HomeMy WebLinkAbout302 S 2010
CRYSTAL M. WEYANT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
:
DAVID H. WEYANT, : PACSES NO. 752111625
Defendant : NO. 302 SUPPORT 2010
IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER’S REPORT
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J., October 27, 2010.
In this domestic relations case regarding the issue of whether a post-nuptial marital
settlement agreement is enforceable to the extent that Plaintiff (wife) has waived her
entitlement to spousal support from Defendant (husband) by virtue of the agreement,
Plaintiff has filed exceptions to the Support Master’s report on the issue of spousal
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support. Following a hearing held on July 13, 2010 by Michael R. Rundle, Esq.,
Cumberland County Support Master, the master issued a report recommending that
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Plaintiff’s claim for spousal support be denied and her complaint be dismissed. An
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interim order in accordance with the recommendation was thereafter entered.
For disposition at this time are exceptions to the support master’s report, filed by
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Plaintiff. The exceptions read as follows:
Wife’s Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, filed August 11, 2010.
1
See Notes of Testimony, Support Master’s hearing, July 13, 2010 (hereinafter N.T. _____); Support
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Master’s Report and Recommendation, filed August 11, 2010.
Interim Order of Court, dated August 11, 2010 (Guido, J.).
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Wife’s Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, filed August 11, 2010.
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1. The Support Master’s finding that Wife was not under duress when she
executed the purported Agreement was in error.
2. The Support Master erred in his finding that Wife could have consulted
with counsel prior the executing [of] the purported Agreement.
3. The Support Master’s finding that Husband met the mandatory full and
fair disclosure required for an effective marital agreement was in error.
4. The Support Master’s failure to address the lack of consideration and
other deficiencies of a valid contractual agreement was in error.
5
5. The Support Master’s finding that a valid agreement exists was in error.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, Plaintiff’s Exceptions to Support Master’s
Report and Recommendations will be dismissed and the interim order of court issued in
accordance with the master’s recommendation will be entered as a final order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Crystal M. Weyant, is an adult individual residing in Mechanicsburg,
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Pennsylvania. Defendant, David H. Weyant, is an adult individual residing in Camp Hill,
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Pennsylvania. As of the hearing, Plaintiff and Defendant were sixty years old and fifty-
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seven years old, respectively. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on October 26,
910
1992 and separated in December of 2006.
Wife’s Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, filed August 11, 2010.
5
N.T. 28.
6
N.T. 77.
7
N.T. 28, 77.
8
N.T. 28.
9
Complaint for Support, filed April 27, 2010; N.T. 28, 72. Plaintiff testified that, as of the time of the
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hearing, Defendant had filed for a divorce, but that she had not received the divorce documents.
N.T. 28.
2
On April 27, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint for spousal support against
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Defendant. A hearing before the Cumberland County Support Master on the complaint,
at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the person of Linda A. Clotfelter, Esq.
and Defendant was represented by counsel in the person of Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esq.,
was held on July 13, 2010. The evidence at the hearing pertinent to the exceptions of
Plaintiff may be summarized as follows:
During their marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant resided together in the marital
12
home, which was located on Mountain Road in Summerdale, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff
was the legal owner of the Mountain Road property, as the property was titled solely in
1314
her name. After the parties separated in December of 2006, they periodically resided
1516
together in the Mountain Road property until March of 2010. In September 2009,
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Plaintiff listed the Mountain Road property for sale with RE/MAX; the property was
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eventually sold in March 2010. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff purchased and moved into a
property located on Easterly Drive, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania with the proceeds she
Complaint for Support, filed April 27, 2010.
11
N.T. 28, 72-74, 76
12
N.T. 15, 47-49. Plaintiff received the Mountain Road property as a result of a previous divorce.
13
When she acquired the property, there was an existing mortgage which was paid off during the
parties’ marriage. N.T. 49. Defendant testified that, during the course of the marriage, he caused
the value of the property to increase. N.T. 108.
Complaint for Support, filed April 27, 2010; N.T. 28.
14
See N.T. 76-80.
15
N.T. 63, 78.
16
See Defendant’s Exhibit 5, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010; N.T. 84.
17
N.T. 85.
18
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19
received from the sale of the Mountain Road property. Defendant moved into a
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residence on East Crestwood Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania with his girlfriend.
