HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-3505 CivilDAVID W. KNAUER,
ESQUIRE, and DAVID W.
KNAUER, P.C.,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Vo
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
RISK ENTERPRISE
MANAGEMENT LIMITED a/k/a:
REM, JAMES R. SCHADEL,
ESQUIRE, WEINHEIMER
SCHADEL & HABER,
MICHAEL P. O'DAY,
ESQUIRE, and O'DAY &
SMITH, a parmership,
Defendants
NO. 97-3505 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
OBJECTION TO VENUE
BEFORE HOFFER~ P.J. OLER and GUIDO~ JJ.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J., July 10, 2001.
This case has its genesis in an earlier legal malpractice claim brought on behalf of
Fred F. Schleicher by his attorney, David W. Knauer, Esquire, a Plaintiff herein. The
malpractice action was based upon the allegedly negligent prosecution of a workers'
compensation claim by Schleicher's prior counsel, a law firm known as O'Day and
Smith. ~
James R. Schadel, Esquire, a Defendant herein, was attorney for O'Day and Smith
in the malpractice action. On behalf of his client, he joined Knauer as an additional
defendant in the action.2 Knauer requested dismissal of the joinder, and Schadel
eventually, but not immediately, complied with the request.3 Knauer then commenced the
~ Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 5; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 5.
2 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G.
3 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 41; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 41.
current action against the above-named Defendants, asserting various claims arising from
the allegedly improper joinder.4
All Defendants have been dismissed from the present action except Schadel and
his law firm, Weinheimer, Schadel & Haber.5 All counts have been dismissed except
Count III (abuse of process for wrongful initiation ofjoinder by Knauer against Schadel),
Count IV (abuse of process for wrongful continuation of joinder by Knauer against
Schadel), Count XII (wrongful use of civil proceedings for initiation ofjoinder by Knauer
against Schadel), Count XV (wrongful use of civil proceedings for continuation of
joinder by Knauer against Schadel), Count XVIII (abuse of process, wrongful use of civil
proceedings for initiation and continuation ofjoinder by Knauer, P.C., against Schadel),
and Count XXII (civil conspiracy to commit perjury by Knauer against Schadel and
Weinheimer, Schadel & Haber).6
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the pending counts. Defendants
also, as part of the motion for summary judgment, have moved for transfer of the case to
Indiana County or Allegheny County, on the ground of improper venue.
Based upon the evidence in the record, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted and
Defendants' objection to venue, included as part of the motion for summary judgment,
will be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure establish the standard of review for a
motion for summary judgment:
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not
to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in
whole or in part as a matter of law
See Third Am. Compl. (hereinafter "Complaint").
See Stipulation of Dismissal, June 20, 2000; Stipulations of Dismissal, July 14, 2000.
See Op. and Order of Ct., February 22, 1999.
2
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as
to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could
be established by additional discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the
motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party
who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in
a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.
Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2.
Under subparagraph (1) of Rule 1035.2, summary judgment may be granted if the
material facts are not in dispute and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Dean v. Commonwealth, 561 Pa. 503, 507, 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (2000). In this
context, "the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [non-moving]
party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party." Id. at 507, 751 A.2d at 1132. Under subparagraph
(2), summary judgment also may be granted if the non-moving party has not offered
evidence sufficient to support its burden of proof on a key element of the claim or
defense. Young v. Commonwealth Dept. ofTransp., 560 Pa. 373, 375-76, 744 A.2d 1276,
1277 (2000).
This case was preceded by a workers' compensation claim instituted on behalf of
one Fred Schleicher by a law firm known as O'Day and Smith.7 The claim was
successful, but Schleicher was unable to collect on the award because the entity identified
as his employer in the claim as filed was not in fact responsible for providing workers'
compensation coverage for him and could not satisfy the award.8 After discovery of the
mistake, Schleicher notified O'Day and Smith and requested that it take action against his
"true" employer.9
7 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 5; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 5.
