HomeMy WebLinkAbout2006-6544
MONTE SNAVELY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PAMELA SNAVELY, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VICTORIA SNAVELY, :
CHAD SNAVELY AND :
ADAM SNAVELY, :
PLAINTIFFS :
:
V. :
:
MICHAEL E. PANZA, :
DEFENDANT : NO. 06-6544 CIVIL
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HESS, P.J., AND EBERT, J.
ORDER OF COURT
st
AND NOW
, this 31 day of January, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant
Panza’s Motion for Summary Judgment, after argument and consideration of the briefs
submitted by both parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that Defendant’s Motion for
DENIED.
Summary Judgment is
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Dusan Bratic, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
MONTE SNAVELY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PAMELA SNAVELY, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VICTORIA SNAVELY, :
CHAD SNAVELY AND :
ADAM SNAVELY, :
PLAINTIFFS :
:
V. :
:
MICHAEL E. PANZA, :
DEFENDANT : NO. 06-6544 CIVIL
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HESS, P. J., AND EBERT, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Ebert, J., January 31, 2011 -
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on August 9, 2007, for claims related to a motor
vehicle accident which occurred on or about November 10, 2004. On October 29, 2009,
Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Preclude Monte, Pamela,
Adam, and Chad Snavely from Recovering Non-Economic Damages because the
Plaintiffs’ elected to have the limited tort option in their auto insurance. The Honorable
Judge Guido granted Defendant’s Motion on February 23, 2010, and precluded
Plaintiffs from receiving non-economic damages. On June 30, 2010, Defendant filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiffs Monte Snavely and Pamela Snavely are adult individuals residing at
164 Texaco Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. They are the parents of Plaintiffs
1
Victoria Snavely, Chad Snavely, and Adam Snavely, who are all minor individuals
1
residing at the same address. Defendant is Michael Panza, an adult individual residing
2
at 4341 Carlisle Pike, Apartment C, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. On or about November
10, 2004, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the parties were involved in an automobile
accident in which Defendant ran into the back of Plaintiff’s car as they were driving on
3
Route 581 in Lemoyne Borough in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff, Monte Snavely, was the driver of a 2004 Chevrolet Silverado, and
Plaintiffs Pamela Snavely, Victoria Snavely, Chad Snavely, and Adam Snavely were all
passengers. Defendant was driving a 1999 Cadillac Deville in the same lane of travel
4
as Plaintiffs and ran into the back of Plaintiffs’ car. Defendant left the scene of the
accident before police arrived. The Defendant explained why he left the scene of the
accident as follows:
“… I was leaving because I am on the highway there,
and to me it was dangerous and I wanted to get out of
5
there.”
Defendant said that he did not answer the door when the police came to his residence
on the night of the accident because he had the television on and did not know
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someone was at the door.
7
On the day of the accident, Defendant left work at approximately 2:30 p.m.
Between the time he left work and the time of the accident at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
Defendant visited the American Legion, the Dutch Club, and the Italian Club, all in
1
Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed Aug. 9, 2007, ¶ 1-2.
2
Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 3.
3
Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 4.
4
Plaintiff’s Complaint at ¶ 6.
5
Deposition of Defendant Michael E. Panza, Apr. 2, 2009, p. 8.
6
Dep. of Def., p. 9.
7
Dep. of Def., p. 5.
2
8
Steelton, Pennsylvania. Defendant admitted drinking at each of these clubs in the six
hour period before the accident but said he could not remember the number of drinks or
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the length of time over which he consumed them. Defendant was found guilty of
violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code for Failing to Give Information and
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Render Aid and for Failure to Drive Vehicle at a Safe Speed.
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Pa. C.S.A. 1035.2, after the relevant pleadings are closed, a party
may move for summary judgment in two instances:
(1) Whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be
established by additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) If, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the
burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to
the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues
to be submitted to a jury.
Pa. C.S.A. 1035.2.
The Court may grant summary judgment only when the right to such judgment is
clear and free from doubt. Sebast v. Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1153 (Pa. 2007). A
Court shall enter judgment whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to
a necessary element of cause of action that could be established by additional
discovery. Swords v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 883 A.2d 562, 566 (Pa. 2005). Summary
judgment is meant to eliminate the waste of time and resources of both litigants and the
8
Dep. of Def., p. 12.