The events concerning the instant dispute arose prior to the sale of the Mountain
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Road property. Plaintiff testified that she thought Defendant had to sign certain
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documents in order to convey clear title. Defendant testified that he originally refused to
sign the documents presented by Plaintiff, as he did not want to sell the Mountain Road
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property. Defendant further testified:
A: I did not want to sell the house. And if [Plaintiff] wanted the divorce bad
enough, if you really want the divorce, and you don’t want to be around
N.T. 60.
19
N.T. 77-79.
20
See N.T. 46, 82.
21
N.T. 49-51. Seth Pomeroy, II, an employee of RE/MAX realtors and the individual who notarized
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the documents at the September 19, 2009 settlement on the property, testified that a spousal
waiver, such as the one signed by Defendant, was needed when one spouse makes a purchase
while a “divorce or something of that nature” is pending because “the title companies need to see
where the money is coming from, from just one spouse and that way it is not coming from the
other spouse.” N.T. 20. Mr. Pomeroy further testified that, without the Spousal Waiver and Seller’s
Proceeds Distribution Request and Waiver of Liability, Plaintiff would have gotten all proceeds
from the sale of the Mountain Road property:
Q: Absent specific instructions in this form like the one you prepared, who would get
the [proceeds from the sale of property] – the titled owner?
A: The titled owner would get the proceeds if there was no form like that.
* * *
Q: And Mr. Weyant was not a titled owner of One Mountain?
A: I believe that again it was just Crystal on the deed.
N.T. 19.
Mr. Pomeroy further testified that, “if there is going to be a split in proceeds, we have to
have a letter from either an attorney or a notarized statement where all parties agree.” N.T. 21. Mr.
Pomeroy also testified that, “[i]f spouses do not agree, then . . . we need some sort of document.”
N.T. 22.
N.T. 83-84.
23
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me, just, you know, give me $25,000.00 out of the house and let me go
my way and then you go your way.
Q: And what did [Plaintiff] say to that?
A: . . . [Plaintiff] said she wanted spousal support, and this and that. Then
she kept saying, you are not getting $25,000.00. And I would say, I feel
that I am entitled to it because we lived together for – I forget what – 18
or 19 years of marriage – and I just felt that I deserved $25,000.00 at
24
least.
* * *
Q: What were your reasons for telling her you deserved . . . $25,000.00?
A: I felt being we were married and I lived there, and we were together.
And I helped pay the house off. I helped pay the taxes. I helped pay the
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upkeep of the house and of everything that we did.
Plaintiff testified that her real estate agent informed her that there was a contract on the
26
Mountain Road property. Plaintiff testified that she relayed this information to
27
Defendant, and instructed him that they needed to sign the papers. Defendant testified
that, two days prior to the September 19, 2009 settlement, he presented Plaintiff with an
28
agreement that he had drafted. Defendant further testified that Plaintiff rejected his offer
and refused to sign this agreement which he initially proposed:
Q: Was there a prior agreement that was prepared for your wife’s
signature?
A: There was. The first one I wanted $30,000.00, and she did not like the
$30,000.00 deal, so she balled it up while I was in my room, the
N.T. 84.
24
N.T. 86.
25
N.T. 46.
26
See N.T. 46.
27
See N.T. 46, 82-83.
28
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computer room, and she came in, and she threw the paper at me, and she
says, I don’t agree to this.
Q: When did you give her the one that said you wanted $30,000.00?
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A: Two days prior to settlement.
On the following day, Defendant presented Plaintiff with a self-drafted marital settlement
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agreement. This document provided:
Crystal M. Weyant and David H. Weyant:
Do here by swear to the terms of this agreement and that under No
Circumstances are conditions of this agreement to be changed or contested
any time in the future.And as witnessed this is a legal and binding
document.
Terms are as Follows: Upon the sale of the property address at 1 Mountain
Rd Summerdale ,Pa 17093 David shall receive a separate check from the
sale of the property in the amount of $25,000.00. All remaining money
from the sale of the property goes to Crystal. Any debits made from this
day on will be the sole responsibility of the party who makes them. Both
agree that David will supply medical insurance for Crystal until Jan.1,
2010. And will not be responsible to provide medical insurance to Crystal
at any time after that date. Both agree to a no fault divorce which will be
paid for by Crystal. There will be no spousal support ordered or expected
from David in any amount to Crystal at any time , nor Is she entitled to and
signs off for any retirement money on Davids behalf from ConAgra Foods
N.T. 82-83. The facts of exactly when the papers were drawn up were disputed by the parties at
29
the hearing. Plaintiff testified:
“The very night before we signed those papers he brought a copy of this to me and
said, I am not signing to sell this house until you sign this. And I crumbled it up and
threw it out. And I said I am not signing this. And so when we went that morning to
sign the papers, he brought another one there and said, you have to sign this or I am
not selling the house. I am not signing to sell the house. And because I wanted to sell
the house and leave, what was going on in our household, I signed it.”