8 Compl. para. 12; Answer para. 12.
9 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 11, 12; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 11, 12.
When O'Day and Smith did not respond to this letter of notification, Schleicher
scheduled an appointment with Knauer, of the law firm known as David W. Knauer, P.C.,
for 3:00 p.m. on September 9, 1986; as it happened, September 9, 1986 was the last day
on which a workers' compensation claim could be filed under the applicable statute of
limitations,l° Schleicher arrived at Knauer's office with his employment log book, but
without the file on his claim, which was still at O'Day and Smith.il The log book
contained information identifying Schleicher's true employer and the statute of
limitations period.12 After a brief meeting with Knauer, Schleicher left to retrieve the
file.13 Schleicher returned later that day, but the evidence tends to show that Knauer did
not review the file until that evening, after government offices had closed.TM Schleicher
did not sign his contingent fee agreement until September 10, 1986, and Knauer filed
Schleicher's claim that day, after the expiration of the statute of limitations period. 15
Knauer, on behalf of Schleicher, commenced litigation in Indiana County for legal
malpractice against O'Day and Smith on September 12, 1986, based upon negligent
representation with respect to Schleicher's workers' compensation claim.16 The
malpractice complaint stated in paragraph 20 that, "[s]ubsequent to SCHLEICHER'S
retention of[Knauer] as his counsel, SCHLEICHER instituted a claim petition" against
Schleicher's true employer.17 Since the claim petition had been filed only one day after
l0 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 13, 14; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 13, 14.
ll Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 17; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 18.
12 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. E.
13 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 20; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 20.
14 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 20; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. paras. 16, 20.
15 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para.
31; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 31.
16 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 5; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot.
Suture. J. para. 5.
17 Compl. para. 20 (emphasis added).
4
the expiration of the statute of limitations,la this allegation lent itself to an interpretation
that Knauer was Schieicher's attorney before the expiration of the statute of limitations
and could himself have submitted a claim in time on behalf of Schieicher.
Based upon this interpretation, Schadei joined Knauer as an additional defendant
in the malpractice action on October 20, 1993.~9 The depositions of Knauer and others in
connection with the joinder initially were scheduled for November 18, 1993, but due to
scheduling conflicts of Knauer and other persons, the depositions were not conducted
until December 16, 1994.20 During his deposition, Knauer produced his appointment
schedule for September 9, 1986 and the contingent fee agreement dated September 10,
1986,2~ both of which tended to support Knauer's position that he did not have sufficient
time to file a complaint before 5:00 p.m. on September 9, 1986.22
The deposition of Michael P. O'Day, Esquire, also conducted on December 16,
1994, precipitated the charge of civil conspiracy to commit perjury against Schadei and
Weinheimer, Schadei & Haber. Knauer conducted the deposition of O'Day, during which
Knauer asked if O'Day knew the whereabouts of Edward H. Smith, Esquire.23 O'Day
testified that he did not know Smith's whereabouts,24 and Knauer alleges that O'Day
intentionally perjured himself to conceal information possessed by Smith that showed the
la Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. S; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 21.
19 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot.
Summ. J. para. 29.
20 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. R; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot.
Summ. J. para. 49-50.
2~ Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 31; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 31.
22 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. S; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. T; Pis.' Br. Opp'n Defs.' Mot.
Summ. J. at 2-4.
23 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. O; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 53-54.
24 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. O; Pis.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 53-54.
