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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-6540 CIVIL (2)MARY JANE KRETZING and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DAVID S. KRETZING, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : vs. : 97-6540 CIVIL : DEBORAH LESSARD, : Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: EXCEPTIONS TO THE MASTER’S REPORT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER Before the court are exceptions to the report of a master appointed to hear a replevin case. The plaintiffs, Mary Jane Kretzing and her son David, filed their complaint on November 24, 1997. In Count I of the compl aint, under the heading David S. Kretzing v. Deborah M. Lessard , the plaintiff alleged that he had stored numerous items of personal property, owned solely by him, on the defendant’s property. He alleges, further, that the defendant permitted the storage of those items pursuant to an agreement whereby he would become a permanent resident on the defendant’s property in exchange for his performance of “substantial remodeling, landscaping care and maintenance of Plaintiff’s [sic] dwelling house, barn, and the grounds adjacent thereto, in accordance with Defendant’s directions and specifications.” Even though he substantially completed the agreed upon tasks, the defendant, according to the plaintiff, terminated his services and directed him to vacate the property. It is alleged that the defendant has prevented him from retrieving his personalty. According to the plaintiff, the total fair market value of his property was $7,954.00. In Count II of the complaint, under the heading Mary Jane Kretzing v. Deborah M. Lessard , the plaintiff alleges that she, with the defendant’s consent, stored various items of 97-6540 CIVIL personal property in the defendant’s farmhouse and barn. The complaint provides a total fair market value of $5,075.00 for these items. According to the complaint, it was the plaintiff’s intent to make some of the items available for use by her son and the defendant and for other items to be stored until the plaintiff could sell them. Following the dissolution of the relationship between the plaintiff’s son and the defendant, the defendant neither allowed the plaintiff to retrieve her property nor did she agree to return it. In her answer to the complaint, the defendant alleges, inter alia, that the list of the property sought by the plaintiff is either fabricated or inaccurate. She also contends that, after the breakup of her relationship with David Kretzing, she made arrangements for him to pick up his property. When the plaintiff returned to her home, she alleges that he physically attacked her. Despite this altercation, according to the defendant, virtually all items belonging to both plaintiffs have been returned. The record of the master’s hearing in this case fills 475 pages. A review of the transcript supports the following factual findings. Deborah M. Lessard, the defendant, met plaintiff David M. Kretzing in January 1994. Ms. Lessard relocated to Cumberland County at that time in order to commence her employment as a Risk Manager/Vice President with Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company (“ PHICO”) in Mechanicsburg. Ms. Lessard had an arrangement with PHICO whereby the company paid for her initial lodging expenses until she made arrangements for permanent accommodations. Plaintiff Mary Jane Kretzing—David Kretzing’s mother—owns a bed & breakfast, Kanaga House, in New Kingston, where Ms. Lessard spent her first several months in the area. Mr. Kretzing lives in the B&B, with his mother. Ms. Lessard remained at the B&B for one year, during which time she and David Kretzing became romantically involved. Upon the expiration of PHICO’s temporary lodging 2 97-6540 CIVIL allowance in May 1994, Ms. Lessard continued to reside at the B&B, albeit in a smaller room and at her own expense—at a correspondingly lower rate—until January 1995. It appears that David Kretzing began to cohabitate with Ms. Lessard during her stay in the smaller room. In January 1995, Ms. Lessard located and moved into a house on Yellow Breaches Road; Mr. Kretzing joined her, though his name did not appear on the lease and he did not contribute financially to the resultant living expenses. Ms. Lessard’s home furnishings were supplemented by various items of personal property brought by David Kretzing from the B&B, some of which belonged to him and some to his mother. Soon thereafter, in M ay 1995, Ms. Lessard purchased a farmhouse at a public auction and, in October of that year, settled on the property. In December 1995, the couple moved back into the B&B, as Ms. Lessard did not wish to pay both rent for one property and a mortgage on another at the same time. As the farmhouse required many improvements in order to make it habitable, Ms. Lessard and the plaintiff remained at the B&B until May 1996. During this second