HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-4514 CIVIL
STANLEY W. HOYNITSKI and
TODD W. HOYNITSKI,
Petitioners- Appellants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
01-4514 CIVIL
vs.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP,
Respondent-Appellee
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL
BEFORE BAYLEY, HESS AND GUIDO, 1.1.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is an appeal with respect to certain unfavorable action by the Board of
Supervisors of Silver Spring Township regarding a land development plan of the petitioners.
The appeal involved action with regard to the township denying certain requested waivers of
storm water management requirements, the township's attempt to require a revised traffic study,
and a prohibition against phased construction. At the oral argument of this matter, counsel
indicated that the matters of a traffic study and phased construction are no longer significant.
The crux of this appeal, therefore, has to do with the requested waivers of storm water
management requirements. The brief of the respondent/appellee aptly summarizes the
background of this case as follows.
On or about April 12, 2000, Stanley W. Hoynitski ("Hoynitski") applied for a conditional
use to operate a dealers-only auto auction on a parcel ofland located on the north side of Texaco
Road in the 1-1, Light Industrial zoning district in Silver Spring Township (the "Township").
After hearings, the Township Board of Supervisors (the "Board") issued a decision on July 29,
2000, approving the conditional use subject to certain conditions. Hoynitski appealed the
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Board's decision to the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. Prior to briefing and oral
argument on the appeal, Hoynitski and the Township entered into a Settlement Agreement
resolving the dispute between the parties. The Settlement Agreement revised the conditions as
originally set forth in the Board's decision.
Thereafter, in January 2001, Hoynitski submitted a Preliminary Land Development Plan
for the Harrisburg Auto Auction (the "Plan"). Shortly after submission of the Plan, Hoynitski in
February 2001, constructed an access driveway into the subject property without obtaining the
required Storm Water Management Permit, pursuant to the Township Storm Water Management
Ordinance. A Notice of Violation was issued to Hoynitski by the Township Zoning Officer
advising him of the violation of the Storm Water Management Ordinance. Hoynitski did not
appeal the Notice of Violation and the Zoning Officer issued a citation to Hoynitski.
In addition, the Township Zoning Officer issued a determination that in removing part of
a forested area and constructing the access driveway in a location which was not in accordance
with the plan submitted with the conditional use application, Hoynitski would be required to
apply for a new conditional use reflecting a change in the access to the subject property.
Hoynitski appealed the determination to the Township Zoning Hearing Board, which found that
the driveway constructed by Hoynitski was temporary and ifHoynitski removed the driveway
and replaced the trees that were removed within thirty (30) days of the date of its decision, the
Zoning Officer's determination would be overruled. If, however, Hoynitski did not complete the
required work within thirty (30) days, the Zoning Officer's decision would be upheld and
Hoynitski would be required to submit a new conditional use application.
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After the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board and prior to a hearing before the district
justice on the citation, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby Hoynitski agreed
to pay a fine for the violation of the Storm Water Management Ordinance and remove the access
driveway and re-forest the area where the access driveway had been located.
During the pendency of the Zoning Hearing Board appeal and the adjudication of the
violation of the Storm Water Management Ordinance, Hoynitski filed a revised Plan with the
Township, which included eight (8) requests for waivers from the Subdivision and Land
Development Ordinance. After consideration of the Plan and waiver requests, the Board on June
28, 2001, issued a decision approving the Plan subject to certain conditions, and approved five
(5) of the eight (8) waiver requests, but denied the following waiver requests: Storm water
basins located in known sinkhole prone areas are required to be lined to prevent infiltration into
ground (S.W.M.O. 402.06); a low flow channel must be paved if basin bottom is less than 2%
slope (402.06); and minimum pipe size permitted is 15" (402.13). On July 27,2001, Hoyniski
filed an appeal of the Township's conditional approval of the Plan.
Section 503(8) of the MPC, 53 P.S. 910503(8) authorizes municipalities to adopt as a part
of the subdivision and land development ordinances:
Provisions for administering waivers or
modifications to the minimum standards of the
ordinance in accordance with section 512.1 when
the literal compliance with mandatory provisions is
shown to the satisfaction of the governing body or
planning agency, where applicable, to be
unreasonable, to cause undue hardship, or when an
alternative standard can be demonstrated to
provide equal or better results.
Section 512.1 of the MPC, 53 P.S. 910512.1, provides, in pertinent part:
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The governing body or the planning agency, if
authorized to approve applications within the
subdivision and land development ordinance, may
grant a modification of the requirements of one or
more provisions if the literal enforcement will
exact undue hardship because of peculiar
conditions pertaining to the land in question,
provided that such modification will not be
contrary to the public interest and that the purpose
and intent of the ordinance is observed.
(Emphasis added).
Pursuant to Sections 503(8) and 512.1 of the MPC, the Township enacted Section 305 of
the Township Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance, which governs waiver requests.
