Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout2008-3493 JAMES L. FRALISH, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Individually, and as Personal : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Representative of the Estate : of Jean Fralish, : CIVIL ACTION – LAW Plaintiff : NO. 08-3493 CIVIL : vs. : : CARLISLE HMA, INC., d/b/a : CARLISLE REGIONAL MEDICAL : CENTER, and MANOR CARE OF : CARLISLE PA, LLC, : Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT, MANOR CARE OF CARLISLE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J. AND EBERT, J. OPINION AND ORDER In this case, the Defendant Manor Care has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s survival action claim asserting that the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The decedent, Jean Fralish, resided at Defendant’s facility from August 2005 to March 13, 2006. She died some months later on June 13, 2006. On June 9, 2008, Plaintiff, James Fralish, the personal representative of the Estate of Jean Fralish, initiated the instant matter by writ of summons. Plaintiff filed its original complaint on July 24, 2008. The original complaint included a survival action but did not include a claim for wrongful death. Instead, Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim first appeared in the fourth amended complaint, filed July 15, 2009. Defendants, Carlisle HMA, Inc. and Manor Care of Carlisle (hereinafter “Manor Care”) then motioned for judgment on the pleadings. On April 26, 2010, the Honorable Albert H. Masland denied Defendants’ motion as to the survival action claim, but granted the motion on the wrongful death action after finding that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant Manor Care now moves for summary judgment on the survival action claim again alleging that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant Manor Care contends that Plaintiff’s deposition indicated that the decedent was extremely aware of the nature and cause of her injuries prior to her death on June 13, 2006. As a result, Defendant Manor Care asserts that such knowledge indicates that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the decedent was aware of the nature and cause of her injuries. At the conclusion of relevant pleadings, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law “(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. Summary judgment is only appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Grossman v. Rosen, 623 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1993). The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Case v. Lower Saucon Tp., 654 A.2d 57, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Summary judgment may only be entered in those cases that are clear and free from doubt. Johnson v. Harris, 615 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super. 1992). 2 In determining when the clock begins to run for a personal injury claim, generally, time will begin to accrue on the date of the injury and claims not initiated within two years of that date will be untimely. Pulli v. Ustin, 24 A.3d 421, 425 (2011). A survival action is not a new cause of action arising at the time of a decedent’s death; rather, it permits the estate to enforce a cause of action already accrued to the decedent at the time of their death. Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323, 326 (Pa. 1987) (internal citations omitted). The discovery rule is an equitable principle that may toll the statute of limitations when an injured party could not have known of his injury or its cause, despite the exercise of due diligence. Cochran v. GAF Corp., 666 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1995). The question of whether the discovery rule is to be applied to toll the statute of limitations “involves a factual determination as to whether a party was able, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to know of his injury and its cause. . . .” Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 485 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Ordinarily, such a factual determination is to be decided by a jury. Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005). The discovery rule cannot toll the limitation period beyond the time of a decedent’s death. Pastierik, 526 A.2d at 326. The discovery rule may toll the limitation period for a survival action until the decedent’s death, but not beyond. Id. In the present case, the decedent was a resident of Manor Care from August 1, 2005 to March 13, 2006, when she was transferred to Carlisle Regional Medical Center. During the course of the decedent’s treatment at Manor Care, she was allegedly subject to inadequate medical care. Plaintiff contends that this inadequate medical care caused the decedent to suffer the following: A severe thigh infection, compartment syndrome in her right arm, and a fractured hip. The decedent left Defendant’s care on March 13, 2006, and died on June 13, 2006. On June 3 9, 2008, Plaintiff initiated the instant survival action. Thus, this court is again asked to determine whether Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to justify the tolling of the limitation period from the time the decedent left Defendant’s care until her death. Plaintiff alleges the decedent’s injuries incapacitated her and rendered her unable to discover the operative conduct that caused her injuries. To refute this contention, Defendant points to the deposition of the decedent’s husband, James Fralish. In his deposition, Mr. Fralish stated that decedent was “extremely aware” of the injuries she sustained. However, one’s awareness of injuries sustained cannot be equated to an awareness of their cause. Thus, whether the limitation period should be tolled from the time of the incapacitating injuries until the decedent’s death depends upon whether the decedent was reasonably diligent in her efforts to discover the nature and cause of her injuries. Having failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the decedent’s efforts were not reasonably diligent, it appears that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Disputes such as these may only be properly resolved by the fact finder. Thus, to dispose of this case before a jury has weighed the evidence would be improper. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied. ORDER AND NOW, this day of September, 2011, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Manor Care of Carlisle, is DENIED. BY THE COURT, ______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. 4 5 6 JAMES L. FRALISH, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Individually, and as Personal : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Representative of the Estate : of Jean Fralish, : CIVIL ACTION – LAW Plaintiff : NO. 08-3493 CIVIL : vs. : : CARLISLE HMA, INC., d/b/a : CARLISLE REGIONAL MEDICAL : CENTER, and MANOR CARE OF : CARLISLE PA, LLC, : Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT, MANOR CARE OF CARLISLE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J. AND EBERT, J. ORDER AND NOW, this day of September, 2011, the motion for summary judgment of Defendant, Manor Care of Carlisle, is DENIED. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J. Cory A. Leshner, Esquire For the Plaintiff John M. Skrocki, Esquire For Manor Care of Carlisle Stephanie L. Hersperger, Esquire For Defendant Carlisle HMA Inc., d/b/a Carlisle Regional Medical Center :rlm 7 8