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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-0123 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH RAYMOND DEWAINE ARNOLD IN RE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE BAYLEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., October 4, 2001:-- Defendant, Raymond Dewaine Arnold, is charged with a count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a scheduled II controlled substance (cocaine).1 He filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on September 25, 2001. We find the following facts. At 8:50 p.m., on January 4, 2001, Trooper Anthony Todaro of the Pennsylvania State Police, clocked a vehicle on radar doing 75 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone on the Pennsylvania Turnpike in Upper Mifflin Township, Cumberland County. Trooper Todaro stopped the vehicle. The driver, Dion Lucas, rolled down his front window. Trooper Todaro told him why he was stopped. Darnell Howell, to whom the vehicle was registered, was in the right front seat. Trooper Todaro obtained the driver's license of Lucas and the registration of Howell. Trooper Todaro went to his patrol car and wrote a citation to Lucas for speeding. When he returned to the vehicle, 1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM Lucas inadvertently rolled down the left rear window. Trooper Todaro smelled burnt marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. Trooper Todaro had training as to what burnt marijuana smelled like and he knew, from that training and his experience, what it smelled like. Trooper Todaro had Lucas get out of the vehicle. The trooper went to his patrol car to radio for assistance. He returned to where Lucas was standing, and issued him the speeding citation. Trooper Brian Overcash arrived at the scene. Trooper Todaro had Howell get out of the car. He told Lucas and Howell that he had smelled burnt marijuana coming from inside the car. They denied involvement, and Howell insisted that the trooper search his car. Defendant was in the right rear passenger seat. Trooper Todaro had him get out of the vehicle. Trooper Overcash patted down defendant, and felt a hard object under his pants near his crouch. He asked defendant if it was a weapon, and defendant said "No." Trooper Todaro felt the item, after which defendant said it was cocaine, not a weapon. Trooper Todaro seized the item which was a brown paper bag containing rocks of cocaine. All three people were placed into custody. A search of Lucas revealed a cutting agent in his jacket pocket. The vehicle was searched, but nothing was found. All three were taken to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks. Trooper Todaro read defendant his Miranda warnings at 10:00 p.m.2 Defendant told the trooper that he did not want to talk to him until he had an attorney present. The trooper did not Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). -2- 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM question him. At 10:35 p.m., Troopers Todaro and Overcash were discussing the charges they were going to file against all three parties. Defendant overheard this conservation. Defendant then stated that the cocaine and the cutting agent were his, and that he had hid the cutting agent in Lucas' jacket. Trooper Todaro then questioned defendant without re-Mirandizing him. At 11:05 p.m., defendant then gave him a written, inculpatory statement. I. Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence obtained by the state police. He maintains that the seizure of the cocaine on his person at the scene of the stop must be suppressed, and therefore, all further evidence obtained by the police at the scene, and at the State Police Barracks, must be suppressed as arising from that illegal seizure. Once Trooper Todaro smelled burnt marijuana coming from inside the rear portion of the vehicle, where only defendant was seated, he had probable cause to believe that a crime was being or had been committed, and that evidence of that crime, marijuana and drug paraphernalia, would be found inside the vehicle and/or on the person of defendant. That allowed a search of the vehicle and defendant. Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 324 Pa. Super. 410 (1984). Trooper Todaro had no prior information before the vehicle was stopped that any crime had been committed. Therefore, the search, based on probable cause, was authorized without a warrant given the exigent circumstances of the movable vehicle on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 740 A.2d 712 (Pa. Super. 1999). II. Defendant maintains that the verbal statement he made to the troopers after he -3- 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM exercised his right to remain silent, must be suppressed. If a person is in custody, and has exercised his right to remain silent, any spontaneous, voluntary statements that are not in response to interrogation are still admissible against him. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116 (Pa. 2001). Interrogation occurs when the police should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and the circumstances must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. Id. Troopers Todaro and Overcash were routinely discussing what charges they were going to bring against the three defendants. That conversation was not designed to or likely to elicit any incriminating response from defendant. After defendant was told his Miranda rights, and he exercised his right to remain silent, the troopers neither questioned him nor initiated a conservation with him before he spontaneously, and voluntarily stated that the cocaine and the cutting agent were his, and that he had hid the cutting agent in Lucas' jacket. That statement is admissible against him at trial. Commonwealth v. Fisher, supra. III. Defendant maintains that the written statement he gave to Trooper Todaro must be suppressed because (1) it was made in response to interrogation by Trooper Todaro after he had exercised his right to remain silent, and (2) it was made without his having been re-Mirandized and having then waived his rights. In Commonwealth v. Caswell, 316 Pa. Super. 462 (1983), the defendant was arrested for robbery and related crimes. He was taken to a state police barracks where he was informed him of his Miranda rights. The defendant indicated that he did not wish to talk. Approximately forty-five -4- 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM minutes later, a trooper told the defendant why he was arrested. The defendant responded that he was a gentleman bandit and that he never hurt anyone. Thereafter, a trooper initiated a conversation with the defendant during which he made other incriminating statements that were admitted against him at trial. Responding to the defendant's claim that all of his incriminating statements were improperly admitted into evidence, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: Once a criminal defendant tells the police that he does not want to talk to them about the crime, the interrogation must cease .... After reviewing the record, we hold that the appellant waived his Miranda rights, because his statements were voluntary under the meaning of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-5, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-5, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1991): We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities, unless the accused himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. (emphasis added.) In the instant case, appellant expressed his desire to remain silent. Then, when he volunteered that he was the gentleman bandit and never intended to hurt anyone, he initiated the discussion in which he made the incriminating statements. Under the meaning of Edwards, those statements were voluntary. Like the United States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has developed the rule of law that voluntary statements constitute a waiver of Miranda rights. In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 279, 361 A.2d 282, 289-90 (1976), our Supreme Court stated: Although there is no single litmus paper test for determining the voluntariness of a confession, it must establish that the decision to speak was a product of a free and unconstrained choice of its maker .... All attending circumstances surrounding the confession must be considered in this determination. These include: the duration and methods of the interrogation; the length of delay between arrest and arraignment; the conditions of detainment; the attitudes of police toward defendant; defendant's physical and psychological state; and all other conditions present which may -5- 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM serve to drain one's power of resistance to suggestion or to undermine one's self-determinations. (Citations omitted.) See also, Commonwealth v. O'Bryant, 479 Pa. 534, 539-40, 388 A.2d 1059, 1062 (1978); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 482 Pa. 496, 507-8, 394 A.2d 431,437-8 (1978) In the instant case, the interview seems to have commenced approximately 45 minutes after the appellant was given his Miranda warnings. The appellant did not request the assistance of counsel before he made any statement. Nor does it seem that he requested at any time that the interview be terminated. In fact, his statements to the police suggest that he was alert and responsive. Also, there are no hints of threats or physical violence by the police during the interview. Therefore, the appellant's incriminating statements were the product not of police compulsion, but of his own free will. Accordingly, we hold that the lower court did not err in permitting these statements at the trial. The facts in the case sub judice, cannot be distinguished from those in Caswell. On January 4, 2001, at 10:00 p.m., defendant exercised his right to remain silent. No interrogation was conducted. At 10:35 p.m., Troopers Todaro and Overcash were discussing the charges they were going to file against defendant Arnold, Lucas, and Howell, when defendant spontaneously made an incriminating statement. Trooper Todaro then interrogated him. At 11:05 p.m., defendant made a written incriminating statement. This written statement was made one hour and five minutes after defendant had been given his Miranda warnings, and one-half hour after he made his spontaneous, verbal, incriminating statement. Defendant did not request the assistance of counsel nor did he request that the interrogation be terminated before he made the written statement. There was no duress, the written statement was made of defendant's own free will, and it is admissible against him at trial. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered -6- 01-0123 CRIMINAL TERM AND NOW, this suppress evidence, IS DENIED. ORDER OF COURT day of October, 2001, the motion of defendant to By the Court, Edmund Zigmund, Esquire For the Commonwealth H. Anthony Adams, Esquire For the Defendant :saa Edgar B. Bayley, J. -7-