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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2010-2747 FRED MARSICANO, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : NO. 10-2747 : : CIVIL ACTION STYLINE LOGISTICS, : Defendant. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PRELIMIARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT STYLINE LOGISTICS BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J. and PECK, J. OPINION and ORDER Defendant Styline Logistics has filed the instant Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a). (Preliminary Objections of Defendant, Styline Logistics to Plaintiff, Fred Marsicano’s Civil Action Complaint, filed Oct. 20, 2011). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains four counts: at Count I - Fraudulent Inducement, at Count II – Wrongful Discharge Public Policy, at Count III - Interference with Contractual Relations, and at Count IV - Breach of Implied Contract. (Complaint, filed Sept. 26, 2011). The Complaint has been preliminarily objected to in the form of multiple demurrers and by way of motions to strike for the failure to conform to law or rule of court and for reasons of insufficient specificity. (Preliminary Objections, filed Oct. 20, 2011). Plaintiff’s Complaint may be summarized as follows. This civil case arises out of an employment dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant, Plaintiff having been employed by Defendant for approximately a year and a half. Plaintiff avers in his compliant that, prior to his employment with Defendant, he had worked as a business manager with UPS for more than twenty years. In July of 2006, Plaintiff began discussions with Defendant’s Senior Vice President of Logistics and Purchasing, Ryan Menke, regarding the possibility of his obtaining employment with Defendant Styline Logistics. Plaintiff avers that “Menke induced Plaintiff to leave stable remunerative employment based on general assurances of a career position with a stable family run business which would value his unique experience.” (Complaint, ¶ 10). Plaintiff alleges that “clear assurances” were made to him that his new position was intended to be a “career position” and was “not intended as probationary.” (Complaint, ¶ 12). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that he was assured upon his hiring that he would be provided with “additional support” to help him succeed in his new position. (Complaint, ¶ 13). Plaintiff avers that, on or about July 26, 2006, he travelled to Defendant’s principal place of business, located in Huntingburg, Indiana, to finalize the employment discussions and to visit the area to locate potential housing. Subsequent to this meeting, various memos were exchanged between the parties, the details of compensation and benefits were agreed to, and Plaintiff formally moved to Indiana to begin work as the Director of Safety at Defendant’s Huntingburg, Indiana office in September of 2006. Shortly thereafter, Defendant purchased a home and began his new career. Despite the seemingly positive start, Plaintiff avers that “Defendant intended to materially alter the duties of Plaintiff’s position after he purchased a home, from the outset, knowing that he would then be economically stuck and would not be in a position to refuse unreasonable demands and denial of promised assistance.” (Complaint, ¶ 27). Plaintiff avers that, by mid-November 2006, he had made multiple requests for the promised administrative assistance, yet such assistance was less than forthcoming. Additionally, Plaintiff avers that “[b]y November 29, 2006, Defendant was aware that Plaintiff had executed agreements for the purchase of a home in Jasper, Indiana. Immediately, relations altered considerably.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 32-33). Plaintiff has alleged that on or about November 29, 2006, he received his 2 first of multiple negative “Performance Reviews” wherein various representatives of Defendant indicated that Plaintiff’s performance was not up to par. Plaintiff avers that no reasonable basis existed for the “pre-textual criticisms” that were raised therein. (Complaint, ¶ 36). Plaintiff avers that as his time of employment continued, his workload was increased to unreasonable levels, all without a corresponding increase in pay. Plaintiff avers that “Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to take the position with intent to materially alter the burdens of his position after his mortgage effectively prevented him from complaining or leaving.” (Complaint, ¶ 44). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant continued to provide him with negative performance reviews in an attempt to “make him less marketable to third parties.” (Complaint, ¶ 51). Additionally, Plaintiff avers that he was severely reprimanded for providing suggestions which would have kept Defendant’s business in line with federal regulations. Specifically, Plaintiff avers that he was “berated” for suggesting that an unregistered trailer not be used until it was re-registered. (Complaint, ¶ 65). Plaintiff alleges that he “objected to various [other] illegal and improper practices conducted by Defendant relating to driver safety and tax reporting,” and he avers that, in each instance, he was subjected to increased adverse commentary. (Complaint, ¶ 66). In the end, Plaintiff avers that the foregoing lead to his receipt, on April 1, 2008, of a thirty day notice whereby he would be terminated and discharged from his position. Plaintiff alleges that his discharge was “retaliation for his attempts to secure regulatory compliance and was without cause and based on false and pre-textual criticisms.” (Complaint, ¶ 71). Plaintiff avers that, as a result of his termination, he was required to return to Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and