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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-3517 CivilLAWCO, INC., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : TIMOTHY GREENFIELD, and : SCOTT PERRY, : individually and : t/d/b/a HYDROTECH : MECHANICAL SERVICES, : Defendant : NO. 94-3517 EQUITY TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BEFORE OLER, J. DECREE AND NOW, this ~day of November, 1995, after careful consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is GRANTED, and until June 29, 1998, unless otherwise affected by further Decree, 1. Defendant Greenfield shall not be associated with Hydrotech Mechanical Services; or, in the alternative, 2. Defendants shall not, within a radius of 250 miles of Plaintiff's office at 1156 York Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, perform the services of a water utility service company as discussed in the said Opinion. THIS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is conditioned upon Plaintiff's filing of a bond or cash in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(b) in the amount of $75,000.00. BY THE COURT, Wesley Ole~,~Jr., J. Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. 3448 Trindle Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Plaintiff Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esq. 28 North Thirty-Second Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendants : rc LAWCO, INC., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : TIMOTHY GREENFIELD, and : SCOTT PERRY, : individually and : t/d/b/a HYDROTECH : MECHANICAL SERVICES, : Defendant : NO. 94-3517 EQUITY TERM IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and DECREE Oler, J. Before the court in this equity case is a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Lawco, Inc. (Plaintiff), against Timothy Greenfield and Scott Perry, individually and doing business as ~ydrotech Mechanical Services (Defendants). The basis for the motion is a covenant not to compete and a covenant of non- disclosure executed by Defendant Greenfield. A hearing on Plaintiff's motion was held on February 24, September 29 and October 6, 1995. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, it appears likely that the facts recited hereafter will be again shown by Plaintiff at trial. For this reason, a preliminary injunction will be issued. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business at 1156 York Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.~ Defendants are adult residents of ~ Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 1; Defendants' answers, paragraph 1. NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM Dillsburg, York County, Pennsylvania.2 Plaintiff is a small, solely-owned corporation engaging in the rather specialized business of "water utility service."3 Plaintiff's customers are water utilities, both investor-owned and municipally-owned, as well as a few factories.4 The primary service performed by Plaintiff was described by its owner and president - "chief cook and bottle washer''s -- Norman Law, in the following terms: [P]rimarily we are called calibrators, meaning that we can certify, both in the field and in the test lab, the accuracy of their billing instruments or measuring instruments, whether these instruments are production meter or what we would call, maybe, a source meter coming out of the Susquehanna or the Yellow Bre[e]ches or the billing meter that would sell water to, say, the Hershey Medical Center or an industry.6 In addition to testing water measurement devices for accuracy, the company services and repairs such instruments, salvages and rebuilds them, and rents, sells and installs them. It also sells 2 Plaintiff's complaint, paragraphs 2-3; Defendants' answers, paragraphs 2, 3. 3 N.T. 4 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 4 N.T. 4 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. s N.T. 4 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 6 N.T. 8 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 2 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM parts for them.7 Plaintiff has about seven competitors in the area of its operations,8 which extends across Pennsylvania and into Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia.9 The frequency with which customers require the services provided by Plaintiff varies from several times a year to once in ten years.~° Business in the "water utility service" industry is generated largely through customer referrals.~ Plaintiff corporation has three full-time and two part-time employees.~2 The year of 1994 was described as a financial "nightmare" by its president.~3 In 1987, one of Plaintiff's two "field technicians" (the other being company president Law) resigned.~4 Field technicians perform 7 N.T. 9-15 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 8 N.T. 129-30 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 9 N.T. 51-52 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~8 N.T. 50 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~ N.T. 56 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~2 N.T. 85 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~3 N.T. 81 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~4 N.T. 24, 31 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 3 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM the services of the company in the field - testing and servicing meters, and so forth.~5 Their competency in the area may take as long as a year to fully develop.~6 In Plaintiff's organization, a field technician was also expected at times to solicit business and entertain customers.~7 Defendant Timothy Greenfield was employed by Plaintiff to replace the field technician who resigned.~8 His background was that of a high school graduate, with post-secondary school courses in water systems, sewage treatment and management. He was assistant director of public works for the Borough of Dillsburg in York County, Pennsylvania.