N.T. 46.
Plaintiff further testified that Defendant had not presented to her a document prior to the
document that was signed on September 19, 2009. N.T. 64.
N.T. 87; Defendant’s Exhibit 3, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010. The document was drafted
30
with the help of Defendant’s girlfriend.
6
or Homestat Farms. David will take and keep possession of his 1999 Ford
F150, All Guns, Tools,2005 Polaris Snowmobile,Pontoon Boat ,Jet Ski and
his share of Glen Lyon Camp. Crystal will keep her Sebring
Convertible,All major household appliances and housewares. They will
both split the home furnishings as agreed upon equally. And they will split
all existing money in any savings accounts to this date equally. We both
agree to all terms stated above. And by signing this document we are fully
aware of the stipulations and understand this can not be altered or changed
in anyway at any time. We are both signing of our free will and have not
been forced to or threateded to in anyway.We are both of sound mind and
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body.
32
Plaintiff testified that she initially refused to sign the document when presented,
33
and did not present the agreement to an attorney to review. On September 19, 2009,
Plaintiff and Defendant met at the RE/MAX settlement office for the purpose of signing
various documents in anticipation of signing a contract to sell the Mountain Road
34
property. While at the realtor’s office, Plaintiff and Defendant signed the marital
settlement agreement, which as noted above stated in part, “There will be no spousal
35
support ordered or expected from David in any amount to Crystal at any time.” The
36
parties’ signing of the document was witnessed and notarized. Defendant testified that,
37
before the parties signed the document, the notary read it aloud as drafted. Plaintiff
testified that she signed the document “because [she] wanted to sell the house and
Defendant’s Exhibit 3, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
31
N.T. 51
32
See N.T. 51-52.
33
N.T. 24-26, 89.
34
Defendant’s Exhibit 3, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
35
Defendant’s Exhibit 3, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010; See N.T. 8-9.
36
N.T. 89. During his deposition, the notary was unable to recall whether he read the document
37
aloud. N.T. 9.
7
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leave.” She further testified that she signed the document even though “[she] didn't
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think it was legal” and that “[she] didn't think it would hold up.” On cross-examination,
Plaintiff testified that she signed the document because she had already moved her
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furniture into her new residence. Plaintiff testified that, at the time she signed the
document, she felt that she had no other options, because she needed the Mountain Road
property to be sold before she would be able to buy the Easterly Drive property, and the
41
settlement had to go through that day. Mr. Pomeroy testified that, after he had notarized
the Marital Settlement Agreement, he suggested that the parties have a document
prepared outlining the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the Mountain Road
4243
property. He further testified that, as a result of his suggestion, the parties signed a
N.T 46.
38
N.T. 46. As noted above, the document clearly says that the agreement is to be “legal and binding.”
39
See Defendant’s Exhibit 3, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
N.T. 54, 62. On cross examination, Plaintiff testified:
40
Q: So in order to get into the house that you wanted, you weren’t willing to wait until
you could work things out with David. You had to move into Easterly?
A: Because my furniture was there. I had nowhere to go. I did not have a home. My
home was sold.
Q: And your home was on the market since, what, spring of ’09?
A: No. It was on the market a year and a half
* * *
Q: So you had a year and a half to work out all the details so you could sell [the
Mountain Road property], buy another house, and get into it, right?
A: We didn't talk about any of it
Q: But you had a year and a half to do that, didn't you?
A: Yes.
N.T. 62-63.
See N.T 54-55.
41
N.T. 10, 21.
42
8
44
“Seller’s Proceeds Distribution Request,” which was prepared by RE/MAX realtors’
45
office, which both parties signed and which Mr. Pomeroy notarized. The document
directed RE/MAX to pay Defendant $25,000.00, whereby Plaintiff would receive the
46
remaining proceeds.
