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HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-634 Civil (2)MARGARET AGRUSO (READER) Plaintiff JOSEPH J. BECHARA, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 92-634 CIVIL TERM IN CUSTODY IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 Oler, J., October 14, 1996. In the present custody case involving the parties' six-year- old son, the docket in this court has now extended to its ninth page. Prior proceedings in New York State contain an order advising that "[t]he Court has become very familiar with the difficulties of these parties over the last several months" and noting that "[t]here is an impossible relationship between the two.''~ This particular order concluded with a dismissal of "all of the petitions .herein.''2 With what in retrospect seems to have been an unusual display of alacrity, the New York Court yielded jurisdiction to this court of the parties' custody litigation in 1992.3 Many motions, petitions, conferences and hearings have ensued. During the course of the proceedings, Defendant, now Appellant, has conceded that he presented false testimony.4 He was ~ Plaintiff's Petition To Determine Jurisdiction, Exhibit C (filed March 10, 1992). Id. See Order of Court, March 10, 1992. N.T. 65, Hearing, April 11, 1996. NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM also adjudicated in contempt in 1995.s A few months ago, Defendant appealed an order which this court entered following a hearing on five of the parties' petitions.6 That appeal remains pending in the Superior Court.7 Defendant has now appealed from an order of the court dated August 9, 1996. This order, inter alia, found Defendant in contempt, for a second time, and imposed a $300 sanction.8 The order read as follows: AND NOW, this 9th day of August, 1996, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Petition for Emergency Special Relief/Contempt of Court, and following a hearing at which the Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Gregory J. Katshir, Esquire, and at which the Defendant did not appear but was represented by James J. Kayer, Esquire, the Court finds that the Defendant has intentionally, voluntarily, and willfully failed to comply with the Order of Court heretofore entered in this case, and he is consequently adjudicated in contempt. The Defendant is directed to pay a fine in the amount of $300.00, and reasonable Order of Court, September 7, 1995. Notice of Appeal, filed May 7, 1996. In that appeal, Defendant is challenging (a) the court's failure to order installation of a private telephone line for the parties' six-year-old son at his mother's residence and (b) the court's failure to expand Defendant's contacts with the child beyond "five (5) opportunities in a normal month." Defendant's statement of matters complained of on appeal, filed May 22, 1996. The appeal is docketed at No. 0041/HBG96. 8 Defendant has not paid this sum, nor did he pay the previous sanction for contempt in the amount of $50. NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM attorney's fees to Plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $150.00, and to cause the return of the parties' child to the Plaintiff on Sunday, August 11, 1996, at 12 noon at the entrance to Lowe's department store in Altoona, Pennsylvania, on 17th Street. During the forthcoming school year, the Defendant's periods of partial custody are reduced to one weekend every other month pending further Order of Court, and Defendant's period of partial custody during the summer of 1997 and each summer thereafter pending further Order of Court is reduced by an additional two weeks, giving the Plaintiff a total of three weeks primary custody with the child. In the event that the Defendant fails to return the child at the specified time on Sunday, August 11, 1996, to the Plaintiff, the Court will entertain a request for a sanction of imprisonment. In a statement of matters complained of on appeal, Defendant sets forth th~ grounds for his appeal as follows: 4. [T]heAppellant/Defendant does hereby confirm that he complains of the following issues: (a) the denial to allow the Defendant to participate by telephone given a documentable family emergency, (b) a contempt penalty consisting of an unreasonable limitation of periods of partial custody between father and son, (c) the denial of the Defendant's request for a second hearing to allow him to provide telephone records, unavailable at 3 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM the time of the August 9, 1996 hearing that would corroborate his assertion that he was at the custody transfer point at the court appointed time. 5. The Defendant had advised the court of his family emergency in an earlier motion for continuance dated August 8, 1996, said motion being denied by the court on the same day it was filed. 