HomeMy WebLinkAbout100 Adoptions 2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
K.S., DOB: 05/30/06 :
: 100 ADOPTIONS 2010
:
J.S., DOB: 07/01/08 : 101 ADOPTIONS 2010
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925
Masland, J., April 1, 2011:--
Procedural Background
On February 16, 2011, this court heard testimony on the petitions of Cumberland
County Children & Youth Services, (CYS) to review and determine the permanency
plans of minor children K.S. and J.S. and to terminate the parental rights of natural
mother, K.K. (mother) and natural father, R.S. (father). Following a lengthy hearing, this
court granted both requests for termination and, in the related dependency court
matters, the court changed the permanency goal for both children from reunification to
adoption.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal on March 14, 2011, in the Orphans’ Court matter alone. Said
statement having been timely filed and received in accordance with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the court will now address the issues raised in the Orphans’ Court
proceeding pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Factual Background
K.S. was born on May 30, 2006. Within months, in October, 2006, CYS became
involved with the family due to the parents’ unmanaged mental health concerns. Over
the next few years, CYS was involved in numerous referrals including but not limited to
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substance abuse by both parents, an eviction related to drug use, inappropriate
supervision of K.S., inadequate shelter for K.S., the diagnosis of K.S. with insulin
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dependent diabetes, and mental health concerns for both parents. In the midst of
these various referrals, J.S. was born on July 1, 2008. Ultimately, on April 9, 2009, K.S.
and J.S. were found to be dependent and removed from the home and placed with
foster parents. The basis for the dependency adjudication was the continued parental
drug abuse, unstable housing, and inadequate supervision. The children were returned
to their mother’s care on September 25, 2009, but were returned to foster care on
December 18, 2009, due to the mother’s inability to control her substance abuse
problems and her inability to meet the medical needs of K.S. On December 10, 2010,
CYS filed a petition for involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights, alleging the
following grounds:
1. 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(2).
The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent. (Emphasis added).
2. 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(5).
The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available
to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
Court Exhibit 1, Cumberland County CASA report to the court (CASA), p. 2 and
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3.
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which led to the removal or placement of the child
within a reasonable period of time and termination of
the parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child. (Emphasis added).
3. 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(8).
The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist and termination of parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of the child. (Emphasis
added).
4. 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(d).
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall
give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
(Emphasis added).
Here, CYS bears the burden of proving the grounds for termination by
clear and convincing evidence, “a standard which requires evidence that is so
clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a
clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2009). Sadly, this matter presented
such evidence, and the court must terminate the mother’s parental rights.
Discussion
In addressing the aforesaid grounds, the court will focus on four aspects of
the permanency plan developed for mother and her inability and/or unwillingness
to comply therewith. Specifically, the court will address: (1) mother’s drug and
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alcohol problems, (2) mother’s mental health, (3) diabetes management, and (4)
stable and safe housing.
1. Mother’s Drug and Alcohol Problems
First, mother’s permanency plan required her to cooperate with a drug and
alcohol evaluation, follow any recommendations given, and submit to random
drug tests. As previously noted, mother has had a problem maintaining sobriety
since the initial referral to CYS and has engaged in drug and alcohol treatment
four times since the children were found to be dependent. A little over a month
after the children were returned to her in September, 2009, mother tested
positive for marijuana and reentered treatment at Roxbury. She was
unsuccessfully discharged in December, 2009, due to noncompliance with the
attendance policy (a recurring issue with mother in other areas as well). Mother
enrolled a second time in outpatient treatment and was again discharged for
noncompliance in April, 2010.
In April, 2010, when she was pregnant (though she denied that fact)
mother tested positive for marijuana. In June, 2010, mother again tested positive
for marijuana, after which she completed a second drug and alcohol evaluation
that recommended she participate in individual counseling. In September, 2010,
mother was successfully discharged from counseling program.
Although mother tested positive for marijuana use and admitted to using
Vicodin during her recent pregnancy, she has not tested positive on any further
drug screens. Regarding the Vicodin use, mother claims it was “for a bad tooth,”
and that she was told by the Sadler Health Clinic that she could take pain
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medication while pregnant. Bonnie Gentile, receptionist at the Sadler Health
Clinic acknowledged speaking to the mother on the phone and knowing that the
mother was pregnant; however, she emphatically asserted that she refers
pregnant women to their obstetrician/gynecologist with questions regarding such
medications. Mother’s explanation for using the Vicodin during her pregnancy
was not credible with respect to the alleged permission she was granted. Equally
disturbing was how she had the pill available. In short, mother claimed that she
had received Vicodin as a result of third degree burns on her leg and happened
to have it available when her chipped tooth was causing her pain. The court
never ceases to be amazed at how controlled substances miraculously appear
for individuals with substance abuse problems.
