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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-3770 STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF COMPANY, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff, : : v. : NO. 2011-3770 JAMES DECOSTER and BEVERLY : DIANE RYDMAN, : Defendants. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., GUIDO, J. and PECK, J. OPINION and ORDER The parties at the above captioned docket have filed cross motions for summary judgment, each pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035. (Cross Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant James DeCoster, filed Dec. 20, 2011) (Co-Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Dec. 20, 2011) (Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Dec. 20, 2011). This case involves an action for Declaratory Judgment wherein Plaintiff seeks a declaration that it has no duty under a Homeowners Insurance Policy to defend or indemnify Defendant James DeCoster for any and all allegations arising out of facts alleged in a Complaint filed by Beverly Diane Rydman at Docket Number 2010-4862 in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. (Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed Apr. 18, 2011). The facts were stipulated by the parties and are set forth at length in the Stipulation of Facts, filed of record on August 25, 2011. Those material to the question presented in the instant Motions are in substance as follows: On August 14, 2008, Defendant Diane Rydman and Defendant James DeCoster had been together at a bar known as Fast Eddie’s on High Street in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Rydman and DeCoster had lived within blocks of the bar where they had met each other, and had slept together once before. After leaving the bar, the two went to DeCoster’s home at 161 West Louther Street and continued to drink alcohol. In the early morning hours, and while DeCoster was going to the bathroom, Rydman went outside DeCoster’s home to smoke a cigarette. After approximately ten minutes, Rydman came back into the home and, upon her re-entry, DeCoster mistakenly believed that an intruder had broken into his home. DeCoster grabbed a handgun, and, when he saw Rydman, he mistook her for a small male intruder. At the time, DeCoster was not wearing his eyeglasses, and he began to chase after Rydman believing he was chasing an intruder. DeCoster pointed the handgun and shot Rydman in the abdomen. Of DeCoster’s intent as he shot Rydman, the Stipulation of Facts provides as follows: “Despite being intoxicated, DeCoster intended to shoot who he believed to be a small male intruder. Mr. DeCoster pulled the trigger on purpose intending to shoot who he believed to be a small male intruder. In fact, the victim was Diane Rydman.” (Stipulation of Facts, ¶ (i)). DeCoster called the police, and over the telephone he stated, “You are damn right I shot him. Hurry up and get here.” (Stipulation of Facts, ¶ (n)). Upon their arrival, DeCoster stated to the police, “Over here, I shot him. He is in here.” (Stipulation of Facts, ¶ (o)). DeCoster was intoxicated and had a blood alcohol level of 0.187 as tested by the police shortly after the shooting. DeCoster was charged and found guilty of the offense of aggravated assault by intentionally or knowingly causing to attempt injury to another with a deadly weapon. The 2 conviction was overturned on appeal, and he subsequently accepted a plea in lieu of re-trial. DeCoster pled guilty to aggravated assault, and was sentenced to time served. At the time of the shooting, DeCoster was insured under a homeowners insurance policy issued by Plaintiff State Farm. The insurance policy provided, in pertinent part, as follows: insured If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an for damages because of bodily injuryproperty damage or to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence , we will insured 1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the is legally liable; and 2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment occurrence resulting from the , equals our limit of liability. (Complaint, Ex. A, Homeowners Insurance Policy) (emphasis original). Furthermore, the policy of insurance defined the term “occurrence” as follows: when used in Section II of this policy, means an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in: bodily injury a. ; or property damage b. ; during the policy period. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general occurrence. conditions is considered to be one (Complaint, Ex. A, Homeowners Insurance Policy) (emphasis original). The policy also contained the following relevant exclusionary language: Coverage L and Coverage M do not apply to: bodily injury or property damage: a. 3 insured (1) which is either expected or intended by the ; or insured (2) which is the result of willful and malicious acts of the . (Complaint, Ex. A, Homeowners Insurance Policy) (emphasis original). Rydman filed an action against DeCoster in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County at Docket Number 2010-4862 seeking damages for the harm caused as a result of the shooting. The complaint does not set forth any specific counts; instead, Rydman’s complaint describes the incident and contains substantially the same facts as the above-described Stipulation of Facts. The allegations relevant to the instant Motions are, in pertinent part, as follows: 19. Defendant, who was carrying a handgun, rounded the foot of the stairs and ran from the hallway and then through the living room toward the dining room, where he encountered Plaintiff, whom he mistook for an intruder. 20. Alarmed, Defendant instinctively ran the in [sic] other direction, and Defendant chased her in a circuit through the hallway, the living room and the dining room, until Plaintiff took a wrong turn and Defendant cornered her in the hallway. 22. Plaintiff also noticed, as Defendant approached her, that his eyes were extremely wide open, as if in fear or excitement. 23. Defendant then pointed the handgun at Plaintiff and shot her in the abdomen. 