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HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-1946 CivilTERI WOLFGANG and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WAYNE HARRIS, : CUMBERLAAFD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : SPANKEY' S AUTO SALES, : INC., and FACTORY : FINANCE, INC. , : Defendants : NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., and OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this t&~ day of October, 1995, after careful consideration of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as the briefs and oral arguments presented in the matter, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs' claim-for p~nitive damages is STRICKEN from Count I of the complaint, and otherwise DENIED. IN ACCORDANCE with the accompanying Opinion, Plaintiffs are GRANTED twenty days within which to amend the complaint with respect to damages under Count I. BY THE COURT, Ann Economou, Esq. 205 State Street P.O. Box 808 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Plaintiffs Michael L. Bangs, Esq. 302 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendants : rc TERI WOLFGANG and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WAYNE HARRIS, :o CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : SPANKEY' S AUTO SALES, : INC., and FACTORY : FINANCE, INC., : Defendants : NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., and OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. This is a civil action involving the repossession of a motor vehicle. Plaintiffs allege that at the time of repossession the vehicle was in the rightful possession of Plaintiff Teri Wolfgang and that at such time it contained personal property belonging to Plaintiff Wayne Harris. Plaintiff Teri Wolfgang has filed claims against Defendant Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., for violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Count I of complaint), breach of contract (Count II) and conversion (Count III); she has also filed a claim against Defendant Factory Finance, Inc., for conversion (Count III). Plaintiff Wayne Harris has filed claims against both Defendants for conversion (Counts IV and V). For disposition at this time is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on certain issues involved in Plaintiff Wolfgang's claims. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. PROCEDURAL HISTORY; STATEMENT OF FACTS Procedural history. Following proceedings at the district NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 justice level, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to this court on June 10, 1993. They filed a complaint herein on June 21, 1993. On July 13, 1993, Defendant'Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., filed an answer to the complaint, with new matter and counterclaim; Defendant Factory Finance, Inc., filed an answer without new matter or counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed a reply to the new matter and counterclaim of Defendant Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., on July 23, 1993; Plaintiffs' reply contained new matter with respect to Defendant's counterclaim. On August 3, 1993, a counter-reply was filed to Plaintiffs' new matter. On June 23, 1995, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating in pertinent part as follows: 5. In Count I of the Plaintiff's Complaint [claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection. Law against Defendant Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc.], Plaintiffs claim in a conclusory fashion a violation of the Pennsylvania [Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law] and make a demand for punitive damages as well as legal fees. 6. The Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages or attorney's fees under the Pennsylvania [Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law], 73 Pa. C.S. Section 201-2 et. seq. 7. In Count III of Plaintiffs' Complaint [claim for conversion against both Defendants], Plaintiff Teri Wolf~ang makes an alleged claim for conversion in a conclusory fashion. Plaintiff Teri Wolfgang's Complaint does not state a cause of action for conversion and does not rise to a claim for punitive damages. 2 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 8. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I with respect to a claim for legal fees and punitive damages and Count III. WHEREFORE, Defendants, Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc. and Factory Finance, Inc. respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in its favor on Counts I and III of Plaintiffs' complaint together with costs.~ Statement of facts. The allegations contained in Plaintiffs' complaint may be summarized as follows:2 The Plaintiffs are adult individuals residing in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. Defendant Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc. (Spankey's), is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Mechaniqsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Defendant Factory Finance, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business at the same location in' Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. On or about March 26, 1993, Plaintiff Teri Wolfgang (Wolfgang) concluded negotiations with Spankey's for the purchase of a 1988 Chevrolet C-30 truck. On or about that same date, Wolfgang obtained possession of that vehicle from Spankey's. During the ~ An issue as to the timeliness of Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings has been mooted by an order of court continuing the date of trial in this case. See Order of Court, August 23, 1995 (Sheely, P.J.). 2 In reciting the allegations of the complaint, the court is not expressing any opinion as to their accuracy. 