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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-5639 IN RE: APPEAL OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WALTER J. BRASHEAR, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW vs. : : NO. 2011-5639 CIVIL TERM CUMBERLAND COUNTY : BOARD OF ASSESSMENT : APPEALS, : Appellee : Parcel No. 10-12-2987-001A IN RE: REAL ESTATE TAX ASSESSMENT APPEAL BEFORE HESS, P.J. OPINION and ORDER Appellant/Taxpayer, Walter J. Brashear, has filed the instant appeal from an assessment by Appellee, Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals (hereinafter “Board”), of his property located at 295 Pine Hill Road Extended, Enola, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania 17025, said property also being known as Cumberland County tax parcel 10-12-2987-001A. In this real estate tax assessment appeal, we are asked to establish the fair market value of Appellant’s subject property as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals. A hearing was held November 30, 2011 with the undersigned judge presiding. Having considered all relevant testimony and evidence, and for the following reasons, we find that the fair market value of the property as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals to be $80,844.16. The subject property at issue consists of approximately 9.440 acres of undeveloped land located in Hampden Township, Cumberland County. (Notes of Testimony, 8, Hearing, Nov. 30, 2011 (hereinafter N.T. __)). By deed dated June 9, 1982, Appellant/Taxpayer purchased the property for a consideration of $25,000. (Respondent’s Ex. 1, 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The subject property is bounded to the north and west by Interstate 81 and to the east by land owned by family of the Appellant. (N.T. 8, 20) (Cumberland County Tax Mapping, Respondent’s Ex. 3, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). To the south of the subject property is a plot of land on which a Giant Food Stores shopping center has been proposed, yet not developed, and the southeastern corner of the subject property abuts a parcel of land on which sits the Laurel Ridge Estates townhouse development. (Respondent’s Ex. 3, 5, 6, 7, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The proposed Giant Food Stores parcel fronts on Wertzville Road at the northeastern corner of the Interstate 81/Wertzville Road interchange. (Respondent’s Ex. 3, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). As a result of its location, the subject property is landlocked, as it does not front on a public road, and there is no recorded right-of-way or access easement. (N.T. 20) (Respondent’s Ex. 3, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The subject property has visibility on Interstate 81; however, the property is below road grade, calling into question the amount of visibility a structure would obtain if built. (N.T. 30). The subject property is zoned as Commercial Park Limited but has not been developed in any way. (N.T. 20) (Respondent’s Ex. 3, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). It contains no utility lines, known easements, or right-of-ways. (N.T. 45). The property was at one time planted with pine trees and continues to be heavily timbered along with dense undergrowth. (N.T. 20). It was estimated at the hearing that 90% or more of the subject property is wooded, but it was the opinion of Appellant and at least one expert that there is no timber value to be found on the land. (N.T. 20). Additionally, it was alleged, yet controverted, that a retention pond from a neighboring parcel has been discharging onto the subject property causing erosion on the land in certain areas. (N.T. 21) (Respondent’s Ex. 7, admitted, Nov. 30, 2011). In 2010, pursuant to a countywide reassessment, the subject property was assessed by the County as having a fair market value of $160,100.00. (N.T. 4) (Appeal, Ex. A, filed Jul. 14, 2 2011). By decision dated June 16, 2011, the Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals upheld the assessed fair market value determination of $160,100.00. (Appeal, Ex. A, filed Jul. 14, 2011). Subsequent to the Board’s rendering of its notice of decision, the Appellant/Taxpayer timely filed the instant appeal. (Appeal, filed Jul. 14, 2011). The Cumberland County predetermined ratio for the year 2010 is 100%; there is no applicable Common Level Ratio. (N.T. 4-5). As a result, the only issue before us is to establish the fair market value of the subject property as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals. A de novo hearing was held November 30, 2011. The property record card for the subject property, containing the assessed value, was placed into the record by Appellee. (N.T. 4). Karen Darney, a Pennsylvania certified General Appraiser, testified on behalf of Appellant/Taxpayer as an expert witness. (N.T. 5-6). William C. Reath, Cumberland County’s only commercial appraiser, testified on behalf of the Board as an expert witness. (N.T. 48-49). Before examining the comparable properties relied on by the expert witnesses in formulating their valuations, we begin by noting certain factual issues upon which the experts agree. Both experts