stay at the B&B, the defendant again paid the same monthly rate she had been charged previously; presumably, David Kretzing was not charged rent by his mother for the duration of his stay. Ms. Lessard, joined by Mr. Kretzing, moved into the farmhouse in May 1996 and, with the assistance of numerous friends, worked on improving the house during the spring and summer of 1996. As was the case when they resided in the house on Yellow Breaches Road, Mr. Kretzing did not contribute to the monthly housing expenses (mortgage, utilities, etc.), though he did purchase groceries and supplies on occasion and he brought personal property to the farmhouse at various times during the period he lived at the farmhouse with Ms. Lessard. In addition to items used in the farmhouse—some of which belonged to him and some to his mother—he 3 97-6540 CIVIL stored a large number of items at the farm in various structures located on the property. These items had, for the most part, previously been stored at the B&B. Prior to his relationship with the defendant, David Kretzing had a marriage which ended in separation; the resultant divorce proceedings were still ongoing at the time he met Ms. Lessard. As part of the divorce property settlement, an appraisal of Mr. Kretzing’s property was required: many of the items to be appraised were in storage on Ms. Lessard’s property. She did not, however, wish to have Mr. Kretzing’s divorce-related business conducted on her farm. Hence, in October 1996, Mr. Kretzing removed the items, had them appraised, and then once again placed them in storage on the defendant’s property. Mr. Kretzing lived in the defendant’s home until July 10, 1997, at which time Ms. Lessard ended the relationship and requested that he move out. He left at that time but failed to take any of the stored items with him; consequently, he arranged with the defendant to pick them up on July 29th. On that occasion a dispute arose over the ownership of certain items and a physical altercation ensued. Kretzing left the property that day with some items in his possession. After the altercation, Ms. Lessard forbade Kretzing from setting foot on her property. Nevertheless, a significant amount of property made it back to the plaintiffs on March 21, 1998, when David Kretzing’s sister, her husband, several of their friends, and Kretzing’s children came 1 to the defendant’s property for the agreed-upon purpose of picking up stored items. To that end they utilized a large rental truck and two pick-up trucks. Also, in late 1997, Ms. Lessard delivered a number of items (i.e., camcorder, art supplies, etc.) to Mr. Kretzing’s children. The plaintiffs contend that many of their items remained in the possession of the defendant. 1 Pick-up made via arrangements made by counsel. 4 97-6540 CIVIL The plaintiffs sought the appointment of a master in this case. No objection to this procedure was ever lodged by the defendant. A master was appointed by the Honorable George th th E. Hoffer on June 8, 1999. The master’s hearing was held on the 7 and 29 of July, 1998. The transcript of the hearing reflects extensive testimony about the individual items which the plaintiffs claim the defendant has in her possession. Much of the testimony of the opposing parties was in direct conflict. The transcript indicates that the plaintiffs relied to a great extent on unassisted recollections. On the other hand, the defendant was able to produce cancelled checks and receipts to support her testimony with respect to her claim of ownership of certain items though she, also, relied heavily on personal recollection. Though Judge Hoffer’s order provided that the master would file his report within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing, the report was not forthcoming until approximately two years later, on August 16, 2000. The master recommended that the defendant be ordered to return sixty-eight items, valued by the master at a total of $5,420.00. In lieu of the return of the specified items, the master recommended that a monetary award and judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The master’s report included a finding that there had been a storage arrangement between the parties and that the defendant was not entitled to withhold possession of the property despite the break-up of their relationship. In concluding, however, that the plaintiffs’ property was indeed being wrongfully distrained by the defendant, the master made numerous findings which are clearly not supported by the record. Finding number thirteen is typical: 13. The testimony of several witnesses was necessary to establish surientam [sic] the specific items which eventually were stored on the Defendant’s property. No single witness appeared to have knowledge of all the items; however, each 5 97-6540 CIVIL witness was competent and credible thereby establishing the totality to a fair preponderance. several It is not the case, however, that