The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink About00-2501 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vo VICTOR WILLIAM TIDD OTN: E9360054-0 CHARGES: (1) DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (2) CARELESS DRIVING (SUMMARY) NO. 00-2501 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST-SENTENCE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BEFORE OLER~ J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT OLER, J., July ,2001. On March 6, 2001, a jury found Defendant Victor William Tidd guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving. ~ He was found not guilty of driving while the amount of alcohol by weight in his blood was 0.10% or greater.2 On April 17, 2001, Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to a second offense of driving under the influence.3 Following sentence, Defendant filed a post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal,4 contending that the ~ See Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, § 1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 373 l(a)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); Order of Court, March 6, 2001. Defendant was also found guilty, by the Court, of the summary offense of careless driving. Id ~ See Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, § 1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 373 l(a)(4) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); Order of Court, March 6, 2001. 3 See Order of Ct., April 17, 2001 (sentencing Defendant to pay a fine of $300.00 and undergo imprisonment in the county prison for a period of not less 30 days nor more than 23 months for driving under the influence, and to pay a fine of $25.00 for careless driving). Defendant's release on his own recognizance was continued at sentence due to his expressed intent to file a post-sentence motion. Id 4 Pa. R. Crim. P. 720. evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time he was driving.5 Defendant maintained at trial that most of his alcohol consumption on the occasion in question had occurred after he had driven. For the reasons stated in this opinion, Defendant's post-sentence motion will be denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS Post-sentence motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence require the court to evaluate the entire trial record "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 205-06, 369 A.2d 1266, 1268 (1977) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tabb, 417 Pa. 13, 16, 207 A.2d 884, 886 (1965)). In so doing, the court should give the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence presented at trial. Id at 205-06, 369 A.2d at 1268. This case arises from a single-vehicle accident that occurred when Defendant failed to negotiate a curve on McAllister's Church Road in West Pennsboro Township in Cumberland County. At the time of the accident, Defendant was driving home from his parents' house, where he had been visiting his sister. Defendant's truck was disabled when he drove off the road and into a ditch approximately half a mile from his parents' house around 2:45 a.m. on Thursday, September 14, 2000.6 Defendant told police that he drove into the ditch while swerving to avoid a deer, but testified at trial that this was a fabrication and that the accident occurred because the truck's tire hit a drainage pipe.? Police charged Defendant with driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant 5 Def.'s Post-Sentence Mot. para. 5. 6 N.T. 68. Defendant told police at the scene that he had left his parents' house at 2:45 a.m., but testified at trial that he had left earlier than this. N.T. 68. Defendant's sister did not recall the time when Defendant left their parents' house. N.T. 90-92. Defendant's father, whom Defendant woke after the accident, testified that it was 3:02 a.m. when he was awakened that morning. N.T. 79. 7N.T. 75. 2 contended that he was not incapable of safe driving due to alcohol while he was driving, but became intoxicated only after the accident.8 Trooper John Yunk and his parmer, Trooper Matthew Maxey, members of the Pennsylvania State Police who responded to the accident, testified that they arrived at the scene at 3:48 a.m. and found Defendant holding an open can of beer in his hand.9 Trooper Yunk testified that Defendant evidenced a staggering gait, a lack of proper hand-eye coordination, an odor of alcoholic beverage, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes.l° The troopers testified that, based on these observations and Defendant's admission that he had been driving the truck at the time of the accident, they concluded that Defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving.~ A chemical test showed Defendant's blood-alcohol content to be 0.178% at 5:18 a.m. Defendant testified that he had consumed only two beers before the accident, but that after the accident he had become so upset that he returned on foot to his parents' house and began drinking several cans of beer.~3 Defendant's sister, who was with Defendant until he left their parents' house prior to the accident, testified that she did not see Defendant drink any alcohol after the initial two beers.TM Defendant's father testified that Defendant did not appear intoxicated at 3:02 a.m., when Defendant woke his father to ask him to remove the truck from the ditch.~5 Defendant testified that, following the 8 See N.T. 67-72. 9 N.T. 23, 27, 56. l0 N.T. 23-24. ~ N.T. 28, 59. ~2 N.T. 47. ~3 N.T. 66-69. ~4 N.T. 90-92. ~5 N.T. 79, 85. Defendant's father testified that he called a towing company and police after unsuccessfully attempting to move the truck. N.T. 82-83. 3 accident, he drank nine or ten beers before he returned to the scene to meet police.~6 Trooper Yunk testified that he asked Defendant how he could have gotten so intoxicated in the hour interval between the accident and the arrival of police, but that Defendant did 17 not supply an answer. DISCUSSION Statement of Law In evaluating a post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, "a trial court is limited to determining the presence or absence of that quantum of evidence necessary to establish the elements of the crime." Commonwealth v. Chiari, 741 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Feathers, 442 Pa. Super. 