agreed that the subject property is made extremely difficult to value by virtue of its relative uniqueness in our County in regard to location, attributes, zoning, condition, and potential future use. (N.T. 23, 51). Both experts also agreed that, of the three traditional approaches used to value property, the sales comparison/ market data approach was the only proper way to value the subject property, thus rejecting both the income approach and the cost approach. (N.T. 22, 57). The sales comparison/market data approach “compares the subject property to other similar properties which have been sold, giving consideration to the size, age, physical condition, location, neighborhood, extra amenities, date of sale, lot size, style of 3 building, unique features, and type of financing.” Parkview Court Associates v. Delaware County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 959 A.2d 515, 517 n.3 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Because every property is unique in its own way, the experts made adjustments to the values of their selected comparable properties based on the aforementioned characteristics. (Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011) (Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Lastly, both experts agreed that the “highest and best use” of the property would be a sale to an 1 adjoining land owner, also known as plottage. (N.T 34, 79). Karen Darney, expert witness for Appellant/Taxpayer, testified that she believed the fair market value of the subject property to be $4,200 per acre, which, when multiplied by the subject property’s 9.440 acres, equates to a total fair market value of $39,648, rounded to $40,000. (N.T. 24) (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Darney used the sales comparison/ market data approach in arriving at her estimation, and she testified that she utilized three comparable properties in formulating her Land Appraisal Report. (N.T. 23) (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). She first looked for current land sales of landlocked parcels, presently used for either plottage and/or excess ground. (N.T. 22). Once she had chosen her three comparable properties, all three were adjusted upward in price to account for zoning differences, as there were no commercially zoned landlocked parcels that she could have utilized as comparables. (N.T. 23). Interestingly, all three parcels chosen by Darney as comparables were landlocked, yet all were “mountain land” and zoned either as conservation 1 Karen Darney testified that, when she drafted her Land Appraisal Report, she believed the highest and best use of the subject property to be “conservation/recreation as an interim use until such time a right-of-way, road access and extension of utilities are obtained.” (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). As a result, she valued the land, and thus selected her comparables, based on land which she believed also possessed a highest and best use as conservation/recreation. At the hearing, however, Darney testified that she now believes the property to have a highest and best use as plottage; however, she maintained that the difference did not affect her valuation of the subject property. (N.T. 46). 4 or agricultural-type zoning. (N.T. 35). Darney’s adjustment’s equated to an increase of a mere $200.00 per acre, with no adjustments made for location. (N.T. 35-36). Darney’s Comparable Property Number 1 (hereinafter “Appellant Comp. 1”) was located in Penn Township, 29 miles from the subject property, and was a landlocked parcel, which, in Darney’s opinion, was most similar in terrain to the subject parcel. (N.T. 37) (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 1 was a rural, wooded parcel consisting of mountain land, with no foreseeable future use other than conservation/ recreation. (N.T. 36) (Cumberland County Tax Mapping, Respondent’s Ex. 4, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 1 was the parcel most recently sold, and, as a result, received the “most weight” in Darney’s report. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 1 consisted of 5.13 irregular acres, and sold for $4,000 per acre, for a total sales price of $20,520. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Because the parcel was zoned for conservation, and not commercial park limited, Darney credited the sales price by 5%, for an increase of $200 per acre, resulting in a final sales price for comparison purposes of $4,200 per acre. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Darney’s Comparable Property Number 2 (hereinafter “Appellant Comp. 2”) was also located in Penn Township, close in proximity to Appellant Comp. 1, and located 30 miles from the subject property. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). That property consisted of 5.98 irregular acres, and sold for $3,846 per acre, for a sales price of $23,00. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 2 was a landlocked parcel in a rural, mountain land type terrain, also zoned for conservation. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Because of its zoning, 5 Darney adjusted the sales price by 5%, for an increase of $192 per acre, which resulted in a final sales price for comparison purposes of $4,038 per acre. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Lastly, Darney’s Comparable Property Number 3 (hereinafter “Appellant Comp. 3”) was located in Lower Frankford Township, approximately 21 miles from the subject property. (N.T. 38) (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 3 consisted of 5.35 irregular acres, and sold for $4,486 per acre, for a sales price of $24,00. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellant Comp. 3 was a rural, landlocked parcel with no right-of-way and a variety of terrains, and it was recently sold as a plottage purchase to an adjoining landowner. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). That property was zoned as agricultural/residential; as a result, Darney adjusted the sales price by 5%, for an increase of $224 per acre, which resulted in a final sales price for comparison purposes of $4,710. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The average of Darney’s three comparable properties, before adjustments were made, was $4,111 per acre. The average of her comparable properties, after adjustments, was $4,316 per acre, and Darney concluded that the final value for comparison purposes was to be $4,200 per acre. Darney’s final estimation as to the fair market value of the subject property was, $39,648, which rounded to $40,000. (Land Appraisal Report, Petitioner’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). William C. Reath testified on behalf of the Board as an expert witness. (N.T. 48-49). Reath stated that, in compiling his land appraisal report, he attempted to use a wide range of comparable properties due to the complexity of trying to identify all the different factors and 6 characteristics that made the subject property so difficult to value. (N.T. 57-58). Reath utilized a total of six comparable properties in formulating his opinion as to the value of the subject property, but also considered, albeit less formally, some five additional comparable properties in an attempt to establish a “bottom of the market” floor price for the subject property. (N.T. 66) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath’s Comparable Property Number 1 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 1”) was a located on Wertzville Road, very near to the subject property and which had sold on August 11, 2010 for a sale price of $215,000, or $22,165 per acre. (N.T. 66) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that Appellee Comp. 1 was the best and most appropriate property to compare to the subject property. (N.T. 74-75). Appellee Comp. 1 consisted of 9.70 acres and fronted on Wertzville Road, yet for reasons not explored at the hearing, the previous owner was unable to obtain a driveway permit to the parcel, which resulted in an inability to occupy a residential home that had been built on the property. (N.T. 58). As a result, Appellee Comp. 1 was sold to an adjoining owner to be combined with land already owned by the purchaser. (N.T. 58). Because Appellee Comp. 1 had extensive road frontage, Reath testified that he made a 25% negative location adjustment to the sales price for comparison purposes. (N.T. 59). Additionally, Reath made a negative 10% “adjacent owner” adjustment because of his belief that an adjacent owner would be willing to pay more to add lands to his existing land. (N.T. 59). Lastly, because Appellee Comp. 1 had a residential zoning, Reath made a 20% positive zoning adjustment to the adjusted sales price to reflect the benefit of the commercial park limited zoning regulations that pertain to the subject property. (N.T. 61). The adjustments resulted in a final sales price for comparison purposes of $18,840. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). 7 Reath’s Comparable Property Number 2 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 2”) consisted of 182.61 acres of mountain land located in the southeastern corner of Cumberland County. (N.T. 60) (Cumberland County Tax Mapping, Respondent’s Ex. 4, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The property had legal access; however, Reath testified that access to property was made extremely difficult as entry could be made only by travelling several miles along a dirt road. (N.T. 60). The property had recently sold for a sales price of $360,000, or $1,971 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Because Appellee Comp. 2 was drastically larger than the subject property, Reath testified that he made a 50% positive location increase adjustment to the sales price for comparison purposes. (N.T. 60) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Additionally, Reath made a 25% increase adjustment onto the sales price per acre to adjust for the property’s poor location when compared with the subject property. (N.T. 61) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Appellee Comp. 2 was zoned as a conservation parcel; as a result, Reath made a 20% positive zoning increase adjustment to account for the discrepancy in zoning between Comp. 2 and the subject property. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). After adjustments, Appellee Comp. 2 had a final sales price for comparison purposes of $3,844 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Based on the number of adjustments required to be made to Appellee Comp. 2, Reath testified on cross-examination that he would likely “throw that sale out completely.” (N.T. 77). Reath’s Comparable Property Number 3 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 3”) consisted of 63.08 acres near the Newville area of Cumberland County and was zoned as a multifamily residential parcel. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The property was recently sold to an adjoining land owner, a school district, to be used for 8 recreational purposes by the school itself. (N.T. 62). The property did have legal access. (N.T. 62). Appellee Comp. 3 sold for a sales price of $475,000, or $7,530 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that he made a 10% positive location adjustment, a 20% positive zoning adjustment, and a 20% positive size adjustment. (N.T. 63). Additionally, Reath made a 10% negative adjacent owner adjustment, as he believed that an adjoining landowner would pay a slight premium to purchase property immediately adjacent to their own. (N.T. 63). Reath’s adjustments to Appellee Comp. 3 resulted in a final sales price for comparison purposes of $10,542 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that Appellee Comp. 3 was not as “comparable” to the subject property as his first comparable property. (N.T. 64). Reath also testified that his fourth and fifth comparable properties were not as ideal as Appellee Comp. 1. (N.T. 64). Reath’s Comparable Property Number 4 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 4”) consisted of 5.34 acres and which sold in 2009 for a sales price of $80,000, or $14,981 per acre. (N.T. 64). Appellee Comp. 4 was a residential property at the end of a cul-de- sac and did have legal access. (N.T. 63). Reath made adjustments to the Appellee Comp. 4 sales price which resulted in a 30% increase; the adjustments gave rise to a final sales price for comparison purposes of $19,476. Reath’s Comparable Property Number 5 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 5”) consisted of 3.27 acres located at the end of a “side street” in the Enola area. (N.T. 64). (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The property held storage buildings and did have legal access by way of an alley. (N.T. 64). After Reath’s adjustments were made, Appellee Comp. 5 had a final sales price of $24,465 per acre. (N.T. 64). (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). 9 Lastly, Reath’s Comparable Property Number 6 (hereinafter “Appellee Comp. 6”) was an older land sale and consisted of 24.89 acres. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that he included Appellee Comp. 6 because, although the sale was more than six years old, it was immediately adjacent to the subject property, and he wanted “to get a feel for what was going on in that area.” (N.T. 64). Appellee Comp. 6 was the Laurel Ridge Estates parcel and was zoned as commercial park limited. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). After adjustments, the sales price for comparison purposes was $21,093 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The average of Reath’s six comparable properties, before adjustments were made, was $16,539 per acre. The average of his comparable properties, after adjustments, was $15,433 per acre. Reath’s reconciled value per acre was $13,000 per acre. In sum, Reath’s final adjusted estimation as to the fair market value of the subject property was $122,720, which rounded to $123,00. (N.T. 67) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that, although not formally considered in his report, he did examine and consider five additional comparable properties, some with access issues, in an attempt to establish a “bottom of the market” floor price for the subject property. (N.T. 66) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, 7 admitted Nov. 30, 2011). The properties were listed and described on page seven of Reath’s report. (N.T. 66) (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, 7 admitted Nov. 30, 2011). Reath testified that, in selecting the “floor” comparables, he considered both what a seller would be likely willing to accept for the subject property in an as-is condition, as well as how much a buyer will be willing to risk in purchasing the property. (N.T. 65). Additionally, Reath testified that he considered what the future 10 development around the subject property would be. (N.T. 65). All but two of the “floor” comparable properties had some kind of access issue: some required an easement, or had shared access; another parcel was split in half by a roadway that passed through it. (N.T. 65). Additionally, the “floor” comparable properties were similar in size to the subject property, averaging 7.01 acres. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, 7 admitted Nov. 30, 2011). When examined together, Reath’s additional comparable properties averaged a sales price for comparison purposes of $8,564 per acre. (Assessment Appraisal Report, Respondent’s Ex. 2, 7, admitted Nov. 30, 2011). In a real estate tax assessment appeal case, the proceedings in the trial court are de novo, and the proper order of proof has long been established. Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 417 Pa. 213, 221, 209 A.2d 397, 402 (1965). The procedure has been summarized by the Superior Court as follows: The procedure requires that the taxing authority first present its assessment record into evidence. Such presentation makes out a prima facie case for the validity of the assessment in the sense that it fixes the time when the burden of coming forward with evidence shifts to the taxpayer. If the taxpayer fails to respond with credible, relevant evidence, then the taxing body prevails. But once the taxpayer produces sufficient proof to overcome its initially allotted status, the prima facie significance of the Board's assessment figure has served its procedural purpose, and its value as an evidentiary devise is ended. Thereafter, such record, of itself, loses the weight previously accorded to it and may not then influence the court's determination of the assessment's correctness. [T]he taxpayer still carries the burden of persuading the court of the merits of his appeal, but that burden is not increased by the presence of the assessment record in evidence. Of course, the taxing authority always has the right to rebut the owner's evidence and in such a case the weight to be given to all the evidence is always for the court to determine. The taxing authority cannot, however, rely solely on its assessment record in the face of countervailing evidence unless it is willing to run the risk of having the owner's proof believed by the court. 11 Green v. Schuylkill County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 565 Pa. 185, 195, 772 A.2d 419, 425- 26 (2001) (quoting Deitch Co., 417 Pa. at 221, 209 A.2d at 402). Section 8854 of the new Consolidated County Assessment Law, effective January 1, 2011, is the controlling statute for the instant appeal, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Court of common pleas.-- (1) Following an appeal to the board, any appellant, property owner or affected taxing district may appeal the board's decision to the court of common pleas in the county in which the property is located in accordance with local rules of court. (2) In any appeal of an assessment the court shall make the following determinations: (i) The market value as of the date the appeal was filed before the board. . . . (ii) The common level ratio which was applicable in the original appeal to the board. . . . (3) The court, after determining the market value of the property pursuant to paragraph (2)(i), shall then apply the established predetermined ratio to that value unless the corresponding common level ratio determined pursuant to paragraph (2)(ii) varies by more than 15% from the established predetermined ratio, in which case the court shall apply the applicable common level ratio to the corresponding market value of the property. 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 8854. The duty of the trial court in an assessment appeal is not to become an assessor or an appraiser, see Green, 565 Pa. at 196, 772 A.2d at 426; rather, the trial court is to “weigh the conflicting expert testimony and determine a value based upon credibility determinations.” Allegheny Energy Supply Co. v. County of Greene, 788 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) (citing Air Products v. Board of Assessment, 720 A.2d 790 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1998)). Fair market value has been defined as “the price which a purchaser, willing but not obligated to buy, would pay an owner, willing but not obligated to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the 12 property is adapted and might in reason be applied.” F&M Schaffer Brewing Co. v. Lehigh County Bd. of Appeals, 530 Pa. 451, 457, 610 A.2d 1, 3 (1992) (quoting Buhl Foundation v. Bd. of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 407 Pa. 567, 570, 180 A.2d 900, 902 (1962)); see also Green, 565 Pa. at 194, n.6, 772 A.2d at 425, n.6. “The actual or fair market value, while not easily ascertained, is fixed by the opinions of competent witnesses as to what the property is worth on the market at a fair sale.” F&M Schaffer Brewing Co., 530 Pa. at 457, 610 A.2d at 3 (internal citations omitted). In arriving at a determination in a tax assessment appeal, the trial court must “base its findings on the evidence of record” and also “must state the basis and reasons for its decision.” Green, 565 Pa. at 185, 772 A.2d at 419. “In tax cases, [as in] all others, courts must be guided by the evidence in determining what are proper valuations.” Id. (internal citations omitted). When utilizing the sales comparison/ market data approach, it is appropriate for expert witnesses to make adjustments to comparable properties in order to estimate the value of the subject property. Cumberland Valley School District v. Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals, 125 Pa.Cmwlth. 