Importantly, following this incident in September, 2010, CYS attempted to
increase drug screens with mother to two times per week, but mother did not
cooperate, either failing to return calls or claiming she had transportation
problems that precluded her from traveling to town. On October 19, 2010, when
mother gave birth to her third daughter, both screened negative for drugs. At this
time the agency tried to increase the screens to three times a week, but was
unable to obtain mother’s compliance.
In the weeks preceding the filing of the petition for termination, mother
refused to take a drug test on three occasions. Although the last drug test taken
by mother was on December 12, 2010, and was negative, on five occasions
between December 29, 2010 and February 14, 2011, mother was requested to
appear at CYS for a drug test but did not return any of the calls. On the last
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occasion, she spoke to her caseworker, Robert Haines, and informed him that
she would be in later in the afternoon; however, she did not appear for the drug
test.
In sum, although mother has not testified positive on any drug screen
since her successful completion of treatment in September, 2010, she has
repeatedly failed to comply with CYS requests for random drug screens as
required by her permanency plan. When asked by her counsel why she refused
a drug test on October 14, 2010, her response was “I don’t recall.” Mother claims
to have never made an outright refusal to take a test and also asserts that CYS
refused to return her calls, an assertion we find incredible. To the contrary, we
find that her actions speak much louder than her words. Mother’s substance
abuse concerns are just as troubling now as they were when the children were
declared dependent in April, 2009.
2. Mother’s Mental Health
Another integral part of mother’s permanency plan from the inception of
this saga was that she manage her mental health concerns. Following an
updated drug and alcohol evaluation in November, 2010, it was recommended
that mother resume management of her mental health needs. Again, the
testimony of mother’s caseworker revealed a pattern of noncompliance in the
management of her mental health issues since the agencies first referral in
October, 2006.
Following a March, 2010, psychiatric evaluation through Holy Spirit
Hospital, mother was diagnosed on Axis I with bi-polar affected disorder II, most
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recent depressed and on Axis II with personality disorder, NOS with dependent
features. Although it was known that mother was pregnant at that time it was
recommended that she resume use of the medication Abilify and was informed
that the benefits would far outweigh any possible risk to her child. She was
directed to call Holy Spirit Hospital after discussing the use of Abilify with her
obstetrician, but once again mother did not follow through and, in fact, failed to
appear for an appointment at Holy Spirit Hospital on May 5, 2010.
With respect to her mental health needs, mother testified that she might
take her medication “once a day for irritability.” Regarding her need for
counseling, she acknowledged having failed to attend an appointment in
December, 2010, with Momentum Services. When asked if she called the
agency to report her inability to attend, she responded “No.” When asked by her
counsel why she did not attend, her response was simply “Don’t know.”
Similarly, mother’s attorney inquired about her attempts to contact the
Stevens Mental Health Center for treatment and mother noted that she called on
January 6 but hung up when she found it would take six to eight weeks to get an
appointment. Mother testified that she called Stevens Center again on the day
before the hearing, February 15, 2011, and when asked by counsel why, her
response was “I don’t know . . . I know I need help.” It is not comforting that
mother has only come to this realization on the eve of the termination hearing.
As with her substance abuse, with every small step forward over the past two
years, there has been a corresponding step backwards.
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3. Diabetes Management
Mother’s permanency plan also requires her to participate in diabetes
management training at Hershey Medical Center. Although mother did
participate in training in April, 2010, she has not demonstrated an understanding
of the importance of maintaining K.S.’s sugar levels. Moreover, when the
children are with the kinship providers, mother has not been involved in caring for
K.S.’s diabetes, and the care K.S. gets falls short of this mark. As the CASA
summarized:
[K.S.’s] blood sugar levels have been poorly
controlled during community visits at [grandfather’s]
home while under the care of [grandfather’s] nieces,
both of whom had offered to provide medical care for
[K.S.]. On several occasions, [K.S.’s] blood sugar
logs were not completed, her ketone levels were not
monitored following two or more high blood sugar
readings, and inappropriate levels of insulin were
administered. All of these actions contravened the
direction of [K.S.’s] pediatric endocrinologist. As a
result, [grandfather’s] informal kinship application has
been denied by CYS. The supporting kinship
applications by [grandfather’s] nieces, [T and T], were
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also denied.
Not surprisingly, given mother’s failure to attend her own appointments,
she has also failed to attend appointments regarding K.S.’s diabetes. In fact,
when mother was asked on direct examination whether she had attended doctor
appointments for K.S., her response was simply “No.” And when asked if she
tried to talk to CYS about this, her response, in keeping with all other responses,
was “No, just haven’t.” Regarding her attendance at the doctor appointments for
CASA at 4 and 5.
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J.S., mother noted that she had no idea when those appointments were nor was
she sure who the pediatrician was. In keeping with her pattern of behavior, she
did not bother calling CYS to inquire.