witnesses testified. The only witnesses who testified for the plaintiffs who purported to have any knowledge concerning the nature of the property, itself, were the two plaintiffs. Curiously, none of the persons who purportedly went to the defendant’s farm to retrieve numerous items in March of 1998 testified. The master also found that the defendant testified “she had no knowledge that property of the Plaintiff was being stored on her property” and that her testimony in that regard was not credible. A review of the record, however, discloses numerous instances in which the defendant acknowledged that property of the plaintiffs had been stored at the farm. In fact, she was able to testify about them far more clearly than the plaintiffs. The master also found incredible the defendant’s allegation th at certain items were gifts to her from the plaintiff, David S. Kretzing. The defendant testified that the plaintiff would not work to his income potential and did not “pull his oar” when it came to the improvement and upkeep of the farm which was their joint residence. She would become angry with the plaintiff over this situation. As a result, the plaintiff would, from time to time, attempt to placate the defendant with gifts and promises that he would do better. Her explanation of these various gifts was completely believable. The defendant recites, for example, that she received a lawn mower. Her explanation that this was to be used for the considerable amount of mowing at the farm is perfectly logical. The plaintiff’s assertion that the lawn mower belonged to him when, in fact, he had no lawn, makes no sense. The defendant’s exceptions to the master’s findings encompass both procedural and substantive points. Procedurally, Ms. Lessard’s primary argument is that she suffered a violation of due process because of the two-year delay in the master’s rendering his decision. The 6 97-6540 CIVIL defendant’s substantive objections and exceptions to the master’s report span some thirty paragraphs. An underlying theme is the defendant’s contention that the master awarded property items to the plaintiffs despite their testimony that the items were already in their possession. The defendant points out that the master also awarded items to the plaintiffs that both parties stipulated should be removed from the list of contested items. Ms. Lessard argues that the master made findings in favor of the plaintiffs despite their failure to establish that certain items even existed and/or had ever been in the defendant’s possession. Fundamental to our resolution of this case is an understanding of the amount of deference, if any, the court should accord the master’s findings of fact and his legal conclusions. We have been unable to locate a single Pennsylvania appellate case in which a replevin action had been assigned to a special master. However, guidance with respect to the treatment of master’s findings may be gleaned from cases in the realm of divorce and family law. Standards applied in the appellate review of trial court decisions reviewing the conclusions of a chancellor in equity also shed light on this inquiry. In matters of divorce, it is clear that the reviewing court is not obligated to accept the master’s findings without question: The report of the master is entitled to great consideration in that he has heard and seen the witnesses, and it should not be lightly disregarded. It is advisory only, however, and the reviewing court is not bound by it and it does not come to the court with any preponderant weight or authority which must be overcome. Acure v. Acure , 219 Pa.Super. 415, 281 A.2d. 694, 695 ( Pa.Super. 1971). The reviewing court must consider the evidence, its weight and the credibility of the witnesses, de novo . Id. The master’s report is not controlling, either on the lower court or on the appellate court. Id. 7 97-6540 CIVIL Rothrock v. Rothrock , 765 A.2d 400, 404 ( Pa.Super. 2000). Similarly, where a lack of evidentiary support is apparent, tribunals which review a chancellor’s findings have the power to draw their own inferences and make their own deductions of facts and conclusions of law. See Horner v. People’s Nat. Bank of Cent. Penna. , 719 A.2d 1101 ( Pa.Super. 