649, 651-52, 557 A.2d 1178, 1179-80 (1989). “These adjustments may be as to the condition of the property, its location, size, et cetera.” Id. Because every property is unique, the adjustments made to the comparable properties are important considerations for the fact finder to consider in determining how much weight to give to the expert’s opinion. Id. “The fact finder treats the expert like any other witness. He applies to him the same standards of credibility as any other witness. He may consider his background and the reasons for his opinion, including the adjustments, in determining the persuasive quality of his testimony. The weight of an expert's testimony is left to the fact finder.” Id. (citing Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Corp. Appeal, 440 Pa. 321, 272 A.2d 163 (1970)). 13 When valuing property, there is often a question of possible, potential, or hypothetical future uses based on anticipated happenings that might change what a prudent seller would demand for his property. The quantum of certainty regarding these anticipated happenings can often be difficult to determine, and the amount of certainty required in order to allow these extraneous factors to be considered is incapable of precise measurement. Indeed, determining the fair market value of property is often “not a matter of exact science or capable of mathematical accuracy. . . .” Green, 565 Pa. at 206, 772 A.2d at 432. What is certain, however, is that “property must not be taxed on the basis of how it possibly may exist under ideal hypothetical conditions at some time in the far future. Rather, assessments are a reflection of current market value. . . .” Craftmaster Mfg. v. Bradford County Bd. of Assessment Appeal, 903 A.2d 620, 633 (Pa. Commw. 2004) (emphasis original). Additionally, the Commonwealth Court has held “factors based upon a reasonable probability existing at the time of the assessment are relevant to the determination of a property's fair market value; however, [the Court] stressed that factors based upon pure speculation, such as what a property would be worth in an altered condition, are irrelevant and may not be considered.” ENF Family Partnership v. Erie County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 861 A.2d 438, 441 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004). Applying the forgoing, we find that Appellant presented credible and relevant evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption of validity of the Board's initial assessment record; as a result, the original assessment record has served its procedural purpose, and its value as an evidentiary devise has ended. We therefore move to an examination of the evidence adduced at the hearing to determine a value for the subject property. We begin our determination of the actual value of the subject property by noting that both experts testified competently and credibly in presenting their reports as to the proper value of the 14 subject property. We agree with both experts that the highest and best use for the subject property is likely to be as plottage, or as a sale to an adjoining landowner. With this in mind, we also find the subject parcel’s lack of legal access to be extremely significant in determining the property’s fair market value. The experts agreed that the Giant Food Stores parcel is likely to be the adjoining landowner who may have the greatest interest in purchasing the subject parcel. Despite this, the plan and timeframe as to the building of that grocery store remain speculative; no definitive blueprint as to when Giant Food Stores may desire to purchase the subject property exists. As a result, we cannot determine the fair market value of the subject property as if the Giant Food Stores parcel had a clearly expressed and anticipated interest in purchasing the property. We must also consider what a non-adjoining landowner or investor purchaser would pay for the property, keeping in mind that the highest and best use of the property is as plottage. It is axiomatic that a purchaser of land would not only consider, but indeed may shy away from, property that has no legal right of way. Certainly, options to obtain legal access do exist for the would-be buyer; however, the cost and uncertainty associated such an attempt would play an important role in a buyer’s offer to purchase the subject property. Turning to the comparable properties selected by the expert witnesses, we find the five additional comparable properties selected by William Reath to be the most compelling in our determination of the subject property’s fair market value. The County’s own expert testified that, in selecting the additional comparables, he considered both what a seller would be likely willing to accept for the subject property in an as-is condition, as well as how much a buyer will be willing to risk in purchasing the property. Additionally, Reath testified that he considered what the future development around the subject property would be. We believe this to be the appropriate method of determining the correct valuation of the subject property. Additionally, 15 all but two of Reath’s additional comparable properties had some kind of access issue: some required an easement, or had shared access; another parcel was split in half by a roadway that passed through it. These comparable properties were also similar in size to the subject property; their land sizes were as follows: 6.59 acres, 8.94 acres, 5.09 acres, 11.79 acres, and 2.66 acres, which equated to an average of 