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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-6065 CivilEVA LIMBACHER and BRAD LIMBACHER Plaintiffs Vo IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW BONNIE SANDERS Defendant NO. 99-6065 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BEFORE OLER~ J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT OLER, J., July , 2001. This case arises out of a car accident that occurred when a vehicle driven by Defendant Bonnie Sanders collided with the rear-end of a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Eva Limbacher. Defendant conceded that she was negligent in causing the accident. ~ At trial, Ms. Limbacher presented medical experts to testify that Defendant's negligent conduct proximately caused her injuries. Defendant did not produce any witnesses, but cross-examined Plaintiffs' witnesses so as to suggest that Ms. Limbacher's injuries were a continuation of a pre-existing condition. On March 12, 2001, the jury found that Defendant's negligent conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the harm of which Ms. Limbacher complained) On March 14, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New Trial, in which they argued that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.3 After a careful review of the record and the briefs submitted on behalf of Plaintiffs and Defendant, the court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. ~ N.T. 5. N.T. 86. Pis.' Mot. New Trial paras. 11-13. STATEMENT OF FACTS Ms. Limbacher described the accident in her testimony as follows: At approximately 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, June 2, 1998, while westbound on Carlisle Road en route to her son's baseball game, she was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Carlisle Road and 18th Street in Lower Allen Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Defendant's car, travelling west on Carlisle Road behind Ms. Limbacher, failed to stop and struck the rear-end of Ms. Limbacher's van.4 The force of the collision caused Ms. Limbacher's head to "f[ly] back" and pushed the van approximately ten feet into the intersection.5 Ms. Limbacher exited the van without assistance. When police arrived at the scene, Ms. Limbacher told them that she was not injured.6 She was able to drive the remaining half mile to her son's baseball game.7 However, she had to leave within ten minutes of her arrival because of pain in her neck. She contacted her family physician that evening and obtained an appointment for the next day.8 Plaintiff Brad Limbacher testified that his wife experienced neck pain requiring medical attention shortly after the accident.9 He testified that the damage to the van was limited to minor dents in the rear bumper,l° Photographs of the van taken after the accident showed little damage to the vehicle. ~ Plaintiffs' medical experts testified as to the extent and cause of Ms. Limbacher's alleged injuries. Dr. Ernest Josef, Ms. Limbacher's family physician and one of 4 N.T. 46-48. 5 N.T. 48-49. 6 N.T. 47-50. 7 N.T. 47-50. Mr. Limbacher, who arrived at the scene after the accident, drove the van while Ms. Limbacher drove a second vehicle owned by the Limbachers to the game. N.T. 50. 8 N.T. 50-52. 9 See N.T. 15-21. lo N.T. 17. ~ PIs.' Ex. 1; PIs.' Ex. 2; PIs.' Ex. 3. 2 Plaintiffs' medical experts, testified that X-rays and an MRI performed after the accident showed neither broken bones nor a herniated disk, but showed an overriding disk and a bulging disk in the vertebrae, both of which could cause neck pain.12 Dr. Steven E. Morganstein, presented by Plaintiffs as a medical expert in the field of orthopedic rehabilitation, testified that the results of the X-rays and MRI, considered in conjunction with Ms. Limbacher's complaints about pains, spasms, and limited movement in the neck, were indicative of a condition known as "post-traumatic chronic myofasciai cervical pain syndrome.''13 Both medical experts testified that they had concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that her condition was caused by the accident on June 2, 1998.TM However, both conceded on cross-examination that they had not seen police reports regarding the accident and had based their conclusions on Ms. Limbacher's account of events. 15 Evidence was elicited which tended to show that Ms. Limbacher had a neck condition prior to the accident in June 1998. Dr. Josef testified that Ms. Limbacher filed a workers' compensation claim in 1994 because of carpal tunnel syndrome and neck pains she suffered while working at a Giant supermarket.16 Both experts testified that Ms. Limbacher underwent an MRI scan in 1995, the results of which matched those of the MRI conducted after the accident in 1998.17 Dr. Morganstein testified that the two MRI results showed that Ms. Limbacher's neck condition had not changed over this period,la Dr. Joseftestified that X-rays of Ms. Limbacher's neck showed degenerative changes that had occurred prior to the accident.19 12 Pls.' Ex. 4 13 Pls.' Ex. 6 14 Pls.' Ex. 4 15 Pls.' Ex. 4 16 Pis.' Ex. 4 17 Pis.' Ex. 4 la Pis.' Ex. 6 19 Pis.' Ex. 4 at9, 11-12. atll. at 17; Pis.' Ex. 6 at 15. at 30; Pis.' Ex. 6 at 20-21. at 16-17. at 20-22; Pis.' Ex. 6 at 19-20. at 19-20. at9. Ms. Limbacher claimed that her prior condition had resolved by 1996.20 However, Dr. Josef testified that he wrote prescriptions for neck pain medication for her in July 1997 and March 1998, three months before the accident in June 1998.2~ Dr. Josef testified that Ms. Limbacher's condition was diagnosed in July 1997 as "chronic" neck pain.22 In his testimony, Dr. Morganstein