1998). We conclude that we have the authority to review the master’s report for accuracy, logic, and legal soundness with a consequent liberty to make adjustments where they are warranted. Another consideration in this case is the effect of the two-year delay in filing the instant master’s report. This issue is also not a common one in Pennsylvania jurisprudence; thus, a survey of holdings beyond the Commonwealth’s boundaries is illustrative. There are two 2 primary stances regarding the occurrence of a late report. The first holds that a tardily submitted report results in the master’s loss of jurisdiction of the matter, termination of the reference, and invalidity of any report or judgment entered upon it. The second stance reasons that a specific time period for a master to file his report is directory only; consequently, the master’s failure to file the report on time does not terminate the reference or void the late report. An early Pennsylvania decision, Shaw v. Pearce (1812, Pa.) 4 Binn. 485, falls in the latter category. Thus, to the limited extent that Pennsylvania has spoken to this issue, it would appear that the late filing of a master’s report does not automatically cause the report to be void. To the extent that delay may have caused error in the report itself, the court may, as stated, arrive at its own conclusions if the record does not support the master’s findings. We turn agai n to the report itself. As the defendant points out, the master awarded items to the plaintiffs that both parties stipulated should be removed from the list of contested items or 2 See, generally, Boyd J. Peterson, J.D. Annotation, Referee’s Failure to File Report Within Time Specified by th Statute, Court Order, or Stipulation as Terminating Reference , 71 A.L.R. 4 889. 8 97-6540 CIVIL that, alternatively, the plaintiffs admitted to having in their possession. The transcript of the master’s hearing makes this apparent. The following items, from the master’s list of awarded items, are in this category and should be stricken from the award (applicable portions of the record cited for each item): Item # Item Value Record Citation A5 Cross buck table $ 30.00 T31 A62 Captain’s chair $ 25.00 Stipulated ex. A A78 Dining room table w/chairs $ 150.00 Stipulated ex. A A79 Sunday school chairs $ 100.00 Stipulated ex. A B4 Wicker chair $ 75.00 Stipulated ex. A It is fundamental to an action of replevin that the defendant be in actual or constructive 3 possession of the property which is the subject of the action. In the instance of the various firearms sought by the plaintiffs and awarded to them by the Master, the record demonstrates that the defendant disposed of these items prior to the date that this action was brought by the 4 plaintiffs. The defendant had made clear that she would not tolerate firearms on her property and, when she discovered the guns placed on her property by David Kretzing, she proceeded to 5 dispose of them. She donated the proceeds from the sale to a domestic abuse center. Consequently, the following items should be stricken from the list of awarded items: 3 Commonwealth v. Dean , 245 Pa. Super. 322, 323, 369 A.2d 423, 425 (1976) (citing Winner v. Messinger , 165 Pa. Super. 507, 511, 69 A.2d 172, 174 (1949)). See generally Annotation, Maintainability of Replevin or Similar Possessory Action where Defendant, at Time Action is Brought, is No Longer in Possession of Property , 97 ALR 2d 896. 4 See Transcript at 382. Note: one of the firearms, item A15, a .32 calibre pistol, was returned to Mr. Kretzing inside a gun cabinet that was picked up by the plaintiffs. 5 See Transcript at 382. 9 97-6540 CIVIL Item # Item Value A15 .32 calibre pistol $ 25.00 B41 .380 Remington automatic pistol $ 7 5.00 B42 .22 S&W revolver $ 50.00 B43 .44 reproduction cap & ball revolver $ 25.00 B44 .56 flintlock reproduction pistol $ 50.00 The defendant was able to produce receipts and cancelled c hecks—which were admitted into the record—that showed that she had purchased certain items which were sought by the plaintiffs and, subsequently, awarded to them. Hence, the following items should be removed from the list of items awarded to the plaintiffs: Item # Item Value A24 Brass bed warmer $ 50.00 A67 Miscellaneous garden tools $ 15.00 A97 Ice skates ( apprx. 12 pair) $ 25.00 A98 Hockey goal & net $ 15.00 A99 Hockey sticks $ 20.00 The living arrangemen t between Ms. Lessard and Mr. Kretzing and the disparity between their respective contributions to that arrangement are largely undisputed. The defendant carried a disproportionate burden with respect to paying for food, shelter, utilities and other related living expenses. As a result of this disparity, and the alleged arguments stemming from it, Ms. Lessard claims that Mr. Kretzing gifted her with several items. As we have noted, the defendant’s testimony is credible. Of the disputed items in this case, we believe that there are two which were clearly gifts to the defendant. They are household furnishings which were placed in the home rather than elsewhere on the property, in storage. They were, in other words, 10 97-6540 CIVIL clearly given to the defendant for her use and not for safekeeping for the plaintiff. Thus, the following items should be stricken from the award: Item # Item Value A77 Dutch cupboard $ 1,000.00 A78 Dining room table w/chairs $ 150.00 Th e plaintiffs sought and were awarded various items to which they assigned monetary values which were subsequently amended by the Master without explanation. The plaintiffs also neglected to assign a value to numerous items; upon awarding these items to the plaintiffs, the Master himself