses for 2009, indicating
average monthly expenses of $3,416.45, which included the $500.00 bi-weekly alimony
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payments. Although he testified that he was physically able to continue to work, due
to his age and health conditions, he wished to retire in 2010, which he argued would
constitute a change of employment status, permitting the modification of alimony
payments pursuant to Paragraph Eleven of the Marital Settlement Agreement.
As of the hearing, Plaintiff resided in Florida, and had been employed since 2007
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as a product demonstrator on an “on-call” basis. Plaintiff testified that she had
previously received unemployment compensation, but exhausted her entitlement and no
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longer received any unemployment compensation. Plaintiff testified that, at the time of
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the hearing, she received $878.00 per month in Social Security income. Plaintiff owned
the three-bedroom home in which she lived, and estimated the equity in the house to be
Def.’s Ex. 3.
31
Def.’s Ex. 3.
32
N.T. 14.
33
N.T. 18. Plaintiff testified that she worked between one and four days a week, and earned
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between $9 and $11 per hour, depending on the job. N.T. 36-37.
N.T. 19.
35
N.T. 21, 30.
36
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$135,000.00. Plaintiff owed approximately $27,000.00 on a 2007 Ford Mustang
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vehicle, the equity in which she estimated to be approximately $15,000.00.
Plaintiff testified that, in September of 2009, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
the Northern District of Florida, the result of which was a discharge of approximately
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$44,094.00 of unsecured debt. Plaintiff testified that she had not remarried, but received
some financial contribution from a male companion who had stayed with her in her
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house. Plaintiff testified that, for a period during 2009, her sister had stayed with her
41
and contributed approximately $925.00 per month to household expenses. Plaintiff
testified that, despite her efforts, she had been unable to secure full-time employment in
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2010.
43
Plaintiff submitted a document detailing her estimated yearly expenses. She
testified that she did not receive any regular, substantial income other than the $878.00
44
per month in Social Security, and $500.00 that she received bi-weekly in alimony.
Plaintiff testified that she suffered from a heart condition, which would require
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open-heart surgery to repair in the future. Plaintiff further testified that she could not
N.T. 22, 42.
37
N,T. 33, 42.
38
N.T. 30; 32-33.
39
N.T. 29. Plaintiff was unsure as to the exact amount the male companion contributed, but did
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testify that he no longer contributed, as they “broke up in 2007.”
N.T. 27-29, 31-32.
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N.T. 38; 40-41.
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.
43
Pl.’s Ex. 2.
44
N.T. 25.
45
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afford the 20 percent personal contribution required by Medicare, and therefore had been
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unable to see her treating physician regarding the problem. According to her expense
report, Plaintiff spent roughly $100.00 per month on medication and must pay $90.00 per
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doctor visit.
DISCUSSION
The foregoing facts present two preliminary issues of a legal nature for this court
to resolve. First, whether Defendant’s voluntary retirement would constitute a sufficient
change in employment so as to permit modification of alimony payments in accordance
with the Marital Settlement Agreement; and, second, whether Defendant’s pension
income should be treated as income for purposes of calculating his alimony obligation,
even though the Tyco pension had already been subject to equitable distribution.
Voluntary Retirement As Change in Employment Authorizing Modification.
Because Defendant’s obligation to pay alimony arises from the agreement signed by the
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parties in 2002, this court first looks to Section 3105(c) of the Divorce Code for
guidance regarding the effect of an agreement between parties. Section 3105 states:
(c) Certain provisions not subject to modification.—In the absence of a
specific provision to the contrary appearing in the agreement, a provision
regarding the disposition of . . . alimony . . . shall not be subject to
modification by the court.”
N.T. 25-26.
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Pl.’s Ex. 2.
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Act of Dec. 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, §2, as amended 23 Pa. C.S. §3105 et seq.
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23 Pa. C.S. §3105(c) (emphasis added). The question then becomes whether the language
contained in the agreement sub judice precludes modification of alimony.
A marital settlement agreement is enforced according to the same rules that apply
to contract interpretation. Bianchi v. Bianchi, 2004 PA Super 373, ¶11, 859 A.2d 511,
515. Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning must be
determined by an examination of the terms of the agreement itself. Chamberlin v.