9
Dep. of Def., p. 13.
10
Dep. of Def., p. 15.
3
Courts in cases where a trial would simply be a useless formality. Liles v. Balmer, 567
A.2d 691, 692 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, a Court views the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 2005) (citing Jones v. SEPTA, 772 A.2d 435,
438 (Pa. 2001)). Considering the record in favor of the non-moving party, we cannot
grant summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact involving
the circumstances of the accident, as well as Defendant’s conduct before and after the
accident upon which Plaintiffs base their claims for punitive damages.
Specifically, Plaintiffs present statements from witness, Jason Shade, that
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Defendant was driving erratically and weaving outside Defendant’s lane. Shade
stated that he was “concerned about the way the driver of the Cadillac was driving” and
12
that he “thought he was going to run me off the road.” Defendant maintains that “there
is no testimony that Mr. Panza was swerving or driving in an erratic, reckless or
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outrageous manner at any point.” Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “reeked of alcohol,
had slurring speech, was stumbling, and fled the scene of the accident when told police
14
were coming.” Defendant denies these allegations in his Answer to Plaintiffs’
complaint. There are questions of fact about Defendant’s activities prior to the accident,
the manner of Defendant’s driving, and his conduct before and after the accident. For
these reasons, we deny summary judgment and allow Plaintiffs to proceed to present
11
Affidavit of Jason Shade, Feb. 16, 2010, ¶ 5.
12
Affidavit of Jason Shade, Feb. 16, 2010, ¶ 5.
13
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jun. 30, 2010, ¶ 27.
14
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Aug. 9, 2007, ¶ 7.
4
their case for punitive damages. Equally important we cannot say that as a matter of
law that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to pursue an action for punitive damages.
II. Punitive Damages
Pennsylvania has adopted the rule of punitive damages as set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 and the comments thereunder. See Feld v.
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742 (1984). Section 908(1) provides that
(1) Punitive damages are damages other than compensatory or nominal
damages awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can
properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and
extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to
cause, and the wealth of the defendant.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 908. (Emphasis added)
Comment c to that section states that “it is not essential to the recovery of
punitive damages that the plaintiff should have suffered any harm, either pecuniary or
physical.” Id. comment c. (Emphasis added)
A. Punitive damages are not barred by Plaintiff’s option of Limited Tort Liability
The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code requires that automobile insurers provide a full
tort liability and a limited tort liability option for purchasers of automobile insurance. 74
Pa. C.S.A. § 1705. The limited tort option precludes the insured from seeking non-
economic damages if they are involved in an accident except in certain circumstances.
Insurance providers are required to inform customers of the following provision:
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A. “Limited Tort” Option--The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
give you the right to choose a form of insurance that limits your right and
the right of members of your household to seek financial compensation for
injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of insurance, you and
other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery
for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and
suffering or other nonmonetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall
within the definition of “serious injury” as set forth in the policy or unless
one of several other exceptions noted in the policy applies.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705.
When an individual chooses the limited tort option, that individual is limited
to recovery of economic losses except in certain circumstances. The relevant
portion of the statute provides that recovery is allowed as follows:
(d) Limited tort alternative.--
Each person who elects the limited tort
alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss
sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of
another person pursuant to applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained
is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election
shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any non-economic loss,
except that:
(1) An individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election who sustains
damages in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of
another person may recover damages as if the individual damaged had
elected the full tort alternative whenever the person at fault:
(i) is convicted or accepts Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in that
accident;
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705. (emphasis added).
In this case it is clear that Plaintiffs may not proceed for non-economic damages
15
against Defendant. Plaintiffs have stated that no one sustained a serious injury.
Defendant does not fall into the exception because he was not convicted of nor did he
accept ARD for driving under the influence.
15
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Feb. 16, 2010, p. 3.
6
However, Plaintiff’s complaint also contained claims for punitive damages.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted that at least in medical malpractice cases,
citing Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1042.72(a) that non-economic damages do not include amounts
awarded for punitive damages. Vogelsberger v. Magee-Womens Hosp. of UPMC
Health System, 903 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. 2006). The court cited the rule which states:
“A damage award for non-economic loss does not include amounts awarded for medical
and other related expenses, loss of earnings or earning capacity, or punitive damages.”