6. Within said motion for continuance, the Defendant advised the court of his intention to present an additional fact witness, as well as his intention to present evidence in the form of telephone records, both sources of evidence would serve to authenticate his assertion that he was at the transfer point at the appropriate time. Neither the fact witness, nor the telephone records were available for presentation at the August 9, 1996 hearing, as specified in the DefEndant's August 8, 1996 motion. 7. The court by its own admission indicated on the day of the hearing that it was unaware of the contents of the motion for continuance as it pertained to the two evidentiary questions. 8. The court allowed the Defendant, by his counsel, to make oral motion for a request for a second hearing in order to allow the testimony of the fact witness, Mr. Bachert, and the telephone records to be considered by the court. After consulting with opposing counsel, who advised the court that they opposed the request, the motion was denied. 9. In previous hearings before this Honorable Court, telephone testimony had been utilized by the parties, specifically by the Plaintiff, in order to provide the court with all relevant evidence to be considered. The court apparently changed its standards in refusing to allow telephone testimony in its 4 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM August 9, 1996 hearing. 10. Defendant believes and therefore avers that the court in further curtailing his periods of partial custody as part of its adjudication of contempt, has in its zeal to punish the Defendant, lost sight of the primary goal in any custody proceeding, that is to craft a custody order that will be in the best interest of the child.9 This opinion in support of the order dated August 9, 1996, is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). STATEMENT OF FACTS; PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Plaintiff is Margaret M. Reader (formerly Agruso), residing at 114 West 8th Avenue, Altoona, Blair County, Pennsylvania.~° The Defendant is Joseph J. Bechara, residing at 916 Center Drive, 'Franklin Square, New York.~ The subject of this custody proceeding is Matthew J. Bechara, born December 20, 1989. He is the son of the parties, who were never married to each other; since the dissolution of their relationship, Plaintiff has married Richard E. Reader~2 and Defendant has acquired a girlfriend.TM 9 A Statement of Matters Complained of on Appea~ Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), filed September 26, 1996. N.T. 11, Hearing, August 9, 1996. N.T. 44, Hearing, April 11, 1996. Id. at 40. Id. at 49. 5 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM In 1992, following a hearing, this court entered an order granting primary physical custody of the child to Plaintiff mother, partial physical custody to Defendant father on alternate weeks from Thursday until Sunday and for two weeks in August, and limiting direct contacts between the parties to occasions involving an emergency.TM By agreement of the parties, this order was later amended to provide that Defendant's periods of partial custody would be for one week in January, February, April, May, September, October, November and December; two weeks in March, June, July and August; and over Christmas and New Year's Day on an alternating basis.~s In 1995, Plaintiff filed a petition to modify the order and for contempt.~ The order was modified by agreement of the parties to provide generally for primary physical custody of the child by Plaintiff mother during the school year; and a hearing was scheduled before the court to resolve partial custody rights of Defendant during the school year and to establish a summer custody schedule.~7 Before the scheduled hearing, Defendant filed a motion Order of Court, June 3, 1992. Order of Court, August 14, 1992. Plaintiff's Petition for Modification/Contempt of Custody, filed May 18, 1995. ~7 Order of Court, July 20, 1995. 6 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM for a continuance and a petition for contempt,~8 and Plaintiff filed (at No. 95-4103 Civil Term) a petition under the Protection from Abuse Act for a protective order and custody.~9 Defendant's request for a continuance of the custody proceeding was denied.2° A hearing on the other matters, including custody, was held on September 7, 1995. At the conclusion of the hearing, orders were issued denying Defendant's petition for contempt, denying Plaintiff's petition for a protective order and custody under the Protection from Abuse Act, granting Plaintiff's petition for contempt against Defendant2~ and modifying the custody order. The revised custody order, which was not appealed, provided as follows: AND NOW, this 7th day of September, 1995, upon consideration of the Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Custody and following a hearing, it is ordered and directed as follows: 1. The parties shall share legal custody of their minor child, Matthew J. Bechara, born December 20, 1989. ~8 Defendant's Motion for Continuance, filed August 25, 1995; Defendant's Petition for Contempt of Court, filed September 6, 1995. ~9 Plaintiff's Petition for Protection From Abuse Order and Custody, filed August 1, 1995. Order of Court, August 29, 1995. 