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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-5092 Civil THOMAS E. STEFFEN, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : GERALYN M. STEFFEN, : Defendant : NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF MARITAL HOME BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ day of June, 1995, after careful consideration of Plaintiff's Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Home, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, ~. ~esley OlerOr., ~. ' Edward J. Weintraub, Esq. 130 Walnut Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Lawrence F. Clark, Jr., Esq. 825 Fishburn Road P.O. Box 555 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorney for Defendant :rc THOMAS E. STEFFEN, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : GERALYN M. STEFFEN, : Defendant : NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF MARITAL HOME BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. The present case is a divorce action brought by Thomas E. Steffen (Plaintiff) against Geralyn M. Steffen (Defendant). For disposition at this time is Plaintiff's second petition for exclusive possession of the parties' marital residence. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the petition will be denied. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS Procedural history. Plaintiff commenced this divorce action on September 9, 1994. Grounds for divorce enumerated in the complaint were (a) fault in the form of indignities under Section 3301(a)(6) of the Divorce Code, (b) irretrievable breakdown accompanied by mutual consent under Section 3301(c) of the Code, and (c) irretrievable breakdown accompanied by two-year separation under Section 3301(d). On November 16, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Order for Protection from Abuse and a Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Residence. A hearing was held on these petitions on Monday, November 28, 1994. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court issued an order deferring disposition of the petition for NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM protection from abuse and denying the petition for exclusive possession. The denial of the latter petition was predicated upon certain representations of Defendant as to her future conduct.~ The deferment of disposition of the petition for protection The text of the court's order was as follows: AND NOW, this 28th day of November, 1994, upon consideration of the Plaintiff's Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Residence and Petition for Order for Protection from Abuse, and following a hearing, it is ORDERED and DIRECTED as follows: 1. Disposition of the protection from abuse complaint is deferred until Thursday, January 12, 1995, at 4:00 p.m. 2. Pending further Order of Court, the Plaintiff's request for exclusive possession of the marital residence is DENIED upon consideration of the Defendant ' s representation to the Court that she will not ingest alcohol in any form, that she will continue her outpatient treatment with Mazzitti & Sullivan, and that she will enter inpatient treatment and remain in such treatment until discharged if such treatment is recommended by her counselor. 3. Defendant waives any privilege with respect to release of the recommendations of Mazzitti & Sullivan with respect to inpatient treatment. 4. Plaintiff shall follow the recommendations of Defendant's counselors to support her recovery in whatever form the recommendations take. 5. Nothing in this Order is intended to represent a decision on whether the parties are separated for purposes of the Divorce Code during the parties' residence in the marital home. A continued hearing in these matters, as indicated above, will be held by the Court on Thursday, January 12, 1995, at 4:00 p.m. 2 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM from abuse was extended by agreement of counsel on January 11, 1995. However, as a result of an incident of alleged misconduct by Defendant in February of 1995, Plaintiff filed a second, or renewed, Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Home and for Order [for] Protection [from] Abuse, on February 28, 1995. A hearing was held by the court on this petition on Thursday, May 11, 1995, at which time Plaintiff's counsel withdrew the petition for protection from abuse, and the Court took under advisement the issue of exclusive possession.2 A brief on the issue of exclusive possession was received from Plaintiff's counsel on May 23, 1995. A brief from Defendant's counsel was received on May 25, 1995. Statement of facts.3 The parties were married on October 3, 1981. Two children were born of the marriage: five-year-old Kathryn Lynn Steffen (d.o.b. June 16, 1989) and three-year-old Michael Thomas Steffen (d.o.b. July 4, 1991). The parties live in a jointly-owned house, with their children, at 432 Lamp Post Lane, Camp Hill, Cumberland County. Their equity in the $135,000 property is about $41,000. Plaintiff is a commander in the United States Navy, stationed 2 See Order of Court, May 11, 1995. 3 In its recitation of the facts, the Court has considered evidence presented at the hearing on November 28, 1994, and the more recent hearing on May 11, 1995. 3 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM in Washington, D.C., but detailed to the naval facility in Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County. He is scheduled shortly to become a student at the Army War College in Carlisle, Cumberland County. After a term of about ten months at the War College, it is anticipated that he will be stationed outside this area. Defendant is a part-time cashier at a Giant food market in Camp Hill, Cumberland County. She had been an executive secretary with the federal government for eighteen years, but in the summer of 1993 began drinking. She eventually left her federal employment under an early retirement program. Defendant has since participated in about ten detoxification or other treatment programs for alcoholism, costing many thousands of dollars. In 1994, Plaintiff paid about $6,000 of these charges and his insurance covered about $36,000. The alcoholic substance which Defendant most commonly consumes is Listerine mouthwash. When Defendant is sober, she cares for the parties' children, prepares meals for the family, engages in her employment and functions relatively normally. There is, however, considerable tension between the parties in the home. In general, the parties have not transferred their unhappiness with each other to their children. Defendant