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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-1675 Civil DONALD WOOD/WOODY'S Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 04-1675 CIVIL ARROW AUTO SALES AND SERVICE, Defendant MEMORANDUM AND VERDICT BEFORE HESS, 1. This suit seeks recovery of towing and storage fees. The vehicle which was towed and which has been stored is a 1987 Audi sedan which the parties value at approximately $200.00. In addition to a towing fee of $65.00, the plaintiff seeks more than $9,000.00 in storage fees. The essential facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, Donald Wood, is the owner of "Woody' s" which is a towing service licensed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The defendant, Arrow Auto Sales and Service, is an automobile dealership owned by Mr. Robin Diver. The defendant acquired the subject 1987 Audi from an individual named Paula Zorek. Shortly after acquiring the vehicle, the defendant loaned it to an individual named Barry Limpo. Mr. Limpo had a residence at the Twigg Mobile Home Park in Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County. He parked the vehicle there where it remained while he was out of the country for several weeks during the summer of 2003. The park rules and regulations, which had been furnished to Mr. Limpo, provided that any vehicle at the park not bearing a current valid inspection sticker and license plate would be towed away and stored at the owner's expense. Because the 1987 Audi sedan was in violation of park rules, it was towed on August 7,2003. NO. 04-1675 CIVIL On August 11, 2003, the plaintiff submitted the vehicle identification number to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The record abstract, dated August 11th, indicated the vehicle was still owned by Paula Zorek. On August 18,2003, the defendant applied for and received a certificate of title for the vehicle. This was approximately eleven days after it had been towed. The defendant learned for the first time, on October 1,2003, that the vehicle had been towed and that the plaintiff was seeking a towing fee of $65.00 together with a storage fee of$10.00 per day. The plaintiff and defendant were unable to reach an accommodation of this matter, one suggestion being that the vehicle be turned over to the plaintiff in exchange for the forgiveness of the storage fees. The vehicle has now been in storage for a time period approaching a thousand days. 1 We note, initially, that while Mr. Limpo was made aware of the rules and regulations of the Twigg Mobile Home Park, the true owner of the vehicle, the defendant, was not. Weare satisfied, therefore, that the remedies available to the plaintiff are limited to those provided for in the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 3353 of the Code, entitled "Prohibitions in Specified Places," provides that, under certain circumstances, the landowner "may remove or have removed [a] vehicle at the reasonable expense of the owner of the vehicle." The Code goes on to provide that: Such person who removes or has removed a vehicle left parked or unattended in violation of the provisions of subsection (b) shall have a lien against the owner of the vehicle, in the amount of the reasonable value of the costs of removing the vehicle plus the costs of storage. 1 The plaintiff admits that his storage lot has never been completely full. In other words, he has not been required to turn away any storage business on account of the 1987 Audi. 2 NO. 04-1675 CIVIL The law is clear, we believe, that where an illegally parked vehicle is removed, a judgment may be had against the owner of the vehicle for the cost of towing. There is a question, however, as to the extent of the liability of the vehicle owner for the costs of storage. With respect to those costs, the statute provides that the person who removes the vehicle "shall have a lien against the owner of the vehicle" for the storage costs. Black's Law Dictionary defines "a lien" as a "charge or security or encumbrance upon property." Black, Henry Campbell, Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1979) 832. We have been unable to find any body oflaw suggesting that there is such a thing as a lien against a person.2 Weare satisfied that, if our legislature had intended that a person towing a vehicle could obtain a judgment against the owner of a vehicle for the amount of storage (no matter how much), it would have said so. Instead, the statute provides for a "lien" against the owner for the amount of storage. In determining the extent of this "lien," a review of our case law is helpful. The portion of Section 3353, allowing for a lien in the amount of the costs of towing and storage, was added in 1979. It is logical to assume that this legislative action was in response to the case of Apartment Owners and Managers Committee of State College Area Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 382 A.2d 473,252 Pa.Super. 539(1977), reversed at 410 A.2d 747, 487 Pa. 548 (1980). This case involved the consolidation of two lower court cases. The issue at the heart of both matters was whether one who removes an illegally parked vehicle from his land has a possessory lien on the vehicle for the costs of towing and storage. The cases arose from the 2 There are, of course, cases which discuss the issue of what constitutes "property" subject to a lien. Loma v. Pa. Public Utility Comiss., 682 A.2d 424 (1996), for example, holds that a certificate of public convenience for a motor carrier service is property subject to the Federal Tax Lien Statute. The statute, at 26 U.S.c. ~ 6231, provides that amounts of unpaid income tax together with penalties "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 3 NO. 04-1675 CIVIL problem presented by persons who illegally parked their motor vehicles on private property on weekends when the Penn State football team played at State College. Attempts to remedy the situation, such as posting warning signs or issuing citations, had been of little or no avail. The matter was brought