HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-2158TERRY PEIPER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. : CIVIL ACTION
DALE E. KENDALL,
Defendant NO. 2011-2158 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
BEFORE OLER, EBERT and MASLAND, JJ.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J. June 16, 2011.
In this civil action, Plaintiff has sued Defendant for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a motor vehicle accident that allegedly occurred as a result of
Defendant's negligent and reckless conduct.' Specifically, it is alleged that Defendant
drove a speeding truck into the rear of a stopped vehicle operated by Plaintiff.2
For disposition at this time are Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint,3 as well as Plaintiff's preliminary objections to Defendant's
' Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, filed April 18, 2011 (hereinafter Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl.).
2 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶4-7, 17.
' Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, filed April 26, 2011
(hereinafter Def 's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am Compl.)
preliminary objections .4 Both sets of preliminary objections were argued on May 27,
2011.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, Defendant's preliminary objections to
Plaintiff's second amended complaint will be dismissed, and Plaintiff's preliminary
objections to Defendant's preliminary objections will be deemed moot.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 23, 2011, Plaintiff, Terry Peiper, filed a complaint alleging
negligence on the part of Defendant, Dale E. Kendall, relating to a motor vehicle accident
involving Plaintiff and Defendant that allegedly occurred on October 15, 2010.5
Defendant filed preliminary objections to the complaint on March 3, 20116 requesting,
inter alfa, a more specific pleading.' On March 21, 2011 Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint that was very similar to Plaintiff s original complaint.8 On March 29, 2011,
Defendant filed preliminary objections to Plaintiffs amended complaint, essentially
reiterating Defendant's prior preliminary objections.9 On April 18, 2011, Plaintiff filed a
second amended complaint that included, for the first time, an allegation of recklessness
and a request for punitive damages.lo
4 Plaintiff's Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint, filed May 6, 2011 (hereinafter Pl.'s Prelim. Objections to Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s
Sec. Am. Compl.).
s Plaintiff's Complaint, filed February 23, 2011.
6 Defendant's Preliminary Objections, filed March 3, 2011 (hereinafter Def's Prelim. Objections).
Def's Prelim. Objections, ¶¶3-4.
s Plaintiff s Amended Complaint, filed March 21, 2011.
9 Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, filed March 29, 2011.
10 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl.
2
On April 26, 2011, Defendant filed preliminary objections to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, wherein Defendant (a) demurred to Plaintiffs complaint to the
extent that it was based upon "recklessness,""
to the extent that it requested punitive
damages, 12
and to the extent that it alleged that Defendant "[a]cted with reckless
disregard for the well-being of other vehicles and people on the roadway" (subparagraph
17(g) of the second amended complaint) and "created an unreasonable risk of harm to
Plaintiff," (subparagraph 17(h) of the second amended complaint),13 (b) requested, in the
alternative, a more specific pleading with respect to the allegations that Defendant
"[a]cted with reckless disregard for the well-being of other vehicles and people on the
roadway" and "[c]reated an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff," 14 (c) moved to
"dismiss" allegations that Defendant had pled guilty to driving at an unsafe speed in
connection with the accident, on the ground that the allegations were "not admissible,
irrelevant and impertinent," 15 and (d) moved to dismiss Plaintiffs entire second amended
" Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶1.
12 Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶3.
" Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl. ¶2. Defendant's Preliminary Objections to
Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint asserted, inter alia, that subparagraphs 17(g), 17(h) and 17(1) "do
not set forth a cause of action." Subparagraph 17(g) alleged that Defendant "[a]cted with reckless
disregard for the well-being of other vehicles and people on the roadway" and subparagraph 17(h) alleged
that Defendant "[c]reated an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff" There was no subparagraph 17(1) in
the second amended complaint.