confirmed that Ms. Limbacher's neck problems could "flare-up" at any time.23 Dr. Josef also testified that Ms. Limbacher was involved in a car accident in December 1995 when a vehicle collided with the rear-end of her vehicie,24 and that he had prescribed medication to alleviate Ms. Limbacher's neck pains.25 Ms. Limbacher was questioned about the 1995 accident during cross-examination, but testified that she could not remember being in the accident or having received the prescription for neck pain medication.26 DISCUSSION Statement of Law A motion for a new trial based on the ground that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence should be granted only when the verdict is so disproportionate to the evidence presented at trial that it "shocks one's sense of justice." Neison v. Hines, 539 Pa. 516, 520, 653 A.2d 634, 636 (1995) (quoting Burrell v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 438 Pa. 286, 289, 265 A.2d 516, 518 (1970)). It is the role of the jury to decide issues of credibility, and the jury may "believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by a witness." Id. at 520, 653 A.2d at 637. "Even if the testimony is 20 N.T. 70. Mr. Limbacher also testified that Ms. Limbacher had not experienced neck problems in the six months prior to the accident. N.T. 19. 21 Pis.' Ex. 4 at 25-26. 22 Pis.' Ex. 4 at 24-25. 23 Pis.' Ex. 6 at 19-20. 24 Pis.' Ex. 4 at 22. 25 Pis.' Ex. 4 at 22. 26 N.T. 71. 4 uncontradicted, the jury is not required to accept everything or anything a party presents." Bezerra v. Nat'/R.R. Passenger Corp., 760 A.2d 56, 63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting Damson v. Fogy/er, 384 Pa. Super. 329, 558 A.2d 565, 567 (1989)). In deciding issues of credibility, the jury may consider whether the witness has an interest in the outcome of the case. Williams v. McC/ain, 513 Pa. 300, 309, 520 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1987). In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the negligent conduct was a proximate cause of the harm suffered. B/tim ex re/B/tim v. Merrell Dom Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). To establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must prove that the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Id.; Whimer v. Von Hintz, 437 Pa. 448, 456, 263 A.2d 889, 893 (1970). To determine whether a defendant's negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing the alleged harm in cases involving a car collision between the parties, the jury may consider evidence of the severity of the collision, the immediacy with which plaintiff sought treatment after the accident, and the testimony of medical experts. Nelson, 539 Pa. at 521-22, 653 A.2d at 637. The jury also may consider evidence of pre-existing medical conditions, and in an appropriate case may conclude that the injuries are representative of a prior condition, and not a product of the more recent negligent conduct. Bezerra, 760 A.2d at 59; Brodhead v. Brentwood Ornamental Iron Co., 435 Pa. 7, 10-11, 255 A.2d 120, 122 (1969). The jury is "not obliged to believe that every injury causes pain or the pain alleged." Boggavaraptt v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 167, 542 A.2d 516, 518 (1988). Application of Law to Facts In the court's view, the jury's verdict was not so disproportionate to the evidence presented at trial as to "[shock] the conscience of the court." Nelson, 539 Pa. at 520, 653 A.2d at 636. Immediately following the accident, Ms. Limbacher told police she was not injured and she was able to drive away. Pictures of Ms. Limbacher's van showed only minimal damage to the rear bumper. Unlike the situation in cases in which the plaintiff's vehicle was severely damaged, "[c]ommon-sense" does not mandate a conclusion that Ms. Limbacher would have been injured in this type of accident. Id. at 522, 653 A.2d at 638. Without suggesting that the court would have found as the jury did, we can not say that it was shocking that the jury was unpersuaded that the accident in question was a proximate cause of the injuries complained of. Although Plaintiffs' experts testified that they had concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Ms. Limbacher's injuries were caused by the accident of June 2, 1998, these conclusions were challenged on cross-examination. Plaintiffs' medical experts conceded that they had not read the police report of the accident and that they had based their opinions on Ms. Limbacher's version of the incident and its effect upon her. The jury may not have been persuaded that these conclusions were based upon a fully accurate account, and thus may have accorded the opinions of the experts little weight. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, David L. Lutz, Esq. Angino & Rovner, P.C. 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiffs James Nealon, Esq. Nealon & Gover, P.C. 2411 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Defendant /s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. EVA LIMBACHER and BRAD LIMBACHER Plaintiffs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW BONNIE SANDERS Defendant NO. 99-6065 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BEFORE OLER~ J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of July, 2001, after careful consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, David L. Lutz, Esq. Angino & Rovner, P.C. 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiffs James Nealon, Esq. Nealon & Gover, P.C. 2411 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Defendant J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.