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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0002732-2008 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CP-21-CR-2732-2008 : : RENEE LAMASON : IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 BEFORE HESS, P.J. OPINION AND ORDER Renee M. Lamason has filed an appeal from her convictions on two counts of Indecent Assault and two counts of Endangering the Welfare of Children. In her appeal, Lamason contends that she was prejudiced by the consolidation of her case with that of her husband, Scott Lamason. She also argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to allow the jury to find her guilty of either Indecent Assault or Endangering the Welfare of Children. At trial, defendant’s son, J.G., testified that he was sexually abused by defendant and her husband, Scott Lamason, on separate occasions. (Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings, April 6, 2009, at 45-67; hereinafter “N.T. _”). J.G. testified at trial that his mother touched him inappropriately by using her hand to touch his genitals on more than one occasion. (N.T. 47). J. G. further testified that his mother forced him to insert his genitals into hers. (N.T. 42). J.G. stated under oath that this made him mad, but he was scared to tell anyone because she threatened to kill him if he did. (N.T. 53). At trial, J.G. stated that both his mother and his stepfather, Scott Lamason, made him touch his sisters, M.L. and S.L., inappropriately. (N.T. 63- 67). He also stated that defendant and her husband took pornographic pictures of the children. (N.T. 77). J.G. made separate allegations that his stepfather, Scott Lamason, touched him inappropriately and molested him. (N.T. 57-62). J.G. also testified that the places he lived with his family were uncomfortable and unclean. (N.T. 43). In addition to providing testimony from J.G., the Commonwealth also presented the testimony of M.L., the daughter of the defendant. (N.T. 84). M.L. echoed many of the allegations made by her brother, J.G., and she testified that she was abused by both the defendant and Scott Lamason. M.L. explained that the defendant used her hand to touch her genitals. (N.T. 91). At trial, M.L. distinguished the allegations of misconduct against the defendant from those against Scott Lamason. (N.T. 94). Pam Gross, a caseworker for Cumberland County Children and Youth Services, testified that she was responsible for the supervision of the defendant and her children. (N.T. 100-01). Gross further testified that J.G., M.L., and S.L. had to be placed in foster care because of unstable housing and severe hygiene issues. (N.T. 103). Gross explained that the family had moved thirty-six times in a span of just six and a half years and some of the places they lived included a tent, a car, and a hotel. (N.T. 103, 130). She also testified that there were numerous incidents of head lice over the years and that the children often appeared unclean. (N.T. 104). Ms. Gross further testified that they tried to do everything they could to keep the children in the defendant’s care, but it finally came to a point where they had to be removed for their safety. (N.T. 105). She explained that J.G., M.L., and S.L. were placed in the foster care of Tracy Reesman. (N.T. 101). Ms. Gross testified that J.G. had to be removed from foster care because he was acting out and made numerous attempts to harm himself. (N.T. 119). After being removed from foster care, J.G. was placed in a partial hospitalization treatment program. (N.T. 119). 2 At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Tracy Reesman. (N.T. 157). Reesman served as the therapeutic foster parent to J.G., M.L., and S.L. (N.T.158). Reesman testified that all three children were very fearful of their parents and did not want to go to their scheduled visits with them. (N.T. 169-70). Reesman also testified that the children recalled that the places they lived with their parents were dirty and cold. (N.T. 183). At trial, Reesman testified that the children told her about the sexual abuse they had suffered by their parents without being prompted. (N.T. 186). Defendant, Renee M. Lamason, argues that this court erred by consolidating her case with that of her husband, Scott Lamason. She claims that she was prejudiced by the court’s decision to refuse her request for a separate trial. Joinder is governed by Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 582, which provides in pertinent part, as follows: (A) Standards (1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried together if: (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction. (2) Defendants charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried together if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Pa.R.Crim.P. 582. The standard for reviewing a trial court’s denial of a request for severance is abuse of discretion. Com. v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1981). “As a general proposition it is well established that the grant or denial of severance is a matter of discretion with the trial judge whose conclusion will be reversed only for manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear 3 injustice to the defendant.” Com. v. Peterson, 307 A.2d 264 (Pa. 1973). A defendant has the burden of showing that he suffered actual, not speculative, prejudice because of the court’s granting of a joint trial. Com. v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2001). A claim that one defendant may try to absolve himself at the expense of the other is not enough to justify granting severance. Com. v. Chester, 587 A.2d 1367, 1373 (Pa. 1991). Severance is not justified simply because a co-defendant may have been more likely to be acquitted if they were tried separately. Com. v. Iacino, 401 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Pa.Super. 1979). “[T]he fact that defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the extents to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together.” Chester, 587 A.2d at 1373. In assessing the propriety of a joint trial, Pennsylvania courts have considered the burden placed on a young victim by testifying in two separate lengthy trials. For example, in Com. v. Patterson, the court held that an appellee was not unduly prejudiced by being tried in a joint trial. Com. v. Patterson, 546 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa. 1988). In Patterson, two co-defendants were faced with identical rape, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and conspiracy charges based on the same incident and involving the same evidence, but one co-defendant was also charged with witness intimidation. Id. at 597-98. In finding that the appellee would not be prejudiced by a joint trial, the court reasoned that forcing the young victim to testify at two separate lengthy trials would impose an unnecessary burden. Id. The court also concluded that any resulting prejudice could be offset by curative and cautionary instructions. Id. In the instant case, Defendant Renee Lamason was not unduly prejudiced by the court’s decision to consolidate her case with Scott Lamason’s case. The case sub judice is similar to 4 Patterson because in each case the victim was a young child. In Patterson, the court reasoned that forcing the young victim to testify at two separate lengthy trials would be more burdensome on the victims than is necessary. Id. at 199. In the case sub judice, the victims of the alleged sexual and physical abuse are three children. At trial, two of the children presented detailed accounts of their parents’ misconduct. The children explained that the abuse they suffered made them angry and embarrassed. In considering the nature of the abuse the children claimed to have suffered, it