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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-6706 CivilDENNIS KENNEDY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF HELEN M. COX, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : CUMBERLAND-PERRY ASSOCIATION : OF RETARDED CITIZENS, PEGGY : [MARGARITE] WHITE, JAMES : GURRERI, PAUL STENGEL, CAROL : FIRENZ, SHIRLEY KNOX, VICKI : DELILLIS, JOYCE CROFT, : CAPELLINE PIVORNIC, DAVID : SIPHER, ED TIMBRELL, : JEFFREY DEKEMAN/DYKEMAN/ : HECKMAN, ED STEMME, : DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, : Defendants : NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this %~ day of May, 1995, after careful consideration of the Department of Public Welfare's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Plaintiffs' complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the preliminary objections are SUSTAINED and the complaint is DISMISSED as to Defendant Department of Public Welfare. BY THE COURT, J~We~ley Ofer~., 5. William C. Hodgson, Esq. 229 Walnut Street Newport, PA 17074 Attorney for Plaintiffs James R. Moyles, Esq. Senior Deputy Attorney General Torts Litigation Section 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Attorney for Department of Public Welfare, Defendant William A. Addams, Esq. 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Cumberland-Perry Association of Retarded Citizens, James Gurreri, Carol Firenz, Shirley Knox, Vicki Delillis, Capelline Pivornic, Peggy White, Paul Stengel, Joyce Croft, David Sipher, Ed Timbrell, Jeffrey Dekeman/Dykeman/Heckman, and Ed Stemme Defendants : rc DENNIS KENNEDY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF HELEN M. COX, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : CUMBERLAND-PERRY ASSOCIATION : OF RETARDED CITIZENS, PEGGY : [MARGARITE] WHITE, JAMES : GURRERI, PAUL STENGEL, CAROL : FIRENZ, SHIRLEY KNOX, VICKI : DELILLIS, JOYCE CROFT, : CAPELLINE PIVORNIC, DAVID : SIPHER, ED TIMBRELL, : JEFFREY DEKEMAN/DYKEMAN/ : HECKMAN, ED STEMME, : DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, : Defendants : NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. This is an action for damages filed by Plaintiffs arising out of alleged harm suffered by Dennis Kennedy while he resided in various group homes operated by Defendant Cumberland-Perry Association of Retarded Citizens (C-PARC). Presently before the Court are preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer of Defendant Department of Public Welfare (Defendant-Public Welfare) to Plaintiffs' complaint. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the preliminary objections will be sustained. NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM The facts as averred in Plaintiffs' complaint~ may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff Dennis Kennedy (Plaintiff- Kennedy) is an adult individual with an address of Selinsgrove Center, Box 500, Selinsgrove, Snyder County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Helen Cox (Plaintiff-Cox) is an adult individual with an address of R.D. 4, Box 173, Newport, Perry County, Pennsylvania, and is the mother of Dennis Kennedy. Defendant-Public Welfare is a Department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with a business address of 305 Health and Welfare Building, Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. The incidents giving rise to this action allegedly took place from September 1980 through 1992. During this period, Plaintiff- Kennedy, who suffers from some sort of mental deficiency,2 resided in group homes operated by C-PARC. The incidents for which Plaintiffs seek damages are sexual in nature. It is alleged that sometime during his first stay at a group home operated by C-PARC, to which he was admitted in the fall ~ Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 22, 1995, apparently in response to preliminary objections filed by other defendants in this case. See Pa. R.C.P. 1028(c)(1). The allegations against Defendant-Public Welfare are the same in both the original complaint, to which the instant objections are directed, and the amended complaint. In this Order and Opinion of Court, the Court has used the caption of the praecipe for a writ of summons by which the action was commenced. 2 The exact nature of Plaintiff Dennis Kennedy's condition is not fully evident from the complaint; the complaint indicates that he has been diagnosed as being mildly to moderately retarded. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraphs 34, 40. 2 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM of 1980, Plaintiff-Kennedy was molested and possibly sexually assaulted by a female staff member.3 A second incident allegedly occurred after Plaintiff-Kennedy was moved to another group home, also operated by C-PARC, in December 1981. According to Plaintiffs, shortly after this move, Plaintiff-Kennedy observed a male staff member molesting a female resident.4 In October 1989, Plaintiff-Kennedy was moved to a third group home, also operated by C-PARC, where it is alleged he encountered a male staff member who came to work cross-dressed.~ Throughout this entire period, beginning with the first incident, it is alleged that Plaintiff- Kennedy displayed various episodes of inappropriate behavior that was sexual in nature and that was not properly addressed by C-PARC staff members. With regard to the first two incidents, it is alleged that Plaintiff-Cox was not informed of them at the time they occurred. She claims she first learned of the incident in which her son was allegedly molested on Thanksgiving weekend, 1992-, when she was told of the occurrence by him. With regard to specific allegations directed to Defendant- Public Welfare, it is alleged that Defendant "is and was the inspector, and/or licenser, and/or regulator of at least one of the See Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraphs 36-43. Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraph 48. 5 Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraph 56. 3 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM group homes and the employees of C-PARC during the time when at least one of the tortious acts of gross negligence against Plaintiff Dennis Kennedy took place.''6 Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant-Public Welfare was grossly and ordinarily negligent for its inappropriate regulation of the C-PARC group homes in which the alleged improper conduct took place.7 Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons on March 23, 1994. This was followed by a complaint filed by Plaintiffs on January 17, 1995. Defendant- Public Welfare filed preliminary objections to Plaintiffs' complaint on January 31, 1995. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 22, 1995.8 Defendant-Public Welfare's preliminary objections are in the nature of a demurrer, contending that no cause of action against it exists for negligent licensing, inspection and/or regulation because of sovereign immunity. Therefore, Defendant-Public Welfare requests that we strike from the complaint the allegations with regard to it. Initially, we note that the defense of sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which is most appropriately raised in new Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraph 25. Plaintiffs' Complaint, paragraph 77. See note 1 supra. 