joinder was improper.25 Knauer alleges that Schadel and Weinheimer, Schadel & Haber
conspired with O'Day with respect to the commission of this perjury.26
Following the depositions, Knauer requested that Schadel discontinue the joinder,
and Schadel subsequently did so.27 In a letter to the insurer of his client dated December
30, 1994, Schadel stated that the initial joinder had been based solely on the pleadings,
and that the continuation of the joinder might be feasible with further discovery.28 In this
regard, Schadel questioned details of Knauer's deposition, specifically claims that Knauer
did not have sufficient time to review Schleicher's file before the expiration of the statute
of limitations.29 On February 2, 1995, Knauer secured issuance of a rule upon Schadel's
client to file a complaint against Knauer.3°
Schadel followed with another letter to the insurer in March, 1995 advising that
the joinder was unlikely to succeed and that it presented an "acute conflict" for Knauer in
continuing to act as Schleicher's attorney while being joined as a defendant.3~ Schadel
then submitted a praecipe to discontinue the joinder, to which Knauer consented, and the
joinder was filed as discontinued on July 5, 1995.32
Knauer commenced the current action against the above-named Defendants in
1997.33
25 Compl. paras. 45-46, 48.
26 Id.
27 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 32; Pls.' Resp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. para. 32.
2a Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. S. Home Insurance Company insured O'Day & Smith during
the litigation concerning Schleicher's claim for malpractice. Id
29 Id.
30 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H.
3~ Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. T.
32 Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J.
33 See Compl.
DISCUSSION
Statement of Law
Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings. The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings
is codified at 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8351, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Elements of action.--A person who takes part in the procurement,
initiation or continuation of civil proceedings against another is subject to
liability to the other for wrongful use of civil proceedings:
(1) He acts in a grossly negligent manner or without probable
cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the
proper discovery, joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim in
which the proceedings are based; and
(2) The proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
against whom they are brought.
Act of Dec. 19, 1980, P.L. 1296, No. 232, § 1, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8351(a) (West 1998 &
Supp. 2001).
Three elements must be proven to succeed in this type of claim: (1) that the
defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause in instituting or
continuing the underlying civil proceedings, (2) that the defendant acted with malicious
or improper purpose, and (3) that the underlying civil proceedings were terminated in
favor of the plaintiff. Rosen v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 399 Pa. Super. 226, 230, 582
A.2d 27, 29-30 (1990) (citing Shaf]kr v. Stewart, 326 Pa. Super. 135, 140, 473 A.2d
1017, 1020 (1984)). Only a party in the underlying action may maintain a subsequent
claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. Hart v. 0 'Malley, 436 Pa. Super. 151, 165,
647 A.2d 542, 549 (1994), aff'd, 544 Pa. 315, 676 A.2d 222 (1996).
The first element of the claim may be satisfied by showing the defendant acted
either in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause in instituting the
underlying litigation. Under the statute, probable cause exists when
[a] person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or
continuation of civil proceedings.., reasonably believes in the existence of
the facts upon which the claim is based, and ....
Believes as an attorney of record, in good faith that his
procurement, initiation or continuation of a civil cause is not intended to
merely harass or maliciously injure the opposite party.
42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8352. Evidence of an improper motive may support an allegation of a
lack of probable cause. Korn v. Epstein, 727 A.2d 1130, 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999),
appeal denied, 743 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1999).
The second element of the claim is satisfied by showing that the defendant
instituted or continued underlying litigation for a malicious or improper purpose. As to
this element, it is unnecessary to prove actual malice; improper purpose may be inferred
from attendant circumstances, including lack of probable cause. Gentzler v. Atlee, 443 Pa.
Super. 128, 142, 660 A.2d 1378, 1385 (1995) (citing ShafJbr, 326 Pa. Super. 135, 473
A.2d 1017)). One common example of litigation brought for an improper purpose is the
"nuisance suit," in which the claim is meant only to harass the other party and to force
him or her into a favorable settlement. ShafJbr, 326 Pa. Super. at 142-43, 473 A.2d at
1021 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 676 cmt. c (1979)). Improper purpose is
normally a question for the trier of fact. See Bannar, 701 A.2d at 239.
The third element is satisfied by showing a favorable termination of the underlying
litigation for the plaintiff. "Whether withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final
termination in favor of the person against whom the proceedings are brought.., depends
on the circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn." Rosenfield v. Pa.
