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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-4407 SCOTT T. WYLAND, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : WEST SHORE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : DEFENDANT : 11-4407 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Masland, J., December 14, 2011:-- Before the court is a petition for preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiff, Scott T. Wyland asking the court to enjoin Defendant, West Shore School District to resume providing bus transportation service for his children. After a thorough review, the court concludes Plaintiff has made out his case and a preliminary injunction shall be granted. This case presents the limited question of whether a school district must provide transportation service to children attending a non-public elementary school within the district when the children reside in the district part-time due to a shared custody arrangement between their parents. Following a hearing and briefing by the parties, the court concludes the children are entitled to district- provided transportation services and therefore Defendant is preliminarily enjoined to provide same. I. Background Plaintiff’s minor children attend St. Theresa School, a private, nonpublic school that lies within the geographic boundaries of the West Shore Public School District in the Borough of New Cumberland, Cumberland County, 11-4407 CIVIL TERM Pennsylvania. Plaintiff’s children are full-time elementary students enrolled at St. Theresa School for the 2011-2012 school year. Plaintiff is divorced and has 50% physical custody and joint legal custody of his two children. The children reside 50% of the time with their mother, who until April 25, 2011, lived in Fairview Township, York County, within the West Shore School District. The Plaintiff resides in Wormleysburg, Cumberland County, which is also within the West Shore School District. The custody arrangement is set in a weekly 3-2-2 schedule, which requires the children to reside with the Plaintiff either two or three school days per week throughout the year. Defendant West Shore School District has provided bus transportation for the children to and from St. Theresa School from their mother’s home in Fairview Township, and to St. Theresa School from the Plaintiff’s residence in Wormleysburg, from August 2008 through April 22, 2011. During this time period when the West Shore School District provided transportation to the children, the children would ride Bus 61 in the morning from Plaintiff’s residence to St. Theresa School. Bus 61 continues to pass by Plaintiff’s driveway each morning at approximately 7:46 a.m., as it picks up other children in the neighborhood. However, the bus will no longer stop for Plaintiff’s children. On April 20, 2011, the children’s mother informed St. Theresa School that she was moving her residence to Hampton Township, Cumberland County on April 25, 2011. Her new residence is located within the Cumberland Valley Public School District. St. Theresa’s staff then notified the Cumberland Valley -2- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM School District that the children would be residing with their mother within the Cumberland Valley School District and also notified the West Shore School District that the children would be residing with their mother. This was done without Plaintiff’s prior knowledge. On or about April 20, 2011, the West Shore School District’s Transportation Office notified St. Theresa School that the bus service at Plaintiff’s home would be terminated upon the mother’s move out of the district. St. Theresa School immediately informed Plaintiff that West Shore School District would no longer be providing bus transportation. Plaintiff contacted both the West Shore School District and St. Theresa School to notify them that the children’s residence status with the Plaintiff had not changed and that bus transportation was still required in the same manner as had been followed since August 2008. In response, West Shore School District transportation and administrative representatives informed Plaintiff that, effective April 25, 2011, they would no longer be providing transportation for the children. Plaintiff was then told to make alternative transportation arrangements to St. Theresa School. Plaintiff made a written request to restore bus service. This request was refused by final decision of the West Shore School District. II. Discussion For a preliminary injunction to be granted, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the injunction must be necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that could not be compensated by damages; (2) greater injury would result by refusing the injunction than by granting it; (3) the injunction restores the parties to the status quo that existed immediately before the -3- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM alleged wrong; (4) the wrong is manifest and the injunction is reasonably suited to abate it; and (5) the applicant's right to relief is clear. Tinicum Twp. v. Delaware Valley Concrete, Inc., 812 A.2d 758, 762 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). A. Immediate and Irreparable Harm Defendant contends Plaintiff fails to show that the preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent an immediate and irreparable harm because, at the time of filing, Plaintiff’s children were on summer vacation. The court disagrees because now, in December, the school year is already underway and thus Defendant is causing immediate harm to Plaintiff by refusing to provide transportation services. B. Possibility of Greater Injury Defendant next argues that granting the preliminary injunction will harm the school district and other stakeholders because to do so would require Defendant to provide transportation services without reimbursement from the Commonwealth. Even if this is the case, the court finds that this is not an appropriate basis for denying the preliminary injunction. The Public School Code provides that “[e]ach school district, regardless of classification, shall be paid by the Commonwealth … for each nonpublic school pupil transported in the school year ….” 