HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-1023 CIVILMARY E. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff
V.
JOHN S. HEIGES,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2001-1023 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HESS, GUIDO, JJ.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Before us is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have briefed and
argued their respective positions. This matter is now ready for disposition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
At issue is the interpretation of a marital settlement agreement executed by the
parties in 1990. Paragraph 14 of the agreement provides as follows:
PENSION PLAN
Husband is employed by KEEN TRANSPORT, INC. and
presently has a pension and Husband agrees to a QDRO for
$17,500.
The current controversy arose when defendant recently retired from Keen Transport, Inc.
He received $172,976.27 upon his retirement. He tendered $17,500 of that amount to
plaintiff in full satisfaction of his above quoted obligation.
Plaintiff argues that the parties agreed to segregate $17, 500 of defendant's
pension at Keen Transport, Inc. for her use and benefit at the time the agreement was
executed. Therefore, she claims that she is entitled to any increase or decrease on that
portion. Defendant, on the other hand, claims that he never agreed to segregate any
2001 - 1023 CIVIL TERM
portion of his pension.
request.
Rather, he merely agreed to transfer $17,500 to plaintiff upon her
DISCUSSION
Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 allows for the grant of summary judgment
when there is no genuine issue of material fact. In determining whether to grant a motion
for summary judgment, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Ertel v. Patriot News Company, 544 Pa. 93,674 A.2d 1038 (1996).
Summary judgment should only be granted in cases which are clear and free from doubt.
Hoffman v. Brandywine Hospital, 443 Pa. Super. 245, 661 A.2d 397 (1995).
Based upon our recitation of the factual background it would certainly appear that
there is a factual dispute which would preclude the grant of summary judgment.
However, defendant argues that the intention of the parties must be determined from the
four corners of the agreement. Since the agreement is silent as to the segregation of
funds, he contends that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We
disagree.
Marital settlement agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with the general
rules of contract interpretation. Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 425 Pa. Super. 204, 624
A.2d 638 (1993). As our Supreme Court has stated:
Determining the intention of the parties is a paramount
consideration in the interpretation of any contract. Robert
F. Felte, Inc. v. White, 451 Pa. 137, 143,302 A.2d 347, 351
(1973); Unit Fending Corp. v. Lacas, 410 Pa. 614, 617, 190
A.2d 298, 300 (1963). The intent of the parties is to be
ascertained from the document itself when the terms are
clear and unambiguous. Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45,
48-49, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (1982); In re Estate of Breyer,
475 Pa. 108, 115, 379 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1977). However,
~ See affidavit of John S. Heiges attached as Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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2001 - 1023 CIVIL TERM
as this Court stated in Herr Estate, 400 Pa. 90, 161 A.2d 32
(1960). "where an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is
admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity,
irrespective of whether the ambiguity is created by the
language of the instrument or by extrinsic or collateral
circumstances."
Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 519 A.2d 385, 389 (1986).
In the instant case, the agreement is far from clear and unambiguous. Plaintiff' s
contention that paragraph 14 of the agreement required defendant to immediately
segregate a portion of his pension is certainly a reasonable interpretation of the
requirement that he "agrees to a QDRO for $17,500." On the other hand, defendant's
claim that he had no obligation to segregate the $17,500 until he was presented with a
QDRO to sign is arguably supported by other language in the agreement)
"A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions
and capable of being understood in more than one sense." Preston v. Saucon Valley
School Dist., 666 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Commonwealth 1995). At this stage of the
proceedings, we cannot say that either interpretation is unreasonable. It depends upon the
parties' intention at the time the agreement was signed. Since there is a genuine issue of
fact as to that intention, the grant of summary judgment would not be appropriate.
See paragraphs 20 and 25.
2001 - 1023 CIVIL TERM
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of AUGUST, 2001, for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
By the Court,
Melissa A. Swauger, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Peter J. Russo, Esquire
For the Defendant
/s/Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.
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