14 Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶4. Defendant's Preliminary Objections to
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserted, inter alia, that subparagraphs 17(g), (17(h) and 17(1)
" [i]n the alternative ... do not set forth sufficient facts." Subparagraph 17(g) alleged that Defendant
"[a]cted with reckless disregard for the well-being of other vehicles and people on the roadway" and
subparagraph 17(h) alleged that Defendant "[c]reated an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff" There
was no subparagraph 17(1) in the second amended complaint
is Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶5.
3
complaint on the ground that under the Rules of Civil Procedure a plaintiff may file of
right only one amended complaint in response to preliminary objections. 16
Plaintiff chose on May 6, 2011, to file a preliminary objection in the form of a
"demurrer" to Defendant's preliminary objections insofar as they challenged Plaintiff's
right to file a second amended complaint .17 Plaintiff characterized Defendant's
preliminary objection in this regard as "frivolous" and "without merit whatsoever."18
The facts alleged in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pertaining to his
claims for negligence and recklessness and request for punitive damages may be
summarized as follows: Terry Peiper, Plaintiff, is an individual who resides in Carlisle,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.19 Dale E. Kendall, Defendant, is an individual who
resides in Newburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.20
On October 15, 2010, Plaintiff, operating a 1997 Chevrolet 1500,21 was "carefully
and prudently stopped in her vehicle on Walnut Bottom Road, ,22 facing east at the
intersection of Walnut Bottom Road and Richland Road, in Dickinson Township,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.23 Defendant, driving a 1995 Dodge Dakota ,24 was
16 Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶6.
17 Plaintiff's Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, filed May 6, 2011 (hereinafter Pl.'s Prelim. Objections to Def's Prelim. Objections
to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl.).
" Pl.'s Prelim. Objections to Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶6.
19 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶1.
20 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶2.
21 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶5.
22 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶4.
23 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶3.
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travelling east in his vehicle at a "dangerous and excessive"25 rate of speed on Walnut
Bottom Road when he "crested a hill" and collided with the rear of Plaintiff's motor
vehicle .26 Defendant was cited for a violation of Section 3361 of the Motor Vehicle
Code, "Driving Vehicle at a Safe Speed," subsequent to the collision ,27 and on October
17, 2011, he pled guilty to the charge .28
The collision caused Plaintiff to be "flung backwards in her vehicle"29 and
"pushed [Plaintiff's vehicle] to the left into oncoming traffic .,,30 Plaintiff avoided a head-
on collision ,31 but "sustained serious personal injuries to her left arm and neck in the
collision [with Defendant]." 32
Plaintiff suffered losses from the collision in the form of the "[total] loss of her
vehicle, towing expenses, bodily injury, lost wages, and pain and suffering. ,33 In
Paragraph 17 of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that "the collision was
caused by the recklessness, carelessness, and negligence of the Defendant. ,34 Defendant
evidenced his recklessness, carelessness, and negligence in the following particulars:
24 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶7.
25 pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶17.
26 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶6.
27 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶14.
28 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶15.
29 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶8.
so Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶9.
31 Pl.'s Sec. Am.
Compl., ¶10.
32 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶11.
" Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., Request for Relief Counts I, II.
34 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶17.
E
a. Operat[ing] the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive
rate of speed under the circumstances then and there existing;
b. Fail[ing] to observe and obey traffic controls under the
circumstances;
C. Fail[ing] to pay proper and due heed and precaution to the point and
position of the Plaintiff,
d. Fail[ing] to reduce speed to avoid a collision;
e. Fail[ing] to observe due care and precaution and to maintain proper
and adequate control of the motor vehicle;
f. Fail[ing] to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully upon
the roadway;
g. Act[ing] with reckless disregard for the well-being of other vehicles
and people on the roadway; and
h. Creat[ing] an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff.35
Defendant's recklessness, carelessness, and negligence were further evidenced by
his failure to abide by the speed limit despite his familiarity with the same on Walnut
Bottom Road .36 Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant knew that he was breaking the speed
limit at [that location on the Walnut Bottom Road] and [that doing so] would increase the
likelihood of his inability to stop to avoid other automobiles in the roadway[, thus]
increasing the likelihood of an accident. ,37
DISCUSSION
Defendant's demurrer relating to allegations of recklessness and claim for
punitive damages. A preliminary objection to a complaint in the nature of a demurrer is
" Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶17.
