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Home My WebLink About92-2837 Civil LawCHERI[E] M. JACOBY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : ERNEST E. JACOBY, : Defendant : NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR BIFURCATION BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, thin'day of February, 1995, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition for Bifurcation, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, 6. Wesley 01~, Jr.,' J~" Sally J. Winder, Esq. Plaintiff's Attorney Bradley L. Griffie, Esq. Defendant's Attorney Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. :re CHERI[E] M. JACOBY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : ERNEST E. JACOBY, : Defendant : NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR BIFURCATION BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. For disposition in this divorce action is a Petition for Bifurcation filed by Defendant husband.~ Following a hearing held on Monday, January 30, 1995, the following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Order of Court are made and entered. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Defendant and Petitioner is Ernest E. Jacoby, an adult individual residing at 81Kutz Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Plaintiff and Respondent is Cherie M. Jacoby, an adult individual residing at 103 Parsonage Street, Newville, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. The parties were married on September 13, 1987. 4. Two children were born of the marriage, and Defendant adopted a previously-born child of Plaintiff: Ernest J. Jacoby (d.o.b. March 5, 1988); Amanda Sue Jacoby (d.o.b. June 1, 1989); and Coreena E. Jacoby (d.o.b. October 10, 1983). ~ Through an inadvertency, the caption on the petition listed Defendant as plaintiff and contained an incorrect docket number. This was corrected by an Order of Court dated January 30, 1995. NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 5. The parties separated in June of 1992. 6. Defendant/Petitioner lives with a woman named Paula Day and her daughter, in a home which he is in the process of buying with his parents; he testified that he intends to marry Ms. Day, although at times he has told Plaintiff/Respondent otherwise. 7. Defendant/Petitioner is essentially self-employed as a truck driver, working for his own corporation, E.E. Jacoby, Inc. 8. Defendant/Petitioner is in arrears on child support. 9. Plaintiff/Respondent is employed on a less-than-full-time basis by Swain Health Center; she carries no medical insurance on herself. 10. Plaintiff/Respondent has had at least one serious relationship since the parties separated. 11. The parties have most recently seriously discussed reconciliation in October of 1994. 12. Plaintiff/Respondent sincerely believes that the marriage is not irretrievably broken; on the other hand, her Complaint in divorce alleges that it is. 13. A serious question exists in this case as to whether the parties' marriage is irretrievably broken. 14. The parties have sold their marital residence and amicably divided the proceeds. 15. Several economic issues remain unresolved with respect to the parties' marriage, including equitable distribution as to a 2 NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 truck and certain bank accounts appropriated by Defendant/Petitioner, spousal support, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and costs. 16. With respect to alimony pendente lite and spousal support, the following Order pursuant to an agreement of counsel was entered previously: AND NOW, this 4th day of August, 1993, upon relation of Defendant's counsel, Bradley L. Griffie, Esq., that he and Plaintiff's counsel, Diane G. Radcliff, Esq., have agreed that Plaintiff's client will be filing a petition for a hearing on alimony pendente lite, and that both counsel wish the Court to join Plaintiff's spousal support action with that matter for purposes of a hearing, both cases are CONTINUED GENERALLY pending Plaintiff's filing of the said petition, at which time a joint hearing will be scheduled before the Court. Counsel are requested to advise the Court at such time as Plaintiff's petition is filed so that a hearing can be scheduled. 17. In accordance with the wishes of the parties, prior to the filing of Defendant's bifurcation petition this divorce action was not being actively pursued. Neither party has petitioned for appointment of a master, and no affidavit under Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code has been served. 18. The advantages of bifurcation in this case do not outweigh the disadvantages. DISCUSSION Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.52(c), in a divorce action "[t]he court need not determine all claims at one 3 NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 time but may enter a decree adjudicating a specific claim or claims." See also Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, §2, 23 Pa. C.S. §3323(c). However, "bifurcation should not be made pro- forma." Frank & Gale, Pennsylvania Family Practice Manual §6.06, at 192 (1990). Rather, such a determination should be made only after the disadvantages and advantages have been carefully explored and analyzed. Each case must be reviewed on its own facts and only following the court's determination that the consequences of bifurcating the case will be of greater benefit than not bifurcating, should it grant the petition. Wolk v. Wolk, 318 Pa. Super. 311, 317-18, 464 A.2d 1359, 1362 (1983). "The trend throughout the state ... has been to allow bifurcation so long as there is no economic prejudice to the dependent spouse as a result of bifurcation."2 "Advantages cited by the Wolk court for granting bifurcation include: The speedy resolution of the divorce which permits the parties to quickly begin restructuring their lives, encouragement of settlements, [and] tax advantages in being able to remarry and file jointly with a spouse and avoiding the status of married filing separately .... " Hitt v. Hitt, No. 308 Civil 1990, slip op. at 6 n.1 (Sheely, P.J., Cumb. Co., Feb. 12, 1992). "The disadvantages pointed out by the court include: The need for two hearings if there is no settlement, delay in the resolution, 2 Frank & Gale, Pennsylvania Family Practice Manual S6.01, at 187 (1990). 4 -NO'. 2837 CIVIL 1992 inability of parties to file a joint tax return, and the effect on the right to receive the proceeds of insurance policies." Id. A decision on the question of bifurcation is a matter of judicial discretion.3 In the present case, several factors militate against granting the request for bifurcation. First, some question at least exists as to the viability of the parties' marriage.4 Second, neither the evidence at the hearing nor either party's actions in the past suggest a pressing need for immediate dissolution of the marriage. Third, it is doubtful that the ultimate completion of this action will be other than delayed by bifurcation. Finally, if the benefit of a master's analysis of the issue of irretrievable breakdown is to be received, a bifurcation will not reduce the extent of proceedings required. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of February, 1995, upon consideration of Defendant's Petition for Bifurcation, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Sally J. Winder, Esq. Plaintiff's Attorney ~ Id., §6.07, at 194. ~ Cf. Folmar v. Folmar, No. 2452 Civil 1991 (Cumb. Co., Feb. 23, 1993) (granting bifurcation over defendant's objection where parties stipulated to two-year-separation and irretrievable breakdown of marriage). 5 NO. 2837 CIVIL 1992 Bradley L. Griffie, Esq. Defendant's Attorney Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. : rc 6