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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2006-3497 (2) SCOT J. COSTA AND : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DANIELLE C. COSTA, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA HUSBAND AND WIFE, : PLAINTIFFS : : V. : : TRAVIS MCCOLLUM, : DEFENDANT : 06-3497 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION IN LIMINE ORDER OF COURT nd AND NOW , this 22 day of September, 2011, upon consideration of the Defendant’s Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs’ Answer thereto, the briefs filed by the Parties and after oral argument; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s Motion in GRANTEDDENIED Limine is in part and in part. The scope of the new trial will be limited to damages resulted from the uncontroverted injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. DENIED However, the request that damages be limited to non-economic damages is . The Plaintiffs may seek damages for non-economic damages, loss of earnings, and loss of consortium. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Ronald Tomasko, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant SCOT J. COSTA AND : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DANIELLE C. COSTA, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA HUSBAND AND WIFE, : PLAINTIFFS : : V. : : TRAVIS MCCOLLUM, : DEFENDANT : 06-3497 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION IN LIMINE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Ebert, Jr., J., September 22, 2011 – Background Pending before this Court is Defendant, Travis McCollum’s, Motion in Limine (“Motion”) to limit the scope of the remanded trial to matters concerning the injuries conceded by Defendant’s expert, Dr. Fultz, and to further limit the scope to non-economic damages. A brief procedural history relevant to the pending Motion is provided. A two day jury trial was held on November 18 and 19, 2009, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Defendant, Travis McCollum. Specifically, the jury found that any harm claimed by the Plaintiff was not factually caused by the Defendant’s negligence. On November 30, 2009, Plaintiffs, Scot J. and Danielle C. Costa, filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief which was denied on January 4, 2010. On January 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. On February 11, 2010, Plaintiffs filed, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure (“Pa. R.C.P.”) 1925(b), a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal. On May 17, 2011, the Superior Court reversed the Order denying Post- Trial Relief and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages. On July 29, 2011, Defendant filed this Motion in Limine. Plaintiffs responded on August 15, 2011, opposing the Motion. 1 Discussion I.The scope of the new trial will be limited to evidence relevant to damages associated with the uncontroverted injuries conceded by Defendant’s expert, Dr. Fultz. “Ordinarily, the grant of a new trial means a new trial grnerally [sic]; it restores a case to the status it had before the trial took place and is fully open to be tried de novo as to all parties and all issues[.]” Mains v. Moore, 150 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. 1959). However, an exception to this general rule regarding the scope of a new trial is found in motor vehicle accident cases where an Appellate Court has remanded the case for a new trial after holding that the first verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Superior Court has long-held and affirmed through a recent line of cases that the scope of a remanded trial, when a jury incorrectly found against the weight of the evidence that no causal relationship existed between the motor vehicle accident and sustained injuries, is “limited to only those injuries that were uncontroverted by the defense’s medical experts.” Bostanic v. Barker-Barto, 936 A.2d 1084, 1089 (Pa. Super. 2007); see Elliott v. Ionta, 869 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, “we will … remand for a new trial limited to only those injuries which were uncontroverted by appellee’s medical experts, i.e., post-traumatic headaches, depression and the cervical sprain/strain.”); Pentarek v. Christy, 854 A.2d 970, 978 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding, “[w]e reverse the judgment … and remand for a new trial limited to damages for soft tissue injuries sustained ….”); Hyang v. Lynde, 820 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding, “we affirm the grant of a new trial, but limit the grant of the new trial to only uncontested injuries.”). The Hyang court further elaborated on how a limitation of the scope of a remanded trial both supports justice and is in accordance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding in Neison v. Hines, 653 A.2d 634, 636-37 (Pa. 1995): 2 The issue that has not been addressed is what happens if a new trial is granted. Does the plaintiff get a second bite at the apple and is he or she able to