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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2010-5740 BRANDON R. MORGANS AND : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF JULIANNE M. MORGANS, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFFS : : V. : : TRIPLE CROWN : CORPORATION, : DEFENDANT : 10-5740 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., November 3, 2011:-- Before the court is Defendant Triple Crown Corporation’s motion for partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs, Brandon R. and Julianne M. Morgans. Defendant seeks to dismiss Counts I and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint claiming that the Pennsylvania Real Estate Disclosure Law is inapplicable in this matter. Plaintiffs seek damages and attorney fees under the statute. Following oral argument and briefing by the parties, Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied. I. Background Defendant Triple Crown Corporation was the owner of real property located at 14 Foxwood Boulevard, Mechanicsburg, PA 17050. On March 15, 2010 Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a written contract whereby Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the property for a specified sum. Prior to settlement the Plaintiffs hired Tillery Inspections to perform a home inspection on the property. The inspection indicated that there was excessive moisture in the home. Further tests indicated 10-5740 CIVIL TERM that mold spores were present within the home and remediation work was recommended. The matter could not be resolved, and on or about May 20, 2010 the Plaintiffs gave Defendant a “termination of contract notice and release of deposit money” which terminated the Real Estate Sales Agreement. Plaintiffs claim that the Pennsylvania Real Estate Disclosure Law is applicable in this case and there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this was violated as a certificate of occupancy was not issued during the time a contract existed between the parties. Defendant claims that the sale was not subject to the Real Estate Disclosure Law as a certificate of occupancy showing the date of inspection as August 11, 2010 was disclosed to Plaintiffs during discovery, and therefore both Counts I and V should be dismissed under Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. We disagree. Discussion II. Summary judgment is properly granted only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits establish there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1035. Here, Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment presents a question of statutory applicability and interpretation. The real question before the Court is whether a certificate of occupancy issued after the plaintiffs had terminated the agreement meets the statutory requirements so as to make the Real Estate Disclosure Law inapplicable. We believe that it does not. -2- 10-5740 CIVIL TERM A. Statute The Pennsylvania Real Estate Disclosure Law, 68 Pa.C.S. § 7301 et seq, provides, in relevant part, that it applies to all residential real estate transfers except transfers of new residential construction that have not been previously occupied, when: (i) the buyer has received a one year or longer written warranty covering such construction; (ii) the dwelling has been inspected for compliance with the applicable building code or, if there is no applicable code, for compliance with a nationally recognized model building code; and (iii) a certificate of occupancy has been issued for the dwelling. 68 Pa.C.S. § 7302. Restated, this section allows a plaintiff to recover under the statute when new construction, not previously occupied, does not meet all three elements. 1. Statutory Interpretation It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs received a one year or longer written warranty and that the building was inspected for compliance with the applicable building code. However, the parties disagree regarding the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Defendant claims that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy on August 11, 2010 meets the exception of the statute, and the statute should not apply. Plaintiff claims that since the certificate of occupancy was issued after the postponed settlement date in May 2010, and after the plaintiffs formally terminated the Real Estate Sales Agreement on or about May 20, 2010, the certificate of occupancy would not apply to this claim. We agree. -3- 10-5740 CIVIL TERM The Pennsylvania Real Estate Disclosure Law was enacted in December 2000 after nearly twenty years of case law that provided buyers protection against fraudulent claims and misrepresentations in real estate transactions. Vaughn v. Drab, 73 Pa. D. & C. 4th 550, 555-57 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2005). Despite the previous protections, the legislature felt it necessary to enact the Real Estate Disclosure Law which expanded the seller’s duties and the buyer’s remedies. This law provided potential victims with greater access to material facts prior to sale, as well as made it easier for victims to seek justice and recover their losses. 68 Pa.C.S. § 7301. Therefore, “the only reasonable explanation to the enactment of the Disclosure Law was to provide broader relief to the buyers of residential real estate.” Vaughn, 73 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 552. The Court shall adhere to this legislative purpose in following the plain meaning of the statute. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Davis v. Sulcowe, 205 A.2d 89, 92 (1969). Here, the plain meaning of the statute requires that all three elements be met for the exclusion to apply. The fact that the certificate of occupancy was not issued for the dwelling until August 2010 and was not available by the date of settlement or at the time the Real Estate Sales Agreement was terminated, cannot be reconciled with the statute. Given the statute’s purpose in broadening buyers’ relief, the court finds that the legislature intended the exclusion to apply -4- 10-5740 CIVIL TERM only when every element has been met in order to afford the most protection to a buyer. Because the only relevant time period for the issuance of the certificate of occupancy is the time prior to the termination of the Real Estate Sales Agreement, the third element of the statute has not been met. Therefore, the certificate of occupancy requirement for exclusion from the statute has not been met and the statute applies. III. Conclusion In sum, we conclude that the Pennsylvania Real Estate Disclosure Law applies to the instant transaction. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ________ day of November, 2011, the Defendant’s IS DENIED motion for partial summary judgment, . By the Court, ____________________ Albert H. Masland, J. David S. Makara, Esquire For Plaintiffs Jeni S. Madden, Esquire For Defendant :saa -5- BRANDON R. MORGANS AND : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF JULIANNE M. MORGANS, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFFS : : V. : : TRIPLE CROWN : CORPORATION, : DEFENDANT : 10-5740 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER, J., GUIDO, J. AND MASLAND, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ________ day of November, 2011, the Defendant’s IS DENIED motion for partial summary judgment, . By the Court, ____________________ Albert H. Masland, J. David S. Makara, Esquire For Plaintiffs Jeni S. Madden, Esquire For Defendant :saa