2~ The contempt related to phone calls made to Plaintiff in violation of the order. The court imposed a sanction of $50. Order of Court, September 7, 1995. NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM 2. During the school year, the child shall be in the primary physical custody of the mother, and the father shall have the following periods of temporary custody: (a) One weekend per month during the school year to be exercised by the father giving the mother forty (40) days advance notice of the weekend he will have the child; and (b) The period from noon on December 26th through noon December 30, each year; [and] (c) The child's entire vacation from school in the spring of each year (in the event the child has two separate vacations from school, the father shall be entitled to have the child for the longer of the two but not both). 3. From noon on the second Saturday following the child's dismissal from school each summer until noon on the second Friday before school resumes in fall. The Child shall be in the . physical custody of his father at his homY'in New York. Mother shall have seven (7) consecutive days of custody of the child, to be exercised on dates selected by the mother [as] to which she will give the father written notice no later than the 15th day of April each year. 4. The parties will share transportation for all custodial exchanges equally by selecting a mid-point between their homes for purposes of exchange. Unless the parties agree otherwise, that midpoint will be at the border between Pennsylvania and New Jersey on Interstate 78, and will be at 8:00 p.m. on Friday evening at the beginning of the father's weekends, and 7:00 p.m. on Sunday at the end of those weekends. 5. The party having custody or partial custody shall provide a telephone number where he or she can be promptly reached directly or 8 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM indirectly in the event of a medical emergency. No communication shall be made by either party directly or indirectly with the other, with [a] member of the other's family, or with the other's employer or co-workers except in the event of a medical emergency or through legal counsel.22 About two months later, Defendant filed a Petition for Reconsideration. A representative paragraph of the petition read as follows: 10. The Petitioner requests the court to order the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner for the cost that he incurs each trip in tolls. It was this Honorable Court's Order of September 7, 1995 that established the parties equally sharing the transportation responsibilities given the great distance that exists between the parties. However, due to the existence of several toll bridges and roads at his end of the transportation arrangements, the Petitioner regularly must spend in excess of $12.00 per trip on tolls while the Respondent spends $.50 cents for a single toll.23 A hearing was scheduled on this petition.24 However, in the interim both counsel requested a conference in chambers on an emergency basis, and the following order resulted from the conference: AND NOW, this 22nd day of November, 1995, following a conference in chambers with counsel for the Plaintiff, Gregory J. Katshir, 1995. Order of Court, September 7, 1995. Defendant's Petition for Reconsideration, filed October 31, Order of Court, November 3, 1995. NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM Esquire, and counsel for the Defendant, James J. Kayer, Esquire, and both counsel having requested that certain issues be resolved by the Court on an emergency basis, it is ordered and directed as follows: 1. Telephone access to the child shall be permitted ~y the Plaintiff, Margaret Agruso Reader, for the Defendant, Joseph Bechara, on Wednesdays at 8:00 p.m., at which time the father shall call the child and the child shall be permitted to answer the phone without the mother's intervening. 2. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties through counsel, when a weekend chosen by the father for his partial custody shall be a three-day weekend (i.e., having a school holiday falling on a Friday or Monday), the father's visitation shall extend to that vacation day. 3. With respect to the father's Christmas vacation period of temporary custody with the child in this year (1995), the father's weekend custody period for that month shall occur either at the end of the Christmas vacation period by the taking of two additional days or at another time during the month in December, at the father's option, but not the weekend commencing December 22. 