start all over again and claim significant damages from disc involvement, etc.? Or, in the alternative is the new trial limited to damages only from the strain and sprain the [sic] both sides’ experts concede resulted from the accident? We believe that justice requires the latter solution, and we therefore limit the new trial to permitting the jury to award damages only for neck and back strain and sprain. It is clear that the jury discounted the controverted testimony of the plaintiff. The jury clearly rejected the claim that the many serious injuries claimed by [plaintiff] resulted from the accident. …. This rule announced by our Supreme Court indicates that it is only the uncontested or conceded injuries which are at issue. [….] Discounting the obvious jury determination that the major injuries are not related to the accident defies justice and common sense. Hyang, 820 A.2d at 756-57. In the present case, the Superior Court has “[r]emanded for new trial on the issue of damages.” No. 128 MDA 2010, slip op. at 24 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 31, 2011). The Superior Court held that Defendant’s medical expert, Dr. Fultz, had conceded that certain injuries were sustained by Scot J. Costa (“Plaintiff”) as a result of the motor vehicle accident on May 1, 2005. Id. at 15-16. The Superior Court quotes Dr. Fultz’s Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) and Video Deposition direct and cross examination in reaching the conclusion that he was in agreement with Plaintiffs’ medical experts regarding certain injuries sustained by Plaintiff. Id. at 12, 15. Specifically in coming to this conclusion, the Court quotes Dr. Fultz in the following instances: He actually had, my opinion, his diagnosis from the motor vehicle accident would be Diagnosis 6, which would be increased neck pain for the interscapular area and exacerbation of the other work-related diagnosis, and then No. 9, which was the left hip and low back that resolved. Video Deposition of Dr. Craig Fultz, 10/30/08, at 32. 3 It is my opinion that the motor vehicle accident exacerbated his symptoms that are all tied together with the spondylitic process, his injury to his neck, and subsequent surgery he had to his neck. Id. at 42-43. Yes. Again, those diagnoses that I list as being exacerbated, I list several diagnoses. I’m not isolating one versus the other. I do that in that [sic] his symptom complex that he had after 1, 3, 4, and 5 diagnoses that was present prior to the motor vehicle accident had subjectively been made worse. Id. at 45. It is my opinion that the injuries he sustained of the cervical spine, shoulder, hips, lower back from the motor vehicle accident…. Independent Medical Examination by Dr. Craig Fultz, at 13. Costa, No. 128 MDA 2010, slip op. at 13-15. The uncontroverted injuries before this Court include the “cervical spine, shoulder, hips, [and] lower back” symptoms that had been “exacerbated” by the motor vehicle accident and “had resolved at the time of [Dr. Fultz’s] examination of Costa.” Id. at 15-16. Therefore, taking into account the specific injuries admitted by Dr. Fultz and cited by the Superior Court, in conjunction with the previously mentioned line of cases dealing with remanded “weight of the evidence-motor vehicle” trials, this Court finds the scope of the remanded trial is limited to the uncontroverted injuries and the damages resulting therefrom, as 1 well as any derivative loss of consortium claim. See Elliot, 869 A.2d at 511 (holding, “[i]n addition, the jury can consider any derivative loss of consortium claim by appellant-wife.”); but cf. Pentarek, 854 A.2d 970, vacated in part, 583 Pa. 64 (2005) (vacating Superior Court’s decision remanding consideration for loss of consortium claim) (citing Cleveland v. Johns- 1 The Bostanic court states that although the jury “must find the accident was a substantial cause of at least some injury … the jury may then find the injuries caused by the accident were incidental or non-compensable and deny damages on that basis ….” 936 A.2d at 1089. 4 Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146 (Pa. 1997) (holding loss of consortium claim does not exist if complaining parties are not married when injury occurs)). II.Defendant did not waive, nor is precluded from raising the issue regarding the scope of the new trial as it relates to damages. The Superior Court has said, “in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court.” Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa. Super. 