Chamberlin, 693 A.2d 970, 971-72 (Pa. Super. 1997). In this case, the parties’ agreement
is clear: Defendant’s alimony obligation is subject to modification upon a change in
employment status, under paragraph 11 of the agreement.
Although Defendant is, admittedly, still physically capable of working, he desires
to retire based upon his age and numerous health conditions. Accordingly, Defendant’s
income will be reduced, which the court considers a change in circumstances and
employment status, thus warranting modification pursuant to the Marital Settlement
Agreement. The court finds little merit to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s voluntary
retirement should be precluded from being considered a sufficient change in employment
status. In McFadden v. McFadden, 386 Pa. Super. 506, 563 A.2d 180 (1989), the
Superior Court held that voluntary and foreseeable changes do not prevent the paying
party from arguing that those changes constitute a substantial and continuing change in
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circumstances.
Furthermore, the McFadden court specifically found that the husband’s retirement was made in
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good faith, and therefore the wife was not allowed to automatically avoid review of the original
award simply because the original agreement did not expressly plan for retirement. Id. at 511,
563 A.2d at 183. Similarly, Defendant’s desire to retire is made in good faith in consideration of
his age and health conditions.
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Similarly, in the instant matter, while the Marital Settlement Agreement does not
expressly provide for modification based upon retirement, the court finds that the broad
scope of the Agreement’s permission for modification based on a change in employment
status includes voluntary retirement when the obligor seeks to retire at an appropriate
retirement age and for appropriate reasons. Accordingly, Defendant’s voluntary
retirement does constitute a substantial change in employment status, permitting
modification of the alimony amount.
Pension As Income for Purposes of Determining Amount of Alimony. Having
determined that the amount of alimony is modifiable and that Defendant’s voluntary
retirement is a sufficient change in employment status to allow modification of the
alimony award, this court must decide whether Defendant’s pension income shall be
treated as income for purposes of determining his alimony obligation.
Under Pennsylvania law, in determining alimony, the court must consider certain
relevant factors prescribed by statute. Section 3701 states:
Factors relevant
(b) .—In determining whether alimony is necessary and
in determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of
alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the
parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to,
medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
* * *
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(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
* * *
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
* * *
(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property,
including, but not limited to, property distributed under Chapter 35
(relating to property rights), to provide for the party’s reasonable
needs.
(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-support
through appropriate employment.
23 Pa. C.S. §3701(b).
Especially relevant in the matter sub judice are the parties’ sources of income,
specifically, Defendant’s retirement benefits. It is clear that a pension accrued during
marriage is generally treated as marital property subject to equitable distribution. Flynn v.
Flynn, 341 Pa. Super. 76, 491 A.2d 156 (1985); Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa. Super.
185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985). Furthermore, pension income received by a spouse may be
considered as a resource available for the payment of alimony. See e.g. McFadden v.
McFadden, 386 Pa. Super. 506, 563 A.2d 180 (1989); Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa.
Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985). Finally, the Divorce Code expressly provides that an
asset distributed in equitable distribution to a payee is to be considered in calculating an
alimony award. 23 Pa. C.S. §3701(b)(16).
Defendant argues that the pension he will receive from Tyco, based upon an asset
that had already been subjected to equitable distribution by way of the Marital Settlement
Agreement, should be excluded when calculating his income for purposes of determining
spousal support obligations. In this regard, Defendant maintains, that the court should
11
take direction from the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s holding in Miller v. Miller, 2001
PA Super 274, 783 A.2d 832.
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However, as conceded by counsel in argument, Miller is focused on a child
support issue. In addition, the facts of Miller and those of the instant case are otherwise
dissimilar. In Miller, the payee spouse sought to increase the payor spouse’s child support
obligations and treat a lump sum received by the paying spouse as a result of equitable
distribution as income. Id. at ¶5, 783 A.2d at 834. The Superior Court rejected the payee
spouse’s argument, reasoning that the lump sum petitioned for inclusion had been given
in equitable distribution, for which the payee spouse received a comparable benefit, and
that to include that money as income for child support purposes would afford the payee a
“double dip,” a result inconsistent with the goal of equitable distribution, namely,
economic justice. Id. at ¶12, 783 A.2d at 835-36. Accordingly, Miller is not controlling
and this court finds Defendant’s argument based on Miller inapplicable to the current
dispute.