~9 He also held Pennsylvania operators' licenses for water and sewer plants.2° Defendant Greenfield and Plaintiff's president Law met on January 13, 1988, to discuss the possibility of the former's ~5 N.T. 16-17, 28-29 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~6 N.T. 29 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~7 N.T. 20-21, 56-57 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~8 N.T. 42 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~9 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. Not all testimony in the present case has been transcribed. 20 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 4 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM employment.2~ According to Mr. Law, Defendant Greenfield was "absolutely" informed at this time that a covenant not to compete would be involved with his employment.22 Defendant Greenfield's recollection is to the contrary.23 On Friday, February 19, 1988, Defendant Greenfield was provided with an employment agreement executed by company president Law and dated the 19th.24 He took it home to review; he commenced work for Plaintiff on Monday, February 22, 1988; and he returned the agreement signed on Monday, February 29, 1988.25 The employment agreement contained, and Defendant Greenfield was aware of the import of,26 the following provisions: B. NON-COMPETITION: 1. EMPLOYEE agrees that during his employment and for a period of five (5) years immediately following the termination of said employment, for any reason whatsoever, he shall not, either as a principal, disclosed or 2~ N.T. 32-33 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 22 N.T. 34 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 23 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 24 N.T. 38 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 25 N.T. 38-39 (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 25, 1995. 26 N.T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 5 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM undisclosed, on behalf of, or in conjunction with any other person, firm, partnership, company or corporation, either as an agent, employee, partner, officer, director, consultant or in .any other capacity, without limitation by prior specification, directly or indirectly, within a territory defined by a radius of 250 miles from the EMPLOYER'S principal place of business, located at 1156 York Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, do any of the following: a. He shall not engage in the business of installation, repair, calibration, sales and/or rentals of water meters of any kind. b. He shall not solicit orders or contracts for the installation, repair, calibration, sales and/or rentals of water meters of the same or similar nature provided by the EMPLOYER. c. He shall not solicit, divert, take away or induce any of the customers of the EMPLOYER. 2. EMPLOYEE acknowledges that the remedies at law for any breach by him of any of the provisions of Paragraph B 1 of this Agreement will be inadequate relief against him and in the event of any such breach, EMPLOYEE further acknowledges and warrants that he will be fully able to earn an adequate livelihood for himself and his dependents if the terms of this Agreement should be specifically enforced against him. 3. If the provisions of Paragraph B 1 of this Agreement should be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable by a court 6 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM of competent jurisdiction because of the time limitation and geographical area therein provided, such provisions shall nevertheless be effective and enforceable for such a period of time and in such a geographical area as may be held to be reasonable by such court. Any provision of this Agreement that is invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any such jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability without invalidating or rendering unenforceable the remaining provisions of this Agreement, and any such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not, of itself, affect the validity, legality or enforceability of such provision in any other jurisdiction. 4. The parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement pertaining to the employment of EMPLOYEE by EMPLOYER as set forth in Paragraph A herein is given in exchange for and act as consideration for this Covenant not to compete, provided, however, that this covenant not to compete shall be deemed separate and apart from the terms of the employment relationship and any other agreement set forth herein. C. NON-DISCLOSURE: 1. EMPLOYEE agrees not to solicit, divert or take away customers of EMPLOYER in any state, not included in the aforesaid territory heretofore mentioned, whether such customers become known to him during the course of his employment with EMPLOYER, nor shall he divulge to anyone the names of EMPLOYER'S customers or the details of its transactions with them. 2. EMPLOYEE shall not, directly, or indirectly, disclose or use at any time, either during or subsequent to the said employment, any secret or confidential information, knowledge or data of the EMPLOYER, whether or not obtained, acquired or NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM developed by the EMPLOYEE, unless he shall first secure the written consent of the EMPLOYER. Upon the termination of his employment, EMPLOYEE shall turn over to the EMPLOYER all notes, memoranda, notebooks, drawings or other documents made by, complied [sic] by, or delivered to him concerning any customers, distributors, distribution systems, products, apparatus, or methods used, developed, or investigated by the EMPLOYER during the period of his employment; it being expressly agreed that the same and all information contained therein are, at all times, the property of the EMPLOYER.27 In the ensuing four to six months, Plaintiff's president personally trained Defendant Greenfield in the field.TM Thereafter, Mr. Greenfield generally performed his duties alone.29 During the course of his employment, he had access to all of Plaintiff's customer files, which contained valuable background information on customers' equipment, suppliers and personnel,3° and to Plaintiff's pricing policies.3~ Defendant Greenfield also became acquainted 27 Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 28 N.T. 45 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995; N.T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 