1995). Succinctly stated by the Superior Court: The principle rationale underlying the waiver rule is that when an error is pointed out to the trial court, the court then has an opportunity to correct the error. By specifically objecting to any obvious error, the trial court can quickly and easily correct the problem and prevent the need for a new trial. Additionally, the appellate court should not be required to waste judicial resources correcting a problem that the trial court could have easily corrected if it had been given the opportunity to avoid the necessity of granting a new trial. Id. at 516 (internal citations omitted). In the present case, Defendant is presenting their Motion in Limine specifically for the reason of allowing this Court to have the opportunity to “correct[] a problem that … could have easily [been] corrected” regarding the scope of the remanded trial. Id. Although Defendant’s Motion is timely and not waived, the Motion could be considered moot, in part, because the issue of the remanded trial’s scope has already been decided by the Superior Court. This Court is of the opinion that the Defendant’s Motion, in part, is requesting this Court to address the issue of scope in accordance with the previous rulings of our Superior Court. Plaintiffs, in opposition, argue that the Motion is “now asking this Court to inject language into the Superior Court’s Order to restrict the scope of the new trial but such limitations are not 5 2 supported by the Superior Court’s express instructions or by the ‘law of the case’ doctrine.” Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion in Limine (Remand), at 5, delivered Aug. 12, 2011. Additionally, the Plaintiffs argue the “Superior Court has examined the evidence of record and issued a clear directive to this Court: to hold a new trial on damages (without any express or implied limitation as to the scope of evidence to be provided to a jury).” Id. at 6. Plaintiffs are only partially correct in their argument. The Plaintiffs are correct in stating that the Superior Court has issued a clear directive to this Court and that this Court should not limit the scope of the remanded trial to only non-economic damages. However, they are incorrect that there are no limitations as to the scope of the remanded trial in general. The Superior Court’s holding limits the remanded trial both expressly and implicitly based upon the language, case law, and logic. The Defendant’s Motion requests that the remanded trial be limited, but the Superior on the Court has already placed a limitation, in clear language, “[r]emand[ing] for new trial issue of damages .” Costa, No. 128 MDA 2010, slip op. at 24 (emphasis added). As cited in the previously mentioned Superior Court cases, when a case is remanded based upon a jury verdict against the weight of the evidence, the remanded trial is limited in scope to “any evidence concerning the occurrence of the accident and its severity that is relevant to the issue of damages,” resulting from the uncontroverted injuries admitted by Defendant’s medical experts. Elliot, 869 A.2d at 511; see supra Section I. This limitation logically follows because in the remanded trial the new jury is only being asked to make a determination as to the amount of uncontroverted injuries damages resulting from the where “the severity of the injury is disputed,” not to the issue of liability for whether the accident was a substantial cause of the 2 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, it is this Court’s opinion that to find no limitation on the scope of the remanded trial would be in violation of the “law of the case” doctrine where, the Superior Court has in fact already resolved that legal question. 6 injuries. Bostanic, 936 A.2d at 1089. The liability issue of whether the accident was a substantial controverted cause of the injuries had already been decided by the previous jury and is no longer a question of fact for the new jury to decide. See Elliot, 869 A.2d at 511 (“To reverse the judgment and remand for a new, global trial on the issue of damages under the facts of this case, where there was virtually no objective evidence of injury and the jury discounted appellants’ testimony, would sanction the precise scenario that this court’s en banc holding in Majczyk sought to avoid.”). Thus, it would go against the Superior Court’s ruling, case law, and logic to allow, as the Plaintiffs suggest, a new trial on damages without limiting the scope of the trial to only those damages caused by the uncontroverted injuries. Conclusion This Court finds, in accordance with the Superior Court’s rulings, the scope of the new trial is limited to damages that resulted from the uncontroverted injuries previously mentioned with no limitation as to only non-economic damages. Accordingly the following Order is entered: nd AND NOW , this 22 day of September, 2011, upon consideration of the Defendant’s Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs’ Answer thereto, the briefs filed by the Parties and after oral argument; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s Motion in GRANTEDDENIED Limine is in part and in part. The scope of the new trial will be limited to damages resulted from the uncontroverted injuries sustained by the Plaintiff. DENIED However the request that damages be limited to non-economic damages is . 7 The Plaintiffs may seek damages for non-economic damages, loss of earnings, and loss of consortium. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Ronald Tomasko, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin D. Rauch, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 8