26. After the police responded to the call, Defendant, still unaware that he had shot Plaintiff, insisted to the police that he had shot a male intruder. 27. In his drunken condition, to grab his handgun and run downstairs to confront a supposed intruder, without putting on his eyeglasses and without taking time to identify the person in his hallway before shooting, was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in his situation. 28. Defendant’s grossly negligent or reckless shooting of Plaintiff in the abdomen caused Plaintiff such grievous harm that she had to be transported by helicopter for emergency treatment in the trauma center at Hershey Medical Center. 4 (Complaint, Ex. B, Rydman Complaint). DeCoster then filed a claim with State Farm requesting that State Farm defend and indemnify DeCoster in the Rydman action. State Farm subsequently filed the underlying declaratory judgment action, requesting this court to declare that it has no duty to defend or indemnify DeCoster for any and all allegations arising out of facts stated in a Rydman complaint. State Farm has filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that the above- quoted language of the insurance policy excludes coverage. Rydman and DeCoster, as Co- Defendants herein, have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment, asserting that, because DeCoster did not intend to shoot Rydman, the exclusion does not apply and State Farm is obligated to defend DeCoster in the Rydman action. Pursuant to Rule 1035.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may grant summary judgment after the relevant pleadings are closed and whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense that could be established by any additional discovery or expert report, or if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense, which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.2(1); Estate of Borst v. Edward Stover Sr. Testamentary Trust, 2011 PA Super 222, 30 A.3d 1207. Summary judgment shall be granted whenever “the material facts are undisputed,” or the facts are insufficient “to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.” McCarthy v. Dan Lepore & Sons Co., 724 A.2d 938, 940 (Pa. Super. 1998); Pa. R. Civ. P. 5 1035.2(1). Furthermore, summary judgment is proper when “the uncontroverted allegations in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of record, and submitted affidavits demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Reliance Ins. Co. v. IRPC, Inc., 2006 PA Super 150, ¶ 8, 904 A.2d 912, 915. Finally, a trial court’s entry of summary judgment will not be overturned absent an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. McCain v. Pennbank, 379 Pa. Super. 313, 318, 549 A.2d 1311, 1313 (1988). The question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured, and thus “[t]he interpretation of an insurance contract regarding the existence or non-existence of coverage,” is a question of law to be decided by the court, and is properly resolved in a declaratory judgment action. Minnesota Fire and Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 579 Pa. 333, 344, 855 A.2d 854, 861 (2004); Aetna Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Roe, 437 Pa. Super. 414, 650 A.2d 94, 98 (1994). In so interpreting, the court is to ascertain “the intent of the parties as manifested by the terms used in the written insurance policy.” Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 595 Pa. 147, 155, 938 A.2d 286, 290 (2007) (citing 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Group, 583 Pa. 445, 454, 879 A.2d 166, 171 (2005)). “Where a provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. . . .Where, however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.” Minnesota Fire and Cas. Co., 579 Pa. at 344, 855 A.2d at 861 (quoting Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Company, 512 Pa. 420, 517 A.2d 910, 913 (1986)). 6 Pennsylvania courts have previously examined policy provisions that exclude coverage for bodily injuries which are “expected or intended” by an insured, and it is well settled that such provisions are “ambiguous as a matter of law and must be construed against the insurer.” Erie Insurance Exchange v. Muff, 2004 PA Super 177, ¶ 13, 851 A.2d 919, 927 (quoting Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen’s Club, 421 Pa. Super. 548, 618 A.2d 945, 953 (1992)). “The words ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ are synonymous when interpreting this exclusionary clause, and connote an element of conscious awareness on the part of the insured. For purposes of this ‘expected or intended’ provision, ‘an insured intends an injury if he desired to cause the consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such consequences were substantially certain to result.’” Id. at ¶ 13, 851 A.2d at 927-28. The duty of an insurance company to defend and indemnify an insured is a great responsibility, and an insurer bears the burden of showing that claims raised in a third party complaint are excluded from the policy issued to the insured. Utica First Ins. Co. v. McClaim, 2009 WL 415988; see also D’Auria v. Zurich Ins. Co., 352 Pa. Super. 231, 233-34, 507 A.2d 857, 859 (1986). In determining whether an insurance company has a responsibility to defend its insured, our Supreme Court has instructed that the relevant inquiry lies in a comparison between the language of the insurance policy and the facts alleged in the third party complaint, from which the insured seeks to be defended and ultimately, perhaps, indemnified. Donegal, 595 Pa. at 155, 938 A.2d at 290-91 (quoting Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 555 Pa. 534, 538, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (1999)). Indeed, the Supreme Court observed, in a case oft cited in this area, the following: 7 [a]n insurer's duty to defend an action against the insured is measured, in the first instance, by the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings. . . . In determining the duty to defend, the complaint claiming damages must be compared to the policy and a determination made as to whether, if the allegations are sustained, the insurer would be required to pay resulting judgment. . . .