attached valuations to them. With respect to other items of property, the Master awarded multiple items where the plaintiffs only pled for one item. The plaintiffs were also awarded property which they characterized as “miscellaneous,” “quantity uncertain, but including,” and items described in the plural but without a specific number. Finally, one item was awarded to the plaintiffs which they never listed among the items being sought. Pa. R.C.P. 1073.1(a) provides that, in an action of replevin, the plaintiff must include in the complaint, “(1) a description of the property to be replevied, (2) its value, (3) its location if known, and (4) the material facts upon which the plaintiff’s claim is based.” In failing to provide valuations and quantities for certain items, the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of the rule. Where the plaintiffs failed to provide a value the Master should not have done so for them; conversely, the Master should not have increased values which the plaintiffs dutifully affixed to certain items. Given the failure of the plaintiffs to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1073.1(a), the following items should be removed from the list of awarded items: Items for which no value was provided: 11 97-6540 CIVIL Item # Item (Master’s valuation ) A87 MTD snowblower $ 400.00 A91 WWI items $ 25.00 A92 Copper bait bucket $ 35.00 A93 Wicker fish creel $ 15.00 A96 Five sleeping bags $ 25.00 A101 Refrigerator (almond) GE/Hotpoint $ 75.00 A102 Bench vise & flatware chimes $ 50.00 B28 Spinning wheel $ 150.00 B52 Game bird plates $ 150. 00 Items for which no quantities were provided: A74 Antique hand plains $ 125.00 A100 Assorted pots & pans $ 100.00 B14 Picture frames, quantity uncertain, but including $ 150.00 frame d picture of Martin Luther B38 Empty wooden silverware chests $ 75.00 The following item was neither listed nor assigned a value by the plaintiffs and should thus be stricken from the list of awarded items: nil Yard swee per $ 100.00 The following single item was sought by the plaintiffs; for unexplained reasons, the Master awarded four units of the item. The award should be modified to reflect the original, correct amount. B30 Tent $ 15.00 12 97-6540 CIVIL The values assigned to the following items should be revised to reflect those originally assigned by the plaintiffs. Item # Item Master’s valuation Plaintiffs’ valuation A28 Kerosene lamp $ 40.00 $ 15.00 A43 Three serving platters $ 15.00 $ 5.00 A44 Two plates $ 10.00 $ 5.00 B28 Spinning wheel $ 150.00 $ 75.00 With all the changes suggested above, it would appear that Mr. Kretzing is entitled to the return of the following items or the monetary value thereof: Item # Item Value A1 Telescope $ 100.00 A3 Painted square end table $ 15.00 A8 Decorated plank bottom chair $ 50.00 A22 Stereoscope & cards $ 25.00 A25 Duck decoy $ 15.00 A26 Stroh’s beer tray $ 75.00 A28 Kerosene lamp $ 15.00 A37 Two water pitchers $ 100.00 A40 Oak basket $ 10.00 A43 Three serving platters $ 5.00 A44 Two plates $ 5.00 A50 Copper pot $ 25.00 13 97-6540 CIVIL A51 Two brass & tin ladles $ 40.00 A52 Copper ladle $ 20.00 A53 Potato masher $ 5.00 A54 Tin strainer $ 5.00 A55 Rolling pin $ 5.00 A74 Toolbox and hand tools $ 100.00 A76 Workbench $ 50.00 A83 Unfinished drop leaf table $ 15.00 A84 Large drop leaf table $ 150.00 A85 Sm all drop leaf table $ 25.00 $ 755.00 Similarly, it would appear that Mary Jane Kretzing is entitled to the return of the following items or the monetary value thereof: Item # Item Value B3 Child’s wicker chair $ 50.00 B5 Top of blanket chest $ 50.00 B10 Unfinished desk, slant top $ 150.00 B22 Craftsman sander $ 20.00 B23 Craftsman belt sander $ 25.00 B24 Chainsaw, small green $ 25.00 B25 Craftsman miter saw $ 50.00 B26 Delta miter saw $ 75.00 14 97-6540 CIVIL B30 Tent $ 15.00 B34 Washer & dryer $ 50.00 B35 Wheelbarrow $ 25.00 B36 Yarn winder $ 35.00 $ 520.00 The inquiry, however, does not stop here. To the contrary, with respect to the immediately foregoing items, the testimony at the master’s hearing does not support a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. After the instant lawsuit was filed, Ms. Lessard prepared two lists of the property claimed. List “A” was property claimed by David Kretzing. List “B” was property claimed by Mary Jane Kretzing. These lists were entered into evidence at the master’s hearing by stipulation of the parties. The lists denoted whether the item of property was “mine,” “not mine,” and “I don’t have.” After the lists were prepared Ms. Lessard conducted an inventory and prepared many items for return to the plaintiffs. Arrangements were then made for a group of people to retrieve the plaintiffs’ property. The inventory lists were used as guides. There is no 6 dispute in this case that Ms. Lessard took these steps to return the property at issue. That Ms. Lessard would take such pains to return the plaintiffs’ property and yet keep some