3 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 course of the negotiations the parties discussed the financing arrangements for the vehicle, which were to be made either "in- house" or through a bank. On the date on which she took possession of the vehicle, Wolfgang signed a motor vehicle installment sales contract which Spankey's explained was for the purpose of permitting Wolfgang to drive the vehicle with dealer tags. On March 29, 1993, Spankey's contacted Wolfgang and informed her that the bank had approved financing of this vehicle and requested that Wolfgang return to Spankey's in order to complete the necessary paperwork. Wolfgang went to Spankey's that same day .and signed a second motor vehicle installment sales contract. On various dates subsequent to the signing of this document, Spankey's requested that Wolfgang provide confirmation of her employment and wage information. Wolfgang complied with these requests. Thereafter, on at least one occasion, Spankey's demanded that the vehicle be returned. On or about April 24, 1993, Spankey's caused the vehicle to be taken from the home of Wolfgang by agents of Def~'ndant Factory Finance, Inc. With specific reference to her claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law against Defendant Spankey's (Count I of complaint), Plaintiff Wolfgang alleges, among other things: 23. [T]he conduct of Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., during this transaction has violated [Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law], 73 Pa. NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 C.S. Section 201-2, et seq. in that inter alia: A. The Defendant attempted to enforce the document attached hereto as Exhibit "A" as a Motor Vehicle Installment Sale Contract after it had been supplanted and replaced by the later, document attached hereto as Exhibit "B". B. The Defendant misled Teri Wolfgang as to the consequences and effect which the Defendant attached to Exhibit "A". C. The Defendant led the Plaintiff to believe that the only sales contract in effect with respect to this transaction was Exhibit "B" D. The Defendant caused the motor vehicle to be taken away at a time when Teri Wolfgang was not in default of any of the provisions of Exhibit "B" E. The Defendant misled the Plaintiff as to the true state of the Defendant's intentions with respect to financing. Specifically, the Defendant .led the Plaintiff, Teri Wolfgang, to believe that as of the execution of Exhibit "B" all financing arrangements were final and approved and that the vehicle would be financed according to the terms of Exhibit "B" either by Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., "in- house" or by a bank. F. Spankey's Auto Sal~s, Inc., contributed to the causing of~ confusion between the parties of this lawsuit and CCNB Bank which 5 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 confusion resukted in CCNB refusing to accept an assignment of Exhibit G. Upon the refusal of CCNB to accept an assignment of Exhibit "B", Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., unilaterally, unlawfully, and without proper .cause attempted to cancel the transaction, took possession of the vehicle, and retained all of Teri Wolfgang's down payment monies and the property of Wayne Harris, in addition to retaining the vehicle itself. H. Spankey's Auto Sales, Inc., then filed suit against Teri Wolfgang for the full purchase price of the vehicle despite the fact that they already had the. vehicle back. 24. This conduct constituted fraudulent conduct which created a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. On this claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, Plaintiff Wolfgang seeks punitive damages and legal fees, inter alia. With specific reference to her claims for conversion against both Defendants (Count III of complaint), Plaintiff Wolfgang alleges, among other things: 15. During the course of the purchase of this vehicle, Teri Wolfgang paid SPankey's Auto Sales, Inc., down payments and deposits toward the purchase price of'this vehicle in the total amount of $2,000.00. 16. Neither Defendant has refunded Teri Wolfgang's down payment. NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 22. The taking of the motor vehicle from Teri Wolfgang and the taking of the personal property of Wayne Harris constituted a wrongful taking, misappropriation, and conversion committed by the Defendants. On these claims for conversion, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, inter alia. STATEMENT OF LAW Judqment on the pleadings. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 provides the following: (a) After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. (b) The court shall enter such judgment or order as shall be proper on the pleadings. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that a motion for j.udgment on the pleadings should be granted only in cases where there are no issues of material fact and which are so free from doubt that a trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise. 3 Goodrich Amram 2d §1034(b) :2, at 261-62 (1991). It has also been said that where the rules of law are not clear the court should be "especially wary" of granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.; Jeffries v. Hoffman, 417 Pa. 1, 5 n.1, 207 A.2d 774, 776 n.1 (1965). "[W]here there is any uncertainty or doubt, the motion should be denied. The preferable approach is Go deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings and to await the filing of affidavits and depositions and then to consider the issue on a mo~ion for summary 7 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 judgment with an explicit factual record, or to permit the matter to proceed to trial .... " 3 Goodrich Amram 2d §1034(b) :2, at 263 (1991). Furthermore, "[e]very reasonable inference that the court can draw from the factual averments in the pleadings of the party opposing the motion must be considered as true for purposes of' ruling on a motion under Rule 1034 for judgment on the pleadings." Id. §1034(b) :4, at 265. With regard to the opportunity to amend pleadings in response to a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the following is instructive. "Whenever a defect in a party's pleading can be cured by amendment, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted without affording that party an opportunity to amend his or her pleading. Thus, when the court determines, on a motion for judgment by the defendant, that the complaint fails to state an actionable claim, the court may grant the plaintiff an opportunity to amend." Id. §1034(b) :14, at 275. "The court is given wide powers as to how it can rule on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 1034. The court must enter such judgment or order as shall be proper on the pleadings." Id. §1034(b) :1, at 260. Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Section 2(4) (xvii) of Pennsylvania'~ Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law defines "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive, acts or practices" to include the 8 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 following: Engaging in any other fraudulent conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.3 ,."The key to invoking [Section 2(4) (xvii)] of the Consumer Protection Law is fraud. Actual fraud has five elements which must coalesce. There must be (1) misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) scienter; (3) intention by the declarant to induce action; (4) justifiable reliance by th~ party defrauded upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the party defrauded as a proximate result." Rizzo v. Michener, 401 Pa. Super. 