[T]he language of the policy and the allegations of the complaint must be construed together to determine the insurers' obligation. Donegal, 595 Pa. at 155, 938 A.2d at 290 (quoting Gene’s Restaurant Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 Pa. 306, 308, 548 A.2d 246, 247 (1988)). Pennsylvania law is clear that it is not the actual details of the alleged injury, but, rather, the nature of the claim that determines whether the insurer is required to defend. D’Auria v. Zurich Insurance Co., 352 Pa. Super. at 234, 507 A.2d at 859. The duty to defend is “limited to only those claims covered by the policy. The insurer is obligated to defend if the factual allegations of the complaint on its face comprehend an injury which is actually or potentially within the scope of the policy.” Id. “It does not matter if in reality the facts are completely groundless, false or fraudulent. It is the face of the complaint and not the truth of the facts alleged therein which determines whether there is a duty to defend.” Id. at 253, 507 A.2d at 859. In light of the foregoing, we question the appropriateness of the use of a stipulation of facts as the basis for determination of the instant motions, as opposed to the use of solely the Rydman complaint. As a result, we rely on the Stipulation merely as a guide in interpreting the facts alleged in the underlying Rydman complaint. Despite the deceptively simple “policy/complaint” comparison test, Pennsylvania courts have rejected artful pleading as a means to circumvent coverage exclusions; indeed, the Superior Court has held that 8 . . . the particular cause of action that a complainant pleads is not determinative of whether coverage has been triggered. Instead it is necessary to look at the factual allegations contained in the complaint. If we were to allow the manner in which the complainant frames the request for damages to control the coverage question, we would permit insureds to circumvent exclusions that are clearly part of the policy of insurance. Erie Insurance Exchange v. Fidler, 2008 PA Super 307, ¶ 7, 808 A.2d 587, 590 (citing Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 555 Pa. 534, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (1999) (“The fact that the [underlying claimant] couched their claims in terms of negligence does not control the question of coverage.”). In this case, Mr. DeCoster intentionally shot a person. However, he neither expected nor intended to shoot Ms. Rydman. In short, this case involves an intentional act with an unintended result. The question then becomes whether the shooting of Ms. Rydman was accidental for the purpose of coverage under the State Farm policy. In seeking guidance to resolve this issue, we have been unable to find any appellate cases with facts which are even remotely similar. As noted above, when applying the provisions of the policy to the allegations of the Plaintiff’s complaint, we are bound to construe those provisions in favor of the insured and against the insurer. The Plaintiff’s complaint alleges acts which were “grossly negligent” or “reckless.” Under the language of the policy, there is no coverage for acts which are “willful and malicious.” There is no contention in Ms. Rydman’s complaint that Mr. DeCoster bore her malice. Instead, the contention is that his actions in mistaking her for an intruder were grossly negligent. 9 We recognize that affording Mr. DeCoster coverage is troublesome given the extreme recklessness of his actions. As we have already noted, however, to the extent that there is ambiguity in the insurance policy, the law requires that we resolve it in favor of the insured. ORDER AND NOW, this day of March, 2012, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant James DeCoster’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the responses filed thereto, and after oral argument by the parties heard on January 6, 2012, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Thus, it is ordered and directed that Plaintiff State Farm is required to defend and indemnify Defendant DeCoster in the action filed against him by Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas at Docket No. 2010-4862. BY THE COURT, ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. 10 STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF COMPANY, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiff, : : v. : NO. 2011-3770 JAMES DECOSTER and BEVERLY : DIANE RYDMAN, : Defendants. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS, P.J., GUIDO, J. and PECK, J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 13 day of March, 2012, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant James DeCoster’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the responses filed thereto, and after oral argument by the parties heard on January 6, 2012, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Thus, it is ordered and directed that Plaintiff State Farm is required to defend and indemnify Defendant DeCoster in the action filed against him by Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas at Docket No. 2010-4862. BY THE COURT, ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 13 day of March, 2012, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant James DeCoster’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the responses filed thereto, and after oral argument by the parties heard on January 6, 2012, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED. Thus, it is ordered and directed that Plaintiff State Farm is required to defend and indemnify Defendant DeCoster in the action filed against him by Defendant Beverly Diane Rydman in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas at Docket No. 2010-4862. BY THE COURT, ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. David J. Rosenberg, Esquire For the Plaintiff John R. Ninosky, Esquire For Defendant DeCoster James D. Flower, Jr., Esquire For Defendant Rydman :rlm