HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-2996
IN RE: : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
KEVIN JACOBS, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Petitioner :
: NO. 2004 – 2996 CIVIL TERM
:
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925
Guido, J., April , 2010
Petitioner sought to have us vacate his involuntary civil commitment under
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Sections 302 and 303 of the Mental Health Procedures Act. We conducted an
evidentiary hearing on July 29, 2009. Thereafter we gave the parties an opportunity to
file briefs in support of their respective positions. By order dated November 9, 2009 we
denied the requested relief. Petitioner thereafter filed this timely appeal.
On appeal petitioner alleges that we erred in failing to expunge the record of his
involuntary civil commitment. Specifically he contends that 1) his involuntary
commitment was unlawful in that there was not sufficient evidence to prove he was a
“clear and present danger” to others, and 2) the involuntary treatment order violated his
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“right to due process mandated by 50 Pa. C.S.A. § 7102.”
Factual Background.
On June 24, 2004 petitioner’s mother completed a request for an involuntary
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emergency examination and treatment under Section 302 of the MHPA. She alleged that
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50 P.S. § 7302; 7303.
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See “Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.” The statement also alleged that we erred in
denying his petition to expunge and that the evidence violated the “prescriptions of § 702 of the Mental
Health Procedures Act.” However, without the specifics we are unable to address the former allegation.
Further, since there is no § 702 of the Act we cannot address the latter.
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See Petitioner’s Exhibit 1.
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her son posed a clear and present danger to others. In support of her request his mother
recounted the following behavior:
Today my son awoke and was very angry. He was yelling and cursing and
threatening me and my husband all day. At one point today he placed his belt
around my neck and threatened to strangle me. I sometimes feel as though we
[sic] being held hostage in my [sic] own home. He follows me from room to
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room yelling.
Based upon the above allegations the county administrator issued a warrant to
have petitioner transported to Holy Spirit Hospital to be examined and, if necessary,
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admitted for treatment. He was informed of his rights under the MHPA and appeared to
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understand them. Petitioner was examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Petkash, who
diagnosed him with depressive disorder. Dr. Petkash also determined that he was in need
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of inpatient treatment. Petitioner was admitted to Holy Spirit Hospital for psychiatric
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care at 11:04 a.m. on June 25, 2004.
On June 28, 2004 petitioner’s medical team requested certification for additional
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involuntary treatment under Section 303 of the MPHA. His treating psychiatrist Dr.
Dela Cruz indicated that petitioner “continues to be severely mentally disabled and in
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need of treatment.” Dr. Petkash opined that additional counseling, antidepressant
medication and therapeutic programs were needed. On June 29, 2004 a hearing was
conducted before a Mental Health Review Officer. Petitioner was represented by counsel
at that hearing. Based upon the recommendations of Dr. Dela Cruz the petitioner was
found to be severely mentally disabled and ordered to participate in 2 additional days of
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, p. 2.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, p. 3.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, p. 5.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, p. 5.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, p. 7 and Commonwealth Exhibit 1, p. 1.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, p. 2.
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50 P.S. § 7303.
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Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, p. 3.
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inpatient treatment followed by 18 days in the partial hospitalization program. His
discharge summary indicated a diagnosis of depressive disorder, NOS and impulse
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disorder, NOS. It also listed his condition as “well improved.”
Sufficient Evidence of Clear and Present Danger.
In determining if someone may be involuntarily committed for mental health
treatment the MPHA provides in relevant part as follows:
§7301. Persons who may be subject to involuntary emergency examination
and treatment
(a)Persons Subject.
– Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in
need of immediate treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary
emergency examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally
disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-
control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social
relations . . . is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to
others or to himself.
(b)Determination of Clear and Present Danger.
– (1) Clear and present danger
to others shall be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days the
person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and
that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.
50 P.S. § 7301 (a) (b).
An involuntary commitment under Section 302 is justified if “there are reasonable
grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate
treatment.” 50 P.S. § 7302. See In re: Hancock, 719 A.2d.1053, 1055 (Pa. Super. 1998).
In the instant case we were satisfied that the allegations contained in the petition as well
as the findings and recommendations of Dr. Petkash sustained that burden.
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Commonwealth Exhibit 1, p. 1.
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Commonwealth Exhibit 1, p. 4.
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NO. 2004 – 2996 CIVIL TERM
Clear and convincing evidence that a person is severely mentally disabled is
needed for an extension of the involuntary commitment and treatment beyond 120 hours.
50 P.S. § 7303, In re: Hancock, supra. In making this determination the mental health
review officer could properly consider the prior allegations and examinations. (50 P.S.
§ 7303), In re: R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. 1999). The findings and recommendations
of Dr. Dela Cruz coupled with mother’s allegations, as well as Dr. Petkash’s findings and
recommendations sustained that burden.
Due Process.
Petitioner alleges a violation of the due process mandated by Section 102 of the
MPHA because he was not offered the option of voluntary treatment. The relevant
portion of that section provides:
It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to seek to assure the
availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill, and it is the
purpose of this act to establish procedures whereby this policy can be affected.
The provisions of this act shall be interpreted in conformity with the
principles of due process to make voluntary and involuntary treatment
available where the need is great and its absence could result in serious harm
to the mentally ill person or to others.
Treatment on a voluntary basis shall be
preferred to involuntary treatment;
(Emphasis added). 50 P.S. § 7102.
The overarching policy of the MPHA is to assure treatment of the mentally ill.
Petitioner did not cite nor could we find any authority for the proposition that due process
requires voluntary treatment to be offered to the patient prior to an involuntary
commitment. Involuntary examination and treatment cannot occur without a finding that
a person is “severely mentally disabled” and that “he poses a clear and present danger of
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NO. 2004 – 2996 CIVIL TERM
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harm to others or to himself.” The MHPA incorporates detailed due process safeguards
at each stage of the involuntary examination and treatment procedure. See 50 P.S.
§ 7301 - § 7304. There is no specific requirement that voluntary treatment be offered as a
part of those due process protections. We were not prepared to add such a requirement.
As the superior Court has stated:
“due process protections additional to those provided by the Act should not be
applied so long as reasonable due process safeguards, appropriate to the treatment
needs of the patient, are provided by the statute itself.”
In re: R.D., 739 A.2d 548 at 556.
Furthermore, in the instant case we were satisfied that petitioner would not have
agreed to voluntary treatment even if it had been offered. The Holy Spirit Hospital
records indicate that “The patient verbalized to the staff that he did not want to be here
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when seen in the Emergency Room.” Even more compelling is the fact that he refused
to sign the “Consent to Medical Treatment” when given the opportunity at 9:15 a.m. on
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June 25, 2004, prior to being involuntarily admitted.
________________ ________________
DATE Edward E. Guido, J.
Galen R. Waltz, Esquire
John Herman, Esquire
David W. Deluce, Esquire
Robert O’Brien, Esquire
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50 P.S. § 7301. If those circumstances are met, as they were in this case, involuntary treatment is
appropriate. This is especially true in light of the fact that voluntary treatment may be terminated by the
patient at any time.
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Commonwealth Exhibit 1, p. 2.
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Commonwealth Exhibit 1.
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