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HomeMy WebLinkAbout95-2905 CivilCREEDIN H. OTTO, JR., Appellant V. ZONING HEARING BOARD OF HAMPDEN TOWNSHIP, Appellee V. HAMPDEN TOWNSHIP, Intervenor IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ day of February, 1996, after careful consideration of Appellant's land use appeal, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Hampden Township is AFFIRMED. William H. Andring, Esq. 248 Creek Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Appellant BY THE COURT, John E. Slike, Esq. Johnna J. Deily, Esq. Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Masland 2109 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorneys for Appellee Richard C. Snelbaker, Esq. Snelbaker & Brenneman, P.C. 44 West Main Street P.O. Box 318 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Intervenor : rc CREEDIN H. OTTO, JR., Appellant v. ZONING HEARING BOARD OF HAMPDEN TOWNSHIP, Appellee v. HAMPDEN TOWNSHIP, Intervenor IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. In this zoning case, a landowner has appealed from a decision of a zoning hearing board denying his variance application. The municipality has intervened in support of the board's decision. No additional' evidence has been taken by this court.~ Argument on the appeal was held on December 6, 1995. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the zoning hearing ~ Appellant filed a Motion for the Presentation of Additional Evidence and for the Consideration of the Present Appeal upon a de Novo Review of the Record Below As Supplemented by Additional Evidence, on August 22, 1995. At oral argument herein, Appellant's counsel advised that he would not pursue the portion of the motion requesting the presentation of additional evidence, provided that the court would consider the entire record as certified from the zoning hearing board. In so indicating, Appellant's counsel expressly did not waive Appellant's position that the court should review the record de novo, on the ground that the zoning hearing board's decision was deficient. This issue will be discussed in the text hereafter. In disposing of this appeal, the court has, as requested by Appellant's counsel, considered the entire record as certified from the zoning hearing board. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM board will be affirmed. STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant is Creedin H. Otto, Jr., who resides at 220 Silver Spring Road, Mechanicsburg (Hampden Township), Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.2 He is the owner of the property at which he resides.3 Appellant's property is a more or less rectangular, 1.1 acre lot, fronting on Silver Spring Road, having sides of 496 feet, and front and rear lines of 99.31 feet. More exactly, the lot is a slightly non-rectangular parallelogram, having an actual width of 97.24 feet. The front two-thirds of the lot contains a house, garage, swimming pool and two sheds.4 Appellant purchased the property in 1978s and has lived there ever since.6 The lot and its residential use precede the pertinent 2 N.T. 7, Hearing, Hampden Township Zoning Hearing Board, April 5, 1995 (hereinafter N.T. __). 3 Township Exhibit 3, Hearing, Hampden Township Zoning Hearing Board, April 5, 1995 (Building permit application, deed attachment) (hereinafter Township Exhibit __). Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment. s Township Exhibit 3 attachment). 6 N.T. 17, 20. (Building permit application, deed 2 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM township zoning ordinance regulations.? The land is in an I-G, Industrial - General, zoning district.8 There are residences on each side of Appellant's property. A housing development lies across the street. Behind the property is an industrial use of some sort.9 Appellant is a welder.~° He was self-employed for about ten years, and in approximately August of 1994 became an employee of BWB, Incorporated, a demolition or wrecking company.~ In 7 N.T. 23-24, 88; Ordinance No. 84-02 (March 29, 1984), as amended. With respect to nonconforming uses, the Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance provides, inter alia; Ail lawful uses of land or of a building or other structure existing on the effective date of this Chapter may be continued, altered, restored, reconstructed, sold or maintained even though such use may not conform to the use, height, area, yard and other regulations of the district in which it is located .... Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance ~2001. The ordinance also provides for the expansion of nonconforming uses. Id. §2004. It does not appear to contain a provision dedicated to nonconforming lots. 8 N.T. 23, 26; Ordinance No. 84-02, part 14 (March 29, 1984), as amended. 9 N.T. 17-18; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment. ~0 N.T. 5. ~ N.T. 5, 9, 68-69. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM connection with his trade, he owns a truck-mounted welder,~2 a lathe,~3 a welder on a cart,TM an air compressor,~s various pieces of equipment on wheels,~6 forklifts,~? pipe, fittings, pullers, jacks, hydraulic presses,~8 trucks,~9 etc. He has at least ten vehicles,2° and one or more2~ of his trucks bear the insignia "Otto's Equipment Repair.,,22 On January 15, 1992, Appellant applied to the township for a building permit.23 The application was for construction on his premises of a new, steel-frame, one-story building, 30 feet in width, 18 feet in height, 1800 square feet in area,24 and, by implication, 60 feet in length. The proposed use of the new N.T. 5, 10. N.T. 19. N.T. 38. N.T. 70. N.T. 39. N.T. 10. N.T. 18. N.T. 76. N.T. 72. N.T. 74. N.T. 83. N.T. 32; Township Exhibit 1. Township Exhibit 1. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM building was for storage of a boat, camper, tractor and trailers.2s The application elicited a response from the township in the form of a request for more details, including a clarification as to whether private or commercial storage was contemplated.26 Appellant did not respond to this letter, and the application was treated by both parties as abandoned.27 On October 12, 1993, Appellant filed a second building permit application.28 The structure which resulted from this permit application is the subject of the present litigation.29 Appellant's second application was for construction at the rear of his property of a new 42- by 64-foot, one-story, steel- frame building, having a height of about 21 feet, an area of 2,552.25 square feet, and no heating capacity.3° The proposed use of the new building was given as "residential storage."3~ This application resulted in discussions between Appellant and township officials regarding precisely what the building was to be Id. N.T. 32-33; Township Exhibit 2. N.T. 33. N.T. 33-34; Township Exhibit 3. N.T. 34. N.T. 33-35; Township Exhibit 3. Township Exhibit 3. 5 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM used for.32 A document negotiated between the parties stipulated that the storage building was to be used for "personal equipment and vehicles only," and that "[a]ny change in use for this building [had to] be addressed by the proper submission of plans to Hampden Township.''3~ The township also agreed to an increase in the length of the proposed structure to 83 feet.34 The municipality issued a permit for the structure on October 20, 1993.~s The permit authorized a "residential" accessory building for "personal equipment and vehicles."36 Appellant constructed the building in the winter of 1994.37 The following spring, the township received a complaint of excessive noise coming from the structure.38 An inspection of the building revealed that two truck trailers were being refurbished in it.39 At a May 13, 1995, meeting between Appellant and the township's code enforcement officer, Appellant, according to the work remained to be done as of April 5, 1995. 38 N.T. 35. 39 N.T. 38. N.T. 36-37. Township Exhibit 5. Township Exhibits 3-4. N.T. 34-35; Township Exhibit 4. Township Exhibit 4. N.T. 8-9. Concrete flooring and some interior finishing N.T. 7, 9. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM officer, stated that the site was being used essentially for a base operation of his family business that involved vehicle repair, hauling and other commercial activities that happened off premises, [and] that the building in the rear was used to repair vehicles and store and service other equipment that was used in the business.4° The codes enforcement officer advised Appellant that such an operation was not consistent with the accessory residential use provided for in the permit.4~ He told Appellant that he would have to file a land development plan, which was required for all proposed uses of a nonresidential nature.42 Appellant failed to comply with this directive.~3 The township filed two summary citations against Appellant for zoning ordinance violations~ on September 22, 1994.~5 Prompted in this manner, Appellant engaged a surveyor to prepare a land development plan.46 ~0 N.T. 39-40. ~ N.T. 40. Id.; Township Exhibit 7. ~3 N.T. 41. 4~ Whether a summary offense prosecution is a proper means of municipal enforcement of a zoning ordinance is not before the court. See 2 Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice §9.1.15 (1995). No disposition of these citations had occurred as of the zoning hearing board hearing on April 5, 1995. N.T. 56-57. 4s N.T. 41-42; Township Exhibit 9. ,6 N.T. 21-23, 30. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM The result of a survey performed by the surveyor was a drawing dated February 27, 1995, entitled "As-Built Survey," depicting Appellant's property and the structures on it.47 Although a welding shop, as well as other industrial uses, were permitted in an I-G zoning district,48 it was determined that seven variances would be requested to accommodate such a permitted use in the building in question:49 a. b. Ce a lot width variance of about 50 feet;5° two Side-yard variances of about 125 feet each;5~ two side-yard buffer strip variances of 25 feet each, dispensing with buffer strips entirely;~2 47 N.T. 22; Application for variance, attachment. "As-Built Survey" Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance §1403. ~9 N.T. 24-27, 30; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment. s0 N.T. 24; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment; Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance §1406. The zoning ordinance required a lot width of 150 feet; Appellant's lot was a little under 100 feet in width. ~ N.T. 24; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment; Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance ~1408(2)(B). The zoning ordinance required side yards of 150 feet where adjacent properties were used residentially; Appellant's side yards at the site of the building were about 25 feet. s2 N.T. 25; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment; Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance §1408(2)(D). The zoning ordinance required buffer strips of 25 feet, for purposes of visual screening, in side yards adjacent to residential uses. N.T. 44. Appellant proposed to provide so such