47, 61, 584 A.2d 973, 980 (1990). Moreover, "[t]he pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the. claim to the opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense and they must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are not merely subterfuge." Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank, 423 Pa. 373, 380, 224 A.2d 174, 179 (1966). The act provides for the following forms of relief for private actions: Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a m~thod, act or practice declared unlawful by ~.. this act, may bring a private action, to recover actual 3 Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, §2 (4) (xvii) , as reenacted, 73 P.S. §201-2 (4) (xvii) . 9 NO. t946 CIVIL 1993 damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or prgper.4 Conversion. With regard to pleading a cause of action in conversion, the following principles of law are helpful. "In a conversion action, the facts set forth in the complaint should show that the defendant, without the plaintiff's consent or lawful justification, intentionally exercised dominion or control over the plaintiff's chattel which so seriously denied or interfered with the plaintiff's lawful right to possess or control it that the defendant may justly be required to pay the plaintiff the chattel's full value." 4 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d §23:108, at 460 (1993). "The complaint should state that the plaintiff has possessory rights to the chattel; plaintiff must be the possessor or have the right of immediate or future possession." Id., at 461. "A plaintiff has a cause of action in conversion if he or she had actual or constructive possession of a chattel or an immediate right to possession of a chattel at the time of the alleged conversion." Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Smith, 434 Pa. Super. 429, 434, 643 A.2d 1098, 1100 (1994). Id., §9.2, as amended, 73 P.S. §201-9.2. 10 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 Pleadinq of punitive damaqes. "To provide a basis for an award of punitive damages the plaintiff's complaint should aver ... facts from which the trier of fact may find that the defendant acted outrageously .... ,, 4 Standard Pa. Practice 2d §21:66, at 80 (1993). "Punitive damages can only be awarded where a defendant's conduct is found to be malicious, wanton, wilful, reckless or oppressive .... If the wrong committed does not of itself imply malice, the plaintiff should allege maliciousness, willfulness, or reckless indifference." Id. at 79-80. "Punitive damages may also be available where the defendant's conduct is outrageous because of 'evil motive.' Punitive damages cannot be awarded where a defendant's conduct is found to constitute ordinary negligence." Id. at 81. Conversion is an intentional tort, and in an appropriate case will provide a basis for punitive damages. See, e.g., Pikunse v. Kopchinski, 429 Pa. Super. 46, 631 A.2d 1049 (1993). APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS With regard to Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' complaint as it relates to Ms. Wolfgang, is purely con'clusory for purposes of stating a cause of action under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection L~w, the court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' factual averments and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them are sufficient to support 11 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 the claim. Ms. Wolfgang has pled that Defendant Spankey's intentionally misrepresented a material fact to induce action on her part and that her justifiable reliance on that misrepresentation caused her to suffer damages. With regard to Defendants' contention that punitive damages are not an available item of recovery under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, the court is in agreement with them. The act does, however, permit.a recovery of treble damages, or $100, in certain cases, and such additional relief as the court deems necessary or proper. The claim for punitive damages will therefore be stricken and Plaintiffs will be permitted to amend the complaint to-request the type of relief authorized under the act, if they so desire. With regard to Defendants' contention that an award of attorney's fees is not an available remedy under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, it is at least arguable that the act's provision for such additional relief as the court deems necessary and proper would encompass attorney's fees in an appropriate case. For this reason, that portion of Plaintiffs' complaint will not be stricken. With regard to Defendants' contention that Plaintiffs' complaint as it relate~ to Ms. Wolfgang fails to state a cause of action in conversion, the court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' factual averments and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 12 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 therefrom are sufficient to allege that the Defendants, without Ms. Wolfgang's consent or lawful justification, intentionally interfered with her possessory rights in the vehicle. For this reason, Plaintiff Wolfgang's claims for conversion against both Defendants will not be dismissed. With regard to Defendants' contention that Plaintiff Wolfgang is not entitled to punitive damages based on her causes of action for conversion, the court cannot say with certainty that Defendants are correct. The court feels that given the available record in this matter it is preferable to deny the motion in this respect and to either consider the issue on a motion for summary judgment with a more explicit factual record or permit the matter to proceed to trial. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of October, 1995, after careful consideration of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as the briefs and oral arguments presented in the matter, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is STRICKEN from Count I of the complaint, and otherwise DENIED. IN ACCORDANCE with the accompanying Opinion, Plaintiffs are GRANTED twenty days within which to amend the complaint with 13 NO. 1946 CIVIL 1993 respect to damages under Count I. BY THE'COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Ann Economou, Esq. 205 State Street P.O. Box 808 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Plaintiffs Michael L. Bangs, Esq. 302 South 18th Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendants :rc 14