36 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶¶18-21.
37 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶21.
0
appropriate where the complaint is legally insufficient to sustain a cause of action
recognized by law. Pa. R.C.P.1028(a)(4). Preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer normally require the court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the
challenged pleading. In general, no testimony or other evidence outside of the pleading
may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the demurrer. Cooper v.
Church of St. Benedict, 2008 PA Super 171, ¶2, 954 A.2d 1216, 1218, citing Hess v. Fox
Rothschild, LLP, 2007 PA Super 133, ¶18, 925 A.2d 798, 805, appeal denied, 596 Pa.
733, 945 A.2d 171 (2008).
When considering a demurrer, the court must accept all material facts set forth in
the complaint, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, as admitted and
true and decide whether, based on the facts averred, recovery is impossible as a matter of
law. Wagner v Waitlevertch, 2001 PA Super 100, ¶6, 774 A.2d 1247, 1250 , citing
Wiernik v. PHH U.S. Mortg. Corp., 1999 PA Super 193, 736 A.2d 616 (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 700, 751 A.2d 193 (2000). The demurrer should be
sustained only if, after the averments of the complaint are assumed to be true, the plaintiff
has failed to assert a legally cognizable cause of action and, therefore, cannot prevail.
See Lerner v. Lerner, 2008 PA Super 183, ¶11, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234, citing Kramer v.
Dunn, 2000 PA Super 101, ¶18, 749 A.2d 984, 990.
To justify an award of punitive damages, the wrongful conduct of the defendant
must be "outrageous." Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984) (adopting
section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Conduct is considered to be
outrageous if it is intentional, willful, or wanton, Slappo v. J's Development Associates
7
Inc., 2002 PA Super 18, 791 A.2d 409, malicious or oppressive, Jahanshahi v. Centura
Development Inc., 2003 PA Super 43, 816 A.2d 1179, 1188, or "done with a bad motive
or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others." Jude Technical Services Inc. v.
Clancy, 2002 PA Super 391, 813 A.2d 879, 889.
"Reckless indifference to the interests of others" refers to an act "of an
unreasonable character, in disregard to a risk known to [the tortfeasor] or so obvious that
he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow." McClellan v. HMO of Pennsylvania, 413 Pa. Super. 128, 145, 604
A.2d 1053, 1061 (1992). Thus, for conduct to be considered reckless "[i]t must involve
an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial physical harm, and the probability that
it will so result must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary negligence."
Hall v. Jackson, 2001 PA Super 334, 788 A.2d 390, 403, citing Moran v. G. & W.H.
Corson, Inc., 402 Pa. Super. 101, 586 A.2d 416, 423 (1991) (quoting Comments to
Restatement (Second) of Torts §500.)
Within reason, the issue of whether a defendant's actions constitute outrageous or
reckless conduct is a factual matter, relegated to the determination of the fact -finder.
SHV Coal Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 526 Pa. 489, 495, 587 A.2d 702, 705 (1991);
Trotman v. Mecchella, 421 Pa. Super. 620, 625, 618 A.2d 982, 985 (1992). In deciding
whether punitive damages will be awarded, the trier -of -fact can consider the act itself and
all the circumstances, including the motive of the wrongdoer, the relations between the
parties, and the provocation or want of provocation for the act. Focht v. Rahada, 217 Pa.
Super. 35, 40, 268 A.2d 157, 160 (1970). The court should peremptorily rule upon the
'3
viability of a punitive damages claim "only when no reasonable inference from the facts
alleged supports a punitive award." Eagle Traffic Control v. Addco, 889 F. Supp. 200,
201 (E.D. Pa. 1995), citing Trotman v. Mecchella, 421 Pa. Super. at 625, 618 A.2d at 985
(1992).