490, 499, 660 A.2d 90, 94-95 (1995) (en banc), afj°d, 546 Pa. 139, 683 A.2d 289 (1996)). Post-sentence motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence require the court to determine whether, upon evaluation of the entire trial record "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth," a reasonable jury could render the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. See Meadows, 471 Pa. at 205-06, 369 A.2d at 1268. It is a function of the jury to determine questions regarding the credibility of witnesses. Feathers, 442 Pa. Super. at 499, 660 A.2d at 95. In a determination as to whether a witness is credible, it is proper for the jury to consider whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 553 Pa. 648, 664, 720 A.2d 473, 480 (1998). The jury may believe "all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Jackson, 336 Pa. Super. 609, 626, 486 A.2d 431,441 (1984). Section § 3731 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Offense defined.--A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle... (1) While under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving. 16 N.T. 69. ~7 N.T. 28. 4 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1). This section "provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which it may prove that the accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol." Commonwealth v. McCurdy, 558 Pa. 65, 71,735 A.2d 681, 684 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 402-03, 663 A.2d 669, 673-74 (1995)). The jury may consider evidence of a defendant's BAC test result and outward symptoms of intoxication in concluding that the defendant was incapable of safe driving due to alcohol. Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639, 646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1547(c) (providing that evidence of blood-alcohol content is admissible in criminal proceedings under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1)). The Commonwealth does not need to present evidence that relates the blood-alcohol level back to the time when defendant was driving, but a significant period of time between driving and the test may affect the weight of the evidence. Zugay, 745 A.2d at 647. The occurrence of a one- vehicle accident under circumstances suggestive of serious driver error may also be indicative of alcohol impairment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mahaney, 373 Pa. Super. 129, 135, 540 A.2d 556, 559 (1988). In Commonwealth v. Fairley, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a conviction based on evidence that the defendant appeared intoxicated after the accident, was holding a container of alcohol at the scene, had a blood-alcohol content of 0.19% after the accident, and was involved in a one-car accident suggestive of serious driver error. 298 Pa. Super. 236, 244-45, 444 A.2d 748, 752 (1982). In Fairley, the defendant claimed that he had not been impaired while driving, but had become incapable of safe driving due to alcohol only after the accident. Id. at 244, 44 A.2d at 752. The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 245, 444 A.2d at 752; see also Commonwealth v. Allen, 394 Pa. Super. 127, 134, 575 A.2d 131, 135 (1990) (holding that the defendant's symptoms of intoxication at the scene of the accident and blood-alcohol content of 0.16% "easily support[ed]" conviction under § 373 l(a)(1)). 5 Application of Law to Facts In this court's view, the evidence presented at trial in the present case provided a sufficient basis upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 373 l(a)(1). The evidence tended to show that Defendant admitted to the consumption of some alcohol prior to driving, that he was 18 involved in a one-vehicle accident suggestive of serious driver error around 2:45 a.m., that he gave conflicting versions of how the accident had occurred, that he appeared intoxicated approximately one hour after the accident, that he was holding a can of beer when police arrived at the scene, and that his blood-alcohol content was 0.178% after the accident. Defendant's claim that he had consumed nine to ten beers following the accident was self-serving and, obviously to the jury, incredible. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of Defendant's post-sentence motion in the form of a motion for judgment of acquittal, and for the reasons stated in accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, /s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. la The instant case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Kelley, 438 Pa. Super. 289, 652 A.2d 378 (1994), in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that there had been insufficient evidence to support a conviction under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 373 l(a)(1) because the Commonwealth had failed to establish "to some degree" a time period for the operation of the vehicle and resultant accident. 438 Pa. Super. at 299, 652 A.2d at 383. In this case, the period of driving and resultant accident, around 2:45 a.m., was much more discernible from the evidence, including testimony of Defendant and his father. 6 Michael Mervine, Esq. Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esq. Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Defendant 7 COMMONWEALTH Vo VICTOR WILLIAM TIDD OTN: E9360054-0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CHARGES: (1) DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (2) CARELESS DRIVING (SUMMARY) NO. 00-2501 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POST-SENTENCE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BEFORE OLER~ J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 27th day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of Defendant's post-sentence motion in the form of a motion for judgment of acquittal, and for the reasons stated in accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Michael Mervine, Esq. Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esq. Assistant Public Defender Attorney for Defendant