29 N.T. 45 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 30 N.T. 53-55 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion fOr preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 3~ N.T. 81 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 8 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM with the managers of the utilities serviced by Plaintiff,32 and entertained their employees.33 He obtained a certification for "back flow" testing while working for Plaintiff.34 Around February of 1993, Mr. Greenfield expressed an interest in buying the testing portion of Plaintiff's business and going out on his own.35 In anticipation of such a venture, he had, a month or so earlier, formed a business relationship with Defendant Scott Perry, who was not himself experienced in the water utility service field, and they had registered Hydrotech Mechanical Services as a fictitious name.36 However, negotiations with Plaintiff did not produce an agreement.37 On June 29, 1993, Defendant Greenfield resigned, advising Plaintiff's president that he would be going into the 32 N.T. 94 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 33 N.T. 96-97 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 34 N.T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 3s N.T. 58 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 36 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995; N.T. (testimony of Scott Perry), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, October 6, 1995. 37 N.T. 60 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 9 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM landscaping business.38 Prior to his resignation, Plaintiff's president had reminded Mr. Greenfield of his contractual obligations and of Plaintiff's intent to enforce its proscriptive rights if necessary.39 Defendant Perry was also aware of these contractual obligations.4° Defendant Greenfield did not enter the landscaping business. Instead, he and Defendant Perry commenced a water utility service operation under the name Hydrotech Mechanical Services at 10 Chestnut Grove Road, Dillsburg, York County, Pennsylvania.4~ The company's brochure includes the following information: Hydrotech Mechanical Services is a full service company offering expert consultation, as well as a variety of meter testing, modernization, replacement and repair services. Our technicians can repair any problem you have .... Hydrotech Mechanical Services is a PUC ~8 N.T. 61 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. ~9 N.T. 60 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 40 N.T. (testimony of Scott Perry), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, October 6, 1995. 4~ N,T. (testimony of Scott Perry), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, October 6, 1995; Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 (brochure), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. Mr. Perry testified that Hydrotech Mechanical Services became operational in the summer of 1993. N.T. (testimony of Scott Perry), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, October 6, 1995. 10 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM approved water meter testing agency and will test any style or size of meter from any manufacturer at any time. Meter testing will be done in-line with no interruptions or need for additional manpower and will be performed at the customers convenience. Hydrotech Mechanical Services comes to work with over 18 years of field experience in the water industry. This includes in excess of 15,000 water meters tested in the field as well as lab testing. It also includes thousands of installations or replacements, work within the municipal environment, membership on our local sewer and water authority board, valid Pennsylvania certifications in water and sewage treatment, a decade of design experience, and NEWWA certification in back flow prevention. Hydrotech Mechanical Services is experienced in serving all users of the water industry in Pennsylvania and all neighboring states.42 The brochure lists as the company's field technician Defendant Greenfield. Defendant Perry is listed as its general manager. No other individuals' names appear.43 A comparison of the very detailed test report forms used by Plaintiff and Hydrotech shows that for~all practical purposes they are identical.44 The form had been designed by Plaintiff's 42 Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 (brochure), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 43 Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 (brochure), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 44 Plaintiff's Exhibits 13 (Hydrotech form), 15 (Lawco form), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 11 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM president, and the conclusion is inescapable that Defendants have adopted it for their own purposes.45 As a gesture toward the aforesaid contractual restrictions, Defendants during their first year of operation did not affirmatively solicit known customers of Plaintiff within a 100- mile radius, although such business was not refused when initiated by the customer.46 Defendants have since abandoned this limitation in the operation of their business.~7 Defendants succeeded in engaging a significant number of Plaintiff's customers,~8 and their solicitation of Plaintiff's customers has been pervasive.~9 In 1994, the major part of Defendants' business was with customers of Plaintiff.so Presently, the water utility service industry is glutted in 29, 1995. 4~ N.T. 71 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 46 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. ¢7 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. ~8 N.T. 65-73 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 49 N.T. 73 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. s0 N. T. (testimony of Timothy Greenfield), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, September 29, 1995. 