Defendant testified that, after Plaintiff signed the separation agreement, he signed
47
the Spousal Waiver, which provided, in part:
David H. Weyant waives any and all rights to any money from the sale of
Crystal Weyant’s [Mountain Road Property] over and above the
48
$25,000.00 he is receiving. It is specifically understood by [Defendant]
that, by execution of this Waiver, (he/she) cannot claim any rights in and to
said property as “marital property” under any actions for “equitable
49
distribution” under present law.
Seth Pomeroy, II, an employee in the Settlement Department at RE/MAX realtors,
50
testified that he notarized the agreements. Mr. Pomeroy testified that, at the time he
N.T. 10.
43
Defendant’s Exhibit 1, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
44
N.T. 10-11, 90.
45
Defendant’s Exhibit 1, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010; See N.T. 10, 27.
46
Defendant’s Exhibit 2, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
47
Defendant’s Exhibit 2, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010. The document was modified by hand
48
from $25,000.00 to $10,000.00 on March 8, 2010, the day of settlement of the properties located
on One Mountain Road and Easterly Drive. Mr. Pomeroy, an employee of Plaintiff’s real estate
agent and the individual who notarized the documents, testified that “throughout the course of the
transaction…there just wasn’t enough proceeds as people were expecting. So I was asked to change
the document from $25,000.00 to $10,000.00.” N.T. 6, 13. Plaintiff testified that she had to show a
profit of $15,000.00 in order for her to buy the Mechanicsburg property in which she currently
lives. Plaintiff testified that, although the Spousal Waiver and Seller’s Proceeds Distribution
Request and Waiver of Liability indicate that Defendant was to receive $10,000.00 from the sale of
the Mountain Road property, Plaintiff subsequently wrote Defendant a check for $15,000.00. N.T
54.
Defendant’s Exhibit 2, admitted at hearing, July 13, 2010.
49
N.T. 7.
50
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notarized the agreements, there was neither discussion nor argument between the parties
with regard to any of the terms contained in the marital settlement agreement, nor did he
51
observe duress. Although the agreements were signed on September 19, 2009, the sale
52
of the Mountain Road property did not take place in September of 2009, but rather in
53
March of 2010.
During the hearing, Plaintiff and Defendant testified as to their involvement in the
joint finances. Plaintiff testified that she was not aware of Defendant’s finances.
However, at the hearing, Plaintiff admitted that she had set up Defendant’s bank
54
accounts, and had set up direct deposit for the checks he received from various sources.
Plaintiff testified that she would receive bank statements and direct deposit papers, which
were sent to the Mountain Road property, even during the period where Defendant no
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longer resided in the home. Plaintiff further testified that she would open the statements
and notices, and would call Defendant and tell him how much money he had made and
56
how much money had gone into the account. Defendant would then use the money as
57
he desired.
N.T. 9.
51
N.T. 26.
52
See N.T. 24, 53-55, 85
53
N.T. 67.
54
N.T. 67, 82.
55
See N.T. 67.
56
N.T. 68.
57
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Plaintiff also admitted that she had a joint account with Defendant. Plaintiff
testified that both her payroll check and Defendant’s payroll check would be deposited
into the joint checking account, money from which Plaintiff used to pay household
59
bills. Plaintiff was also aware of a retirement benefit Defendant was receiving from a
company called Conagra, as the monthly check would be directly deposited into the joint
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checking account. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that statements relating to another
retirement fund of Defendant had been coming to the Mountain Road property
61
throughout the parties’ marriage, and Plaintiff placed all information regarding this
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retirement fund into a filing cabinet. Because Defendant’s checks, direct deposit
receipts, and retirement benefits were sent to the Mountain Road address, Plaintiff was
aware of, and had access to, all of Defendant’s financial statements and affairs before and
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after the parties’ separation in December of 2006.
DISCUSSION
Statement of law. The standard of review of a support master’s report and
recommendation is well settled. Although the report “is to be given the fullest
consideration, especially with regard to the credibility of witnesses,” the findings and
conclusions are advisory rather than binding. Goodman v. Goodman, 375 Pa. Super. 504,
See N.T. 68.
58
N.T. 68. Plaintiff was also the recipient of the monthly bank statement for the joint account.
59
See N.T. 68-69.
60
N.T. 69.
61
N.T. 82.
62
See N.T. 67-70, 80-83.