In support of his demurrers with respect to Plaintiff's allegation of recklessness
and claim for punitive damages, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims that
"Defendant's conduct consisted of `recklessness' [are] not supported by facts set forth in
the Complaint,"38 that Plaintiff's claim "do[es] not set forth a cause of action, ,39
and that
Plaintiff's request for punitive damages "is not supported by the facts set forth in the
Complaint .,,40 Although the Plaintiff has the burden of proving a mental state of
recklessness on the part of Defendant that would merit Plaintiff's receipt of punitive
damages, as a general rule the trier -of -fact must determine whether Plaintiff has met this
burden, not a court presiding over preliminary objections, where the issue is at least
arguable. This general rule is particularly applicable where an assessment of the degree
of risk to which a speeding motorist subjects other persons on the road is dependent upon
an evaluation of many variables, including the rate of speed and road, weather and traffic
conditions. Accordingly, the demurrers to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as
they relate to recklessness and punitive damages will be dismissed.
" Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶1.
39 Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶2.
40
Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶3.
0
Defendant's contention that Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in paragraphs
17(g) and 17(h)41 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint likewise has no merit.
Paragraph 17 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that the collision in
question was caused by the "recklessness, carelessness and negligence of the Defendant"
in that he "[o]perated the motor vehicle at a high, dangerous and excessive rate of speed
under the circumstances" and "failed to observe and obey traffic controls."42 These
allegations, as subparts of Paragraph 17, must be considered in conjunction with the
balance of the paragraph, and do not in themselves purport to represent independent
causes of action. Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer with respect to these subparagraphs
of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
Request for a more specific pleading. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1028(a)(3) governs requests for more specific pleadings. The issue implicated by Rule
1028(a)(3) is "whether the complaint is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to
prepare his defense or ... [if it] informs the defendant with accuracy and completeness of
the specific basis on which recovery is sought so that he may know without question
upon what grounds to make his defense." Rambo v. Green, 2006 PA Super 231, ¶11, 906
A.2d 1232, 1236, citing Ammlung v. City of Chester, 224 Pa. Super. 47, 59 n.36, 302
A.2d 491, 498 n.36 (1973). The trial court has broad discretion in determining the
amount of detail that must be pleaded since this is not something capable of precise
41 Although Defendant also objected to subparagraph 17(1) of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the
court cannot determine what subparagraph 17(1) refers to as no such subparagraph appears in the amended
complaint.
42 Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶17.
10
measurement. Pike County Hotels Corp. v. Kiefer 262 Pa. Super. 126, 134, 396 A.2d
677, 681 (1976). A complaint is sufficiently specific if it provides enough facts to enable
the defendant to frame a proper answer and prepare a defense. Boyd v. Rockwood Area
School District, 907 A.2d 1157, 1167-68 n.20 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). "[I]n determining
whether a particular paragraph in a complaint is stated with the necessary specificity,
such paragraph must be read in the context of all of the allegations in the complaint."
United Sportsmen of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Game Commission (PGC), 950 A.2d
1120, 1134 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).
Defendant's motion for a more specific pleading with respect to Paragraph 17,
subparts 17(g) and 17(h), contends that they "do not set forth sufficient facts .„43
Although subparagraphs 17(g) and 17(h), when viewed independently of the rest of
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint, may not "set forth sufficient facts,” the law
requires that the subparts be read in the context of the entire complaint. When read in
this context, these averments are not so general as to deprive Defendant of the ability to
prepare a defense.
Motion to strike for inclusion of impertinent material. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1028(a)(2) governs preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to strike
impertinent material. Rule 1028(a)(2) states that " [p]reliminary objections may be filed
by any party... [for] failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court or inclusion
of scandalous or impertinent material. ,44 For allegations to be stricken as "scandalous
43 Def's Prelim. Objections to Pl.'s Sec. Am. Compl., ¶4.
44 Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(2).
