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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-6054 Civil Law(2) KAREN H. NEIDIG, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW LARRY O. NEIDIG, : Defendant : NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 1995, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Petition for Special Relief, following a hearing, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, J. ~~ley Oler,~., J~.~'~ James M. Bach, Esq. 352 South Sporting Hill Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiff Marlin R. McCaleb, Esq. Frankeberger Place 219 East Main Street P.O. Box 230 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Defendant :rc KAREN H. NEIDIG, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : LARRY O. NEIDIG, : Defendant : NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. For disposition in this divorce action is a petition for special relief filed by Plaintiff wife. The petition seeks a declaration that a certain property settlement and custody agreement entered into by the parties when they separated entitles Plaintiff to one-half the value of the marital home, while imposing upon Defendant total liability for a lien and mortgage upon the property. A hearing on the Petition was held on December 12, 1994, and April 13, 1995. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the petition will be denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The parties were married on August 22, 1975. 2. The parties own a home in which they resided during the marriage at 1916 Fisher Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, as tenants by the entireties. 3. The home has been appraised at $85,000. 4. The parties separated in March of 1992. 5. Encumbrances on the home consisted of a mortgage in favor of F.M.H.A. United States Department of Agriculture in the NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM principal amount of about $43,000 and a lien in favor of DAFCU securing a debt of $12,000. 6. Following the parties' separation, Plaintiff wife moved to 105 North St. John's Road in Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and Defendant husband remained at the marital residence. 7. The parties executed a Property Settlement and Custody Agreement on May 19, 1992. 8. The agreement was drafted by Plaintiff's attorney. 9. Among other terms, the agreement contained the following provisions: Husband agrees to pay and be solely liable for the obligation due DAFCU (the home equity loan and Choice/Visa consolidation loan) and for the mortgage on the marital residence due and owing to F.M.H.A.U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. The parties agree that the method for determining the value and distribution of the value of the house shall be decided if and when a divorce action is filed by either party. 10. The intention of the parties with respect to the home and encumbrances thereon, and the meaning of the words of the agreement, was that pending a divorce Defendant was to be responsible for making the monthly payments on the debts encumbering the property where he resided, and that upon divorce, in the absence of an agreement at that time, the parties' equity in 2 NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM the home was to be distributed in accordance with the principles of equitable distribution under the Divorce Code. 11. The present divorce action was commenced by Plaintiff wife on October 20, 1994. DISCUSSION "The primary objective of contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties as it is reasonably manifested by the language of their written contract." O'Brien Energy Systems, Inc. v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 427 Pa. Super. 456, 461, 629 A.2d 957, 960 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 633, 642 A.2d 487 (1994). When interpreting a contract, a court must determine the intent of the parties and effect must be given to all provisions in the contract. It is firmly settled that the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself. When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be found only in the express language of the agreement .... Where the contract terms are ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, the court is free to receive extrinsic evidence, i.e., parol evidence, to resolve the ambiguity. Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 425 Pa. Super. 204, 211-12, 624 A.2d 638, 642 (citations omitted), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 626, 637 A.2d 287 (1993). "Where a contract is ambiguous, it is undisputed that the rule [of contra proferentum] requires the language to be construed against the drafter .... - Commonwealth, Department of 3 NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM Transportation v. Semanderes, 109 Pa. Commw. 505, 511, 531 A.2d 815, 818 (1987). "A contract will be found to be ambiguous if ... it is reasonably or fairly susceptible to different constructions, is capable of being understood in more senses than one, is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression, or has a double meaning." Erie Insurance Co./Erie Insurance Exchange v. Flood, __ Pa. , __, 649 A.2d 736, 738 (1994). "It is well established that in Pennsylvania, a settlement agreement between a husband and wife is governed by the law of contracts unless the agreement itself provides otherwise." Brower v. Brower, 413 Pa. Super. 48, 56, 604 A.2d 726, 730 (1992). In this regard, it has been said that, "[b]efore a court will interpret a provision in [a marital agreement] in such a way as to lead to an absurdity or make the contract ineffective to accomplish its purpose, it will endeavor to find an interpretation which will effectuate the reasonable result intended." Laudig v. Laudig, 425 Pa. Super. 228, 234, 624 A.2d 651, 654 (1993). "[A] grant of relief under a petition for special relief based upon the interpretation of a marital settlement agreement 'is within the sound discretion of the trial court .... '" delCastillo v. delCastillo, 420 Pa. Super. 520, 524, 617 A.2d 26, 28-29 (1992), quoting Jawork v. Jawork, 378 Pa. Super. 89, 96, 548 A.2d 290, 293 (1988). 4 NO. 94-6054 CIVIL TERM In this case, the language of the marital agreement with respect to the parties' home and encumbrances thereon is, at the least, reasonably susceptible to the interpretation advanced by Defendant. Upon an application of the principles of law recited above, and in its capacity as trier-of-fact, the Court has resolved the issue of interpretation adversely to Plaintiff's position. For this reason, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 1995, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Petition for Special Relief, following a hearing, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler,{Jr., ~.~' ' ~ James M. Bach, Esq. 352 South Sporting Hill Road Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiff Marlin R. McCaleb, Esq. Frankeberger Place 219 East Main Street P.O. Box 230 Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Defendant : re 5