subsequently filed for bankruptcy in 2009. Moreover, Plaintiff avers that his Jasper, Indiana home was foreclosed upon and eventually sold at a short sale for a loss of 3 $120,000.00. Plaintiff avers that he has suffered and continues to suffer lost and diminished wages as a result of the “fraudulent inducement and wrongful discharge.” (Complaint, ¶ 75). Lastly, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant has since made defamatory communications to prospective employers by falsely repeating, directly or by implication, in a false light various “false allegations” that he had been discharged for deficiencies in performance. As a result of the above-described chain of events, Plaintiff has filed the underlying civil complaint wherein he has asserted, at Count I, a claim of Fraudulent Inducement, at Count II, a claim of Wrongful Discharge Public Policy, at Count III, a claim of Interference with Contractual Relations, and at Count IV, a claim of Breach of Implied Contract. Defendant subsequently filed the instant preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendant has preliminarily objected to Plaintiff’s Complaint in the form of various demurrers and also by way of motions to strike for the failure to conform to law or rule of court and for reasons of insufficient specificity. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a), preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading on several grounds, including the following: (2) Failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court . . .; (3) Insufficient specificity in a pleading; (4) Legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer). Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2), (3), (4). The standard of review for preliminary objections in this Commonwealth is well settled. Preliminary objections are properly granted only when, “based on the facts pleaded, it is clear and free from doubt that the complainant will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief.” Mazur v. Trinity Area School Dist., 599 Pa. 232, 240-41, 961 A.2d 96, 4 101 (2008) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “[f]or the purpose of evaluating the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts.” Mazur v. Trinity Area School Dist., 599 Pa. at 241. The trial court “need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from fact, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Penn Title Insurance Co. v. Deshler, 661 A.2d 481, 483 (Pa. Commw. 1995). Additionally, “the lower court has broad discretion in determining the amount of detail that must be averred since the standard of pleading set forth in Rule 1019(a) is inapplicable of precise measurement.” United Refrigerator Co. v. Appplebaum, 410 Pa. 210, 213, 189 A.2d 253, 255 (1963). The appellate court will only reverse a trial court’s ruling on a preliminary objection when “there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Excavation Technologies, Inc. v. Columbia Gas Co. of Pa., 2007 Pa. Super. 327, ¶ 5, 936 A.2d 111, 113. At this stage, it is not for us to assess the level of difficulty on the part of Plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the variety of allegations contained within his complaint. Instead, we are constrained to overrule the preliminary objections at this time as we are not prepared to say that, based on the facts pleaded, it is clear and free from doubt that Plaintiff will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. In his complaint, Plaintiff has averred a variety of actions on the part of Defendant, including that Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to accept new employment, move across the country and purchase a new residence, while at the same time setting him up for failure and financial hardship. The credibility of such assertions is for another day. We are limited to an examination of the facts averred in the complaint and must take them as true. By doing so, we are unable to 5 conclude that it is clear and free from doubt that the complainant will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. Lastly, the parties having agreed to the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as to Count IV Breach of Implied Contract, the claim for punitive damages therein will be stricken. ORDER th AND NOW, this 5 day of April, 2012, upon consideration of Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and after oral argument, the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant are OVERRULED. AND FURTHER, the parties being in agreement as to the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as to Count IV Breach of Implied Contract, the claim for punitive damages therein is hereby STRICKEN. BY THE COURT, ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. Andrew W. Barbin, Esquire For the Plaintiff Andrew W. Bonekemper, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm 6 FRED MARSICANO, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : NO. 10-2747 : : CIVIL ACTION STYLINE LOGISTICS, : Defendant. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PRELIMIARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT STYLINE LOGISTICS BEFORE HESS, P.J., EBERT, J. and PECK, J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 5 day of April, 2012, upon consideration of Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and after oral argument, the Preliminary Objections of the Defendant are OVERRULED. AND FURTHER, the parties being in agreement as to the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as to Count IV Breach of Implied Contract, the claim for punitive damages therein is hereby STRICKEN. BY THE COURT, ___________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P.J. Andrew W. Barbin, Esquire For the Plaintiff Andrew W. Bonekemper, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm