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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000662-2010 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : CP-21-CR-0662-2010 : : CHARGE: 1. UNLAWFUL DELIVERY, : MANUFACTURE OR POSSESSION WITH : INTENT TO DELIVER A SCHEDULE I, V. : CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE – HEROIN; : 2. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO : UNLAWFUL DELIVERY, MANUFACTURE : OR POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO : DELIVER A SCHEDULE I, CONTROLLED : SUBSTANCE – HEROIN; : 3. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF : SCHEDULE I, CONTROLLED : SUBSTANCE – HEROIN; : 4. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF DRUG : PARAPHERNALIA : KENDRICK JERMANE HOLLOWAY : AFFIANT: SGT. ANTHONY DELUCA IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925 Ebert, J., February 28, 2011 - Defendant was convicted of Counts 1, 3, and 4 of the above-captioned charges in a jury trial held November 15-19, 2010. Defendant appeals based on the following 1 contentions listed in his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal: 1. This Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress physical evidence as the search and resultant seizure of evidence from Mr. Holloway’s automobile violated his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the asserted basis for the traffic stop was pre-textual. 2. This Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress physical evidence as the search and resultant seizure of evidence from Mr. Holloway’s automobile violated his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the length and nature of the traffic stop resulted in an unconstitutional seizure. 3. This Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress physical evidence as the search and resultant seizure of evidence from Mr. Holloway’s 1 Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Feb. 7, 2011. automobile violated his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where there was no articulable break between the traffic stop and the second interaction. 4. This Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress physical evidence as the search and resultant seizure of evidence from Mr. Holloway’s automobile violated his rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where there was no reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative detention. This Court previously filed a 12 page opinion on October 27, 2010, which deals with the legal issues presented in this case at length. The issues of whether the traffic stop was pre-textual and whether reasonable suspicion existed were addressed in detail in this Court’s previous opinion. This opinion is filed pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) to supplement the prior opinion and more specifically address those issues raised in the Defendant’s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Specifically, we will address the issues surrounding the nature and length of the traffic stop and the articulable break between the traffic stop and the second interaction. Procedural History Defendant was stopped by Sergeant Anthony DeLuca of the Pennsylvania State Police for speeding and registration sticker violations on February 23, 2010, on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. After the traffic stop, Sergeant DeLuca asked for and Defendant consented to a search of the vehicle. During the search, Sergeant DeLuca found that heroin was being transported in the vehicle and Defendant was arrested along with co-defendant Corey Heath for the above-captioned charges. On June 25, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence. A suppression hearing was held on August 23, 2010. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence was denied by Order of Court on October 27, 2010. A jury trial was held on November 15-19, 2010, and 2 Defendant was found guilty of the above-captioned Counts 1, 3, and 4, and was found not guilty of Count 2. Defendant filed this timely appeal. Discussion Defendant argues that this Court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress Evidence. As detailed in our previous opinion, supplemented by the explanations below, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress was properly denied and all evidence obtained as a result of the search was properly admitted. A. The length and nature of the traffic stop did not result in an unconstitutional seizure. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has used the standard set by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether a detention is too long. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1995). The United States Supreme Court has held that the key factor to be examined in determining if a detention lasts too long to be justified as an investigative stop is whether “the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. At 1048 (quoting U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Ellis, found that a ten to fifteen minute detention was not too lengthy when it was legitimately used for the officer’s investigation of the scene and issuing appellant a citation for driving without a license. The facts of this case are clear that the police officers did not detain Defendant for an unnecessary or unreasonable length of time during the traffic stop. It took approximately 20 minutes from the time of the stop to the time Defendant Holloway was asked for consent to search. Because Defendant Heath was driving and was not the owner of the vehicle, and the owner, Defendant Holloway, was sitting in the back seat, 3 Sergeant DeLuca had to ask both Defendants to exit the car so that he could explain the violations to them. Sergeant DeLuca cancelled the request for a canine unit when it did not arrive promptly because he did not want to extend the stop longer than necessary. On several occasions Sergeant DeLuca told Defendants that he wanted to get them on their way. Furthermore, the traffic stop, captured on police video, did not involve any coercive behavior by police, and the demeanor and tone of the officers was conversational and non-threatening throughout the entire encounter. B. There was an articulable break between the traffic stop and the second interaction. Sergeant DeLuca initiated two separate interactions with Defendant. The first was the traffic stop, and the second was the encounter in which Defendant voluntarily gave his consent to search the vehicle. Generally a traffic stop concludes after the officer completes his actions in addressing the motor vehicle violation. Comm. v. Van Winkle, 880 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Comm. v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000) (once officer accomplished purpose of the stop, Defendant was within right to drive away)). It is clear that the first encounter with Defendant had ended after Sergeant DeLuca addressed the motor vehicle violations. The traffic stop concluded when Sergeant DeLuca gave Defendant warnings for speeding and registration sticker violations and explained the procedure for how to take care of the registration sticker. A second defendant, Corey Heath, was the driver of the car, and Heath had already returned to the car when Sergeant DeLuca was explaining the registration procedure to Defendant Holloway. After the warning, Holloway returned to the vehicle and was almost halfway into the vehicle when Sergeant DeLuca initiated another interaction by asking Defendant Holloway if he could ask him a question. The traffic stop had ended 4 and Sergeant DeLuca initiated another encounter for which he had reasonable suspicion based on his observations from the traffic stop. Conclusion There was no violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution or under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The traffic stop was valid and not pre-textual, the nature and length of the traffic stop was not unreasonable or unnecessarily prolonged, and there was a clear break between the traffic stop and the second encounter, for which Sergeant DeLuca had reasonable suspicion. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress was properly denied. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Jaime Keating, Esquire First Deputy District Attorney Royce Morris, Esquire Attorney for Kendrick Holloway 5