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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-1619 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM : CHARGES: (A) DUI DUANE ALAN PETRO : (B) DRIVING VEHICLE AT OTN: E956579-2 : SAFE SPEED (SUMMARY) IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION (MOTION TO SUPPRESS) BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ day of March, 1995, upon consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, a Oesley Ole~Jr., ~. ~' Jaime M. Keating, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Patrick F. Lauer, Jr., Esq. 2108 Market Street Aztec Building Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant :rc COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : : 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM : CHARGES: (A) DUI DUANE ALAN PETRO : (B) DRIVING VEHICLE AT OTN: E956579-2 : SAFE SPEED (SUMMARY) IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION (MOTION TO SUPPRESS) BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. In the present Vehicle Code case where Defendant is charged with driving under the influence~ and driving too fast for conditions,2 Defendant has filed a motion to suppress. The motion is based upon an alleged lack of probable cause for Defendant's arrest on the charge of driving under the influence. Relief requested is the suppression of statements made by Defendant following his arrest and suppression of a blood alcohol content test result. A hearing on the motion was held on Thursday, March 2, 1995. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the motion to suppress will be denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The defendant and moving party is Duane Alan Petro. 2. On Friday, June 10, 1994, at about midnight, Defendant was driving a Ford Ranger pickup truck on U.S. Route 11 in ~ Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, ~1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. ~3731 (1994 Supp.). 2 Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, §1, 75 Pa. C.S. ~3361. 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM Cumberland County. 3. In the course of leaving Route 11 at the point of its intersection with Pennsylvania Route 641, Defendant failed to negotiate a curve on the exit ramp. 4. Defendant's pickup truck left the ramp cartway, struck a guardrail, and rolled over. 5. The roadway surface was dry at the time, the vehicle left the cartway in the direction in which centrifugal force was acting upon it, and an obvious possible cause of the accident was excessive speed on the curve. 6. Pennsylvania State Trooper Darryl Gore arrived at the accident scene at 12:15 a.m. on June 11, 1995, as Defendant was being placed in an ambulance for transport to Holy Spirit Hospital in Cumberland County. 7. Trooper Gore determined that the registered owner of the pickup truck was one Albert J. Petro. 8. The trooper went to the hospital, located Defendant on a gurney, and at 1:20 a.m. began to interview him for purposes of filling out an accident report. 9. Defendant said that he had been the driver of the pickup truck involved in the accident. 10. Defendant's speech was not slurred and he appeared cognizant of his circumstances; however, as Defendant spoke, the trooper noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath. 2 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM 11. The trooper also noticed that Defendant's eyes were glassy. 12. At 1:25 a.m., the trooper placed Defendant under arrest for driving under the influence and administered Miranda warnings. 13. Defendant thereafter made several inculpatory statements. 14. In addition, Trooper Gore directed hospital personnel to draw a sample of Defendant's blood for purposes of a blood alcohol content test. 15. The blood sample was drawn at 1:40 a.m. and yielded a BAC test result of .30%. DISCUSSION As a general rule,3 where a defendant's arrest is illegal, suppression of all evidence incident to the arrest is required unless the Commonwealth is able to establish that the evidence is sufficiently purged of any taint from the illegal arrest. Commonwealth v. Walker, 348 Pa. Super. 207, 581 A.2d 1143 (1985). The legality of an arrest is dependent, inter alia, upon the existence of probable cause. Commonwealth v. Martinez, Pa. Super. , 649 A.2d 143 (1994). Although Section 1547(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code provides that a driver has impliedly consented to a blood alcohol content test where his or her vehicle "was involved in an accident in which the ~ See Commonwealth v. Boqan, 482 Pa. 151, 393 A.2d 424 (1978) (noting absence of per se rule'of exclusion of evidence in event of illegal arrest). 3 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM operator or passenger . . . or a pedestrian required treatment at a medical facility or was killed,"4 the existence of probable cause to believe the driver was under the influence is a prerequisite to the constitutional seizure of a blood sample pursuant to the provision. See Commonwealth v. Franz, 430 Pa. Super. 394, 634 A.2d 662 (1993). "Probable cause exists when an officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances, gained through trustworthy information, to warrant a prudent [person] to believe that the person seized has committed a crime." Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 166, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (1992). In the case of driving under the influence, "[f]actors which bear upon whether a person is reasonably thought to be under the influence of alcohol include the circumstances of any accident which may have occurred,~ the odor of an alcoholic beverage,~ and bloodshot eyes.-7 Commonwealth v. McClellan, 42 Cumberland L.J. 312, 317 (1993). "Glassy eyes" are a similar factor bearing upon the issue.8 In the present case, the circumstances of the one-vehicle accident, Defendant's admission that he was the driver, the odor of 4 Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, Sl, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(a)(2) (1994 Supp.). ~ See Commonwealth v. Hanes, 397 Pa. Super. 38, 579 A.2d 920 (1990). ~ See Commonwealth v. Fick, 391 Pa. Super. 625, 571 A.2d 1091 (1990); Commonwealth v. Fairley, 298 Pa. Super. 236, 444 A 2d 748 (1982). ' 7 See Commonwealth v. Hanes, 397 Pa. Super. 38, 579 A.2d 920 (1990). ~ Commonwealth v. Whitehead, 427 Pa. Super. 362, 629 A.2d 142 (1993). 4 94-1619 CRIMINAL TERM an alcoholic beverage on his breath, and the condition of his eyes constituted sufficient facts and circumstances "to warrant a prudent [person] to believe that the [Defendant] ha[d] committed a crime" in the form of driving under the influence. Consequently, the inculpatory statements of Defendant9 and the result of the blood alcohol content test are not suppressible on the basis of a lack of probable cause. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ day of March, 1995, upon consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Jaime M. Keating, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Patrick F. Lauer, Jr., Esq. 2108 Market Street Aztec Building Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant :rc 9 Defendant's inculpatory statement regarding operation of the vehicle, made prior to his arrest in the course of supplying information for an accident report, would not be suppressible on the ground of an absence of Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth v. Fento, 363 Pa. Super. 488, 526 A.2d 784 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 621, 538 A.2d 875 (1988). 5