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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1293-2005 COMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. TED WILLIAM ARMSTRONG NO. CP-21-CRIMINAL 1293-2005 IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. RA.P. 1925 Guido, J., January , 2006 On September 16, 2005, we held an evidentiary hearing in connection with the defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion, which included a motion to suppress evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing we made the following Findings of Fact: 1. On April 11, 2005, at approximately 11: 15 p.m., Mr. Justin Stoner witnessed the Defendant's vehicle exit the Caddy Shack parking lot in Hampden Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. The Defendant's vehicle nearly struck Mr. Stoner's vehicle, and an accident was narrowly avoided. 3. Mr. Stoner proceeded to following the Defendant's vehicle through numerous townships in Cumberland County witnessing erratic driving the entire way. 4. Shortly after his initial encounter with the vehicle, he called 911 and described erratic driving, which included, inter alia, the near-accident referenced above, his wheels hitting the side of a bridge, and running red lights. 5. All of the above information was made known to the police via County Dispatch. 6. Mr. Stoner followed the Defendant's vehicle all the way to the Defendant's home in Upper Allen Township, where he saw the Defendant leave the vehicle and enter the residence. 7. The police arrived within minutes after the Defendant get out of his vehicle. 8. The police on the scene included contingents from Hampden Township, Lower Allen Township, Mechanicsburg, Shiremanstown, and Upper Allen Township. All police officers on the scene were in marked vehicles and in full uniform. CP-21-CRIMINAL 1293 - 2005 9. The corporal on the scene from Hampden Township, Jeff Snyder, took charge of the investigation because the initial report was made to him from County Control. 10. Corporal Snyder rang the Defendant's doorbell, and upon talking to the Defendant noticed an odor of alcohol and glassy bloodshot eyes. 11. At that point, he asked the Defendant for his license and registration. 12. The Defendant indicated that his license was in the home and that he had to go get it. 13. The corporal gave him permission, but asked to be able to accompany him, which he did. 14. After retrieving the license, the corporal directed the Defendant to produce his registration, which was outside in the vehicle. 15. The corporal followed the Defendant to his vehicle and obtained the registration. 16. After obtaining the registration, the corporal directed the Defendant to perform certain field sobriety tests. 17. As part of those field sobriety tests, certain questions intended to elicit a response were posed to the Defendant by the corporal. 1 The parties were given the opportunity to file briefs in support of their respective positions. Thereafter we entered the following order: ORDER And now, this 4TH day of OCTOBER, 2005, after hearing and having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED insofar as the Defendant's verbal responses to questioning during the field sobriety tests are suppressed and may not be used by the Commonwealth as part of its case in chief. In all other respects, the Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED? The Commonwealth has filed this timely appeal in which it contends that we "erred in finding that the defendant should have been advised of Miranda rights prior to the field sobriety tests.,,3 In support of its position, the Commonwealth relies on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Hayes, 544 Pa. 46, 674 A.2d 677 (1996). We agree 1 See Order dated September 16, 2005, "In Re: Findings of Facts." 2 See Order dated October 4,2005. 3 See Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal." 2 CP-21-CRIMINAL 1293 - 2005 that Hayes stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to advise a person of his Miranda warnings prior to requesting that he submit to field sobriety testing. 674 A.2d at 683. However, the decision in Hayes was based upon the Court's conclusion that the 5TH Amendment did not apply to field sobriety tests because they were nontestimonial in nature. For that reason, we did not suppress the results of the field sobriety tests.4 It is by now hornbook law that the prophylactic rule enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966) applies only to custodial interrogation. Interrogation occurs when police questioning or conduct is "designed to or likely to evoke an incriminating response." Commonwealth v. Gaul, 867 A.2d 557, 559 (Pa. Super. 2005). "Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on whether the person is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 855 A.2d 783, 790 (2004). In the instant case, we concluded that the defendant was in custody and subject to police interrogation at the time of the field sobriety testing. Therefore, we suppressed his verbal responses to the police questioning, a result we felt to be consistent with the 4 As the Hayes court stated: In reviewing the decisions of our sister states we find unanimous agreement on the classification offield sobriety tests as nontestimonial (with the exception in Allred for recitation of the alphabet backwards). Naturally following from the conclusion that filed sobriety tests are non-testimonial, our sister states have unanimously declared that no Miranda warnings are required before a police officer may request a suspect perform a field sobriety test. We find the reasoning of our sister states logically persuasive. 674 A.2d at 682 (emphasis added). 3 CP-21-CRIMINAL 1293 - 2005 Supreme Court's ruling in Hayes. 5 DATE Edward E. Guido, 1. Daniel 1. Sodus, Esquire For the Commonwealth John B. Mancke, Esquire F or the Defendant :sld 5 In dicta, the Hayes court stated: We also note with approval the decision of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Conway, 368 Pa.Super. 488, 534 A.2d 541 (1987), where the Court distinguished the physiological aspects of a field sobriety test which merely require a driver to exhibit physical coordination from an interrogation which would necessitate a response of a testimonial nature. The Court in Conway carefully analyzed the encounter in that case and affirmed the trial court's suppression of the defendant's statements made during the sobriety tests which were clearly testimonial in nature. 674 A.2d at 682, footnote 8. 4