Id. at 554. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law
defines a “non-economic” loss as “pain and suffering and other non-monetary
detriment.” 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1702.
Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the victim for any non-
economic loss such as pain and suffering, but instead are intended to punish the
tortfeasor for outrageous conduct and to deter him or others from similar conduct. The
purpose of civil damages awards is typically to compensate for injuries sustained.
However, punitive damages are warranted when the conduct of the tortfeasor is so
outrageous that it is necessary to impose punishment and deterrence through civil
actions. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, has stated that “one function of
punitive damages awards is to relieve the pressures on an overloaded system of
criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor crimes.”
Willow Inn Inc. v. Public Service Mutual Insurance Company, 399 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir.
2005).
In this case Plaintiffs allege facts that Defendant’s conduct was outrageous and
showed reckless indifference to others, but, by leaving the scene of the accident,
7
Defendant escaped any possibility of criminal charges being filed against him for driving
under the influence because evidence of his intoxication had dissipated. Accordingly,
he could not be convicted of Driving Under the Influence and the provisions of 75
Pa.C.S.A. §1705(d) now prevent Plaintiffs’ non-economic recovery. Plaintiffs argue that
they did, in fact sustain “injury” and that Defendant only escaped DUI charges because
16
he left the scene of the accident when he was told police were on their way.
Therefore, it is appropriate in this case for Plaintiffs to proceed in their claims for
punitive damages based on Defendant’s conduct including his alleged Vehicle Code
violations.
B. Punitive damages may be awarded without an award of compensatory
damages.
Pennsylvania case law in general supports the position that punitive damages
should not be awarded if the Plaintiff has not first proved actual damages. See Houston
v. Texaco, Inc., 538 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 1988) (punitive damages cannot be recovered
in the absence of a legally recognized injury); see also Sulecki v. Southeast National
Bank, 516 A.2d 1217 (Pa. Super. 1986) (in order to recover punitive damages plaintiff
must first prove compensatory damages). In a case which is now over 50 years old, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “it is well recognized that no award for
punitive damages may be made where actual damage has not been suffered.” Hilbert
v. Roth, 149 A.2d 648, 652 (Pa. 1959).
These cases are factually different than the present case because Plaintiffs have
presented evidence of actual damages. Unlike the cases above, Plaintiffs have
16
Plaintiff’s Answer in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jul. 20, 2010, ¶ 8.
8
presented evidence of physical injuries and damage to property. In Houston, Plaintiffs
had brought claims of negligently caused emotional distress but did not allege any
physical injury as is required to recover on such a claim. As such, the facts did not
support a cause of action. The Superior Court said that “plaintiff-appellees failed to
show that defendant-appellant’s conduct was of such a nature that punitive damages
were appropriate as punishment.” Houston, 538 A.2d at 505.
Unlike Houston, where there was no physical injury, Plaintiffs in this case clearly
17
suffered injuries as a result of the accident. Plaintiff, Monte Snavely, missed two days
18
of work for which he was never compensated. In addition to physical injuries, Plaintiff
Monte Snavely suffered damage to his new Chevrolet truck when Defendant’s car hit
Plaintiff’s vehicle during the accident, ruining the bumper hitch and causing severe
19
damage to the frame. In this day and age, ordinary common sense establishes that at
trial the Plaintiffs may introduce evidence of the inconvenience they suffered along with
all of the other tribulations involved in settling an insurance claim such as obtaining
estimates and completing forms. They attribute these “injuries” to the Defendant’s
reckless indifference to their rights by driving while intoxicated. As noted in §908(1) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “the nature and extent of the harm to the Plaintiff
that the Defendant caused” may be considered by the trier of fact in awarding punitive
damages. The fact that compensation for some of these injuries was covered by first-
party benefits has no bearing on whether Plaintiffs actually did sustain injury.
17
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶ 9.
18
Dep. of Monte Snavely, p. 45-46.
19
Deposition of Monte Snavely, Apr. 2, 2009, p. 42.
9
In Hilbert v. Roth, 149 A.2d 648 (Pa. 1959), the plaintiff had received a
satisfaction of judgment from one of two defendant tortfeasors while the case was still
pending against the second tortfeasor, which included claims of punitive damages.