4. Because of the impending birth of the mother's child, the weekend commencing January 12, 1995, shall not be available for the father's partial custody, and he shall select another weekend for that period .... 2s This order was not appealed. Order of Court, November 22, 1995. 10 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM Still prior to the hearing scheduled on Defendant's Petition for Reconsideration, Defendant filed an "Emergency Petition for Special Relief Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1915.13." This petition requested that Defendant be afforded custody of the child for the weekend of December 15, 1995. A conference with counsel in chambers resulted in an order expanding instead the Defendant's custodial period during the child's Christmas vacation.26 This order was not appealed. Four additional petitions were then filed. They were scheduled to be heard at the same time as Defendant's Petition for Reconsideration. These were Defendant's Petition for Contempt of Court, filed December 29, 1995; Plaintiff's Petition for Contempt, filed March 22, 1996; Defendant's Petition for Special Relief, filed April 10, 1996; and Defendant's Supplemental Petition for Contempt, filed April 10, 1996. Order of Court, December 14, 1995. 11 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM A hearing was held on the five petitions on April 11, 1996. Among numerous issues at this hearing27 was whether Defendant should be held in contempt of court for tardiness on his part designed to frustrate the transfer of custody. In spite of rather strong third-party testimony adverse to Defendant,28 including testimony that he was habitually late for custody exchanges,~9 the court gave Defendant the benefit of the doubt and declined to adjudicate him 27 A sense of the nature of hearings in this case may be obtained from the following excerpt taken from Defendant's direct examination, on the issue of Defendant's demand that the court order a private telephone line installed for the six-year-old at the mother's home: Q What solution would you request the judge make with regard to telephone contact? A Since the parents seem to have difficulty, the son shouldn't pay. My son should not pay for adult problems. My son should have liberal communication with me, not at the expense of interfering with other families, but he should be able to speak to me. Two times a week is not asking a lot, Margaret, it really isn't. And I don't see if that can't be achieved, then a separate line for him, I'll figure out how we figure out the bill, and you won't be bothered if it's such a bother for me to speak to Matthew. THE PLAINTIFF: You abuse that right. THE COURT: Wait. I don't want the parties talking to each other during the testimony .... N.T. 52, Hearing, April 11, 1996. 28 N.T. 3-16, Hearing, April 11, 1996. 29 N.T. 10, Hearing, April 11, 1996. 12 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM in contempt. The order entered following the hearing was as follows: AND NOW, this llth day of April, 1996, upon consideration of the Petition for Contempt filed on behalf of Plaintiff, Margaret Agruso Reader, the Petition for Contempt of Court filed on behalf of Defendant, Joseph J. Bechara, the Petition for Special Relief filed on behalf of Defendant, Joseph J. Bechara, the Supplemental Petition for Contempt filed on behalf of Defendant, Joseph J. Bechara, and the Petition for Reconsideration filed on behalf of Defendant, Joseph J. Bechara, and following a hearing, it is ORDERED and DIRECTED as follows: 1. The custody order previously entered in this case as represented by the Orders of Court dated September 7, 1995, and November 22, 1995, is amended to provided [sic] as follows: Wednesday a. With respect to the weekly evening telephone calls from Defendant to the parties' child at the Plaintiff's residence, the said calls shall be made between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday evening and no other time; Plaintiff shall insure that the telephone line is open during that half hour for receipt of the calls; Plaintiff shall not listen in to the conversation between Defendant and the parties' child; and Plaintiff shall not react to the child's side of the conversation which she may overhear. b. Neither party shall call the other party's residence collect at any time. 2. Plaintiff shall reimburse the Defendant in the amount of $192.50 for airplane fare, representing a portion of the sum which he expended in reliance upon misinformation conveyed to him by Plaintiff. 3. Defendant shall receive an additional 13 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM two days of partial custody with respect to the parties' child during the forthcoming summer, with one day to be selected by the Plaintiff and one day to be selected by the Defendant. 