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HomeMy WebLinkAbout92-0041 Civil UI UNG LEE and PYONG SUN LEE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF his wife, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY JAMES F. SHEAFFER, : Defendant : No. 41 EQUITY 1992 IN RE: ADJUDICATION AND DECREE NISI BEFORE OLER, J. DECREE NISI AND NOW, this~,~ day of February, 1994, following a trial and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant is ENJOINED from blocking vehicular access on High Street to Plaintiffs' garage and dwelling units, and from interfering with parking directly in front of the dwelling units. All other relief requested by either party is DENIED. This DECREE NISI shall become a final decree unless post-trial motions are filed within 10 days. BY THE COURT, ~esley Ole~Jr , ~ ~ ' Richard C. Snelbaker, Esq. 44 West Main Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiffs Henry F. Coyne, Esq. 3901 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant :re UI UNG LEE and PYONG SUN LEE, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF his wife, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Plaintiffs : : v. : CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY : JAMES F. SHEAFFER, : Defendant : No. 41 EQUITY 1992 IN RE: ADJUDICATION AND DECREE NISI BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION AND DECREE NISI Oler, J. The present equity case arises out of a dispute between two neighboring landowners as to the ownership and use of a proposed, undedicated, unopened 40-foot-wide street known as "High Street." This north/south unopened way is located in Silver Spring Township, Cumberland County, in the vicinity of the Carlisle Pike. Viewed proceeding north, High Street initially overlaps Old Willow Mill Road at or near the latter's juncture with the Carlisle Pike, and separates from it as Old Willow Mill Road bends slightly northeast. "High Street," which has a length of only a few hundred feet, has its northern terminus at a 25-foot-wide alley running perpendicular to it. The properties of the litigants lie across High Street from each other. Ui Ung Lee and Pyong Sun Lee, husband and wife (Plaintiffs), commenced this action to enjoin James F. Sheaffer (Defendant) from using High Street in a manner obstructing access to and parking at their two rental units and garage, located on the west side of High No. 41 Equity 1992 Street; Plaintiffs also seek to recover rents and profits allegedly lost due to their inability to find tenants for their property, as well as costs and attorney's fees. Defendant filed a counterclaim, premised upon his ownership of land east and to the center line of "High Street," to enjoin encroachments by Plaintiffs into his portion of the street. He also seeks costs and attorney's fees. A trial in these matters commenced on May 13, 1993, before the undersigned judge.~ After four additional days of testimony, the record was closed on August 13, 1993, at which time a request was made by counsel that the notes of testimony be transcribed and briefs submitted. These matters having been completed, and based upon the evidence presented at trial, the following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Adjudication and Decree Nisi are made and entered: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Plaintiffs are Ui Ung Lee and Pyong Sun Lee, husband and wife, of Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 2. Defendant is James F. Sheaffer, of Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Plaintiffs are the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of land situated on the west side of Old Willow Mill Road, ~ Dates of the proceedings are as follows: May 13, May 14, July 12, July 21, and August 13, 1993. 2 No. 41 Equity 1992 in Silver Spring Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, containing two rental dwelling units, described in a deed to the Plaintiffs dated August 17, 1990, recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland County in Deed Book S, Volume 34, Page 775, and known as 9 and 9A Old Willow Mill Road.2 4. Defendant is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land also situated on the west side of Old Willow Mill Road, in Silver Spring Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, described in a deed to Defendant dated November 25, 1986, recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds for Cumberland County in Deed Book I, Volume 32, Page 331; this land contains a shed from which Defendant carries on a business, "Sheaffer's Auto Body Shop and Sales," and is known as 11 Old Willow Mill Road.3 5. On or about August 31, 1992, Plaintiffs' tenant, David Gutshall, residing at the aforementioned property, terminated his tenancy under a lease with Plaintiffs by vacating the premises.4 6. Sometime in late August and early September, 1992, Defendant parked vehicles in front of the unoccupied rental building, and erected two signs at the walkway to a front door. One sign mounted on a post was black with white lettering, and bore the following admonition: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 (Plaintiffs' Deed); N.T. II, 80-81. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 (Defendant's Deed); N.T. IV, 60. N.T. III, 43. 3 No. 41 Equity 1992 PRIVATE PARKING. Sheaffer Auto Body Customers Only. Violators will be towed at their own expense.5 The second sign was written on the windshield of a parked vehicle in front of the rental property. It read, "Private Parkig (sic) For-Sheaffer,s.-6 7. The subject of dispute in the present case is known as "High Street," which is not and never has been a public street or road of Silver Spring Township.7 8. Arthur P. Loscher, a title abstractor, testified that, in deeds in Plaintiffs' chain of title, the western side of High Street is given as the eastern line of Plaintiffs' property.8 In addition, he indicated that there is one reference to High Street's being a property line in Defendant's chain of title - the eastern right-of-way line of High Street being given as the property's western boundary line9 in the deed of conveyance to Defendant. Mr. Loscher's testimony is accepted as accurate. 