12 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM terms of competition.5~ In 1992, Plaintiff's income from field testing labor sales was $79,215.00.52 In 1993, Plaintiff's income from these sales was $48,247.81.53 In 1994, Plaintiff's income from such sales was $37,225.05.54 Further deterioration in Plaintiff's income in this area is anticipated for the future.55 Although not all of the decline in Plaintiff's business is attributable to Defendants' competition, the effect of their operation cannot be regarded as de minimis.56 DISCUSSION The prerequisites for a preliminary injunction have been set forth by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court as follows: Three criteria have been established for the granting of a preliminary injunction .... They are: (1) the~preliminary injunction must be necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which could not be compensated for by damages; (2) greater injury would result from the denial of the 5~ N.T. 55 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 52 N.T. 78 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 53 N.T. 79 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 54 N.T. 79 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 55 N.T. 81 (testimony of Norman Law), Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 56 Plaintiff's Exhibit 16, Hearing on Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, February 24, 1995. 13 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM preliminary injunction than from the granting of it; and (3) it would operate to restore the parties to the status quo as it existed prior to the alleged wrongful conduct. In addition to meeting all three criteria, the court must be convinced that plaintiff's right to a preliminary injunction is clear ... and general equity jurisdiction must be warranted. Committee of Seventy v. Albert, 33 Pa. Commw. 44, 49, 381A.2d 188, 190 (1977); see John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977) (affirming issuance of preliminary injunction). The "purpose [of a preliminary injunction] is to preserve the status quo ... by restoring the last peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the controversy." Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen's Club, 361 Pa. Super.~ 473, 477, 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1987). Where a preliminary injunction is issued, it must, as a general rule, be subject to the plaintiff's filing of a bond in an amount fixed and with security approved by the court, naming the Commonwealth as obligee, conditioned that if the injunction is dissolved because improperly granted ..., the plaintiff shall pay to any person injured all damages sustained by reason of granting the injunction and all legally taxable costs and fees, or [to the plaintiff's deposit] ... with the prothonotary [of] legal tender of the United States in an amount fixed by the court to be held by the prothonotary upon the same condition as provided for the injunction bond. Pa. R.C.P. 1531(b). With respect to covenants not to compete, it has been noted by Judge Hess of this court that "[c]ourts of equity will enforce 14 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM restrictive covenants ... when they are (1) incident to an employment relationship between the employer and employee; (2) reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer; and (3) reasonably limited in duration and geographic extent. Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 591, 351 A.2d 250, [252] (1976). When restrictive covenants meet this three-prong test, they are prima facie enforceable. Bettinger v. Carl Berke Associates, Inc., et al., 455 Pa. 100, 103, 314 A.2d 296, 298 (1974)." The Woodco Co., Inc. v. Hickey, 40 Cumberland L.J. 511, 514 (1990) (preliminary injunction issued). The incidence of a restrictive covenant to one's employment is not dependent upon a technical analysis of the precise timing of the employment agreement's execution. See, e.g., Beneficial Finance Co. of Lebanon v. Becker, 422 Pa. 531, 222 A.2d 873 (1966); cf. George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975). "An employer's right to protect, by a covenant not to compete, interest in customer goodwill acquired through the efforts of an employee is well-established in Pennsylvania." $idco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 591, 351 A.2d 250, 252-53 (1976). This aspect of a company's legally protectible interest has been discussed in the following terms: "In almost all commercial enterprises ... contact with customers or clientele is a particularly sensitive aspect of the business .... The employer's sole or major 15 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM contact with buyers [may be] through these agents and the success or failure of the firm [may depend] in part on their effectiveness .... The possibility is present that the customer will regard, or come to regard, the attributes of the employee as more important in his business dealings than any special qualities of the product or service of the employer, especially if the product is not greatly differentiated from others which are available. Thus, some customers may be persuaded, or even be very willing, to abandon the employer should the employee move to a competing organization or leave to set up a business of his own .... "[It is argued that w]hen [the employee] leaves the company he should no more be permitted to try to divert to his own benefit the product of his employment than to abscond with the company's cashbox." Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 593-94, 351 A.2d 250, 253-54 (1976), quoting Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 653-54 (1960); see Jacobson & Co., Inc. v. Int'l Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967). An assessment of irreparable harm in the context of a covenant not to compete is to be made with an understanding that "[i]t is not the initial breach of [the] covenant which necessarily establishes the existence of irreparable harm but rather the threat of the. unbridled continuation of the violation and the resultant incalculable damage to the former employer's business." John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 7, 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1977) (affirming issuance of preliminary injunction). 16 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM "General covenants are reasonably limited if they are within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer without imposing undue hardship on the employee." Jacobson & Co., Inc. v. Int'l Environment Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 452, 235 A.2d 612, 620 (1967). "What limits as to activity, geographical area, and time are appropriate in a particular case depends upon all the circumstances." Restatement (Second) of Contracts S188, comment d (1979). "The reasonableness of the temporal and geographic aspects of a restrictive covenant must be determined in light of the nature of the employer's interest sought to be protected." Boldt Machinery & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 513, 366 A.2d 902, 907 (1976) (per Pomeroy, J., with two judges joining). With regard to the temporal aspect of a covenant not to compete incident to an employment relationship, "restraints of [a 5-year] duration have been upheld in a wide variety of situations by courts in other jurisdictions." Id. at 515, 366 A.2d 908. In this regard, "[f]requency of [customer] contact may ... control or affect the permissible period of the restraint .... [I]f the contact is less frequent, a longer period of restraint may be reasonable." Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 659 n.1 (1960). With regard to the geographic aspect of a covenant not to compete, "[t]he principle of customer-contact protection finds its 17 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM expression in the general rule that the territorial restraint in a covenant not to compete will, generally speaking, be considered reasonable if the area covered by the restraint is limited to the territory in which the employee was able, during the term of his employment, to establish contact with his employer's customers." Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 162 (1955). In appropriate circumstances, a covenant encompassing the area of an entire country may be upheld. See e.g., Plunkett Chemical Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925, 43 A.L.R.2d 91 (1953) (United States). Where reasonableness of a covenant not to compete is an issue, the burden is upon the party asserting such unreasonableness to demonstrate it. John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977) (affirming issuance of preliminary injunction). Finally, if a covenant not to compete is reasonable, it is not a defense that the former employee did not actively pursue solicitation of the employer's prior customers. Sobers v. Shannon Optical Co., Inc., 326 Pa. Super. 170, 473 A.2d 1035 (1984). In the present case, the covenant not to compete executed by Defendant was incident to an employment relationship between Plaintiff as employer and Defendant as employee. It was reasonably necessary for the protection of the Plaintiff, given the competitive nature of this rather unusual industry and the significant position occupied by Mr. Greenfield. And in view of 18 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM the infrequency of contact between water utility service companies and some of their customers, and the extent of the area serviced by a field technician in Plaintiff's employ, the court is not in a position to find the covenant not to complete unreasonable as to duration or territorial restraint. The activity of Defendant Greenfield in association with Defendant Perry over the past two years has been clearly violative of the terms of the employment agreement in question. The "threat of the unbridled continuation of the violation and the resultant incalculable damage to [Plaintiff's] business" represents irreparable harm to Plaintiff which can not be compensated by money damages. To refuse a preliminary injunction after almost half of the restrictive period has passed with no prospect of compliance would, in the court's view, produce a greater injury to Plaintiff's imperiled field testing operation than would result from requiring Defendant Greenfield to refrain from this limited type of activity during the balance of the term. Finally, the issuance of a preliminary injunction would restore the parties to the status quo 19 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM as it existed prior to the wrongful conduct,s? For these reasons, the following Decree will be entered: DECREE AND NOW, this 13th day of November, 1995, after careful consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is GRANTED, and until June 29, 1998, unless otherwise affected by further Decree, 1. Defendant Greenfield shall not be associated with Hydrotech Mechanical Services; or, in the alternative, 2. Defendants shall not, within a radius of 250 miles of Plaintiff's office at 1156 York Road, Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, perform the services of a water utility service company as discussed in the said Opinion. THIS PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is conditioned upon Plaintiff's filing of a bond or cash in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of s? Plaintiff's right to equitable relief with respect to the covenant of non-disclosure executed by Defendant Greenfield is more problematic than is its right with respect to the covenant not to compete. See generally Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 375 Pa. Super. 238, 544 A.2d 450 (1988) (summary of law in area of protectible business information). Some of Plaintiff's customers, for instance, are municipally-owned utilities, information as to which would not normally "be a particular secret of [an] employer [such as] Plaintiff .... " Id. at 258, 544 A.2d at 461. The evidence at the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction did not convince the court to extend the preliminary injunction beyond the terms of the covenant not to compete at this time. 20 NO. 94-5517 EQUITY TERM Civil Procedure 1531(b) in the amount of $75,000.00. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Diane G. Radcliff, Esq. 3448 Trindle Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Plaintiff Mary A. Etter Dissinger, Esq. 28 North Thirty-Second Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendants : rc 21