With respect to mother’s ability to adequately care for her insulin
dependent daughter, the child’s pediatric endocrinologist, Dr. Margaret
D’Arcangelo, noted that if the child has a high hemoglobin A1C levels over the
course of time, there is a thirty percent increase in complications that may
damage the child’s kidneys, eyes and nerves. In comparison to the excellent
care K.S. has received with her foster family, on at least three occasions when
the child has been in mother’s care, she has had high A1C tests. Given the
universe of problems surrounding mother and her inability to care or cope with
them, the court is chary to trust K.S. to mother’s long-term care given the
potential dire consequences.
4. Stable and Safe Housing
Finally, mother’s permanency plan requires her to obtain and maintain
stable and safe housing to accommodate the children and to secure and
maintain a regular source of income. Because these problems pale in
comparison with those previously addressed, we will not belabor the point.
Suffice it to say that the record will show that the mother has bounced around
from house to house and lied to the agency about repeated evictions. She
currently lives with eight other individuals; an arrangement, that even K.S. related
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to the CASA as being inadequate. Two statements of the caseworker summed
matters up well. First, with respect to mother’s credibility, in particular, and her
CASA at 5.
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long-term ability to address her problems, in general, he stated “everything she
says I need to do follow-up because she has lied about various things.” And,
finally, in response to a series of questions from guardian ad litem for the
children, he stated “I’m not seeing her really working hard at any of this.” The
court concurs in this assessment.
On the basis of the foregoing and all of the evidence presented to the
court, there was clear and convincing evidence to prove each ground for
termination. In sum, mother has caused the children to be without essential
parental care and those conditions and causes cannot be remedied by the
mother in a reasonable period of time, if ever. In fact, those conditions continue
to exist with relatively little improvement since the children were first found to be
dependent. To say that the children have languished over the past two years
would be an overstatement because CYS and the foster parents have prevented
them from wasting away. However, we are convinced that had the children spent
20 of 22 months with mother, their prognosis would be bleak. Therefore, we find
that termination of parental rights will serve the best interests of K.S. and J.S.
Having found the grounds to terminate the parental rights of mother exist
under Section 2511(a), the court turns to the provisions of 2511(b) and the
question of the existence of an emotional bond between the children and mother
and whether that bond should be preserved. From our review of the CASA
Exhibits and the testimony presented in court, we acknowledge that a bond
exists between mother and her daughters; however, the children have formed
bonds with their foster parents as well, and we find that the existence of this bond
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will enable mother’s bond to be severed without causing irreparable harm to the
children. Foster mother’s testimony was credible not only with respect to
bonding but in all respects. The foster parents are clearly better able to care for
the children’s general needs and for K.S.’s particular diabetic concerns.
Moreover, they have formed a close bond with both girls, who have in turn
bonded with them as well as their adopted son, biological daughter, and other
foster child.
In determining the best interest of the children under 2511(b), the court
must examine whether termination of parental rights would “best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re
T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 921 (Pa. Super. 2008). The court must consider “intangibles
such as love, comfort, security and stability” and also “discern the nature and
status of the parent-child bond,” paying “utmost attention” to the effect upon the
child of its severance. Id.
We do not relish making this determination, but termination would clearly
best serve the needs and welfare of K.S and J.S. K.S. is receiving proper
medical care with the foster parents, and both are otherwise thriving. They
recognize the foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” They have languished for
20 of the last 22 months waiting for their parents to get their acts together.
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Although mother is certainly a better parent then father, her efforts to address
her needs and the children’s needs have fallen woefully short.It was eminently
clear to us from mother’s testimony and demeanor in court that her ability to
Father did not testify at the hearing nor has he appealed our order. The case to
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terminate his rights was proven beyond all doubt.
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address her concerns, let alone those of her daughters, is significantly
challenged. We suggest that mother now focus her time and energy on properly
caring for the infant daughter who remains in her custody to avoid a similar day
of reckoning.
Conclusion
The agency met its burden to demonstrate not only that a change in the
permanency goals for K.S. and J.S. was in order, but also that grounds for
termination under Sections 2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) existed. Mother’s
repeated incapacity and refusal to perform her duties have caused the children to
be without the essential care they require. Because mother fails to recognize or
admit the causes of her incapacity, it is clear that no remedy is in sight.
Accordingly, it is also clear to the court that termination will best serve the needs
and welfare of K.S. and J.S., allowing their adoption by adults who are willing to
provide them the care, stability, nurture, and love that they require to continue to
thrive.
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
Lindsay D. Baird Esquire
For CYS
Sheri Coover, Esquire
For the Mother
Sean Shultz, Esquire
For the Father
Cindy Villanella, Esquire
Guardian ad Litem
CYS :saa
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