9. The precise origin of High Street cannot be ascertained Plaintiffs' Exhibit 40; N.T. II, 100-02. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 40; N.T. II, 99. N.T. II, 36 (testimony of Township Engineer Robert G. Hartman, Jr.); N.T. V, 64-70 (testimony of Township Solicitor Richard C. Snelbaker). 8 N.T. I, 17. ~ Id., 20; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19. 4 No. 41 Equity 1992 with any definiteness. High Street was purportedly shown on a Plan of Hogestown, but the plan is apparently not a matter of public record. Although former Township Engineer Robert G. Hartman, Jr., testified to having seen a copy of such a plan, no copy has been located.~° 10. Former Township Engineer Hartman testified that, in his opinion, the Sheaffer property line is the east side of "High Street.,,~ 11. Mr. Hartman testified that, in his professional opinion, based upon his forty years of experience as an engineer and surveyor, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant own High Street.~2 12. Lawrence "Pappy" Shoffner owned the Plaintiffs' property from 1947 until his death in 1976.~3 According to testimony given by former Silver Spring Township Supervisor Mervin Raudabaugh (who first became familiar with the area presently in dispute in 1944), Mr. Shoffner and patrons of his antiques business parked their vehicles on High Street for the entire length of that way, and the Township, predecessor in title to Defendant, did not obstruct access.TM This testimony is accepted by the Court as accurate. N.T. I, 32. N.T. I, 29; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28. N.T. I, 35. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. N.T. II, 23-4. 5 No. 41 Equity 1992 13. Donald Robinson testified that he became acquainted with High Street around the year 1958, and that he personally resided at Mr. Shoffner's residence (now Plaintiffs' property) from 1972 until 1985; after 1972, Mr. Robinson became the owner of the Shoffner property through a devise in Mr. Shoffner's will and as a purchaser from the Shoffner estate in 1976. Mr. Robinson maintained his residence there until he sold the property to the Gottshalls in 1985.~s 14. Mr. Robinson testified that he personally used High Street at will, without interference from Township personnel, throughout the duration of his residency.~6 His testimony is also accepted as accurate. 15. Former Township Engineer Hartman confirmed that High Street remained unobstructed and freely accessible to vehicles of guests and residents on what is now Plaintiffs' property.~7 16. Former Silver Spring Township Supervisor Raymond M. Best gave his testimony, drawing on his familiarity with High Street beginning around 1962 as a voter~8 and later as supervisor. He ~s N.T. I, 41-50. ~6 N.T. I, 52-5. ~7 N.T. I, 39-40. ~8 The Township building was used as a voting place before its use was devoted to housing Township maintenance vehicles. It is this same building from which Defendant carries on his auto body repair and sales business. 6 No. 41 Equity 1992 testified that High Street was always unobstructed, and that residents had ample space for parking their vehicles on the length of the property of Plaintiffs' predecessors in title.~9 His testimony is accepted as accurate. 17. Charles D. Vance, a resident of Silver Spring Township from 1964 to the present who travelled past the properties for many years as a commuter, testified that the area between the Township building (the shed occupied by Defendant) and the garage (on Plaintiffs, property) was clear and unobstructed, and that he does not recall ever having seen Township equipment parked along the west side of the building, now belonging to Defendant.20 His testimony is accepted as accurate. 18. William Gottshall, Plaintiffs' direct predecessor in title (unrelated to Plaintiffs' former tenant, David Gutshall), acknowledged that he parked up to ten vehicles in "High Street.,,2~ His testimony is accepted as accurate. 19. Neither party has shown ownership in fee simple of "High Street," or any portion thereof; neither party has convinced the Court that it has suffered pecuniary loss from the other's conduct. DISCUSSION Statement of Law. "A party seeking to enjoin an invasion of N.T. II, 4-8. 20 N.T. II. 12-20. N.T. IV, 6. 7 No. 41 Equity 1992 ... real property must demonstrate that he or she has a clear right to the property in question." Cannon Brothers, Inc. v. D'Agostino, 356 Pa. Super. 286, 291, 514 A.2d 614, 617 (1986). In sustaining this burden, it is well established that the plaintiff "must rely on the strength of his own title, or other legal right, and not on the weakness of the title or legal right asserted by the [defendant]." Myersdale & Salisbury Street Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania & Maryland Street Railway Co., 219 Pa. 558, 566, 69 A. 92, 94-95 (1908). Furthermore, where a street is designated as a boundary but is not dedicated to public use, the grantees' title does not extend to the center of the street, though, depending on use, one may acquire an easement or right over it. Cannon Brothers, Inc. v. D'Agostino, 356 Pa. Super. 286, 514 A.2d 614 (1986). "A principal objective of the law concerning prescription is the protection of long established positions." Brouse v. Hauck, 330 Pa. Super. 58, 64, 478 A.2d 1348, 1352 (1984). The existence vel non of a prescriptive easement is a question for the finder of fact. Burkett v. Smyder, 369 Pa. Super. 519, 535 A.2d 671 (1988). In order to assert an easement by prescription, use of the land must be adverse, open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted for twenty-one years. Keefer v. Jones, 467 Pa. 544, 359 A.2d 735 (1976); Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa. Super. 