HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0002605-2009
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
V. :
:
RICKY L. MILLER, JR. : CP-21-CR-2605-2009
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Masland, J., August 3, 2011:--
Before the court is the omnibus pretrial motion filed by Defendant, Ricky L.
Miller. Relevant here, Defendant is charged with first degree murder and the
Commonwealth is seeking the death penalty. In his motion, Defendant seeks to
preclude the Commonwealth from selecting a death qualified jury and from
seeking the death penalty.
In a capital case, the Commonwealth possesses the initial discretion
whether to seek the death penalty. Commonwealth v. Buck, 709 A.2d 892, 896
(Pa. 1998). This discretion, though broad, is not unlimited. Id. Specifically, such
a prosecution must be supported by a Notice of Aggravating Circumstances at
the time of the Defendant's arraignment. Pa. R. Crim. P. 802. If the notice
"includes at least one aggravating factor that is supported by any evidence, the
case is properly framed as a capital case." Buck, 709 A.2d at 896.
Here, the Commonwealth contends, "[i]n the commission of the offense
the [D]efendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in
addition to the victim of the offense." See Notice of Aggravating Circumstances,
April 15, 2010; 42 Pa. C.S. §9711(d)(7). Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts
that the Defendant "used a deadly weapon (a 9mm Glock handgun) on a vital
CP-21-CR-2605-2009
part of the victim's body (his brain) and shot into an enclosed space within inches
of four other people including the [D]efendant's estranged wife and three small
children." Commonwealth's Ans. to Def.'s Omnibus Pretrial Motion at ¶7.
For his part, the Defendant first notes the coroner's testimony that based
upon evidence of stippling around the wound the maximum distance from the
barrel of the gun to the point of entry was two to three feet. Additionally, he notes
his own statement that he pointed the gun inside the driver's window past his wife
and aimed at the victim specifically close enough so no one else would get hurt.
See Def.'s Omnibus Pretrial Motion at ¶6. As such, he argues the
Commonwealth has failed to present evidence that he knowingly placed others at
grave risk of death during the shooting. We disagree.
As previously stated, the Commonwealth's burden at this stage is modest.
So long as it presents any evidence supporting an aggravating factor, the capital
case is made out. This court has no power to weigh the competing evidence
presented by the Defendant to support his contention that he was in such
proximity to the victim and exercised such care in shooting him that his estranged
wife and children were not in grave danger.
Further, on direct appeal of capital convictions, our Supreme Court has
found sufficient evidence of this aggravating factor even when the endangered
bystander is not directly in the line of fire, stating:
The potential for an errant, ricochet or pass-through
bullet can create the requisite risk. Commonwealth v.
Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 45, 540 A.2d 246, 260 (1988). In
Commonwealth v. Watson, 523 Pa. 51, 565 A.2d 132
(1989), we found that the defendant knowingly created
a grave risk of death to another when he fired into a
-2-
CP-21-CR-2605-2009
closet where he knew a child was hiding, although the
child escaped injury. Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Griffin, 511 Pa. 553, 515 A.2d 865 (1986), we found
that the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to others when he shot the victim in the head at
close range during a party, although no one else was
injured.
Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025, 1037 (Pa. 1996) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We find that the Commonwealth has
presented evidence that the Defendant placed his estranged wife and children in
a similar grave danger by shooting the victim at close range inside a closed
vehicle. Accordingly, the Commonwealth has supplied sufficient prima facie
proof of an aggravating circumstance permitting it to seek the death penalty.
Defendant also maintains he should not face the death penalty as capital
punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the
Pennsylvania and United States constitutions. As Defendant acknowledges, our
courts disagree.
As any other statute, Pennsylvania's death penalty law enjoys a
presumption of constitutionality and can be declared unconstitutional only “if it
clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution.” Erfer v. Commonwealth,
794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002). Our death penalty statute has survived numerous
previous constitutional challenges, and both the United States Supreme Court
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have upheld its constitutionality under
federal and state law. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 308-309,
(1990); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130, 146 (Pa. 1996). In light of this
binding precedent, Defendant's contention lacks merit.
-3-
CP-21-CR-2605-2009
For all these reasons, Defendant's pretrial motion to preclude the
Commonwealth from selecting a death qualified jury due to insufficient prima
facie proof of aggravating circumstances and due to the unconstitutionality of the
death penalty is denied.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of August, 2011, upon consideration of
Defendant’s omnibus pretrial motion, briefing and argument thereon, the motion
DENIED.
is
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
David J. Freed, Esquire
District Attorney
Heidi F. Eakin, Esquire
Special Assistant Public Defender
For Defendant
:saa
-4-
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
V. :
:
RICKY L. MILLER, JR. : CP-21-CR-2605-2009
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this day of August, 2011, upon consideration of
Defendant’s omnibus pretrial motion, briefing and argument thereon, the motion
DENIED.
is
By the Court,
Albert H. Masland, J.
David J. Freed, Esquire
District Attorney
Heidi F. Eakin, Esquire
Special Assistant Public Defender
For Defendant
:saa