Instead, Pennsylvania case law supports Plaintiff payee’s position in this case. See
McFadden v. McFadden, 386 Pa. Super. 506, 563 A.2d 180 (1989); Braderman v.
Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. 185, 488 A.2d 613 (1985). In Braderman, the Superior Court
set forth a convincing rationale for the conclusion that income from a pension must be
considered when fashioning an alimony award, even if the pension was previously
subjected to equitable distribution, stating that
N.T. 54.
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[a conclusion to the contrary] ignores the provisions of the Divorce Code
providing that in determining the alimony award, the court must consider
numerous factors including the sources of income and the property of both
parties. 23 P.S. 501(b)(3) [repealed, replaced by 23 Pa. C.S. §3701(b)(3)].
In determining the husband’s ability to pay support, the court must consider
his earning power and the nature and extent of his property. Commonwealth
ex rel. Buehler v. Buehler, 288 Pa. Super. 303, 431 A.2d 1059 (1981). Also,
in determining whether plaintiff-wife lacks sufficient property to provide
for her reasonable needs, the court must consider any property distributed
to the wife pursuant to the equitable distribution award. 23 P.S. 501(a)(1)
[repealed, replaced by 23 Pa. C.S. §3701(b)(16)]; Geyer v. Geyer, 310 Pa.
Super. 456, 456 A.2d 1025 (1983). As a result, defendant-husband will not
be unjustly burdened since his property as well as plaintiff-wife’s property
must be considered in calculating an alimony award.
Braderman, 339 Pa. Super. at 199-200, 488 A.2d at 620. Accordingly, Defendant’s Tyco
pension income should be considered when determining the modified alimony award,
even though the pension was subject to equitable distribution. Furthermore, the
$10,000.00 received during equitable distribution by Plaintiff in exchange for the Tyco
pension will also be considered.
Amount of alimony. The purpose of alimony is not to “reward one party and to
punish another, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable
to support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met.” Alimony “is
based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of living
established by the parties during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.”
Moreover, “[a]limony following a divorce is a secondary remedy and is available only
13
where economic justice and reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of
an equitable distribution award and development of an appropriate employable skill.”
Teodorski v. Teodorski, 2004 PA Super 313, ¶16, 857 A.2d 194, 200, citing Moran v.
Moran, 2003 PA Super 455, ¶¶11-12, 839 A.2d 1091, 1096-97 (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
Once it is determined that a party is entitled to receive alimony, the court must
look to factors provided in the statute to determine the appropriate amount to be awarded.
23 Pa. C.S. §3701. In determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment
of alimony, the court must consider all relevant factors, including those statutorily
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prescribed. Isralsky v. Isralsky, 2003 PA Super 162, ¶14, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (2003).
Instantly, the court notes that alimony is based on the reasonable needs in
accordance with parties’ standard of living established during marriage, and payor’s
ability to pay. Stamerro v. Stamerro, 2005 PA Super 424, ¶14 889 A.2d 1251, 1259.
Furthermore, the alimony statute must be applied in a non-mechanical manner so that a
reasonable and compassionate result may be reached in each case. Baker v. Baker, 2004
PA Super 413, ¶16, 861 A.2d 298, 303-04.
As to the relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties, the court finds
that, in the future, neither party will be employed to a substantial degree. Defendant seeks
to retire in light of his age and health, and Plaintiff has not secured full-time employment
since the divorce. Therefore, while each party has a capacity to earn an income, it is
The pertinent statutorily-prescribed factors are recited supra, page 8, and will not be restated in
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this section.