291, 556 A.2d 912 (1989); Estojak v. Mazsa, 522 Pa. 353, 562 A.2d 271 (1989). 8 No. 41 Equity 1992 Additionally, "the party asserting the easement must demonstrate the above elements by proof that is clear and positive." Walley v. Iraca, 360 Pa. Super. 436, 441-42, 520 A.2d 886, 889 (1987). For prescription, the claimants' use need not be constant use; "[r]ather, 'continuity is established if the evidence shows a settled course of conduct indicating an attitude of mind on the part of the user or users that the use is the exercise of a property right.'" Newell Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. Bauer, 409 Pa. Super. 75, 81, 597 A.2d 667, 670 (1991), quoting Minteer v. Wolfe, 300 Pa. Super. 234, 240, 446 A.2d 316, 319 (1982). "When a right or title is of ancient origin or where the transaction under investigation is so remote as to be incapable of direct proof ... the law, of necessity, relaxes the rules of evidence and requires less evidence to substantiate the fact [in] controversy." Tomlinson v. Jones, 384 Pa. Super. 176, 179, 557 A.2d 1103, 1104 (1989) (expositing the law regarding easements by implication). "The scope of use during [an easement's] prescriptive period determines the scope of the easement ... obtained, except with respect to a reasonable evolution of use which is not unduly burdensome." Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa. Super. 291, 294, 556 A.2d 912, 914 (1989). Moreover, a prescriptive easement is limited in location and size by the extent of actual use during the prescriptive period. Hash v. Sofinowski, 337 Pa. Super. 451, 487 A.2d 32 (1984). Furthermore, the time period of a permissive 9 No. 41 Equity 1992 easement cannot be "tacked for the purpose of fulfilling the prescriptive period unless ... the prior permissive use had been transformed into an adverse use by appropriate notice to the owner of the land." Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa. Super. 291, 296, 556 A.2d 912, 914 (1989). Application of law to facts. In the present case, Plaintiffs urge the Court to enjoin Defendant from obstructing "High Street," based on Plaintiffs' contention of ownership of "High Street." The evidence presented includes the Last Will and Testament of one Jacob Haldeman;22 various deeds arising out of sales involving the Haldeman property; and testimony as to the use of High Street from approximately the time the property came to be owned by one Lawrence Shoffner in 1947, to the present time. Additionally, numerous photographs were introduced by both parties into evidence. Despite Plaintiffs' claim that they own "High Street," we find the evidence marshalled to support this assertion to be non-definitive. Moreover, we decline to draw the inference that Plaintiffs' predecessors in title provided all the land from which High Street was made. Considering all the evidence, Plaintiffs have failed to establish, through the strength of their title and legal rights, that ownership of High Street lies in them. We need not reach the issue of ownership of "High Street," however, in order to fashion an equitable remedy. From the 2~ Defendant's Exhibit 31. 10 No. 41 Equity 1992 testimony offered at trial, we conclude that Plaintiffs' predecessors in title, beginning with Lawrence Shoffner, used High Street for parking in front of the dwelling units thereon and access to the garage in the rear of the property. The area to the west of what is now Sheaffer's Auto Body Shop was unobstructed, and evidently passable to vehicular traffic. While Plaintiffs' direct predecessors in title, William E. and Margaret Gottshall,23 signed an agreement allowing them to use High Street at the behest of Defendant, we conclude that an easement by prescription for the full use of High Street had already been established by over 38 years of adverse, open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use by Plaintiffs' predecessors in title. Through such use, an easement has been created regardless of who really owned the property, and that easement inured to the benefit of Plaintiffs' predecessors in title, their guests and tenants; Plaintiffs shall benefit from these same rights. Furthermore, no evidence adduced at trial suggests that this easement by prescription has been abandoned.24 As the finder of fact, the Court does not find persuasive the testimony of William E. Gottshall, including his reasons for entering into a permissive- use agreement with Defendant. Mr. Gottshall's testimony that he ~3 The Gottshalls purchased the property in 1985 and sold it to the Lees in 1990. 2~ Ladner on Conveyances in Pennsylvania, ~11.03 cites the following seven ways in which an easement may be extinguished: "(1) release, (2) adverse possession, (3) abandonment, (4) merger of title, (5) foreclosure of a lien antedating the easement, (6) condemnation under power of eminent domain, or (7) cessation of purpose." 11 No. 41 Equity 1992 parked up to ten automobiles on "High Street,"2s however, further serves to demonstrate that Defendant's attempt to claim easement rights in "High Street," which are based on adverse use, and which conflict with Plaintiffs' rights, is not compelling. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: ADJUDICATION AND DECREE NISI AND NOW, this ~ day of February, 1994, following a trial and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant is ENJOINED from blocking vehicular access on High Street to Plaintiffs' garage and dwelling units, and from interfering with parking directly in front of the dwelling units. All other relief requested by either party is DENIED. This DECREE NISI shall become a final decree unless post-trial motions are filed within 10 days. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 2s N.T. IV, 6. 12 No. 41 Equity 1992 Richard C. Snelbaker, Esq. 44 West Main Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Attorney for Plaintiffs Henry F. Coyne, Esq. 3901 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant : rc 13