screening. NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM d. an off-street parking variance of 18 spaces, dispensing with off-street parking entirely in connection with the proposed use;53 and e. a driveway width variance of about 15 feet.54 Appellant filed a variance application with the township on or about February 27, 1995. The application included as attachments the "As-Built Survey" drawing and "affidavits" from certain neighbors. The signers stated that they had "been informed by Mr. Otto of his intended use of the property to conduct a commercial welding shop at the rear of his property," and that they had "no objection to this plan.''5~ The Hampden Township Zoning Hearing Board held a hearing on the variance application on April 5, 1995. At the hearing, the township opposed the application,~ as did the owners of a nearby residence.~7 Evidence at the hearing included testimony that the state 53 N.T. 25; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment; Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance §§1414(1), 1902(2)(H), (U). 54 N.T. 26; Application for variance, "As-Built Survey" attachment; Hampden Township Zoning Ordinance ~1905(4). The zoning ordinance required a driveway width of 24 feet; Appellant's driveway was about nine feet at one point. Application for variance, affidavit attachments. 5~ N.T. 73-82, 87-90. 57 N.T. 29. 9 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM highway occupancy permit which Appellant had received for his driveway was limited to residential use.TM Other witnesses testified to noise from Appellant's equipment emanating from the building,s9 the gathering of people at the building,6° and undesirable sights at the unscreened operation, such as rusty equipment and men relieving themselves outside the building.6~ The structure had been supplied with electricity and was being heated.62 Appellant maintained, perhaps surprisingly to the board in light of his application, that he did not intend to operate a commercial welding shop: Q Do you do work in your garage building when you're not at your regular employment? A No, we don't. Q You don't do anything? You don't weld anything? A I do welding down there for my own use, making shelving and racking to try to store some of my equipment in the evenings when I feel up to it.~3 ~8 N.T. 29. ~9 N.T. 75-76. 60 N.T. 74. ~ N.T. 74, 81-82. ~2 N.T. 83. ~3 N.T. 18. 10 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM Q These affidavits [attached to the variance application] state, Informed by Mr. Otto of his intended use of the property to conduct a commercial welding shop. Is that your plan, to conduct a commercial welding shop? A Not really .... 64 Q Well, you're accumulating [large amounts of materials - pipes, fittings, pullers, jacks, etc.] for some purpose. Are you intending to sell it? A Probably not .... 6s Appellant testified that he accumulated these materials, including long pieces of pipe, because he "enjoy[ed] making hobbies and toys and stuff for myself."66 He said that occasionally he would repair an item as a favor for a friend or neighbor.67 He asserted that no customers appeared on his property.68 At other points in his testimony, however, Appellant spoke of the possibility of customers on the property by "appointment,"69 noting that he "wouldn't work on anybody that didn't have an N.T. 66. N.T. 19. Id. N.T. 67-68. N.T. 10. N.T. 11-12. 11 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM appointment."7° He said that such work "would probably be on the weekend only, on a Saturday."7~ He mentioned, with reference to possible customers, "Mechanicsburg treatment plant and water works up there and the Borough of Mechanicsburg."72 When asked if he charged his neighbors for his favors, he answered only that "[m]ost of it is pretty much free."73 Following the hearing, the zoning hearing board rendered a seven-page opinion on May 3, 1995, denying the variance application. The opinion included a procedural history, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. In brief, the board noted that there was evidence that Appellant was repairing vehicles and equipment of third parties in the building; that the permit which had been issued to him was for a building to be used for residential storage only; that Appellant instead had used, and proposed to use, the structure commercially; that Appellant had used, and continued to use, the property residentially; that Appellant had been given the opportunity to show the unnecessary hardship, minimum deviation from the zoning ordinance, and absence of self-infliction required for a variance; and that he had failed to meet his burden of proof. 70 N.T. 15. 7~ Id. 72 N.T. 67. 73 N.T. 68. 12 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM Appellant appealed from the decision of the zoning hearing board on May 30, 1995.TM DISCUSSION Statement of law. Several points of law are pertinent to the present case. First, in a zoning variance appeal, "[w]hen a trial court receives no additional testimony or evidence, its review will be limited to a determination of whether the Zoning Board abused its discretion or committed an error of law and whether its necessary findings are supported by substantial evidence." Rushford v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 81 Pa. Commw. 274, 278, 473 A.2d 719, 722 (1984); see Enola Constr. Co. v. Board of Township Supervisors, No. 95-2931 Civil Term, slip op. at 3 (Cumberland Co. January 5, 1996) (Sheely, P.J.). "Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lanto$ v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 153 Pa. Commw. 