After judgment against the first tortfeasor, the plaintiff was barred from any further
actions against the second tortfeasor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that
the plaintiff is entitled to “but one satisfaction” and because the plaintiff had obtained an
award of compensatory damages from the first tortfeasor, the second tortfeasor was
discharged from liability. Because there was no longer the possibility of an award of
compensatory damages from the second tortfeasor, and punitive damages were based
upon such an award, the punitive damages claims were dismissed. It is important to
note that Hilbert took place before the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
which allows a plaintiff to settle with one tortfeasor and still pursue damages against
remaining tortfeasors. Baker v. AC&S, Inc., 729 A.2d 1140 (Pa.Super. 1999).
The present case can be distinguished from Hilbert in a number of ways. First, it
must be noted that the tortfeasor in Hilbert actually died in the accident, which was the
basis of the litigation. Accordingly, the chief purpose of punitive damages; that is, to
punish the living tortfeasor for his outrageous conduct, was absent in that case. Volume
4 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which includes the damages section, was
completed on May 19, 1978, some 18 years after Hilbert. It specifically states that
“punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased
tortfeasor…” Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 908(a) Comment a. Secondly, unlike
Hilbert, Defendant has not in any way been discharged from liability. Here, Plaintiffs
were precluded from seeking non-economic damages because of their election of the
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limited tort liability option for insurance coverage. This has no bearing on Defendant’s
actual liability and should not affect Plaintiffs’ rights to seek punitive damages based on
Defendant’s conduct.
Other Pennsylvania case law suggests that an award of compensatory damages
is not necessary to support an award of punitive damages. In Kirkbride v. Lisbon
Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed
punitive damages at length and specifically addressed the relationship to compensatory
damages. The Court stated “ . . . punitive damages must, by necessity, be related to
the injury-producing cause of action. This does not mean, however, that specific
compensatory damages must be awarded to sustain a punitive damage award.” Id. at
802. The Court stated that the uniqueness of its holding in Hilbert was due to the
underlying action being dismissed, thereby extinguishing liability. The Court also
acknowledged the Superior Court’s reasoning in Rhoads v. Heberling, 451 A.2d 1378
(Pa. Super. 1982) when the Superior Court distinguished between an independent and
a derivative action for punitive damages in affirming a punitive damage award to two
injured parties even though neither party received any compensatory damages. The
Court noted that in Rhoads damages were not awarded; however, liability was
determined on the facts and punitive damages were awarded predicated upon the
finding of liability. Id. at 802.
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The Court also discussed the Superior Court’s reasoning in Laniecki v. Polish
Army Veterans Association:
in Laniecki, the Superior Court affirmed a judgment of only punitive
damages in a libel action when the jury believed that the plaintiff’s
reputation had been satisfactorily reinstated, thereby negating any
compensatory damages. In affirming the award, the Superior Court
concluded that the plaintiff sustained a cause of action for compensatory
damages even though he did not receive a monetary award for them. Id.
at 802-803 Even though compensatory damages had not been awarded,
punitive damages could be appropriate, the critical factor being the
establishment of sufficient evidence to sustain the cause of action.
Id. at 802-803. (referencing Lanieki v. Polish Army Veterans Association,
480 A.2d 1101 (Pa. Super. 1984). (emphasis added).
Analyzing the reasoning of the above cases, we acknowledge that punitive
damages are generally not appropriate if compensatory damages are not awarded.
This is usually true because in most cases where compensatory damages are not
awarded, the facts do not support an award of punitive damages. Most importantly, we
note that in most of the cases where compensatory damages were not awarded, there
was no physical harm to Plaintiffs. The present case is markedly different than the
above cases because Plaintiffs sustained physical injuries and suffered damage to their
vehicle.
We also make the distinction between Plaintiffs receiving an award of
compensatory damages and proving actual damages. Plaintiffs do not have a claim for
compensatory damages simply because their pecuniary loss has been covered by
insurance. It does not mean that they do not have other types of damages. The above
case law supports our opinion that punitive damages may be appropriate without an
award of compensatory damages if Plaintiffs prove the required conduct. The fact that
12
Plaintiffs are precluded from receiving compensatory damages from a jury award does
not equate to not having actual damages or not being able to prove facts that support a
cause of action. The underlying facts supporting punitive damages still exist and have
not, as in other cases, been dismissed nor has Defendant in any way otherwise been
excused from liability. He has merely, up to this point, escaped pecuniary liability
because of Plaintiffs’ election of the limited tort liability option.