63
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507, 544 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1988); see Pa. R.C.P. 1910.12 (d), (f), (g); Ewing v. Ewing,
2004 PA Super 46, ¶13, 843 A.2d 1282, 1286; see also McCurdy v. McCurdy, No. 02-
0097 Support (slip op.) (Cumberland Co. 2002) (Hess, J.). The reviewing court therefore
has a duty to make a complete and independent review of all evidence, including an
analysis of the weight and credibility to be given to the testimony of the witnesses. See
Rothrock v. Rothrock, 2000 PA Super 412, 765 A.2d 400, Goodman v. Goodman, 375 Pa.
Super. 504, 544 A.2d 1033 (1988); Gomez v. Gomez, 11 Phila. Co. 221, 226-27 (1984).
Support generally. Generally, a dependent spouse is entitled to an award of
spousal support until it is proven that the conduct of the dependent spouse constitutes
grounds for a fault divorce. Crawford v. Crawford, 429 Pa. Super. 540, 549 633 A.2d
155, 159 (1993); Roach v. Roach, 337 Pa. Super. 440, 443, 487 A.2d 27, 28 (1985).
However, entitlement to spousal support may be waived through the execution of a
written agreement to do so. See Stamerro v. Stamerro, 2005 PA Super 424, 889 A.2d
1251. It is well-settled law in Pennsylvania that a husband and wife are free to determine
their property rights and spousal support obligations by agreement. See 23 Pa. C.S.
§3105. Moreover, one of the well-established principles regarding marital settlement
agreements and their modification is that a marital settlement agreement between a
husband and wife will be enforced by the courts in accordance with the same rules of law
applicable to contract interpretation. See Sorace v. Sorace, 440 Pa. Super. 75, 655 A.2d
125 (1995); see also Gocek v. Gocek, 417 Pa. Super 406, 409, 612 A.2d 1004, 1006
(1992) (property settlement agreements are similarly enforced in accordance with rules
applicable to contract interpretation).
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A private marital settlement agreement between spouses is governed by the law of
contracts, unless the agreement provides otherwise. Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 2007 PA
Super 197, ¶13, 928 A.2d 333, 339. Under Pennsylvania law, the standard for assessing
prenuptial agreements applies equally to post-nuptial agreements both of which are
enforced pursuant to the well-settled principles of contract law. 23 Pa. C.S. §3501; See
Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 672, 819, A.2d 529, 533, n. 5 (2003); Simeone v. Simeone,
525 Pa. 392, 399, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (1990), Paroly v. Paroly, 2005 PA Super 218, 876
A.2d 1061; In re O’Brien, 2006 PA Super 93, ¶15, 898 A.2d 1075, 1080. The paramount
goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent. Bianchi
v. Bianchi, 2004 PA Super 373, ¶11, 859 A.2d 511, 515. Where the words of a contract
are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the express
language of the agreement itself. Id.
In Pennsylvania, marital settlement agreements are presumed to be valid and
binding upon the parties. McGannon v. McGannon, 241 Pa. Super. 45, 48, 359 A.2d 431,
433 (1976). Generally, absent evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or duress, the parties
to a marital settlement agreement should be bound by the terms of their agreement. Sabad
v. Fessenden, 2003 PA Super 202, ¶10, 825 A.2d 682, 688; see also McMahon v.
McMahon, 417 Pa. Super 592, 599, 612 A.2d 1360, 1363 (1992). Moreover, they are
bound “without regard to whether the terms were read and fully understood and
irrespective of whether the agreements embodied reasonable or good bargains. Sabad v.
Fessenden, 2003 PA Super at ¶10, 825 A.2d at 688. Thus, a court may construe or
interpret a property settlement agreement as it would a contract, but it has neither the
13
power nor the authority to modify the agreement unless there is conclusive proof of an
invalidating circumstances, such as fraud, mistake or duress. See Bianchi v. Bianchi,
2004 PA Super 373, ¶11, 859 A.2d 511, 515.
Duress and opportunity to seek counsel. In her exceptions to the Support Master’s
Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff first argues that the Marital Settlement Agreement
signed on September 19, 2009 should be invalidated on the ground of duress. In
Pennsylvania, duress has been defined as “that degree of restraint or danger, either
actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient in severity or
apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.” Adams v. Adams,
2004 PA Super 130, ¶9, 848 A.2d 991, 993; Rzicznek v. Rzicznek, 80 Pa. D. & C. 4th 146,
152, 2006 WL 4410718 (C.C.P Lawrence Cnty.).