4. In all other respects, the relief requested by the parties in the various petitions is denied.3° Defendant appealed this order to the Superior Court on May 7, 1996.3~ This court, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), thereafter filed an opinion in support of its order;32 as noted previously, this appeal remains pending in the Superior Court. On May 20, special relief. special relief. 1996, Plaintiff filed an emergency petition for On May 21, 1996, Defendant filed a petition for On May 23, 1996, the court held a conference in chambers with counsel and the issues raised in the petitions were resolved without a hearing.TM On July 15, 1996, Plaintiff filed the Petition for Emergency Special Relief/Contempt of Custody [sic] which resulted in the order that is the subject of Defendant's most recent appeal and of this opinion. The petition alleged that Defendant did not appear 30 Order of Court, April 11, 1996, as amended, Order of Court, April 16, 1996. Notice of Appeal, filed May 7, 1996. This opinion was filed May 30, 1996. See Order of Court, May 23, 1996. 14 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM as scheduled at the custody exchange point on July 14, 1996; that Plaintiff had not seen her child since June 8, 1996; and that Defendant was keeping the child from her in New York State. On July 17, 1996, Defendant filed a response and counter-petition.34 In this document, Defendant admitted that he had not appeared on time for the exchange.35 A hearing on Plaintiff's petition was scheduled for August 2, 1996.36 On July 19, 1996, it was continued by agreement of counsel to Friday, August 9, 1996, at 10:30 a.m.~? About two-and-a-half business hours before the hearing was to commence, Defendant filed a motion for a continuance.38 The bases for the motion were (a) that Defendant's father had had an operation the.previous week; (b) that Defendant wanted to obtain telephone records to verify that he had made calls to try to locate the mother when he did arrive at the transfer point; and (c) that Defendant wanted to call a witness who was employed at the transfer ~4 A hearing on Defendant's counter-petition was deferred, pending a request by Defendant's counsel that one be scheduled. N.T. 4-6, Hearing, August 9, 1996. ~s Response to Petition for Emergency Special Relief/Contempt of Court and Counterpetition for Relief, paragraph 16 (filed July 17, 1996). Order of Court, July 18, 1996. Order of Court, July 19, 1996. ~8 The motion was filed at 3:34 p.m., August 8, 1996. In the alternative, Defendant asked for an additional hearing date. 15 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM point to verify that Defendant had eventually arrived -- said witness being "out of state on August 9, 1996, and unavailable to be reached by telephone."39 The motion did not indicate that subpoenas had been utilized for production of the records or attendance of the witness, and no explanation was offered for its timing. Plaintiff's counsel declined to agree to the requested continuance. The court entered an order denying the motion for a continuance.4° The hearing was held as scheduled. Defendant did not appear, and he did not return the child for the hearing. At the commencement of the hearing on August 9, 1996, Defendant's counsel orally moved for an additional hearing date, stating inter.alia that "within the next seven to ten days" he could obtain telephone records indicating that Defendant made long- distance telephone calls from the transfer site after he arrived and that the witness, who would say that Defendant eventually arrived and waited at the site with the child, could be subpoenaed to appear at a later date.4~ The court denied Defendant's motion for an additional hearing date, as well as an oral motion made on behalf of Plaintiff that Defendant be held in contempt for failing 39 Defendant's Motion for Continuance, paragraph 8, filed August 8, 1996. Order of Court, August 8, 1996. N.T. 6-10, Hearing, August 9, 1996. 16 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM to appear at the hearing.42 The evidence at the hearing showed that Plaintiff had driven five hours from her home in Altoona, Pennsylvania, with her six- month-old baby, who was ill, to the transfer point43 in Allentown, Pennsylvania, on July 14, 1996; that she arrived at 11:00 a.m. for 'the 12:00 noon transfer; that she waited an hour until noon and then an additional period of seventeen minutes, and thereafter drove back to Altoona without having received Matthew; and that since June 8, 1996, Defendant had prohibited her from having even telephone contact with their son.44 Defendant presented no evidence at the hearing. Following the hearing, the court entered the order quoted at the beginning of this opinion, from which Defendant has appealed.4s DISCUSSION With respect to Defendant's contention on appeal that the Court erred in "the denial to allow the Defendant to participate by telephone given a documentable family emergency," with "the court [having] apparently changed its standards in refusing to allow telephone testimony in its August 9, 1996 hearing," several N.T. 9-10, Hearing, August 9, 1996. A "Welcome Center." N.T. 14, Hearing, August 9, 1996. N.T. 11-38. 