Section 305 provides, in pertinent part:
The Board of Supervisors may waive any
mandatory provision of these regulations to the
benefit of the applicant provided a majority of a
quorum of the Board of Supervisors present at a
scheduled public meeting, determines that the
Waiver:
(a) Is inconsistent with the purpose of the
Ordinance as described in Section 102,
(b) Will remove or reduce an unreasonable
standard, or undue hardship as it applies to the
particular property, which is grossly
disproportionate to any benefit derived from the
standard, or when an alternative standard provides
equal or better results, and,
( c) Provides for reasonable utilization of the
property while securing the public interest.
It shall be the burden of the applicant to
demonstrate compliance with the above conditions.
305.04 Ruling on the Waiver. The Board of
Supervisors shall have the authority to approve
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or disapprove the waiver. In granting any
waiver, the Board of Supervisors may impose such
conditions as will, in its judgment, secure
substantially the objectives of the standards and
requirements of this Ordinance.
Action on the waiver shall be entered into the
minutes of the Board of Supervisors and forwarded
to the applicant. Failure of the Board of
Supervisors to render a decision and communicate
it to the applicant as described herein, shall not be
deemed approval of the waiver.
(Emphasis added).
It is clear from a reading of these foregoing sections that granting a waiver to the
requirements of the Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance is discretionary with the
Board of Supervisors. Notwithstanding, the appellant contends that the Board is required to cite
findings and reasons for the disposition of a waiver. In support of that position, the appellant
cites to Section 306.01.3 of the Silver Spring Township Storm Water Management Ordinance of
1999. That section provides that, following the consideration of a waiver request, the Board
shall :
. .. take such public action as it shall deem
advisable and notify all involved parties within
twenty (20) days of the action. Such notice shall
cite the findings and reasons for the deposition
[sic] of the waiver or appeal.
The Township, however, contends that Section 306.01.3 of the Silver Spring Township Storm
Water Management Ordinance of 1999 has no application to this case, citing Section 302 of the
same Ordinance:
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APPLICATION PROCEDURE
All applications for a Storm Water Management
Permit, the activity for which also constitutes a
subdivision or land development, shall be
submitted concurrently with all Silver Spring
Township Subdivision and Land Development
Ordinance applications. Applications for Storm
Water Management Permits will be submitted in
conjunction with preliminary plans (when
preliminary plans are required). Action on the
Storm Water Management Permit will be made in
conjunction with the preliminary plan under the
subdivision and Land Development Ordinance.
All applications for a Storm Water Management
Permit, the activity for which does not constitute a
subdivision or land development, shall conform
with the below procedures. 1 An application for a
Storm Water Management Permit shall be
submitted to the Township-designated
representative who has been authorized to receive
applications at the Silver Spring Township
Building, on any business day.
(Emphasis added.)
The Township's literal reading of the provisions of the Subdivision and Land
Development Ordinance together with the provisions of the Storm Water Management
Ordinance, create something of an anomaly; namely, when waivers are denied in connection
with an application for a Storm Water Management Permit, reasons must be given, whereas, if
the same application is denied in connection with a Land Development Plan, no reasons need be
given. Such a construction is not logical. We are satisfied that the action on a Storm Water
Management Permit is the same regardless of the context (though the timing of the action may be
1 i.e. Section 306.01.3.
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different). Simply put, the applicant must be heard on the matter of any waiver and reasons must
be given for any denial.
The record of this case is devoid of any analysis by the Township of the appellants'
requests for waivers under the Land Development Ordinance. Where this court neither expands
nor recreates a record in a zoning appeal, our scope of review is limited to a determination of
whether the Board abused its discretion or committed an error oflaw. Board ofCom'rs. of Ross
Twp. v. Harsch, 63 Pa.Cmmwlth. 400, 437 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1981) citing Horst v. Derry Twp.
Bard of Supervisors, 21 Pa.Cmmwlth. 556, 347 A.2d 507 (1975). We are unable to conduct a
review in this instance inasmuch as the Board made no factual findings nor did it issue any sort
of opinion.
ORDER
AND NOW, this
day of November, 2001, this matter is remanded to the Board
of Supervisors of Silver Spring Township to give the appellant the opportunity to be heard on the
matter of waivers and for the Township to make findings and give reasons for the disposition of
same.
BY THE COURT,
Kevin A. Hess, 1.
Charles W. Rubendall, II, Esquire
F or the Appellants
Steven A. Stine, Esquire
For the Township
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STANLEY W. HOYNITSKI and
TODD W. HOYNITSKI,
Petitioners- Appellants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
01-4514 CIVIL
vs.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
SILVER SPRING TOWNSHIP,
Respondent-Appellee
CIVIL ACTION - LAW
IN RE: LAND USE APPEAL
BEFORE BAYLEY, HESS AND GUIDO, 1.1.
ORDER
AND NOW, this
day of November, 2001, this matter is remanded to the Board
of Supervisors of Silver Spring Township to give the appellant the opportunity to be heard on the
matter of waivers and for the Township to make findings and give reasons for the disposition of
same.
BY THE COURT,
Kevin A. Hess, 1.
Charles W. Rubendall, II, Esquire
F or the Appellants
Steven A. Stine, Esquire
For the Township
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