Auto. Ins. Plan, 431 Pa. Super. 383, 389, 636 A.2d 1138, 1142 (1994) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. j). Withdrawals occasioned by compromise or
mootness do not constitute favorable termination. Id at 389, 636 A.2d at 1142.
Settlement agreements and other forms of compromise do not generally establish
favorable termination for either party since neither party admits fault. Elec. Lab. Supply
Co. v. Cullen, 712 A.2d 304, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). Facts showing a "last-second
dismissal in the face of imminent defeat" may establish that the termination favored the
opposing party. Bannar, 701 A.2d at 239. Whether the underlying proceedings
terminated in favor of the plaintiff sub judice is a matter for the court to decide.
Rosenfield, 431 Pa. Super. at 389, 636 A.2d at 1141.
Abuse of Process. The tort of abuse of process requires proof of the defendant's
use of a legal process against another "primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was
not designed." Rosen v. Am. Bank of Rolla, 426 Pa. Super. 376, 381, 627 A.2d 190, 192
(1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682). Unlike the elements of wrongful
use of civil proceedings, the elements of this tort do not include a requirement that the
defendant instituted the underlying litigation with an improper purpose. Id. at 381, 627
A.2d at 192 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a). Rather, abuse of
process is concerned only with "subsequent misuse of the process." Id at 381, 627 A.2d
at 192 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a). The party must "actively
seek and employ" the process to harm the adverse party in the underlying litigation to
support a claim for abuse of process. Hart, 436 Pa. Super. at 169, 647 A.2d at 551-52.
"[T]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the
process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." ShafJkr, 326 Pa.
Super. at 139, 473 A.2d at 1019 (quoting Di Sante v. Russ Fin. Co., 251 Pa. Super. 184,
189, 380 A.2d 439, 441 (1977)).
Civil Conspiracy. The tort of civil conspiracy requires "that two or more persons
combined or agreed with intent to do an unlawful act or to do an otherwise lawful act by
unlawful means." Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 211,412 A.2d 466,
472 (1979). if a civil cause of action does not attach to the particular act underlying the
alleged conspiracy, the civil conspiracy claim cannot stand. Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa.
Super. 422, 432, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1987).
Venue. "improper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if not so
raised shall be waived." Pa. R.C.P. i006(e). The "proper manner" for raising improper
venue is by preliminary objection. Hohlstein v. Hohlstein, 223 Pa. Super. 348, 352, 296
A.2d 886, 888 (1972). Unlike improper venue, petitions for change of venue by reason of
forum non conveniens may be brought after an answer has been filed. Pa. R.C.P. i006(d);
see Scola v. AC & S, Inc., 540 Pa. 353,366-67, 657 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1995).
Application of Law to Facts
Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings. In the present case, the record does not
support the proposition that Schadel acted with gross negligence or without probable
cause in initiating the joinder. Schadel instituted the joinder based on a paragraph in the
malpractice action complaint stating that "[s]ubsequent to SCHLEICHER'S retention of
[Knauer] as his counsel, SCHLEICHER instituted a claim petition" against Schleicher's
true employer.34 Given the fact that the statute of limitations had been missed by less than
one day, Schadel's premise in joining Knauer was not without a reasonable basis.
Nor does the record support the proposition that Schadel acted with gross
negligence or without probable cause in continuing the joinder. Soon after initiating the
joinder in October 1993, Schadel requested information pertaining to the timing of
Knauer's meeting with Schleicher on September 9, 1986, but Knauer did not produce
information at a deposition until December 1994. The evidence showed that the delay of
over a year in taking the deposition was not caused by Schadel, but by scheduling
conflicts among all parties involved in the depositions, including Knauer, and that within
a relatively short time of the Knauer deposition, Schadel discontinued the joinder. Since,
as discussed previously, Schadel did not act with gross negligence or without probable
cause in initiating the joinder, he did not act without probable cause in pursuing it until
the discontinuance. For these reasons, the wrongful use of civil proceedings claim by
Knauer must be dismissed.