7.01 acres. The sales prices per acre for the additional comparables were as follows: $7,587, $7,830, $11,788, $5,089, $10,526, which equated to an average sales price for comparison purposes of $8,564 per acre. With regard to the other comparables selected by Reath, we find issues with those comparables that we do not find with the above listed properties. Specifically, while Reath testified that Appellee Comp. 1 was the most appropriate property to compare to the subject property, we disagree. The subject property is a landlocked parcel bounded by Interstate 81 and neighboring parcels. Reath testified that Appellee Comp. 1 had extensive road frontage on Wertzville Road, a busy thoroughfare. While the previous owner was unable to obtain a driveway permit, Reath testified that it would be possible for the owner to have reapplied for a driveway permit. A previous owner’s inability to obtain a certain driveway permit does not turn an otherwise accessible parcel into a landlocked parcel. For these reasons, Appellee Comp. 1 is an inappropriate comparable property to utilize in determining the value of the subject property. With regard to Appellee Comp. 2, Reath testified that, as a result of all the adjustments that he had to make to the property, he would “throw that sale out completely” in his analysis. Furthermore, Reath testified that his third, fourth, and fifth comparables were not as ideal as his first comparable property, which we have already determined to be inappropriate for use in valuing the subject property. Lastly, Reath testified that Appellee Comp. 6 was the Laurel Ridge Estates townhouse development parcel. While possessing the same zoning restrictions as the 16 subject property, Appellee Comp. 6 is not only the oldest comparable property selected by Reath, but it also had legal access which allowed the property to be developed into a townhome community. For these reasons, Reath’s comparable properties are not as suitable for consideration as his five additional comparable properties discussed above. Turning to the comparable properties selected by Darney, we do not find those properties to be as appropriate for comparison purposes as Reath’s additional comparables. While Darney’s comparable properties were all landlocked parcels, that attribute alone is not dispositive. Darney’s first and second comparable properties were landlocked rural mountain properties with no future foreseeable future use other than for purposes of conservation or recreation. Darney’s adjustment’s equated to an increase of a mere $200.00 per acre, with no adjustments made for location. The subject property is located in Hampden Township and surrounded by substantial prospective economic growth. Quite simply, it is not appropriate to value the land utilizing comparable properties that only serve a conservation or recreation use, thus ignoring the plethora of other factors that make the subject property so unique. Having considered both expert reports and assessments, we find a reasonable assessment of the subject property as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals to be $8,564 per acre, or $80,844.16. Accordingly, the following order will be entered: 17 ORDER th AND NOW, this 26 day of January, 2012, after a hearing, held November 30, 2011, and after careful consideration of the testimony and evidence adduced therein, it is Ordered and Decreed that the fair market value of the property which is the subject of the instant appeal, known as Cumberland County tax parcel 10-12-2987-001A, as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Board of Assessment Appeals, is $80,844.16. Cumberland County having undertaken a Countywide reassessment in year 2010, there is no Common Level Ratio applicable to the within appeal. The Predetermined Ratio is 100% of year 2010 fair market value. Therefore, the real estate tax assessment of the property shall be $80,844.16. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J. Stephen D. Tiley, Esquire For Cumberland County Board of Assessment Appeals Jason E. Kelso, Esquire For the Appellant :rlm 18 IN RE: APPEAL OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WALTER J. BRASHEAR, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : CIVIL ACTION - LAW vs. : : NO. 2011-5639 CIVIL TERM CUMBERLAND COUNTY : BOARD OF ASSESSMENT : APPEALS, : Appellee : Parcel No. 10-12-2987-001A IN RE: REAL ESTATE TAX ASSESSMENT APPEAL BEFORE HESS, P.J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 26 day of January, 2012, after a hearing, held November 30, 2011, and after careful consideration of the testimony and evidence adduced therein, it is Ordered and Decreed that the fair market value of the property which is the subject of the instant appeal, known as Cumberland County tax parcel 10-12-2987-001A, as of the date the appeal was originally filed before the Board of Assessment Appeals, is $80,844.16. Cumberland County having undertaken a Countywide reassessment in year 2010, there is no Common Level Ratio applicable to the within appeal. The Predetermined Ratio is 100% of year 2010 fair market value. Therefore, the real estate tax assessment of the property shall be $80,844.16. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J.