4s Yet another petition has now been filed in this case and remains pending in this court. Plaintiff's Petition for Modification, filed August 9, 1996. 17 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM observations may be made. First, no such request appears in the record, and the court does not recollect such a request.46 Second, the alleged family emergency was not "documented." Third, the court's practice in the past has been to allow telephone testimony in cases where counsel have agreed to the procedure, and not to allow it where they have not; in this case, there is no suggestion that Plaintiff's counsel agreed to Defendant's testimony being received by telephone. Finally, as a general rule "all matters which relate to the orderly conduct of a trial and are not regulated by the Constitution, a statute or a court rule, are within the discretion of the court." 38 P.L.E. Trial §21, at 29 (1961). "The trial court enjoys a broad discretion to control the course of the proceeding." Posel v. Redevelopment Auth., 72 Pa. Commw. 115, 122, 456 A.2d 243, 247 (1983). With respect to Defendant's contention on appeal that the court erred in imposing "a contempt penalty consisting of an unreasonable limitation of periods of partial custody between father and son," with the court "in its zeal to punish the Defendant [having] lost sight of the primary goal in any custody proceeding, that is to craft a custody order that will be in the 46 It was incumbent upon Defendant to make this issue part of the record in the case if he wished to raise it on appeal. See West Shore School District v. Homick, 23 Pa. Commw. 615, 617 n.3, 353 A.2d 93, 94 n.3 (1976). 18 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM best interest of the child," the court is unable to agree. It is, of course, the rule that "the best interest of the child is always our overriding concern" in a custody proceeding. Green v. Sneeringer, 431 Pa. Super. 66, 70, 635 A.2d 1074, 1076 (1993). In this case, Defendant had previously testified falsely and been adjudicated in contempt of court. His personal animosity toward the child's mother has, in the court's view, caused him to undertake to frustrate the Plaintiff's rights, without regard to the effect this would have upon the parties' six-year-old child. After giving Defendant the benefit of the doubt in the most recent contempt hearing, the Court was not willing to sanction such conduct further and fashioned an order which it felt would reduce the stress upon the mother and child occasioned by Defendant's misconduct. Cf. Williams v. Thornton, 395 Pa. Super. 276, 577 A.2d 215 (1990). In this sense, the court regarded its order as being in the best interest of the child. See Guadagnino v. Montie, 435 Pa. Super. 603, 646 A.2d 1257 (1994). With respect to Defendant's contention on appeal that the court erred in "the denial of the Defendant's request for a second hearing to allow him to provide telephone records, unavailable at the time of the ~ugust 9, 1996 hearing that would corroborate his assertion that he was at the custody transfer point at the court appointed time," several observations may be made. First, Defendant conceded in his response to Plaintiff's petition that he 19 NO. 92-0634 CIVIL TERM was not at the transfer point on time, and his motion for the scheduling of another hearing date was not premised upon the contention that he was; it was premised upon the contention that he did arrive eventually. Second, evidence that he had arrived late at the transfer point and made telephone calls would not have led the court to a different conclusion as to the motivation for his condUct. Third, the grant or denial of a request for a continuance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kerns v. Methodist Hospital, 393 Pa. Super. 533, 574 A.2d 1068 (1990). In this case, the circumstances of (a) the late filing of the motion, (b) the Defendant's failure to utilize the subpoena power for the hearing as scheduled and (c) the relative insignificance of the evidence to be adduced at a later hearing led the court to conclude that the motion for the scheduling of another hearing date should be denied. Gregory J. Katshir, Esq. 900 Market Street Lemoyne, PA 17043 Attorney for Plaintiff James J. Kayer, Esq. 4 Liberty Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant : rc 20