591, 597, 621A.2d 1208, 1211 (1993). Second, a zoning hearing board is required to "issue an opinion which sets forth the essential findings of fact and sufficient of the Board's reasoning to show that its action was reasoned rather than arbitrary." Lando v. Springettsbury Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 4 Pa. Commw. 312, 316-17, 286 A.2d 924, 927 (1972). If a board's opinion is deficient in a factual sense, 74 Appellant's counsel on this appeal was not involved in the prior proceedings or permit applications. 13 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM the trial court may make its own findings of fact based on the record below. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, S1005-A, as added, 53 P.S. §l1005A (1995 Supp.); see 2 Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law and Practice ~9.4.24 (1981). "[A]n opinion in a variance case [has been held] sufficient if it covers the matters at issue in the proceeding, even though it is cryptic and fails to include findings with respect to all of the criteria of [the] Planning Code [respecting variances] .... " Id. ~9.4.23, at 165. Third, the requisites for a variance, where relevant, are set forth in Section 910.2 of the Municipalities Planning Code as follows: (1) That there are unique physical circumstances or conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional topographical or other physical conditions peculiar to the particular property and that the unnecessary hardship is due to such conditions and not the circumstances or conditions generally created by the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the neighborhood or district in which the property is located. (2) That because of such physical circumstances or conditions, there is no possibility that the property can be developed in strict conformity with the provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the reasonable use of the property. (3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been created by the appellant. (4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the essential character of the 14 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM neighborhood or district in which the property is located, nor substantially or permanently impair the appropriate use or development of adjacent property, nor be detrimental to the public welfare. (5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent the minimum variance that will afford relief and will represent the least modification possible of the regulation in issue. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, §910.2, as added, 53 P.S. §10910.2 (1995 Supp.). Fourth, "[t]he applicant [for a variance] ... must show that the property is rendered practically valueless," in the absence of the variance. Board of Commissioners v. Decision and Action of Zoning Board, 25 Pa. Commw. 626, 630-31, 361A.2d 455, 458 (1976). Finally, where a nonconforming structure has been built pursuant to a permit obtained by misrepresentation, and where the property in question has been, and can continue to be, lawfully used for residential purposes without regard to the additional structure, any financial hardship claimed by the landowner with respect to the structure will be deemed to have been self- inflicted, and a variance to permit its continuation will be denied. Garnick v. Zoning Hearing Board, 58 Pa. Commw. 92, 427 A.2d 310 (1981). Application of law to facts. An application of the foregoing principles of law to the facts of this case leads the court to affirm the decision of the zoning hearing board. First, the 15 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM board's opinion is sufficiently complete, when read in its entirety, to show that its action was reasoned rather than arbitrary; the decision should accordingly be reviewed using the general standard applicable to cases where no additional testimony or evidence has been received by the court. Even if the board's opinion were deemed inadequate, a de novo consideration of the record below by this court would result in the statement of facts recited above and the same disposition of the appeal. Second, on the merits of the variance request Appellant's position is not persuasive. The variances are not necessary to the lawful use of Appellant's property, and he is in fact using the property, and intends to continue to use the property, as his residence. The land is not practically valueless in the absence of the variances. Any financial hardship arising out of the construction of the nonconformity at issue for the use intended is a self-inflicted consequence of Appellant's permit misrepresentations, and will not support a variance. Finally, major elements of the variance proposal - e.g., exemption from buffer strip, driveway width, and off-street parking regulations -- represent far greater deviations from ordinance requirements than the lot could accommodate. For these reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 1996, after careful 16 NO. 95-2905 CIVIL TERM consideration of Appellant's land use appeal, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Hampden Township is AFFIRMED. BY THE COURT, William H. Andring, Esq. 248 Creek Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Appellant John E. Slike, Esq. Johnna J. Deily, Esq. Saidis, Guido, Shuff & Masland 2109 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Appellee Richard C. Snelbaker, Esq. Snelbaker & Brenneman, P.C. 44 West Main Street P.O. Box 318 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Intervenor : rc s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 17