remained sober from prior to the hearing on November 28, 1994, until Wednesday, February 22, 1995. On that day, Plaintiff arrived home to find that Defendant was at the Camp Hill 4 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM Borough Police Station in Cumberland County. She told him that she had been drinking, had hit several parked cars, had been arrested for driving under the influence and had given a blood sample. The parties' children were at a friend's house.4 Plaintiff took Defendant home and checked into a hotel with the parties' children. Defendant remained in a state of intoxication for several days, at times lying in her own excrement. This incident precipitated Plaintiff's second, or renewed, petition for protection from abuse and exclusive possession. As of the hearing on the petition on May 11, 1995, Defendant had remained sober since the February incident. The parties were residing, without happiness, together in the marital residence, with their children. Both parties were continuing to attend to the children's needs and to work at their respective jobs. Defendant recognizes that she is an alcoholic. Although she expresses a desire to continue the parties' marriage, she displays no discernible sympathy for the anguish which her periods of insobriety cause to the Plaintiff, not only in terms of the burdens which devolve upon him when they occur but also in terms of the climate of apprehension which they generate for the future. Defendant suggests that Plaintiff is a poor Catholic for 4 The evidence did not indicate that the parties' children were with Defendant when she was driving. What, if anything, has resulted from any charge of driving under the influence is also not in evidence. 5 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM considering divorce. It does not appear that a divorce on no-fault grounds is likely to occur in the immediate future. Nor can the Court presume to predict, on the basis of the limited record before it, that a fault divorce is imminent. No affidavit under Section 3301(c) or Section 3301(d) of the Divorce Code has been filed by either party. Neither party has requested the appointment of a divorce master. STATEMENT OF LAW With respect to legislative authority for an award of exclusive possession of a family home during the pendency of a divorce action, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has directed attention to a general statutory provision, presently codified as Section 3323(f) of the Divorce Code, and a more specific provision, presently codified as Section 3502(c) of the Code. Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985). Section 3323(f) provides as follows: Equity power and jurisdiction of the court.-In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this part and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause,s Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, §2, 23 Pa. C.S. §3323(f). 6 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM Section 3502(c) of the Divorce Code contains this language: Family home.--The court may award, during the pendency of the action or otherwise, to one or both of the parties the right to reside in the marital residence.6 Where a party to a divorce action has custody of a child or children of the marriage, an award of temporary exclusive possession of the family home to that party may, in appropriate circumstances, effectuate one or more of the legislative policies of the Divorce Code. Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 496 A.2d 56 (1985). These policies are expressed in Section 3102(a) of the Code as follows: (a) Poli¢¥.--The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is the policy of the Commonwealth to: (1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience. (2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between spouses, especially where children are involved. (3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs. (4) Mitigate the harm to the Id., ~3502(c). 7 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM spouses and their children caused by the legal dissolution of the marriage. (5) Seek causes rather than symptoms of family disintegration and cooperate with and utilize the resources available to deal with family problems. (6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.7 Notwithstanding the authority of a court to exclude a spouse from his or her home during the pendency of a divorce action, this power should be exercised very sparingly. As Judge Tamilia observed in writing for the majority in Laczkowski, "the exclusion of a spouse from the marital home during the pendency of a divorce is a harsh remedy that will not be awarded cavalierly. The need for such an award must be clearly evident in the facts of each case." Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154, 166-67, 496 A.2d 56, 62 (1985). Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, ~2, 23 Pa. C.S. ~3102(a). 8 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS In this difficult case, a number of factors have led the court to resolve the issue of exclusion of Defendant from the family home in favor of Defendant. First, Defendant is joint owner of the residence in question, and it is not clear that she has either the financial means or the emotional capacity to sustain a separate household. Second, Defendant generally assists in the care of the parties' children in the home, and the parties have refrained from venting their hostilities upon the children. Third, at the present time Plaintiff is not the sole custodial parent of the children, and no adjudication as to custody has taken place. Fourth, the future duration of Plaintiff's own residency in the home is quite limited at this time by his anticipated transfer out of the area. Finally, whether the instant action for divorce will result in dissolution of the parties' marriage is not at all certain. Under these circumstances, the court is not persuaded that the need for an award of exclusive possession of the family home is "clearly evident." The following Order will therefore be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this /~ day of June, 1995, after careful consideration of Plaintiff's Petition for Exclusive Possession of Marital Home, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the Petition is DENIED. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 9 NO. 94-5092 CIVIL TERM Edward J. Weintraub, Esq. 130 Walnut Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Lawrence F. Clark, Jr., Esq. 825 Fishburn Road P.O. Box 555 Hershey, PA 17033 Attorney for Defendant :re 10