The facts and circumstances of this case, including that Defendant was found
guilty of two Vehicle Code violations in connection with the accident with Plaintiffs, that
Defendant was allegedly drinking excessively during the six hours preceding the
accident, that Defendant smashed into the rear of Plaintiffs’ vehicle, and that Defendant
left the scene of the accident, still support a possible civil cause of action against
Defendant. Defendant should not be permitted to escape all liability because of
Plaintiff’s Limited Tort Liability coverage. It is a jury question whether Defendant’s
actions rise to the level sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that it is error to instruct
the jury when a Plaintiff has chosen the limited tort option in exchange for lower
insurance premiums because it unfairly prejudices the Plaintiff. The Court found that
the fact that appellants paid lower insurance premiums in exchange for
limited tort coverage was wholly irrelevant on the issue of the amount of
damages required to compensate appellants if the jury determined that
they had suffered non-economic damages. The severity of the non-
economic injuries suffered by a Plaintiff and the corresponding level of
damages simply bears no causal nexus whatsoever to the nature of the
insurance option which that Plaintiff selected.
Price v. Guy, 735 A.2d 668, 671 (Pa. 1999).
The Court reasoned that
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Just as a jury is more likely to attach liability to a Defendant covered by
insurance who will not suffer financially from a Plaintiff’s verdict, so too is a
jury less likely to award damages to a Plaintiff who it views as having
bargained away its right to non-economic damages in exchange for having
obtained less expensive insurance coverage.
Id. at 672.
We find the reasoning in Price supportive of our position that Plaintiffs’ selection
of the limited tort option, and therefore their ability to seek non-economic damages, has
no bearing on whether punitive damages are appropriate based on Defendant’s
conduct. A jury may not award non-economic damages, but it may consider
Defendant’s conduct and liability for Plaintiff’s actual damages suffered in its
determination of punitive damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs have the right to proceed to
trial by jury to determine Defendant’s liability and punitive damages.
There is no Pennsylvania case law directly addressing the issue of whether a
Plaintiff’s limited tort liability option prohibits a Plaintiff from pursuing only punitive
damages. It is clear that Plaintiff may not pursue non-economic damages, but nowhere
have punitive damages been classified as a subset of non-economic damages. Awards
for punitive damages arise from the outrageous conduct of the tortfeasor and are not
linked to compensation for physical or property damage. In this case, punitive damages
may be derived from a jury’s consideration of Defendant’s conduct including alleged
excessive alcohol consumption on the day of the accident, reckless driving which left
him unable to control his vehicle, crashing into Plaintiffs’ vehicle causing them physical
injuries and property damage, leaving the scene of the accident before police arrived,
not answering his door when police came to his door, and his violation of two Vehicle
Code violations.
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Conclusion
While Plaintiffs are precluded from recovery of non-economic damages by their
choice of the limited tort option of insurance, they may still proceed to recover punitive
damages. The statute barring non-economic damages is silent on the issue of punitive
damages, and there is Pennsylvania case law supportive of our opinion that Plaintiffs
may proceed for recovery of punitive damages in the absence of a compensatory
damage award if Plaintiffs can prove that Defendant’s conduct meets the criteria for
punitive damages. This case is not a simple fender-bender accident between two sober
drivers. This Court fully recognizes, as does the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that
“[P]unitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of
judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence.” Restatement (Second) of
.
Torts Sec. 908 Comment (b)There are significant questions of material fact
concerning Defendant’s conduct which caused the accident and his conduct before and
after the accident. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate in this case.
Accordingly, the following Order shall be entered:
st
AND NOW
, this 31 day of January, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant
Panza’s Motion for Summary Judgment, after argument and consideration of the briefs
submitted by both parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that Defendant’s Motion for
DENIED.
Summary Judgment is
By the Court,
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
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Dusan Bratic, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire
Attorney for Defendant
16