In addition, Knauer, P.C., cannot maintain a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings. As all parties acknowledge in their briefs, an entity that is not a party in the
underlying action cannot stand as a party in a subsequent wrongful use of civil
proceedings claim.35 Since Knauer, P.C., was not a party in the underlying joinder, the
claims by Knauer, P.C., against Schadel must be dismissed.
34 Compl. para. 20; see Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. S.
35 Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. Summ J. at 36; Pls.' Br. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. at 15.
10
Abuse of Process. In the court's view, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to
support an abuse of process claim. Evidence of lack of probable cause or improper
purpose in instituting or continuing a joinder is irrelevant to the abuse of process claim.
This claim is concerned only with "subsequent misuse of the process." Rosen, 426 Pa.
Super. at 381, 627 A.2d at 192 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a). In
this case, Plaintiffs has not adduced any evidence showing that Schadel used the joinder
action in a manner other than for which it was intended. Plaintiffs presented no evidence
of threats or other actions suggesting the use of the process to accomplish ends other than
joining Knauer as an additional defendant. Regardless of the propriety of the purpose of
instituting and continuing the process, the fact that Schadel did not employ the process in
any manner inconsistent with its normal use compels dismissal of the claim of abuse of
process.
Civil Conspiracy. Plaintiffs have not presented evidence to establish a valid civil
conspiracy claim. A civil cause of action must attach to the particular act underlying the
alleged conspiracy, or the civil conspiracy claim cannot survive. In this case, Plaintiffs
claim that Schadel conspired with others to have a witness perjure himself in a
deposition, in order to conceal information from Plaintiffs that would have undermined
the joinder.36 While perjury is a criminal violation, no civil claim attaches to this act.
Ginsburg v. Halpern, 383 Pa. 178, 180, 118 A.2d 201, 202 (1955); Pelagatti, 370 Pa.
Super. at 432-33, 536 A.2d at 1342. Since no civil cause of action applies to the alleged
underlying act of perjury, a civil conspiracy claim cannot stand. See Homer v. Ciamacco,
2 Pa. D & C.3d 755, 757-58 (Allegheny County 1977).
Venue. Finally, Defendants have not raised a procedurally proper venue objection.
Improper venue is properly raised by preliminary objection (a preliminary objection
which this court has already denied in this case37). Defendant may not renew an objection
36 Compl. paras. 45-46, 48.
37 See Op. and Order of Ct., February 22, 1999.
11
based on improper venue through a summary judgment motion. This objection will thus
be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this l0th day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, and the briefs and arguments in support thereof, and for the
reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendants' motion for summary judgment
is granted. Defendants' objection to venue, included as part of the motion for summary
judgment, is denied.
BY THE COURT,
Joseph M. Melillo, Esq.
Angino & Rovner, P.C.
4503 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jeffrey T. McGuire, Esq.
Caldwell & Kearns
3631 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110-1533
Attorney for Defendants
s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
12
13
DAVID W. KNAUER,
ESQUIRE, and DAVID W.
KNAUER, P.C.,
Plaintiffs
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Vo
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
RISK ENTERPRISE
MANAGEMENT LIMITED a/k/a:
REM, JAMES R. SCHADEL,
ESQUIRE, WEINHEIMER
SCHADEL & HABER,
MICHAEL P. O'DAY,
ESQUIRE, and O'DAY &
SMITH, a parmership,
Defendants
NO. 97-3505 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
OBJECTION TO VENUE
BEFORE HOFFER~ P.J. OLER and GUIDO~ JJ.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this l0th day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of the
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, and the briefs and arguments in support thereof, and for the
reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendants' motion for summary judgment
is granted. Defendants' objection to venue, included as part of the motion for summary
judgment, is denied.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Joseph M. Melillo, Esq.
Angino & Rovner, P.C.
4503 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jeffrey T. McGuire, Esq.
Caldwell & Keams
3631 North Front Street
Harrisburg, PA 17110-1533
Attorney for Defendants