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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2005-517 Civil ROBIN GRAY, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. CARLISLE REGIONAL NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL MEDICAL CENTER, NURSE DOE, & EASTERN : MOTOR INNS, INC., d.b.a. DAYS INN and SUITES, Defendants CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT DAYS INN AND SUITES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, P.L GUIDO, 1. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Currently before us is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Days Inn as well Plaintiff s cross Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Days Inn. Because there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved, the Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied without discussion. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Days Inn will be granted in part. The Plaintiff has filed a multi-count complaint against numerous parties as a result of the disclosure of her HIV status. The claims against defendant Days Inn are contained in Counts IV and V of the complaint. Count IV makes a claim based upon the tort of "intrusion upon seclusion". Count V alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter ADA). 1 Defendant Days Inn contends that it is entitled to Summary Judgment on each count. We agree as to Count IV. 1 42 U.S.C.A. 12101 et seq. NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report Pa. RC.P. 1035.2(1) In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving m party. Ertel v. Patriot News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038 (1966). Summary judgment may only be granted in cases that are clear and free from doubt. JR. Ex Rei. Hoffman v. Pellak, 764 A.2d 64 (Pa. Super. 2000). We will summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Days Inn as a housekeeper. On October 4,2004 she asked to leave work early because she was ill. Her immediate supervisor, Ms. Keebaugh, agreed that she could leave, but informed her that she would have to provide a doctor's excuse upon her return. Plaintiff was treated in the emergency room of Defendant Carlisle Regional Medical Center. She asked for and received a doctor's excuse. The excuse disclosed her HIV status. Despite plaintiff s requests, Defendant Carlisle Regional Medical Center refused to delete the reference to her HIV status. During a phone conversation the next day, Plaintiff informed Ms. Keebaugh of her HIV status. Ms. Keebaugh advised plaintiff that she would be disclosing her medical 2 NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM condition to two assistant supervisors. Plaintiff objected.2 Nevertheless, Ms. Keebaugh informed the assistant supervisors. On October 9,2004 plaintiff returned to work and provided Ms. Keebaugh with the written medical excuse containing reference to her HIV status. On October 11, 2004 plaintiff overheard the two assistant supervisors discussing her HIV status. She became upset and quit her job. Intrusion upon Seclusion The claim for intrusion upon seclusion is based upon Section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. That Section provides as follows: ~ 652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. In Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super 1984) the Superior Court discussed S 652B. It described the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as follows: An action pursuant to this section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. Restatement (Second) of Torts S 652B, comment a. The invasion may be (1) by physical intrusion into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself, (2) by use of the defendant's senses to oversee or overhear the plaintiff s private affairs, or (3) some other form of investigation or examination into plaintiffs private concerns. Id, comment b. 483 A.2d at 1383. 2 Defendant asserts that plaintiff agreed that Ms. Keebaugh could share the information with the assistant supervisors. However for purposes of reviewing Defendant Days Inn's Motion for Summary Judgment, we must accept plaintiff's version as true. 3 NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM The court went on to state that liability can be imposed upon a defendant "only when (it) has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs." (emphasis added). Id In Harris the defendant voluntarily exposed the facts at issue to the Department of Welfare in order to obtain benefits. The Superior Court held that her voluntary disclosure of the facts precluded an action for intrusion upon seclusion. In the instant case, the plaintiff voluntarily disclosed her HIV status in order to be excused from work. We can see no factual distinction between this case and Harris, supra. Therefore, Defendant Days Inn's Motion for summary Judgment in connection with the intrusion upon seclusion claim (Count IV of the Complaint) must be granted. ADA Claim. Defendant Days Inn contends that it is entitled to summary judgment in connection with plaintiffs ADA claims because 1) she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and 2) the ADA's confidential medical records provision does not apply to the facts of this case. With regard to the first allegation, plaintiff concedes that she did not file an administrative claim and that she did not receive a right to sue letter. However, she contends that the provisions of the ADA requiring those steps as a prerequisite to filing suit do not apply to her because her claims are "privacy claims and do not sound in discrimination."3 She has cited no authority for this proposition and we are satisfied that none can be found. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by her arguments on the issue. On the other hand, defendant concedes that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies 3 See Plaintiff's Brief, p. 8. 4 NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM before bringing suit under the AD A does not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 4 Weare, therefore, reluctant to grant summary judgment on this basis.5 As noted above, Plaintiffs ADA claim is based upon the privacy requirements mandated by the act. The ADA prohibits medical examinations or inquiries except in limited circumstances. The prohibition is contained in 42 U.S.C. S 1211(d)(1) which provides: (d) Medical examinations and inquiries (1) In general The prohibition against discrimination as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall include medical examinations and inquiries. The limited circumstances in which medical examinations and inquiries are authorized can be found in 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4)B which provides: (4) Examination and inquiry (B) Acceptable examinations and inquiries A covered entity may conduct voluntary medical examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program available to employees at that work site. A covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-related functions. (emphasis added). The information obtained by such an examination or inquiry must be "treated as a confidential medical record" and can used only for specified purposes.6 One such specified purpose provides that "supervisors and managers may be informed regarding 4 See Defendant's Brief, p. 10 citing Zipes v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 455 US. 385, 398 (1982). 5 This is particularly true where the defendant failed to raise the matter by way of preliminary objections or in its answer. 6 See 42 US.c. l2112(d) 3 (B), (C) and 4 (C). 5 NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations. ,,7 Defendant argues that there was no violation of the confidentiality provisions under the facts of this case. In the first instance, it contends that it did not request the information regarding plaintiff s status. Rather, the information was voluntarily provided by plaintiff, and disclosed by Ms. Keebaugh to her assistant supervisors, days before the medical excuse was submitted. However, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that the disclosure by plaintiff was in response to defendant's inquiry into her ability to perform her duties. Defendant next argues that even if it could be construed to have requested the information, the dissemination of Plaintiffs HIV status to its assistant supervisors is specifically authorized under 42 US.C. 12112(d) 3(i), supra. However, whether the two "assistant supervisors" qualify as "supervisors and managers" under the terms of the Act, and whether they needed to be informed of Plaintiffs HIV status to accommodate her in the work place are questions of fact to be decided by the jury. 7 See 42 US.c. l2112(d) 3 (B)(i). 6 NO. 2005 - 0517 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of MARCH, 2006, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Days Inn is DENIED. Further, for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion Defendant Days Inn's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in connection with the claim for intrusion upon seclusion, and the motions are DENIED in connection with Plaintiffs ADA claims. By the Court, /s/ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, 1. Renee Knicos, Esquire 301 South Hanover Street, Suite 1 Carlisle, Pa. 17013 Joseph A. Ricci, Esquire 4423 North Front Street Harrisburg, Pa. 17110 Schaun D. Henry, Esquire P.O. Box 1166 100 Pine Street Harrisburg, Pa. 17108-1166 :sld 7