11
and impertinent," they must be immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of
action. Common Cause/Pennsylvania v. Com., 710 A.2d 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). In
this regard, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Diess v Pennsylvania Dept. Of
Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 909 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007), stated that "[c]ourts may regard
such pleadings as simple surplusage and need not sustain [an objection to] every
averment that is not pertinent to the cause of action, but [noted that] trial courts, as
recognized in 4 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d, §16:60, have sustained such
objections when the averments are either prejudicial or create confusion." Where, as
here, the party challenging material in a pleading as impertinent will have ample
opportunity to object to admission of the item at the evidentiary stage of the case, and the
potential for prejudice, embarrassment or confusion is minimal, it would seem that there
is no compelling need to strike the material on a preliminary objection.
Demurrer for failure to conform to proper pleading procedures filing of multiple
amended complaints. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(c) governs the filing of
amended complaints. Rule 1028 states, in part, as follows:
(c)(1) A party may file an amended pleading as of course within twenty
days after service of a copy of preliminary objections. If a party has
filed an amended pleading of course, the preliminary objections to
the original pleading shall be deemed moot.
(c)(2) The court shall determine promptly all preliminary objections. If an
issue of fact is raised, the court shall consider evidence by
depositions or otherwise.
Pa. R.C.P. 1028(c)(1), (c)(2). This Rule does not expressly preclude the filing of
successive amended complaints in response to successive preliminary objections.
12
Furthermore, Pennsylvania case law reveals a tendency of courts to allow several
amended complaints where the filing of the amended complaints has proceeded in a
timely manner and in good faith. See Vetenshtein ex rel. Vetenshtein v. City of
Philadelphia, 755 A.2d 62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Lawrence v. Walker, 2009 WL
5248560 (Pa. Com. Pl., Centre Cnty. 2009); Mansour ex rel. Mansour v. Gnaden Huetten
Memorial Hosp., 2007 WL 5234151 (Pa. Com. Pl., Monroe Cnty. 2007). Indeed, even
when a party lacks the right to file an amended complaint as of course under the
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the amendment may be allowed in the
discretion of the trial court. See Koresko v. Farley, 844 A.2d 607 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2004). Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint in its entirety will not be sustained.
Based upon the foregoing, the following order of court will be entered.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant's
Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's
Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, following oral argument held on May 27, 2011, and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows:
1. Defendant's preliminary objections are dismissed, and Defendant is offered
a period of 20 days from the date of this order to file an answer to
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint; and
13
2. The Court having dismissed Defendant's preliminary objections to
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on the merits, Plaintiff's
"demurrer" to Defendant's preliminary objections is deemed moot.
Jason P. Kutulakis, Esq.
Melissa P. Tanguay, Esq.
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Daniel K. Deardorff, Esq.
Martson Law Offices
10 East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Defendant
BY THE COURT
s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
14
15
16
TERRY PEIPER, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V. : CIVIL ACTION
DALE E. KENDALL,
Defendant NO. 2011-2158 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
BEFORE OLER, EBERT and MASLAND, JJ.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 16th day of June, 2011, upon consideration of Defendant's
Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's
Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, following oral argument held on May 27, 2011, and for the reasons
stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows:
1. Defendant's preliminary objections are dismissed, and Defendant is offered
a period of 20 days from the date of this order to file an answer to
Plaintiff s Second Amended Complaint; and
2. The Court having dismissed Defendant's preliminary objections to
Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint on the merits, Plaintiffs
"demurrer" to Defendant's preliminary objections is deemed moot.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Jason P. Kutulakis, Esq.
Melissa P. Tanguay, Esq.
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Daniel K. Deardorff, Esq.
Martson Law Offices
10 East High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorneys for Defendant