The record is clear that there was neither force nor threat of force used to induce
Plaintiff to sign the post-nuptial marital settlement agreement in this case. Plaintiff signed
the agreement because she was told that, without the agreement, Defendant would refuse
to sign the spousal waiver that Plaintiff thought was required for a valid sale of the
Mountain Road property. Plaintiff testified that she felt compelled to sign the agreement
because she wanted to sell the property and move into another house. She further testified
that she needed to reflect a certain sum of profit from the sale of the property in order for
her to be approved for a mortgage on the property to which she was moving. While
Defendant exercised his bargaining power to induce Plaintiff to sign the settlement
agreement, this court does not find evidence that Plaintiff signed the agreement under
14
duress. Plaintiff made a knowing and voluntary agreement on September 19, 2009. The
law requires her to honor that agreement.
Plaintiff further contends that the agreement should be invalidated on the basis of
Plaintiff’s inability to seek counsel prior to signing. For a person to enter into a legally
binding agreement, independent legal counsel is not required. See Adams v. Adams, 2004
PA Super 130, 848 A.2d 991. In Pennsylvania, courts have consistently held that, where
the contracting party is free to consult with counsel, there can be no counsel-related
duress. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 404 Pa. Super 533, ¶9, 591 A.2d 720 (1991);
Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146, 153, 669 A.2d 946, 950 (1996) (A party who has
reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before entering a contract cannot later
secure its invalidation by claiming duress).
Plaintiff failed to consult with counsel prior to signing the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff was initially presented with the agreement at a time prior to the settlement in her
real estate agent’s office. Plaintiff alleges that she did not have enough time to “find an
attorney, make an appointment, and have the document reviewed” prior to the settlement
conference. The record is clear that Plaintiff created the time constraints by her desire to
sell the Mountain Road that day. If there were time limitations that prevented Plaintiff
from seeking counsel’s advice, such limitations were created by her own desire to sell the
property.
Full and fair disclosure of Defendant’s assets. Pennsylvania jurisprudence has
long mandated that when a husband and wife draft a marital settlement agreement, “full
disclosure of the parties’ financial resources is a mandatory requirement.” Stoner v.
15
Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 673, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (2003). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that because the parties to a marital settlement agreement stand in a relation of
mutual confidence and trust, the disclosure of their financial positions in preparation of
such an agreement must be full and fair, but need not be exact. Simeone, supra, 525 Pa. at
402, 581 A.2d at 167. Parties to marital settlement agreements “do not necessarily deal
with each other at arm’s length” and, thus, “full and fair disclosure of the financial
positions of the parties is required.” Id. (absent “full and fair disclosure,” a party
opposing the validity of a marital settlement agreement may assert that there was a
material misrepresentation to induce a party to sign the agreement). However, full and
fair disclosure does not require disclosure of the exact amount of a party’s assets; rather,
it merely requires sufficient disclosure to allow the intended party to make an informed
decision.
The requirement of full and fair disclosure of relevant financial information may
be satisfied in a situation where there is clear evidence that the spouse opposing
enforcement had already possessed the information. See Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665,
673, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (2003); Paroly v. Paroly, 2005 PA Super 218, ¶16, 876 A.2d
1061, 1066; Ebersole v. Ebersole, 713 A.2d 103 (Pa. Super. 1998), allowance of appeal
64
denied, 559 Pa. 678, 739 A.2d 543 (1999).
Ebersole was reversed on other grounds. See Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529 (2003) (a
64
spouse may enforce a post-nuptial agreement without having to demonstrate that statutory rights
have been disclosed, either in the post-nuptial agreement itself or through other evidence;
disapproving Ebersole).
16
Although Plaintiff did not have Defendant’s financial records in hand at the time
she signed the agreement, they were readily available to her and easily accessible to her.
Plaintiff admitted that all relevant information pertaining to the banking accounts,
Defendant’s checks and retirement benefits were sent to the Mountain Road property and
that Plaintiff would open the envelopes and relay to Defendant pertinent information.
There is a distinction between a party’s failure to disclose the exact valuation of his or her
retirement benefits and a party’s concealment of his or her financial assets to induce his
or her spouse to sign a marital settlement agreement. This court finds that Plaintiff had an
adequate opportunity to verify, and, in fact, was actively involved in, Defendant’s
financial affairs.
Failure to meet general requirements of an enforceable contract. Although
Plaintiff avers that the agreement should be declared invalid because it was procured by
Defendant through duress and without full disclosure of the parties’ assets, the crux of
Plaintiff’s exceptions is an unconscionability argument. Plaintiff maintains that the
settlement agreement is one-sided and does not represent a reasonable division of the
parties’ marital estate. Plaintiff further argues that the agreement is unconscionable
because it is unreasonably favorable to Defendant, who was the drafting party.