to a head on October 27, 1973, when Henry Gnas drove to State College to attend a football game at Beaver Stadium. After the game, he and his companions drove to downtown State College for dinner. Mr. Gnas parked his car illegally in a private parking lot near the restaurant in violation of the Vehicle Code.... Upon finding his car missing from the parking lot, Mr. Gnas was informed that it was at an auto pound owned and operated by Natalie's Towing Service Inc... Mr. Gnas's brother then went to Natalie's and was apparently told he would not be able to remove the car unless he paid the towing charge of$25.30, which he did. Subsequently, Mr. Gnas filed a complaint in assumpsit in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County asserting that Natalie's had wrongfully withheld and deprived Gnas of his motor vehicle and demanded the refund of the towing fee plus interest. A separate action was initiated by the Apartment Owners and Managers Committee of the State College Area Chamber of Commerce et al.. . against the District Attorney of Centre County, Charles Brown, appellee. It seems that the illegal parking of cars on private property was a common occurrence at State College, especially during football games. To combat this problem, the Apartment Owners and Managers Committee persuaded Emanuel Natalie to form a towing service to remove the illegally parked vehicles. It was the practice of Natalie's to release the vehicles to their owners only after payment of the towing fee. In January of 1974, the District Attorney publicly announced at a meeting of the Committee that the holding of the towed vehicles pending payment of the towing fee constituted theft under 4 NO. 04-1675 CIVIL Chapter 39 of the Crimes Code. .. and that his office would prosecute the holder of such vehicles for theft. Consequently, Emanuel Natalie discontinued his towing service which prompted the Committee to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief requesting a judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code and the Crimes Code. This action was consolidated for trial with Gnas's action in assumpsit. Id at 748-749. The then applicable provision of the Vehicle Code allowed a landowner to remove an illegally parked vehicle "at the reasonable expense of the owner thereof." 75 P.S. 1021.1, now repealed. The Superior Court upheld the action of the lower court in granting the relief requested by Gnas, directing that Natalie's refund the towing fee because the Vehicle Code did not permit a possessory lien on the vehicle and, therefore, neither the property owner nor the towing service had the right to retain possession of the towed vehicle until the towing charge was paid. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that both lower courts had engaged in an "unnecessary search for the illusive lien." The Supreme Court, noting that vehicles could be removed at the "reasonable expense of the owner" held that one could not be permitted to thwart the clear intention of the legislature by prevailing in an action to recover monies paid for towing. In dismissing Gnas's action, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the towing service had a possessory lien on the vehicle. The Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court in dismissing the declaratory judgment action against the district attorney. The court noted that the case was moot given a November 1979 amendment to the Vehicle Code which provided, inter alia, that the person removing an illegally parked vehicle "shall have a lien against the owner of the vehicle, in the amount of the reasonable value of the costs of removing the vehicle." The Supreme Court observed that the 5 NO. 04-1675 CIVIL recent amendment established "a lien on the towed vehicle" whereby the tower was "authorized to retain possession until the lien is satisfied." We are satisfied that the current version of Section 3353 permits recovery of the costs of towing irrespective of the existence of a lien. Given the foregoing history, it is equally clear to us that the sole remedy with regard to the collection of storage fees is a lien on the vehicle in the amount of reasonable fees. In other words, the tower may retain possession of the vehicle until such time as the reasonable storage fees are paid. In this case, the plaintiff now has possession of the defendant's vehicle. The cost of storage far exceeds the value of the car. The right of the defendant to retain the vehicle is, for all practical purposes, extinguished. 3 VERDICT AND NOW, this 1 st day of May, 2006, we find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $65.00, together with interest at the legal rate from October 8, 2003. There being no dispute that the cost of storage exceeds the value of the vehicle, the 1987 Audi, VIN number W AUFB0815HA009569, title number 42687048603, is forfeited to the plaintiff with authority to apply for a certificate of title. BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, 1. 3 The Vehicle Code provides that where the interest of an owner in a vehicle passes to another "other than by voluntary transfer," the transferee may apply for a certificate of title. See 75 Pa.C.S. 1114. 6 NO. 04-1675 CIVIL Michael A. Koranda, Esquire F or the Plaintiff Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire F or the Defendant Court Administrator 7 DONALD WOOD/WOODY'S Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 04-1675 CIVIL ARROW AUTO SALES AND SERVICE, Defendant VERDICT BEFORE HESS, 1. AND NOW, this 1 st day of May, 2006, we find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $65.00, together with interest at the legal rate from October 8, 2003. There being no dispute that the cost of storage exceeds the value of the vehicle, the 1987 Audi, VIN number W AUFB0815HA009569, title number 42687048603, is forfeited to the plaintiff with authority to apply for a certificate of title. BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, 1. Michael A. Koranda, Esquire F or the Plaintiff Nathan C. Wolf, Esquire F or the Defendant Court Administrator