items which are of no apparent use to her makes no sense. There is, simply, no reason to disbelieve her testimony, which, as we have indicated, is, in many incidences, documented. A sampling of Ms. Lessard’s testimony with regard to the remaining disputed items follows. Item “A1” claimed by the plaintiff, David Kretzing, is a telescope. Ms. Lessard testified that she had last seen the telescope at Kanaga House, the bed and breakfast owned by Mrs. Kretzing. She searched for the telescope as part of the inventory process which we have 15 97-6540 CIVIL described. Neither she nor two other people who she had enlisted to assist her could find the item. The next item, “A3” is a “painted square end table.” Again, Ms. Lessard indicates that she could not find such an item. She testified as follows: Q Did you find anything similar to it or do you have anything similar to it? A Yes. I have a green, painted, rectangle table that I got at Just Cabinets, along with two rocking chairs. And I painted that green. That’s on the front porch. I have a white, painted wicker occasional table that was my great-grandmother’s. When Ms. Lessard was preparing the plaintiffs’ items for return, she placed some of the smaller items in boxes. The stipulated exhibits contain the number of the boxes in which she placed various items. Again, there is no dispute that a group of Mr. Kretzing’s friends was enlisted to pick up items from Ms. Lessard’s farm. Many of the items listed as being in boxes were things which Mr. Kretzing admitted have been returned. Nonetheless, though it was listed as having been returned to him in one of the boxes, Mr. Kretzing has made a claim for a duck decoy. In that regard, Ms. Lessard testified as follows: Q The next item on the list is duck decoy. And I believe you indicated it’s not yours. And you provided it in box 2. And if I’m not mistaken, Dave testified that all he got was a lousy one, a broken one, to that effect. A My notes reflect that I gave two duck decoys to him. Q And those were in the box. Is that correct? A Correct. 6 We note, again, that none of the people involved in the retrieval of the plaintiffs’ property testified in this case. 16 97-6540 CIVIL We could go on and on. We will, howev er, conclude in a more summary fashion. Suffice it to say that, with respect to the various items which the plaintiffs continue to claim, Ms. Lessard was able to account, in one way or another, for each and every item. In some cases, she explained, in detail, how the item had been gifted to her. In other instances, she was able to describe how the item had been returned. In certain other cases, her recollection was explicit that she had never possessed the item. In the face of this testimony, the master, nonetheless, awarded the plaintiffs virtually everything they sought and, in some cases, at a higher value than they had requested. There can be little doubt that such a skewed result was attributable to a delay of two years between the taking of testimony and the filing of the report. The defendant agreed, at the master’s hearing that she did have one item belonging to the plaintiff, Mary Jane Kretzing. This was a tent valued, by the plaintiffs, at $15.00. The plaintiffs are, of course, entitled to the return of this item or the value thereof. ORDER AND NOW, this day of October, 2001, the exceptions of the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, to the master’s report filed in this case are SUSTAINED. The order of August 31, 2000, accepting said report is VACATED. It is directed that the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, return to the plaintiff, Mary Jane Kretzing: a tent. In lieu of the return thereof, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mary Jane Kretzing, and against the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, in the amount of $15.00. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. 17 MARY JANE KRETZING and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DAVID S. KRETZING, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plainti ffs : : vs. : 97-6540 CIVIL : DEBORAH LESSARD, : Defendant : CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: EXCEPTIONS TO THE MASTER’S REPORT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. ORDER AND NOW, this day of October, 2001, the exceptions of the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, to the master’s report filed in this case are SUSTAINED. The order of August 31, 2000, accepting said report is VACATED. It is directed that the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, return to the plaintiff, Mary Jane Kretzing: a tent. In lieu of the return thereof, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mary Jane Kretzing, and against the defendant, Deborah M. Lessard, in the amount of $15.00. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. G. Thomas Miller, Esquire For the plaintiffs Deborah Lessard, Pro Se Defendant : rlm