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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-DP-0000029-2008 IN THE INTEREST OF: : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA G.I., JR., A MINOR : DOB: 08/02/2007 : CP-21-DP-0029-2008 : FID: 21-FN-50-2005 ------------------------------------------------------------ ADOPTION OF: : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA G.I., JR., A MINOR : DOB: 08/02/2007 : No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925 Masland, J., May 27, 2011:-- I. Procedural Background On March 30 and April 1, 2011, this court heard testimony on the petitions of Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (Agency) to review and determine the permanency plans of the minor child G.I., Jr., (Son) and to terminate the parental rights of natural mother, J.I. (Mother) and natural father G.I., Sr. (Father). Following this lengthy hearing, the court granted the request for termination and, in the related dependency court matters, the court changed the permanency goal for the child from reunification to adoption. Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal and concise statements of matters complained of on appeal on April 15, 2011 and May 2, 2011 respectively. Said statements having been timely filed and received in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court will now address the issues raised in the Orphans’ Court proceeding pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 II. Legal Standard Parental rights may be determined on several grounds, including: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. ... (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. ... (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa. C.S. §2511. -2- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 Here, CYS bears the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, “a standard which requires evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2009). Sadly, this matter presented such evidence. III. Discussion At the outset, we refer the Superior Court to our statement on the record at the close of the hearing where we set out the bulk of our reasons for the 1 termination order. See Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a)(iii). Although we suggest that those findings are sufficient for the Superior Court’s review of both the alteration of the 2 child’s permanency goal and for the termination of parental rights, we offer the following supplemental reasons for our order. First, our interaction with Father has been less than satisfactory, beginning with the hearing on his petition for placement on March 18, 2010. His appearance on that date and his visit in March 2011, served as bookends for various telephonic “appearances.” We do not intend this comment in a harsh manner; however, Father’s credibility was significantly higher when we could not Transcript of Proceedings, April 1, 2011, at 82-91. 1 Alteration of a child’s permanency goal is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of 2 discretion to determine if the “court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable … did not apply the law, or … was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will as shown by the record.” See In re RMG, 997 A.2d 339, 345 (Pa. Super. 2010). In cases involving termination of parental rights, an appellate court is limited to determining “whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.” See In re Adoption of RJS, 901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Super. 2006). -3- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 see him. When Father was present, neither his words nor the manner of his presentation were salutary or credible. More importantly, we were not satisfied with father’s actions either. Even if we found that Father had made bona fide attempts to comply with his permanency plan or to be a real father for his son, placing this child one final time with Father would run afoul of both the spirit and the letter of the law. In essence, Father wafted in and out of his son’s life when it was convenient for him to do so. There was no commitment on Father’s behalf to the goal of reunification. Parents are required “to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2007). Here, Father’s efforts have been far less than diligent and not geared toward a personal assumption of parental duties. Further, his inaction is not excused by the distance between his residence in Missouri and Son’s location in Pennsylvania. In sum, although we do not relish making such decisions, we had no hesitancy in finding that the Agency, with the able assistance of the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), demonstrated convincingly that a change in the permanency goal was in the best interest of the child. So too, grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) were clearly and convincingly demonstrated. Turning to Mother, as noted in our closing remarks, we did hesitate in October 2010 when the Agency first presented us with the issue of a goal change. Over the course of the five months since the initial goal change -4- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 hearings it became clear to the court that we had underestimated two items – first, the Agency’s efforts to assist Mother with her problems and second, the magnitude of Mother’s problems. On the other side of the coin, we are equally convinced that Mother has no appreciation for the Agency’s forbearance or long suffering in working with her nor does she comprehend the magnitude of her addiction. Despite failing to take advantage of her last shot through the pain management clinic and being similarly thrown out of her grandparents’ home because of her manipulative threats of violence to herself, Mother believes that she is able, or will soon be able, to provide her son with a stable home. We do not believe that Mother understands the sort of stability needed for her son and has repeatedly demonstrated that fact over the course of his short life. Although mother feels that her efforts to bring her pain management under control were sabotaged by the Agency, the Agency “is not required to offer services indefinitely, where a parent is unable to properly apply the instruction provided.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002). The duties of the Agency “must have reasonable limits.” Id. Moreover, as the Superior Court indicated more than a decade ago, “[i]f a parent fails to cooperate or appears incapable of benefiting from reasonable efforts supplied over a realistic period of time, the Agency has fulfilled its mandate.” See In Interest of Lilly, 719 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. 1998). Here, Mother has consistently attempted to manipulate the Agency, her healthcare providers and her family and in doing so has evaded their efforts to assure the safety of her son. Sadly, Mother has made superficial progress at -5- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 best to address the constellation of issues that brought about dependency. Further, the unfeasibility of a goal of reunification is demonstrated by Mother’s continued failure to recognize or admit the detrimental effects of her conduct upon her child. Consequently, the court is unsure whether Mother will ever possess the awareness and ability to become the primary caretaker for her son. We have no notion of a feasible timeframe for a reunification as Mother still, after almost three years of Agency involvement, refuses to recognize any problems with her behavior. Although Mother professes the intention to become the parent her son needs, her actions demonstrate otherwise. She does not recognize the reasons for her incapacity or that her failures have placed her son at both physical and emotional risk. Finally, with respect to the bond between parent and child, we do not minimize the existence of Mother’s bond with her son. It is certainly stronger than Father’s bond and not to be sloughed off lightly. Nevertheless, from the time of the initial goal change hearings in October, 2010, it was abundantly clear to the court that the foster parents provided an equally strong bond to the child. That consistent bond, coupled with the fact that foster parents provide a safe, permanent, appropriate, and mentally and emotionally supportive home for the child, more than ameliorates the difficulties the child may have in losing the bond with Mother. Therefore, we conclude that the bond with foster parents is the attachment which should be fostered and protected as is in his best interest. -6- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 IV. Conclusion It is not sensible or compatible with the law or policy of the Commonwealth to require the child to wait an indeterminable number of years for Mother or Father to summon the responsibility and determination to parent. The goal change to adoption is clearly in Son’s best interest. Similarly, the Agency and GAL clearly and convincingly demonstrated grounds for termination. Mother has been unable or unwilling to preform her duties and have caused her son to be without the essential care he requires. Furthermore, given Mother’s failure to recognize or admit the causes of her incapacity obviate her ability to remedy them. The conditions leading to the child’s placement continue to exist and Mother cannot and will not remedy them in a reasonable time, if ever. Therefore, we conclude that termination will serve the child’s best interest and permit his adoption by adults who are willing to provide him the care, stability, nurture and love he requires in order to thrive. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. -7- CP-21-DP-0029-2008 No. 33 ADOPTIONS 2011 Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire For CCC&YS Sean Shultz, Esquire For the Mother John Mangan, Esquire For the Father Kate Lawrence, Esquire Guardian ad Litem for the Juvenile CCC&YS CASA :saa -8-