Whether the agreement was favorable to one party or another at the time of the
execution in September of 2009 is not the issue. See Colonna v. Colonna, 2002 PA Super
376, 791 A.2d 353. In order for a court to deem a contractual provision unconscionable, it
must determine both “that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter
and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding acceptance
17
of the provisions.” Id. at ¶15, 791 A.2d at 357. Whether the agreement embodies
reasonable or good bargains is not a consideration of the court, as an inequity of benefits
is not enough by itself to make an agreement unenforceable. See Crispo v. Crispo, 2006
PA Super 267, ¶19, 909 A.2d 308, 313; Sabad v. Fessenden, 2003 PA Super 202, 825
A.2d 682. Parties are free to enter into bargains they may later regret, and bad deals are as
enforceable as good ones, provided the agreement is free of fraud, duress or another
invalidating factor. Adams v. Adams, 2004 PA Super 130, ¶9, 848 A.2d 991, 993.
The record indicates that Plaintiff did have a meaningful choice as to whether to
enter into the settlement agreement. The agreement was presented to Plaintiff at least two
days prior to the settlement conference. Plaintiff wanted Defendant to sign a distribution
agreement so she could sell the Mountain Road property and purchase another home,
which Defendant did sign after Plaintiff signed the settlement agreement. Plaintiff could
have bargained and negotiated with Defendant to sign the distribution agreement from the
point when the Mountain Road property was placed on the market for sale until the
settlement conference was scheduled. Although the terms of the agreement may
objectively appear to heavily favor Defendant over Plaintiff, Plaintiff received what she
wanted and at no point challenged the terms until months after the agreement was
executed. This court finds the marital settlement agreement to be neither procedurally nor
substantively unconscionable.
This court also finds Plaintiff’s argument that the agreement lacked adequate
consideration so as to make it valid without merit. A mutual promise between husband
and wife contained in a post-nuptial marital settlement agreement that distributed certain
18
assets and limited the parties’ interests furnishes adequate legal consideration for a post-
nuptial separation agreement. See In re Ratoney Estate, 443 Pa. 454, 277 A.2d 791
(1971) (mutual promises are binding upon parties thereto and furnish valid
consideration). Additionally, an agreement may not be avoided for failure or lack of
consideration if the parties include a specific provision expressing their intent to be
legally bound. 33 P.S. §6; see In re Ratony’s Estate, 443 Pa. 454, 277 A.2d 791 (1971);
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 341 Pa. Super. 313, 491 A.2d 281 (1985).
Plaintiff and Defendant’s agreement contained mutual promises dividing property.
Furthermore, Plaintiff signing the marital settlement agreement prepared by Defendant
induced Defendant to sign the distribution agreement for Plaintiff. Furthermore, the
parties’ agreement contains the following language: “Under No Circumstances are
conditions of this agreement to be changed or contested any time in the future.And as
witnessed this is a legal and binding document.” Therefore, the court finds that the parties
both expressed their intent to be legally bound by the agreement and exchanged mutual
promises. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s final argument fails.
For these reasons, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 27 day of October, 2010, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s
Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, and for the reasons stated
in the accompanying opinion, the exceptions are dismissed and the interim order of court
dated August 11, 2010 is entered as a final order.
19
BY THE COURT,
_s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler Jr., J.
Michael R. Rundle, Esq.
Cumberland County
Support Master
Linda A. Clotfelter, Esq.
5021 East Trindle Road, Suite 100
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esq.
400 South State Road
Marysville, PA 17053
Attorney for Defendant
20
CRYSTAL M. WEYANT, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
:
DAVID H. WEYANT, : PACSES NO. 752111625
Defendant : NO. 302 SUPPORT 2010
IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER’S REPORT
BEFORE OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 27 day of October, 2010, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s
Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, and for the reasons stated
in the accompanying opinion, Plaintiff’s exceptions are dismissed and the interim order
of court dated August 11, 2010 is entered as a final order.
BY THE COURT,
_________________
J. Wesley Oler Jr., J.
Michael R. Rundle, Esq.
Cumberland County
Support Master
Linda A. Clotfelter, Esq.
5021 East Trindle Road, Suite 100
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esq.
400 South State Road
Marysville, PA 17053
Attorney for Defendant