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HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-2714 Civil DAVID MELVILLE HUTTON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : RUTH W. McELWEE and : CENTURY 21 BRENEMAN & ASSOC., : Defendants : NO. 2714 CIVIL 1993 IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT CENTURY 21 BRENEMAN & ASSOC. BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~%%ay of January, 1994, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendant Century 21 Breneman & Assoc. to Plaintiff's complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the preliminary objections are DENIED. Defendant is GRANTED 20 days within which to file an answer to Plaintiff's complaint. BY THE COURT, Wesley O~e . Theodore A. Adler, Esq. John J. McNally, III, Esq. 2331 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Plaintiff Francis E. Marshall, Jr., Esq. Charles E. Haddick, Jr., Esq. 10 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant Century 21 Breneman & Associates : rc DAVID MELVILLE HUTTON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : RUTH W. McELWEE and : CENTURY 21 BRENEMAN & ASSOC., : Defendants : NO. 2714 CIVIL 1993 IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT CENTURY 21 BRENEMAN & ASSOC. BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., HOFFER and OLER, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. This case arises out of Plaintiff's purchase of a lot from Defendant McElwee, whose realtor was Defendant Century 21 Breneman Assoc., and Plaintiff's subsequent discovery that the lot could not pass a perk test. For disposition at this time are preliminary objections of Defendant Century 21 to Plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the preliminary objections will be denied. Statement of Facts According to Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff as buyer and Defendant McElwee as seller entered into an agreement of sale with respect to a certain unimproved lot in West Pennsboro Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.~ The agreement was dated December 16, 1991;2 the purchase price was $25,000;3 and Defendant Century ~ Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5. 2 Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5. Seller's approval of the contract, however, is dated December 17, 1991. Id. 3 Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A. No. 2714 Civil 1993 21 served as seller's agent in the transaction and drafted the agreement.4 Plaintiff further alleges that the agreement provided that the sale was "contingent upon approval of existing perk test results,"5 that both defendants knew of Plaintiff's intention to build a home upon the lot,~ and that "[a]t all times prior to settlement, McElwee, through her agent Breneman, represented that a valid on- lot septic permit for the lot had been issued and was 'ready to be picked up' at the township office."? It is also alleged that "[o]n December 17, 1991, McElwee, through her agent [Century 21] Breneman, unilaterally changed the terms of [the written agreement] to provide, inter alia, 'This sale (is) contingent upon satisfac- tory perk test to be paid by buyer.'''8 Settlement, according to Plaintiff, took place on January 13, 1992.9 He obtained a construction loan on March 3, 1992,~° but when he and the builder attempted to secure a building permit it Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 6, 37. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 8. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 10. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 13. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 9. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 11. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 14. 2 No. 2714 Civil 1993 developed that no valid on-lot septic permit existed.~ Such a permit, it is averred, has proven unobtainable because the lot "will not 'perk' in accord with the regulations under the Sewage Facilities Act. "~2 Plaintiff alleges that the lot in question is not served by public water or sewer.~3 The agreement of sale attached to the complaint includes the following provisions: 7. STATUS OF WATER AND SEWER: Seller warrants that this property is serviced by water and sewer. Further, Seller warrants that these systems are fully paid for and, as of the date of this agreement are in satisfactory operating condition. If aforesaid systems are private, Seller warrants that he/she has no information that public water and/or sewer will be assessed or installed for at least six (6) months after the date of settlement 14 16. REPRESENTATIONS: It is understood that Buyer has inspected the property, or hereby waives the right to do so and he/she has agreed to purchase it as a result of such inspection and not because of or in reliance upon any representation made by the Seller or any other officer, partner or employee of Seller, or by the agent of Seller or any of the latter's salespersons and employees, ... and that he/she has agreed to purchase it in its present condition unless otherwise specified herein and further acknowledges that the aforementioned parties are not qualified to render an opinion on construction, engineering, or environmental matters and that the buyer has been advised that he/she may require or wish to seek the assistance of experts in those fields. It is further understood that this Agreement contains the whole agreement between the Seller and Buyer and there are no other terms, obligations, covenants, representations, statements or conditions, Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 15. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 17. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 16. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A. 3 No. 2714 Civil 1993 oral or otherwise of any kind whatsoever concerning this sale .... ~s 23. AGREEMENT: THIS AGREEMENT CONTAINS THE WHOLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SELLER AND BUYER. THERE ARE NO OTHER TERMS, OBLIGATIONS, COVENANTS, REPRESENTATIONS, STATEMENTS OR CONDITIONS, ORAL OR OTHERWISE, OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVER CONCERNING THIS SALE, EXCEPT AS ATTACHED TO THIS CONTRACT.~6 Among the averments of Plaintiff's complaint are allegations that the agreement failed to include information as to the lot's sewage status as mandated by the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act.~? It is further averred that Defendant Century 21 drafted the aforesaid unilateral change in the agreement, regarding a perk test,~8 and then compounded Plaintiff's confusion on the subject by reiterating at settlement its representation that an on-lot septic permit was available.~9 Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant Century 21 on the basis of misrepresentation2° and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.2z Defendant Century 21 has interposed preliminary objections to the complaint in the form of Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A. Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, 35 P.S. §§750.1 et seq.; Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraphs 39-41. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 46. Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 48. 20 Plaintiff's Complaint, Count IV. Plaintiff's Complaint, Count V; see Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as reenacted and amended, 73 P.S. S§201-1 et seq. 4 No. 2714 Civil 1993 (a) a demurrer to both claims based upon a theory of contractual 22 waiver, (b) a motion to strike the paragraph of the complaint alleging a unilateral alteration of the agreement, based upon a version of the agreement differing from that appended to Plaintiff's complaint, displaying Plaintiff's initials next to the change,23 (c) a demurrer to the claim of violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, premised upon the striking of the aforesaid paragraph,24 (d) a motion to strike certain paragraphs of the complaint referring to the agreement's alleged noncompliance with disclosure requirements under the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act, based upon the theory that a private right of action against a realtor is not provided for in the act,2s (e) a demurrer to the claim of misrepresentation, premised upon the striking of the said paragraphs,26 and (f) a motion for a more specific pleading as to the said paragraphs.27 Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 7-12. 23 Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 13-20. 24 Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 13-20. 2s Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 21-25. 2~ Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 21-25. 27 Preliminary Objections of Defendant Century 21, paragraphs 26-32. 5 No. 2714 Civil 1993 Statement of Law Demurrers. With respect to a demurrer, it has been said that "[a] demurrer admits all well-pleaded material facts in the pleading which it attacks, as well as all inferences which may reasonably be deduced therefrom." International Association of Firefighters v. Loftus, 80 Pa. Commw. 329, 333, 471 A.2d 605, 607 (1984). "Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer ... will be sustained only when it appears with certainty that the law permits no recovery under the facts pled, and any doubts in the determination should be resolved by overruling the objections." Paone v. City of Scranton, 9 Pa. C. & C.4th 115, 117 (Montgomery Co. 1991); see Department of Transportation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 33 Pa. Commw. 1, 11, 380 A.2d 1308, 1313 (1977). "If any part of a pleading states a sufficient cause of action, the demurrer to the pleading must be overruled." 2 Anderson, Pennsylvania Civil Practice §1017.180, at 579 (1976). In ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider "[o]nly such matters as arise out of [the challenged] pleading itself ..., and the decision must be on the pleading alone. Therefore collateral matters may not be considered in ruling on a demurrer." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d ~1017(b):29, at 276 (1991); see Pa. R.C.P. 1028, Committee note. "A demurrer which supplies facts not in the record is known as a 'speaking demurrer,' which is condemned." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1017(b):29, at 275 (1991). 6 No. 2714 Civil 1993 Motions to strike. With respect to a motion to strike, it has been said that such a motion is limited to errors of form, and "may be based on ... a pleading's failure to conform to law or a rule of court, or on the inclusion ... of scandalous or impertinent matter." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d ~1017(b):ll, at 253-54 (1991); see Pa. R.C.P. 126. Consistent with this general rule, impertinent matter that is not prejudicial may be treated as "mere surplusage and ignored." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d ~1017(b):16, at 261 (1991). Motions for a more specific pleadinq. With respect to a motion for a more specific pleading, it has been said that such a motion is designed "to insure that an adverse party's right and ability to answer and defend will not be unduly impaired by a pleader's vagueness in stating the grounds of his or her suit." 5 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d §25:57, at 167 (1993). The motion will be denied "where the objecting party may be presumed to have at least as much knowledge of the information sought as does the pleader ... [and where] the objecting party seeks the pleading of evidence .... ,,28 "In general, when a party states a case in a manner that fully advises an opponent of the nature of the case and of the matters with which the opponent will be confronted at trial, there is no need for a motion for a more specific pleading; the opponent should seek discovery if he or she needs more information 28 5 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d ~25:60, at 170-71 (1993). 7 No. 2714 Civil 1993 .... " 2 Goodrich Amram 2d ~1017(b):24, at 268 (1991). Waiver of claim due to inteqration clause in contract. With respect to waiver of an issue as to misrepresentation by a seller's realtor by means of a buyer's disclaimer in an integration clause in a sales agreement, several principles of law are pertinent. First, as a general rule "[a]n agent ... may be liable to an injured third party for his own deceit in a transaction on behalf of his principal." Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 366 Pa. Super. 559, 569, 531 A.2d 1125, 1130 (1987). A seller's realtor who intentionally fails to disclose material information to a buyer with respect to the transaction may be found liable to the buyer following settlement. Id. Second, under certain circumstances an integration clause in an agreement of sale will serve to insulate a seller's realtor from liability upon a claim of misrepresentation. Bowman v. Meadow Ridge, Inc., 419 Pa. Super. 511, 615 A.2d 755 (1992). Thus, in Bowman a clause in an agreement of sale providing that "Buyer has not relied upon any representation ... of any kind made by Seller or Seller's agent [or] employees unless expressly incorporated or stated in this Agreement" was held to warrant dismissal of the buyer's complaint against seller's realtor for an alleged misrepresentation as to the prices involved in comparable sales. Id. Third, under other circumstances such a clause will not defeat No. 2714 Civil 1993 such an action. Myers v. McHenry, 398 Pa. Super. 100, 580 A.2d 860 (1990). Thus, in Myers a similar clause was held not to warrant entry of summary judgment in favor of sellers' realtor on a claim by buyers based upon an alleged misrepresentation as to the availability of a water flow test. The issue in such cases was expressed by the Court as follows: Where buyers allege that they were fraudulently induced to purchase a property through fraud or misrepresentation, the applicability of the parol evidence rule is determined by balancing "the extent of the party's knowledge of objectionable conditions derived from a reasonable inspection against the extent of the coverage of the contract's integration clause in order to determine whether the party could justifiably rely upon oral representations without insisting upon further contractual protection or the deletion of an overly broad integration clause." LeDonne [v. Kessler], 256 Pa. Super. [280,] 294, 389 A.2d [1123,] 1130 [1978]. Myers v. McHenry, 398 Pa. Super. 100, 107, 580 A.2d 860, 864 (1990). Fourth, the parol evidence rule, upon which these cases turn, "makes prior or contemporaneous representations ... inadmissible to vary a complete, written agreement." Jenkins, Pennsylvania Trial Evidence Handbook ~11.1, at 211 (1974). It does not apply to representations made subsequent to the written agreement. McBride v. Davis, 266 Pa. Super. 125, 403 A.2d 125 (1979); see Myers v. McHenry, 398 Pa. Super. 100, 580 A.2d 860 (1990). Pennsylvania Sewaqe Facilities Act. With respect to the No. 2714 Civil 1993 Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act, it is provided in the statute as follows: Every contract for the sale of a lot as defined in [the act] for which there is no currently existing community sewage system available shall contain a statement in the contract clearly indicating to the buyer that there is no community sewage system available and that a permit for an individual sewage system will have to be obtained pursuant to [the act]. The contract shall also clearly state that the buyer should contact the local agency charged with administering this act before signing the contract to determine the procedure and requirements for obtaining a permit for an individual sewage system if one has not already been obtained. Act of January 24, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1535, §7.1(a), as added, 35 P.S. ~750.7a(a). Under the act, "[a]ny contract for the sale of a lot which does not conform to [the above-quoted provision] shall not be enforceable by the seller against the buyer." Id., ~7.1(b), as added, 35 P.S. ~750.7a(b). Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Finally, with respect to conduct constituting a violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, it may be noted that among the types of conduct classified as unfair or deceptive acts or practices are "[c]ausing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the ... approval or certification of goods or services, .... [c]ausing likelihood of confusion or of misunder- standing as to ... certification by ... another," and "[r]epresenting that goods or services have ... approval ... that 10 No. 2714 Civil 1993 they do not have .... " Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, ~2(4)(ii), (iii), (v), as reenacted and amended, 73 P.S. §201- 2(4)(ii), (iii), (v). Application of Law to Facts An application of the foregoing principles of law to the facts of the present case leads to a conclusion that the preliminary objections of Defendant Century 21 can not be sustained. First, as to Defendant's demurrer to both claims on the theory of contractual waiver, the record is not sufficiently complete to permit a balancing of the extent of Plaintiff's knowledge against the extent of the coverage of the agreement's integration clause in order to determine whether Plaintiff could have justifiably relied upon the realtor's alleged oral representation. In addition, the representation is alleged to have been repeated at settlement - i.e., subsequent to the written agreement in question - rendering the parol evidence rule at least partly inapplicable. Second, as to Defendant's motion to strike the paragraph of Plaintiff's complaint alleging a unilateral alteration of the agreement of sale, and the associated demurrer to Plaintiff's claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law -- both premised upon a version of the agreement of sale different from that appended to Plaintiff's complaint - the motion is not being utilized properly and the demurrer is a speaking demurrer. Third, as to Defendant's motion to strike certain paragraphs 11 No. 2714 Civil 1993 of Plaintiff's complaint referring to the Pennsylvania Sewage Facilities Act, and the associated demurrer to Plaintiff's claim for misrepresentation, a review of the complaint indicates that the references are merely supportive of, and incidental to, the allegedly misleading nature of the realtor's conduct. They do not represent an independent cause of action against a realtor under the Sewage Facilities Act, and a dismissal of Plaintiff's misrepresentation claim based upon a deletion of these references would violate the rule that if any part of a pleading states a sufficient cause of action a demurrer to the pleading must be overruled. Finally, as to Defendant's motion for a more specific pleading, it is believed that the Defendant has at least as much knowledge of the subject matter of the paragraphs complained of as has Plaintiff, and that if more information is needed it can be obtained through the discovery process. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered:TM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~day of January, 1994, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendant Century 21 Breneman & Assoc. to Plaintiff's complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the preliminary objections are DENIED. 29 Nothing in this Order or Opinion is intended to indicate an opinion of the Court as to the factual merits of Plaintiff's claims. 12 No. 2714 Civil 1993 Defendant is GRANTED 20 days within which to file an answer to Plaintiff's complaint. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Theodore A. Adler, Esq. John J. McNally, III, Esq. 2331 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Plaintiff Francis E. Marshall, Jr., Esq. Charles E. Haddick, Jr., Esq. 10 West Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant Century 21 Breneman & Associates :rc 13