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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2003-1175 Civil LESTERR. GRIEST IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE NO. 2003-1175 CIVIL TERM UNIVERSITY, DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFEK P.L OLEK GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The instant action was brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).l Plaintiff alleges that he was dismissed from employment because of his age. Currently before us is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we will grant the motion. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in while or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report. In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ertel v. Patriot News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038 (1966). Summary judgment may only be granted in cases that are clear and free from doubt. JR. Ex Rei. Hoffman v. Pellak, 764 A.2d 64 (Pa.Super. 2000). 143 P.S. ~ 951 et seq. NO. 2003 - 1175 CIVIL In the instant case the material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff had been employed by defendant's predecessor, the Dickinson School of Law, as Director of the Plants and Grounds Department. He was asked to resign his position shortly before the employer's merger with the Pennsylvania State University. His resignation was effective June 30, 1997. However, pursuant to a "Separation Agreement and General Release" Plaintiff was placed on "administrative leave" with full salary in May and June. Furthermore, the agreement called for him to receive an additional lump sum payment equal to four months of his salary on June 30, 1997. Paragraph 8 of the Agreement contained the following language. As a material inducement to Dickinson to enter into this Agreement, Employee hereby irrevocably and unconditionally releases, acquits and forever discharges Dickinson and each of Dickinson's. . . successors, assigns, . . . or any of them, from any and all charges, complaints, claims, liabilities, obligations, . . . of any nature whatsoever, excepting only those rights granted to Employee under this Agreement, which Employee may have against Dickinson, including, but not limited to, any and all claims under. . . the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, It is clear from the above language that the current action is barred by the terms of the Agreement. Plaintiff does not allege that the release was ambiguous or that it was procured by fraud, duress or mutual mistake.2 Rather, he contends that it is void as against public policy because it does not comply with the requirements of the Older Worker's Benefits Protections Act. (OWBPA)3 He relies upon the decision rendered in his case by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). Holding the release to be against public policy, the PHRC stated: 2 "The effect of a release is determined by the ordinary meaning of the language contained therein. A release not procured by fraud, duress, or mutual mistake is binding between the parties." Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979,986 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citations omitted). 329 U.S.C. ~ 626 (b). 2 NO. 2003 - 1175 CIVIL Under Pennsylvania law, a release agreement which is contrary to public policy is void. Shades v. Beal, 685 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1982). We consider the policy behind the congressional enactment of the OWBP A to be sound and wholly consistent with the public good, and therefore hold that the failure of the present release to comply with OWBP A provisions renders that agreement void as against public policy with respect to the present PHRC claim. 4 There are no Pennsylvania cases which have addressed the issue before us. However, the Third Circuit has clearly held that the failure to comply with the technical release requirements of the OWBP A only voids the release as to claims made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).5 See Long v. Sears and Roebuck, 105 F 3d 1529 (3d Circuit 1997) and Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F 3d 281 (3d Circuit 2003). In Wastak the Court specifically discussed the statutory policy behind the enactment of the OBW A and concluded that it did not apply to a release which only waived the "right to bring a lawsuit." 342 F3d at 293. The Wastak Court went on to say: the statutory provisions of the OWBP A apply only to ADEA claims, and thus, the effect of the Release with regard to the state PHRA claims is "determined by the ordinary meaning of the language contained therein." Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 986 (1997). 342 F2d at 295. Prior to the enactment of the OWBP A common law contract principles were applied to determine the validity of releases involving federal age discrimination claims. See Long and Wastak, supra. The OWBP A supplanted the common law. As the Long Court stated: . . . Congress, after grappling with the question of whether to permit ADEA waivers at all, stated unequivocally that unless the enumerated requirements are met, an individual "may not waive" ADEA rights. 29 U.S.C. S 626(f)(1) (emphasis added). 4 See Exhibit A to "Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's New Matter, Answer to Counterclaim and New Matter to Defendant's Counterclaim." 529 U.S.C. ~ 621 et seq. 3 NO. 2003 - 1175 CIVIL 105 F 3d at 1539. The instant cause of action was created by the Pennsylvania Legislature with the passage of the PHRA. We can see no reason why the failure to comply with the technical requirements of the OWBP A should void the release of claims in this case. Since the cause of action was created by the Pennsylvania Legislature it is the prerogative of that body, not Congress or the Courts, to limit or abolish the ability to waive the claims created by it. Absent any legislative indication to the contrary, we are of the opinion that the common law should apply. Applying the common law principles enunciated in Strickland, supra, defendant's right to relief is clear and free from doubt. The plaintiff received adequate consideration i.e. six months of his salary. There are no allegations of fraud, duress (financial or otherwise), or mutual mistake. The language of the contract is clear. Defendant "irrevocably and unconditionally" released defendant from "any and all claims" under "the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." Therefore, we will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 7TH day of JUNE, 2005, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. By the Court, Isl Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, 1. Thomas R. Davies, Esquire Paul 1. Dellasega, Esquire Crystal H. Williamson, Esquire 4