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unlikely either party will do so in the upcoming years. The parties are both in their
middle-sixties, and both testified that they suffer from physical ailments. According to
her expense report, Plaintiff spends roughly $100.00 per month on medication and must
pay $90.00 per doctor visit. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that she is on Medicare and
that her heart condition may require surgery in the future. Defendant suffers from
numerous continuing health conditions, and, according to his expense report, spends
$85.00 per month on medication, $260.00 per month on medical expenses, and $275.00
per month on health insurance. With regard to sources of income of both parties, Plaintiff
testified that her only income other than alimony is $878.00 per month she receives in
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Social Security. Defendant expects to receive $2,380.00 from Social Security and
roughly $1,482.17 in aggregate monthly income derived from his three pensions. Plaintiff
has a $869.72 per month mortgage payment, compared to Defendant’s monthly $676.00
mortgage obligation, as combined with his home owners insurance. Plaintiff has a
$560.00 monthly car payment on her 2007 Ford Mustang.
Considering the relative needs of the parties, Plaintiff seems to be living beyond
her means. According to her expense report, Plaintiff has an average monthly expense of
roughly $3,800.00, with a guaranteed income, including the current amount of alimony
received, of $1,878.00. Defendant has an average expense of $3,416.45, including the
amount of alimony he currently pays. The $10,000.00 that Plaintiff received from the
Marital Settlement Agreement is also a factor considered, as it is property distributed
Plaintiff testified that her “on-call” employment yielded $1,028.00 for 2009 and she received
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some support from two individuals who cohabitated with her for a certain time, neither of whom
15
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under Chapter 35, relating to martial property rights. Lastly, although not having
obtained full-time employment, as the party seeking alimony, Plaintiff is not totally
“incapable” of self-support, although her current employment situation does not allow her
to independently satisfy her expenses.
Based on the income and expense estimations presented to the court by the parties,
and their assets and debts, this court finds a reduction in Defendant’s alimony obligation,
to the amount of $315.00 every two weeks appropriate, upon consideration of the
lifestyles the parties were accustomed of living during the marriage, the lifestyle the
parties have been enjoying since the divorce, the physical and health concerns of each
party, the income of both parties, the needs of each party, and each parties’ ability for
self-support.
For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 30 day of June, 2010, upon consideration of Defendant’s
Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, following a hearing held on May 6, 2010, and
for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant’s Petition is granted to the
extent that the amount of his alimony obligation will be reduced to Three Hundred and
Fifteen Dollars bi-weekly. This modification in amount shall be effective upon
Defendant’s retirement from Tyco Electronics International, Inc.
were staying with her at the time of this petition.
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BY THE COURT,
s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Sean M. Shultz, Esq.
Law Office of Sean M. Shultz, P.C.
4 Irvine Row
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
John W. Carter, Esq.
Knight and Associates, P.C.
11 Roadway Drive, Suite B
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Charles A. Rector, Esq.
Law Office of Charles A. Rector, Esquire, P.C.
1104 Fernwood Avenue, Suite 203
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
Theresa Barrett Male, Esq.
Law Office of Theresa Barrett Male
513 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
Act of Dec. 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, §2, as amended 23 Pa. C.S. §3501 et seq. The $10,000.00
53
distributed to Plaintiff as per the Marital Settlement Agreement is presumed to have been
marital property, and thus, included under Section 35 of Title 23. See 23 Pa. C.S. §3501(b).
17
JEANNETTE M. COLLEGE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION—LAW
:
GLEN E. COLLEGE, :
Defendant : NO. 02-907 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PETITION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
BEFORE OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 30 day of June, 2010, upon consideration of Defendant’s
Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement, following a hearing held on May 6, 2010, and
for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant’s Petition is granted to the
extent that the amount of his alimony obligation will be reduced to Three Hundred and
Fifteen Dollars bi-weekly. This modification in amount shall be effective upon
Defendant’s retirement from Tyco Electronics International, Inc.
BY THE COURT,
_________________
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Sean M. Shultz, Esq.
Law Office of Sean M. Shultz, P.C.
4 Irvine Row
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
1
John W. Carter, Esq.
Knight and Associates, P.C.
11 Roadway Drive, Suite B
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Charles A. Rector, Esq.
Law Office of Charles A. Rector, Esquire, P.C.
1104 Fernwood Avenue, Suite 203
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
Theresa Barrett Male, Esq.
Law Office of Theresa Barrett Male
513 North Second Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner