HomeMy WebLinkAbout2007-2044
CHRISTOPHER S. PANILAITIS, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION
:
CNH AMERICA, LLC, :
CASE NEW HOLLAND, INC., :
f/k/a NEW HOLLAND NORTH :
AMERICA, INC., f/k/a FORD :
HOLLAND, INC., and :
CABLE KINNARD, :
Defendants : NO. 2007-2044 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT CABLE KINNARD’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HESS, P.J., GUIDO and PECK, JJ.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
PECK, J., March 14, 2012.
This civil case consists of claims under the theories of strict product liability and
negligence arising from an incident involving a piece of construction equipment alleged
1
to qualify as a chattel known to be dangerous for its intended use. Christopher S.
Panilaitis (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) has sued the manufacturer of the product in strict tort
23
liability. Plaintiff has also sued the supplier of the equipment and Cable Kinnard
(hereinafter “Defendant”), who owns the farm upon which Plaintiff sustained his injuries,
4
for negligence. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to provide to Plaintiff the
1
Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree, in their briefs as well as at argument, that the product is governed by Section
388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use).
2
Complaint, ¶¶18-26, 27-34, 53-54, filed April 13, 2007.
3
In this context, the definition of “supplier” is that given to the term under Section 388 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.
4
Complaint, ¶¶ 35-52, 53-54, filed April 13, 2007.
equipment’s safety manual, allowed Plaintiff to operate the dangerous equipment without
56
proper training, failed to properly maintain the equipment, failed to acquire safety
7
information for the equipment, and failed to supervise Plaintiff’s operation of the
8
equipment. It is alleged that Defendant’s negligence was the actual and proximate cause
9
of an accident that resulted in injuries to Plaintiff, including the “amputation of all five
10
toes on his right foot.”
For disposition at this time is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
11
on Plaintiff’s claim against him. Oral argument was held on January 6, 2012. For the
reasons stated in this opinion, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be
granted.
12
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff filed his complaint against CNH America, LLC and
13
Defendant for damages resulting from an incident that occurred on April 19, 2005. On
14
September 27, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, to which
5
Complaint, ¶¶ 45, 46 filed April 13, 2007.
6
Complaint, ¶49, filed April 13, 2007.
7
Complaint, ¶44, filed April 13, 2007.
8
Complaint, ¶47, filed April 13, 2007.
9
Deposition of Christopher S. Panilaitis, p. 32, 93-94, filed October 26, 2011 (hereinafter “Panilaitis Depo., at
_____, July 16, 2008”).
10
Complaint, ¶10, filed April 13, 2007.
11
Defendant Cable Kinnard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 27, 2011.
12
The Procedural History set forth in this section pertains only to the moving Defendant and Plaintiff.
13
Complaint, filed April 13, 2007.
14
Defendant Cable Kinnard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 27, 2011.
2
15
Plaintiff opposed in his Response. Along with his Response, Plaintiff supplemented the
record with evidence in the form of: (1) a photograph of a warning sticker; (2) a
photograph of the pinch point; (3) the Deposition of Defendant; (4) the Deposition of
Plaintiff; (5) the Deposition of John Dice; and (6) the Operation Manual of the
16
equipment. Oral Argument was held on January 6, 2012, and the matter is now ripe for
disposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence of record relevant to the motion sub judice is largely undisputed and
may be summarized as follows. On April 19, 2005, Plaintiff was operating a piece of
construction equipment, known as a L-783 Skid-Steer Loader (hereinafter “Loader”),
belonging to Defendant, for the purpose of assisting Defendant with a construction
17
project on Defendant’s farm. Plaintiff’s operation of the Loader required him to be
located in the operator’s cabin. Affixed to the inside of the cabin and positioned in plain
view of the Plaintiff as he sat in the operator’s seat, were various notices that warned
whomever should be operating the equipment to use caution. Specifically, one of these
warnings read as follows:
CAUTION
AVOID INJURY
Read operator’s manual
Know location and function of controls
Keep safety devices working
15
Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Cable Kinnard, filed October 26, 2011.
16
Plaintiff’s Submission of Documents in Opposition To Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Cable
Kinnard, filed October 26, 2011.
17
Panilaitis Depo., at 7, July 16, 2008.
3
Keep screens and windows in place
Keep children and others away
Never carry riders
Lower lift arms, engage park brake, stop engine and remove
key before leaving
18
Keep cab clean, especially pedal area.
An additional warning sticker, also located on the inside of the operator’s cabin,
contained the following warning accompanying a diagram:
DANGER
AVOID DEATH
Before removing seat belt and leaving seat
Lower lift arms to ground or rest lift arms on stops
Stop engine
19
Bumping floor pedal can cause lift arms to fall
At his deposition, Plaintiff admitted to having had seen the warning stickers, but denied
20
having read them.
It is undisputed that the Loader’s operation manual was not contained in the
21
Loader. According to Defendant’s uncontradicted deposition testimony, Defendant was
22
never in possession of an operator’s manual for the Loader that he had purchased from
23
a prior owner about two and a half years before the incident occurred. Plaintiff further
admitted that he had neither asked how to use the equipment nor sought the owner’s
18
Exhibit A: Photograph of warning sticker, attached to Plaintiff’s Submission of Documents in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Cable Kinnard, filed October 26, 2011.
19
Deposition Exhibit 8: Copy of Photograph, attached to Exhibit D, Plaintiff’s Submission of Documents in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Cable Kinnard, filed October 26, 2011.
20
Panilaitis Depo., at 92, July 16, 2008; Panilaitis Depo., Ex. 8, July 16, 2008.
21
Deposition of Cable Kinnard, p. 16, filed October 26, 2011 (hereinafter “Kinnard Depo., at _____, February 23,
2011”).
22
Kinnard Depo., at 16, February 23, 2011.
23
Kinnard Depo., at 14, February 23, 2011.
4
24
manual. Additionally, Plaintiff explained that he neither sought to read nor would he
25
have read the owner’s manual if the manual was available.
Despite the absence of an operator’s manual, both Plaintiff and Defendant were
26
aware of how to operate the Loader. Each had developed his own knowledge of its
27
operation from experiences with similar machinery. Relevant to the movement that
caused Plaintiff’s injury, Plaintiff was aware that the left pedal raised and lowered the
2829
Loader’s arm. Plaintiff also was aware of the structure of the equipment. He knew
that the Loader’s arm passed within a very close clearance of the front of the operator’s
30
compartment.
Regarding his familiarity with the Loader, Plaintiff testified that he had worked
31
with heavy construction machinery for many years, partially in connection with his
24
Panilaitis Depo., at 93, July 16, 2008.
25
Panilaitis Depo., at 97, July 16, 2008. At the deposition, the following exchange occurred:
Q: On the date [of the accident], had the manual been in the pocket above the operator’s seat, do you
believe you would have read it?
* * *
A: No.
Q: So you don’t think you would have read it?
A: No.
Panilaitis Depo., at 97, July 16, 2008.
26
See Kinnard Depo., at 18, February 23, 2011; Panilaitis Depo., at 47, July 16, 2008.
27
See Kinnard Depo., at 18, February 23, 2011 (Mr. Kinnard testified that he had not received formal or informal
training but that he had “run them most of [his] life, along with tractors and trucks and any number of machines”);
Panilaitis Depo., at 47, July 16, 2008. (Plaintiff explained his aptitude for working machines such as the Loader as
follows: “I’m pretty mechanically inclined and I can operate just about anything. I’ve always been like that. To me,
it’s like a second wind”).
28
Panilaitis Depo., at 41, 85-88, 91, July 16, 2008.
29
See Panilaitis Depo., at 23, July 16, 2008.
30
Panilaitis Depo., at 16, 23-24, July 16, 2008.
31
Panilaitis Depo., at 37, July 16, 2008.
5
32
employment at an equipment rental business in Arizona. In that capacity, Plaintiff
operated various types of equipment from “weed whackers to D-10 bull dozers,” all of
33
which was done without training. Despite his lack of training, Plaintiff considered
himself adept at operating construction equipment; a sentiment that he had communicated
34
to Defendant. At his deposition, Plaintiff unequivocally explained that he had informed
Defendant that he knew how to operate the Loader as follows:
Q: The very first time that you used this piece of equipment, did you ask any
questions about how to use it?
A: [Defendant] asked me if I knew how to run it and I told him yes.
Q: You told [Defendant] that you did?
35
A: Yes.
Prior to the date on which he sustained his injury, Plaintiff had used this particular
Loader on at least ten occasions during the period of a few years, which totaled
36
approximately forty hours of operating the machine. During that time, he had never
asked for instruction on how to use the Loader and had never experienced an accident or
37
injury due to his operation of the equipment.
The incident that forms the basis for this lawsuit arose in the afternoon of April 19,
2005, at which time Plaintiff had been operating the Loader for approximately half an
32
Panilaitis Depo., at 37, July 16, 2008.
33
Panilaitis Depo., at 37, July 16, 2008.
34
Panilaitis Depo., at 93, July 16, 2008.
35
Panilaitis Depo., at 93, July 16, 2008.
36
Panilaitis Depo., at 11, July 16, 2008.
37
Panilaitis Depo., at 40, July 16, 2008.
6
38
hour. Plaintiff had been operating the Loader to “scoop up gravel” and take it to the
39
location at which it would be poured. During his operation of the Loader, Plaintiff was
40
sitting in the operator’s chair and inadvertently rested his right foot on the ledge located
at the front of the cabin, with his toes extended outside the compartment, while the
41
Loader’s arm was raised in the air. As Plaintiff attempted to dismount the Loader, his
left foot dropped off the ledge and unintentionally bumped the left floor pedal, which
released the arm and caused it to descend and crush his toes that had been extended in the
42
air in front of the cabin.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment standard. The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to
eliminate cases prior to trial where a party cannot make out a claim or defense after the
relevant discovery has been completed. Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 753 A.2d 829,
833 (Pa. Super. 2000). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 makes summary
judgment available to a party when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
38
Panilaitis Depo., at 13, July 16, 2008.
39
Panilaitis Depo., at 12, July 16, 2008.
40
Plaintiff explained the location of his feet as follows:
Q: When you put your feet up on the ledge, you knew that they were in a position where, if the boom
came down for some reason, it could clip your feet?
A: I didn’t realize that because I thought my feet were in because I was only on - - my legs were not
out of the unit. As far as I knew, I was safe having my feet on the inside. I didn’t realize that my
toes were protruding out past the cage.
Q: You didn’t realize that your toes were in that gap area?
A: When the bucket was in the air, you don’t - - you know what I’m saying - - you don’t realize, you
know, that it’s that close or, you know, I didn’t realize that my toes were in a dangerous area at that
time.
Panilaitis Depo., at 23, July 16, 2008.
41
Panilaitis Depo., at 16, 22-23, July 16, 2008.
42
Panilaitis Depo., at 5, 15, July 16, 2008.
7
admissions on file, and supporting affidavits considered together reveal no genuine issue
of material fact, and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
or when, after discovery, the party bearing the burden of proof has failed to produce
evidence of essential facts which would warrant submission of the issue to a jury.
Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1035.2; Toy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 20, 928 A.2d 186
(2007); P.J.S. v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 555 Pa. 149, 153, 723 A.2d 174,
176 (1999); see Kafando v. Erie Ceramic Arts Co., 2000 PA Super 377, ¶5, 764 A.2d 59,
61 (citing Rush v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 1999 PA Super 141, 732 A.2d 648).
Only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, a trial court may
properly enter summary judgment. Basile v. H& R Block, Inc., 563 Pa. 358, 365, 761
A.2d 1115, 1118 (2000).
The moving party bears the burden of proving the non-existence of any genuine
issue of material fact. Kafando v. Erie Ceramic Arts Co., 2000 PA Super 377, ¶5, 764
A.2d 59, 61. A material fact, for summary judgment purposes, is one that directly affects
the outcome of the case. Kuney v. Benjamin Franklin Clinic, 2000 PA Super 129, ¶3,
751 A.2d 662, 664. If a defendant is the moving party, he or she may make the showing
necessary to support the entry of summary judgment by pointing to materials which
indicate that the plaintiff is unable to satisfy an element essential to his or her cause of
action; correspondingly, the non-moving party must adduce sufficient evidence on an
issue essential to his or her case and on which that party bears the burden of proof, such
that a jury could return a verdict favorable to the non-moving party. Rauch v. Mike-
Mayer, 2001 PA Super 270, ¶14, 783 A.2d 815, 824, appeal denied, Rauch ex rel. Estate
8
of Rauch v. Mike Mayer, 586 Pa. 634, 793 A.2d 909 (2002). Failure to adduce this
evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ertel v. Patriot-News Company, 544 Pa. 93,
101, 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1996).
When determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court
must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving
party. Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1035.2; Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 563 Pa. 501, 504,
762 A.2d 339, 340-341 (2000); Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 2001 PA Super 270, ¶13, 783 A.2d
815, 823; see Leonelli v. McMullen, 700 A.2d 525, 527 (Pa. Super. 1997). The non-
moving party may not rely upon mere allegations, and is required to produce evidence of
record to establish the facts essential to its cause of action. Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1035.3(a)(2).
It is not the function of the court ruling on a motion for summary judgment to
weigh evidence and to determine the truth of the matter; rather, the trial court must
confine its inquiry when confronted with a motion for summary judgment as to whether
material factual disputes exist. Keenheel v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 134 Pa.
Commw. 494, 504, 579 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1990); Township of Bensalem v. Moore, 152
Pa. Commw. 540, 543, 620 A.2d 76, 77 (1993).
Chattel known to be dangerous for intended use. Both Plaintiff and Defendant
agree that the law applicable to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant is Section 388 of the
Restate (Second) of Torts, entitled Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use,
which has been adopted as the law of this Commonwealth. See, e.g., Erdos v. Bedford
9
Valley Petroleum Co., 452 Pa. Super. 555, 682 A.2d 806 (1996). That section of the
Restatement provides as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject
to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of
the other or to be endangered by its probable use, the physical harm caused by the use of
the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the
supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the
use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of
the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
R(S)T,§388(1965). The Comment on Clause (b) clarifies
ESTATEMENT ECOND OF ORTS
the intention of the section regarding its conjunctive elements. The Comment provides in
its entirety as follows:
When warning of defects unnecessary. One who supplies a chattel to others to use for any
purpose is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
character in so far as it is known to him, or of facts which to his knowledge make it likely
to be dangerous, if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the
chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved. It is not
necessary for the supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is supplied of a
condition which a mere casual looking over will disclose, unless the circumstances under
which the chattel is supplied are such as to make it likely that even so casual inspection
will not be made. However, the condition, although readily observable, may be one which
only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous. In such case, if the
supplier, having such special experience, knows that the condition involves danger and
has no reason to believe that those who use it will have such special experience as will
enable them to perceive the danger, he is required to inform them of the risk of which he
himself knows and which he has no reason to suppose that they will realize.
R(S)T,§388, cmt. to cl. (b) (1965) (emphasis supplied).
ESTATEMENT ECOND OF ORTS
Application of law. In the case sub judice, Plaintiff has failed to set forth any
evidence in support of the second element, and has thus failed to establish a prima facie
10
case under Section 388. The record is clear that Defendant had reason to believe that
Plaintiff realized the dangerous nature of the Loader. At his deposition, Plaintiff
unequivocally made direct verbal representations that he knew how to use the Loader,
which was reaffirmed by his conduct. According to Plaintiff’s own testimony,
approximately two years before the date of the incident, Defendant had asked Plaintiff
whether he knew how to use the Loader, to which Plaintiff admitted that he had answered
in the affirmative. Additionally, Plaintiff’s actions demonstrated that he did in fact know
how to use the Loader, as he had used the equipment on at least ten prior occasions and
logged over forty hours on the machine. Thus, on the day of the injury, Defendant
supplied to Plaintiff the Loader with the reasonable belief that Plaintiff knew how to use
the equipment.
Additionally, the dangerous nature of the equipment relevant to the injury suffered
by Plaintiff is readily apparent and Defendant’s belief that such was known to Plaintiff
was reasonable. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware the arm of the Loader passed
within a very close distance to the edge of the operator’s cabin. Furthermore, he was
aware that the left pedal controlled the arm’s movement. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s
action, specifically his attempt to climb out of the machine while the arm was still
elevated and at a time where the Loader was still operational, which resulted in his
43
bumping of the left floor pedal, was nothing more than an accident. Based on
Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony, it is clear that the injury he suffered was caused by
43
Panilaitis Depo., at 32, July 16, 2008. (“I accidently bumped the pedal”); Panilaitis Depo., at 94, July 16, 2008.
(“I try to be safety conscious myself all I can. It was just an accident.”).
11
his mistake rather than his misinformed operation of the Loader. Accordingly, the court
is unable to conclude that Defendant can be held liable for his failure to train or supervise
Plaintiff on the Loader, which Plaintiff clearly knew how to use, or inform Plaintiff of the
equipment’s dangerous nature, which was readily apparent. For these reasons, Plaintiff
cannot establish an essential element to support a finding of negligence pursuant to
Section 388 of the Restatement, and thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Additionally, the record is completely devoid of any evidence in support of
Plaintiff’s proposition that Defendant was negligent in his maintaining the Loader.
According to Plaintiff’s own testimony, “as far as [he] knew, [the Loader] was working
44
fine.” To decline to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant would permit
Plaintiff to maintain his suit upon mere allegations, as the record contains no evidence
that would permit reasonable minds to differ on Plaintiff’s unsupported claim that
Defendant was negligent in his maintaining the equipment. As the non-moving party,
Plaintiff is required to come forward with evidence in the record to establish the facts
essential to a cause of action. Unsupported assertions and conclusory accusations cannot
create genuine issues of fact. Consequently, since Plaintiff fails to establish that
Defendant negligently maintained the Loader, this court must grant summary judgment.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant was negligent for his failure to
provide Plaintiff with the operator’s manual must fail. Plaintiff’s own deposition
testimony is dispositive as to the causal link between the breached duty and injury
required to maintain an action for negligence. While it is undisputed that Defendant had
44
Panilaitis Depo., at 94, July 16, 2008.
12
never provided to Plaintiff an operator’s manual and that Plaintiff had never requested
45
such a manual, it is similarly undisputed that, even if Defendant had made such a
provision, Plaintiff would not have read the manual. Additionally, the court must restate
that Plaintiff’s injury was caused by his own unintentional actions; specifically his
placing of his foot in an area that he knew was dangerous and accidently bumping the
floor pedal while climbing out of the operator’s cabin with the Loader still operational.
Plaintiff has not set forth evidence to permit the conclusion that, even if Plaintiff had read
46
the manual his actions would have been different. Accordingly, there exists no genuine
issue of material fact, and the record fails to contain evidence to support Plaintiff’s
contention that Defendant was negligent in his failure to supply the operator’s manual.
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted.
Based on the court’s grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant, the
47
Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is
moot. However, the court agrees with Defendant’s contention that the record lacks any
45
Despite the averment in Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s New Matter, which states, in pertinent part, that “[p] rior
to the time of the incident, Plaintiff was aware that an operator’s manual was available from the manufacturer for the
product and requested Defendant Kinnard for the operator’s manual,” Plaintiff’s deposition makes clear that he had
never asked Defendant to see the owner’s manual. Panilaitis Depo., at 97-98, July 16, 2008. (emphasis Supplied); cf.
Plaintiff’s Reply to New Matter of Defendant Cable Kinnard, ¶58, filed May 29, 2007.
46
Additionally, despite that Plaintiff’s Reply makes the assertion that “as a matter of law, it is presumed that
Plaintiff would have heeded the warnings presented in the manual, had he been supplied with that manual.”
Plaintiff’s Reply to New Matter of Defendant Cable Kinnard, ¶58, filed May 29, 2007. It is clear that, had Plaintiff
been supplied with the operator’s manual, he would not have read the warnings. See Panilaitis Depo., at 97, July 16,
2008.
Q: So you don’t think you would have read [the manual]?
A: No.
Panilaitis Depo., at 97, July 16, 2008.
47
Defendant Cable Kinnard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶14, filed September 27, 2011.
13
indication of “malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or oppressive conduct” as required by
48
the rule governing the award of punitive damages.
For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 14 day of March, 2012, after careful consideration of Defendant
Cable Kinnard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, following oral argument held on
January 6, 2012, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
BY THE COURT,
s/ Christylee L. Peck
Christylee L. Peck, J.
Justin Stefanon, Esq.
Anthony Stefanon, Esq.
407 North Front Street
P.O. Box 12027
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Kevin C. McNamara, Esq.
Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP
305 North Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Attorney for Defendant Kinnard
48
Generally, punitive damages are unavailable absent a showing that the conduct complained of was “outrageous.”
See R(S)T,§908; Johnson v. Pilgram Mut. Ins. Co., 284 Pa. Super. 314, 324-325, 425
ESTATEMENT ECOND OF ORTS
A.2d 1119, 1124-1125 (1981) (recognizing that Pennsylvania has adopted the rule of punitive damages as set forth
in section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
14
Mark E. Gebauer, Esq.
Adam M. Shienvold, Esq.
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC
th
213 Market Street, 8 Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Attorneys for Defendant CNH America, LLC
15
CHRISTOPHER S. PANILAITIS, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION
:
CNH AMERICA, LLC, :
CASE NEW HOLLAND, INC., :
f/k/a NEW HOLLAND NORTH :
AMERICA, INC., f/k/a FORD :
HOLLAND, INC., and :
CABLE KINNARD, :
Defendants : NO. 2007-2044 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT CABLE KINNARD’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BEFORE HESS, P.J., GUIDO and PECK, JJ.
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW, this 14day of March, 2012, after careful consideration of Defendant
Cable Kinnard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, following oral argument held on
January 6, 2012, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
BY THE COURT,
___________________
Christylee L. Peck, J.
Justin Stefanon, Esq.
Anthony Stefanon, Esq.
407 North Front Street
P.O. Box 12027
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Kevin C. McNamara, Esq.
Thomas, Thomas & Hafer, LLP
305 North Front Street
P.O. Box 999
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Attorney for Defendant Kinnard
Mark E. Gebauer, Esq.
Adam M. Shienvold, Esq.
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC
th
213 Market Street, 8 Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Attorneys for Defendant CNH America, LLC