24 P.S. § 25-2509.3. Defendant contends this reimbursement is only available to pupils whose primary residence is within the district. However, no such limiting language appears in this section of the Code. Further, even if such a policy exists, it would not alter Defendant’s statutory obligation to provide transportation services to resident pupils in the -4- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM district. Defendant’s concerns present no barrier to the court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Defendant also argues that the grant of a preliminary injunction would harm the public interest by burdening it with “enormous financial and legal obligations ….” Br. at 17. In support of this contention, Defendant presented the testimony of school administrators who complained of the administrative difficulties associated with providing transportation services to children who reside, part-time, in two school districts. Ultimately, the court found the testimony 1 of alleged hardships unpersuasive. In short, the burden of having the computer program provide for one more bus stop will not harm the public interest. The inconvenience of adapting to shared custody agreements does not relieve Defendant of its statutory duty to provide transportation services to resident pupils. The importance of maintaining viable, healthy relationships with separated parents far outweighs any inconvenience the district or the Pennsylvania Department of Education may incur. C. Restoration of Status Quo Defendant disputes whether a preliminary injunction would not restore the status quo between the parties because it only terminated transportation services after Plaintiff’s children were enrolled in another school district. Thus, a restoration of the status quo could only be achieved if Plaintiff’s children would 1 The school administrators are primarily concerned with the potential burden in “the adoption of a principle that goes beyond transportation.” (Testimony of Stephen Fisher, PDE). This is not merely a bus reimbursement case in their eyes, but rather the beginning of anarchy and resulting chaos with accountability in areas such as Special Education funding or PSSA testing. This “slippery slope” argument is unconvincing. We will decide this case based on its distinct facts and the applicable law. -5- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM reenroll in the West Shore School District. The court views the facts a bit more simply. Here, the status quo was the Defendant provided transportation services to Plaintiff’s children. That is a status the grant of a preliminary injunction can achieve. D. Suitability of Injunctive Relief Again, Defendant argues that a preliminary injunction is inappropriate because Plaintiff can easily reregister his children in the West Shore School District and immediately begin receiving transportation services. This argument merely begs the question of whether Defendant’s transportation policy satisfies the requirements of the Public School Code. Thus, it presents no barrier to the grant of a preliminary injunction. E. Right to Relief - Entitlement to Transportation Services Finally, the court will address the dispositive portion of the preliminary injunction standard, whether Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief is clear. The Public School Code provides: The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled, …. When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transportation of public school pupils to and from such schools … the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic kindergarten, elementary and high schools not operated for profit to and from such schools or to and from any points within or without the Commonwealth in order to provide field trips as herein provided. Such transportation of pupils attending nonpublic schools shall be provided during regular school hours on such dates and periods that the nonpublic school not operated for profit is in regular session, according to the school calendar officially adopted by the directors of the same in accordance with provisions of law. The board of school directors shall provide such transportation whenever so required by any of the provisions of this act or -6- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM of any other act of Assembly. 24 P.S. § 13-1361(1) (emphasis added). In other words, when a school district provides transportation for its own students, it must provide the same service for resident pupils attending nonpublic schools. Here, it is undisputed that Defendant provides transportation services to students residing in the district. The dispute here is whether Plaintiff’s children qualify as resident pupils under the statute where they reside within the district part-time due to Plaintiff’s custody arrangement. Plaintiff argues that even though his daughters reside within the district only half-time, they are nonetheless resident pupils entitled to transportation services provided by Defendant. Defendant concedes the first part of Plaintiff’s argument, stating, “The West Shore School District does not contest that Mr. Wyland’s children are resident pupils.” Def. Br. at 16. Instead, Defendant argues that the children are simultaneously resident pupils in two school districts and because they have been enrolled as primary residents in the Cumberland Valley School District, they cannot receive transportation services from the Defendant school district. Essentially, Defendant contends “it has no duty to transport pupils unless and until it is designated the district