is clear that forcing them to testify more than once would have been extremely burdensome. Defendant contends that testimony provided at trial, wherein Scott Lamason was alleged to have sexually abused the children, inflamed the jury and prejudiced them against her. The Commonwealth, however, also presented testimony from the children detailing separate allegations of sexual abuse committed by the defendant herself, including claims that she inappropriately touched and molested the children. At trial, J.G. and M.L. testified that both defendant and Scott Lamason threatened to kill them if they told anyone about the abuse they had suffered. Defendant further argues that there was no evidence produced at trial that the defendant and Scott Lamason conspired together to abuse the children or subject them to any abuse. The Commonwealth, however, presented testimony from J.G. indicating that his mother and stepfather took pornographic pictures of him. It is clear that the defendants were each aware of the conduct of the other. In addition to the allegations of sexual abuse, the Commonwealth also charged the defendant and Scott Lamason with endangering the welfare of the children. The evidence 5 presented demonstrated that J.G., M.L., and S.L. were malnourished, suffered from severe hygiene issues, and have lived in deplorable housing conditions. This evidence, as it pertains to both the defendant and Scott Lamason, was the same because both individuals shared the responsibility of ensuring that their children were adequately cared for. Upon presenting evidence which indicated that the children did not receive the minimum level of care imposed by law, the Commonwealth demonstrated that both the defendant and Scott Lamason had failed to ensure the safety of the children. For these reasons, it was in the best interest of judicial economy to consolidate the cases of the defendant and Scott Lamason. Defendant Lamason also contends that her convictions of indecent assault and endangering the welfare of children were not supported by the weight of the evidence. To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a jury’s finding of guilt, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Com. v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90, 95 (Pa.Super. 1995). The test is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa. Super. 2002). The evidence is sufficient whenever the trier of fact could have found that each element of the crimes charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Defendant first contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict her of indecent assault. Indecent assault is found at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Offense defined. –A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire 6 in the person or the complainant and: . . . (7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 33126(a). Defendant’s contention that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence to support her conviction of indecent assault is without merit. Taking the evidence of trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to establish the necessary elements which make up the crime of indecent assault. Specifically, with regard to subsection (7), it is undisputed that all three of the victims in the case sub judice were under the age of thirteen. The legal sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, hinges upon whether the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the defendant had indecent contact with the victim for the purpose of arousing sexual desire. At trial, J.G. testified that the defendant touched his private parts with her hand on more than one occasion. Similarly, M.G. testified that the defendant also touched her genitals using her hand. The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Tracy Reesman, who served as a foster parent to each of defendant’s children at one point, and she testified that the children recalled being touched inappropriately by their mother and expressed fears that it would happen again. It is clear that the touching was sexual in nature. Defendant also contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict her of endangering the welfare of children. An individual is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child if he or she, as a parent, guardian, or other person supervising the child’s welfare, knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304. In order to support a conviction of endangering the welfare of children, the 7 Commonwealth must establish each of the following elements: “(1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2) the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare; and (3) the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s welfare.” Com. v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Pa.Super. 2002). In the case, the first element of the offense is undisputed because defendant had parental guardian status over J.G., M.L., and S.L. at all relevant times. As a parental guardian, the defendant has a duty to ensure that her children are safe and cared for. The second element of endangering the welfare of children requires that the defendant is aware that her children are in circumstances that could threaten their physical or psychological welfare. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from J.G. and M.L. that the defendant touched them inappropriately. J.G. also alleged that defendant forced him to have sexual intercourse with her. Tracy Reesman testified that the children confirmed the allegations of sexual abuse committed by the defendant to her, and she testified that the children were often fearful that they would be abused again. Defendant should have been fully aware that sexually abusing her children would have lasting psychological effects. The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Pamela Gross, a caseworker who supervised the defendant and her three children. Ms. Gross testified that the children had to be placed in foster care because of unstable housing and severe hygiene issues. The living conditions, as well as the sexual abuse to which the children were subjected, show that the defendant was aware that her children were living under circumstances that threatened their physical and psychological welfare. 8 Finally, the defendant’s attempts to protect the welfare of her children were either non- existent or were so insufficient that they could not reasonably be expected to protect their welfare. It is clear that defendant not only failed to protect the welfare of children, but directly placed them in danger by touching them inappropriately and taking pornographic pictures of them. At trial, the children alleged that the were also sexually abused by Scott Lamason. Defendant claims that she was unaware of her husband’s misconduct, but the fact that it occurred multiple times and while they were living together suggests that her claim is not credible. By additionally failing to protect her children from her husband, the defendant violated her duty to protect the welfare of her children. Having demonstrated that the evidence presented was sufficient to satisfy all of the elements for endangering the welfare of children beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s conviction did not lack legal sufficiency. As the fact finder, the jury was free to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses presented before them and accept or reject their testimonies as they saw fit. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty. May 5, 2011 _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. Matthew Smith, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Sheri Coover, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm 9