4 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM matter.9 However, the right to challenge the use of a preliminary objection to raise the issue is waived when a plaintiff fails to file a preliminary objection to a defendant's preliminary objection. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Frantz Construction, 157 Pa. Commw. 620, 623 n.1, 630 A.2d 932, 934 n.1 (1993). Therefore, we will proceed to address Defendant's demurrer on the merits. With respect to a demurrer, it has been said that "[a] demurrer admits all well-pleaded material facts in the pleading which it attacks, as well as all inferences which may reasonably be deduced therefrom." International Association of Firefighters v. Loftus, 80 Pa. Commw. 329, 333, 471 A.2d 605, 607 (1984). "Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer ... will be sustained only when it appears with certainty that the law permits no recovery under the facts pled, and any doubts in the determination should be resolved by overruling the objections." Paone v. City of Scranton, 9 D. & C.4th 115, 117 (Montgomery Co. 1991); see Department of Transportation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 33 Pa. Commw. 1, 11, 380 A.2d 1308, 1313 (1977). "[A] demurrer will not be sustained on the ground that a pleading is not sufficiently specific .... " 2 Goodrich-Amram 2d §1017(b):27, at 272 (1991). And, "[i]f any part of a pleading states a sufficient cause of action, the demurrer to the pleading must be overruled." 2 Anderson, Pennsylvania Civil Practice ~1017.180, at 579 (1976). 9 Pa. R.C.P. 1030. 5 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM Agencies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as provided for in 1 Pa. C.S. ~2310.~° Pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. When the General Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be brought only in such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the provisions of Title 42 ... unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute.~ Section 8521 of Title 42 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) General rule.-- Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no provision of this title shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the purpose of 1 Pa. C.S. §2310 (relating to sovereign immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver) or otherwise.~2 Exceptions to sovereign immunity are provided for in §8522 of Title 42: (a) Liability imposed.-- The General Assembly, pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does Act of September 28, 1978, P.L. 788, ~1, 1 Pa. C.S. ~2310. Id. ~2 Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, §221(1), 42 Pa. C.S. ~8521. 6 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.~3 The nine specific areas in which state agency liability may result are (1) vehicles; (2) medical-professional matters; (3) care, custody, or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous roadway conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines.~4 With regard to the present case, the medical-professional liability exception is the only one with possible relevancy. That exception provides: (b) Acts which may impose liability.-- The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by: . . . ( 2 ) Medical-professional ~3 Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, §221(1), 42 Pa. C.S. 58522. ~4 Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, 5221(1), as amended, 42 Pa. C.S. 58522(b) (1994 Supp.). 7 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM liability.- Acts of health care employees of Commonwealth agency medical facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor, dentist, nurse or related health care personnel. The legislative history of the Sovereign Immunity Act lists ten specific areas in which a waiver of sovereign immunity was rejected. See Report of the Joint State Government Commission on Sovereign Immunity, May 1978, at 15-16. Among the ten items rejected were improper licensing or delay in granting of licenses, permits, etc., and the failure to inspect or improper inspection. Id. The Commonwealth Court addressed the issue of licensing with regard to §8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act of Title 42 in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Frantz Construction, 157 Pa. Commw. 620, 630 A.2d 932 (1993). In CSX, the plaintiff alleged that DER failed to properly regulate the defendant. In holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against DER which fell within the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, the Court observed that "[t]he mere fact that certain property or operations are subject to licensing and inspection by a Commonwealth agency is not, in and of itself, sufficient to state a claim cognizable under Section 8522(b)." CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Frantz Construction, 157 Pa. Commw. 620, 626, 630 A.2d 932, 935 (1993), quoting Snyder v. Harmon, 102 Pa. Commw. 519, 525, 519 A.2d 528, 531 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989). 8 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM In the present case, there is no allegation in Plaintiffs' complaint that any of the employees committing the allegedly tortious acts were employees of the State. Moreover, the only allegations leveled at Defendant-Public Welfare are that it was negligent in its licensing and regulation of the group homes in which Plaintiff-Kennedy was housed. Since the State has not waived sovereign immunity with regard to licensing and regulation, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim which falls within an exception to sovereign immunity. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this %~ day of May, 1995, after careful consideration of the Department of Public Welfare's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Plaintiffs' complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the preliminary objections are SUSTAINED and the complaint is DISMISSED as to Defendant Department of Public Welfare. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. William C. Hodgson, Esq. 229 Walnut Street Newport, PA 17074 Attorney for Plaintiffs 9 NO. 94-6706 CIVIL TERM James R. Moyles, Esq. Senior Deputy Attorney General Torts Litigation Section 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 Attorney for Department of Public Welfare, Defendant William A. Addams, Esq. 28 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Cumberland-Perry Association of Retarded Citizens, James Gurreri, Carol Firenz, Shirley Knox, Vicki Delillis, Capelline Pivornic, Peggy White, Paul Stengel, Joyce Croft, David Sipher, Ed Timbrell, Jeffrey Dekeman/Dykeman/Heckman, and Ed Stemme Defendants : rc 10