of primary residence.” Id. For the following reasons, the court disagrees. “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Although we must “listen attentively to what a statute says[;][we] must also listen attentively to what it does not say.” Kmonk–Sullivan -7- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955, 962 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). “[I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a court has no power to insert a word into a statute if the legislature has failed to supply it.” Vlasic Farms, Inc. v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 734 A.2d 487, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), aff'd, 777 A.2d 80 (Pa. 2001); see also Girgis v. Bd. of Physical Therapy, 859 A.2d 852 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (we may not insert a word the legislature failed to supply into a statute). Here, the Public School Code directs school districts to provide transportation services to “resident pupils” not to pupils whose primary residence is within the district. Defendant argues strenuously and presented testimony at the hearing, that Plaintiff’s proposed result would be untenable and absurd resulting in a disruption of its common transportation practices. Again, the court disagrees. The General Assembly failed to include a primary residence requirement and the court declines to supply one. The court finds further support for its conclusion in other cases which have broadly interpreted the terms “reside” or “resident” in the School Code. First, the court looks to Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist. v. Rotteveel, 487 A.2d 109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). There, the school district denied transportation to a student residing within its limits attending a nonpublic school on the basis that she was too young to be lawfully enrolled in the district’s public schools. As such, the district argued the child did not meet the “resident pupil” requirement. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction which was affirmed. In its opinion, our Commonwealth Court looked no further than the unambiguous statutory -8- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM language and concluded “that the legislature intended the term, resident pupil, to mean simply any lawfully enrolled student of a public or nonpublic school described therein who lives in the school district in question.” Id. at 339. This holding renders a pupil’s eligibility for enrollment irrelevant; residency is the only question. Next, the court turns to the judicial interpretation of the term “resides” in the School Code. In, In re Residence Hearing Before the Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 2000), a school district tried to deny free public education services to a pupil whose mother and brother moved to a rented townhouse during the school year to be closer to high-quality special education. The district argued that because the pupil’s father and family home were outside the district, he failed to establish his primary residence or domicile within the district sufficient to entitle him to public education services. Our Supreme Court disagreed, concluding: The courts below properly interpreted the term “resides” as it is used in the Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 13-1302, supra. The term refers to a place where the custodial parent maintains a residence, and, contrary to the board's view, it need not be a primary residence or domicile. The legislature, in enacting section 1302, is presumed to have known the common meanings of the terms “residence” and “domicile.” Indeed, words in a statute must be construed in accordance with their common and approved usage. In choosing the term “resides” rather than terms such as “has a primary residence” or “is domiciled” in the school district, the legislature did not require that parents do anything more than reside in a school district in order to enroll their children in the local public schools. Id. at 1274 (emphasis added). The court reaches the same conclusion here. The General Assembly could have included a primary residence or domicile requirement, but it did not. -9- 11-4407 CIVIL TERM For these reasons, the court determines that due to Plaintiff’s children’s half-time residence within the West Shore School District, they are “resident pupils” entitled to transportation services provided by Defendant. Plaintiff’s right to relief is clear. III. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Plaintiff’s children are “resident pupils” of the West Shore School District for the purposes of the Public School Code’s transportation requirements. As such, they are entitled to transportation services. 24 P.S. § 13-1361(1). Defendant, West Shore School District is hereby preliminarily enjoined to provide those services. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of December, 2011, Plaintiff’s Petition for GRANTEDENJOINED a Preliminary Injunction is . Defendant is hereby to provide transportation services to Plaintiff’s children. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Scott T. Wyland, Esquire 354 Alexander Spring Road, Suite 1 Carlisle, PA 17015 Robert Watson, Jr., Esquire PO Box 1389 Doylestown, PA 18901 For West Shore School District :saa -10- SCOTT T. WYLAND, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : WEST SHORE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : DEFENDANT : 11-4407 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of December, 2011, Plaintiff’s Petition for GRANTEDENJOINED a Preliminary Injunction is . Defendant is hereby to provide transportation services to Plaintiff’s children. By the Court, Albert H. Masland, J. Scott T. Wyland, Esquire 354 Alexander Spring Road, Suite 1 Carlisle, PA 17015 Robert Watson, Jr., Esquire PO Box 1389 Doylestown, PA 18901 For West Shore School District :saa