HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-0418 Criminal COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : 418 CRIMINAL 1993
:
: CHARGE: (A) D.U.I.
: (B) ENDANG. WELFARE OF CHILDREN
: (C) RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
SANDRA L. PEALER : (D) DRIVING VEH. AT SAFE SPEED
OTN: E024325-0 : AFFIANT: PTL. MICHAEL HOPE
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 1st day of February, 1994, upon
consideration of the Defendant's omnibus pretrial motion for
relief in the form of a motion to suppress, following a hearing,
and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the
Defendant's motion is DENIED.
By the Court, '--~
I / .? ./ / '"
Michael Schwoyer, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
Austin F. Grogan, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : 418 CRIMINAL 1993
:
: CHARGE: (A) D.U.I.
: (B) ENDANG. WELFARE OF CHILDREN
: (C) RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
SANDRA L. PEALER : (D) DRIVING VEH. AT SAFE SPEED
OTN: E024325-0 : AFFIANT: PTL. MICHAEL HOPE
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Oler, J.
In the present Crimes Code and Vehicle Code case
involving charges of driving under the influence,
endangering welfare of children, driving at an unsafe speed,
and failure to employ a restraint system, the Defendant has
filed an omnibus pre-trial motion for relief in the form of
a suppression motion. In the motion, she seeks the
suppression of evidence resulting from the stop of her
vehicle on the ground that the officer lacked a sufficient
basis to make a legal stop and arrest. A hearing was held
on the motion on Tuesday, February 1, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Sunday, November 15, 1992, at approximately 2:00
a.m., the affiant in this case, Patrolman Michael Hope of
the Camp Hill Borough Police Department, was on routine
patrol in uniform and in a marked police car, traveling
south on the Camp Hill Bypass in the Borough of Camp Hill,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
officer Hope was traveling at a speed of
approximately 35 miles per hour, which was the posted speed
limit of the said roadway. In the vicinity of the
intersection of the Bypass with Country Club Road, Officer
Hope observed in his rear-view mirror a vehicle approaching
at a high rate of speed, and he watched as it passed by him.
He estimated its speed to be between 55 and 60 miles per
hour. The vehicle then made a right turn from the Bypass
onto Country Club Road.
Patrolman Hope, a veteran of seven years with the
borough's police department, with extensive experience in
making traffic stops and judging the speed of vehicles, put
on his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle which he had
seen pass him. The vehicle stopped in the middle of the
street.
Patrolman Hope approached the vehicle, which the
Defendant, Sandra L. Pealer, was operating, and observed a
can of beer in a cup holder in the vehicle. He also
observed a child of the Defendant in the vehicle. The
Defendant proceeded to spill the cup of beer. The officer
detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on the
Defendants's breath, observed that her eyes were bloodshot
and glassy, and perceived that her speech was slurred. He
a preliminary breath test, and attempted unsuccessfully to
administer two standard field sobriety tests. However, the
Defendant insisted upon holding her child during the tests,
and was consequently unable to complete them. In the
opinion of the officer, the Defendant was under the
influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered her
incapable of safe driving. At 3:07 a.m. on that morning,
the Defendant submitted to a blood alcohol test, the result
of which was .159 percent.
STATEMENT OF LAW
"Encounters with police may be classified as mere
encounters, non-custodial detentions, custodial detentions
and formal arrests." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa. Super.
337, 354, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 (1988).1 "The classification
of the encounter determines the applicability and scope of
the constitutional protections .... "Id.
"An individual has not been arrested when he is
stopped briefly for questioning. Thus, an officer may stop
and briefly detain and question an individual if the
investigating officer can point to specific and articulable
facts which reasonably warrant the belief that criminal
1 Non-custodial detentions "are also commonly referred to
as Terry stops, traffic stops, investigatory detentions and
intermediate detentions." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.
Super. 337, 354 n.5, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 n.5 (1988).
activity is afoot. These brief investigatory stops are not
considered to be arrests." 1 Wasserbly, Pennsylvania
Criminal Practice Section 6.01 (1991). "A policeman who
lacks the requisite level of information for probable cause
is not required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape." I__d. Section 6.02.
Even in the absence of probable cause, an
investigating police officer may stop and
briefly detain an individual, as long as
the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts, which, in conjunction
with the natural inferences derived from
these facts, warrant the intrusion.2
With respect to driving under the influence,
erratic or unsafe driving is a common ground for initiating
an investigatory stop.3 "An investigative detention, of
course, may ripen into an arrest based upon probable cause
when police uncover additional information confirming
earlier suspicions." 1 Wasserbly, Pennsylvania Criminal
Practice Section 6.02 (1991); see, e.q., Commonwealth v.
Hamme, 400 Pa. Super. 537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990). Probable
cause is "those facts and circumstances available at the
time of the arrest which would justify a reasonable prudent
2 i Wasserbly, Pennsylvania Criminal Practice Section
6.02 (1991).
3 See Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa. Super. 537, 583
A.2d 1245 (1990); Pokrandt v. Shields, 773 F. Supp. 758
(E.D. Pa. 1991).
man in the belief that a crime has been committed and that
the individual arrested was the probable perpetrator."
Commonwealth v. Harper, 485 Pa. 572, 583, 403 A.2d 536, 542
(1979).
Indicia of being under the influence have been held
by this Court to include "excessive speed and impaired
judgment, as well as the odor of an alcoholic beverage,
bloodshot eyes, and unkempt condition .... " Commonwealth
v. McClellan, 42 Cumb. L.J. 312, 318 (1993). Additional
factors present in this case include parking of the vehicle
in the street, the presence of an alcoholic beverage in the
vehicle, the spilling of alcohol by the Defendant, and her
unwillingness to submit to the field sobriety tests in the
proper manner.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
In the present case, the Court finds that the
officer had a clearly sufficient basis to stop the
Defendant's vehicle for a traffic violation, and that,
following execution of the stop, the officer perceived
sufficient indicia of the Defendant's being under the
influence to warrant his arrest of her for driving under the
influence. It follows that he also had a sufficient basis
for requesting that the Defendant submit to a blood alcohol
test. For these reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress
evidence based upon the illegality of the vehicle's stop and
her subsequent allegedly unlawful arrest must be denied.
For the foregoing reasons, the following Order of
Court will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 1st day of February, 1994, upon
consideration of the Defendant,s omnibus pre-trial motion
for relief in the form of a motion to suppress, following a
hearing, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying
Opinion, the Defendant's motion is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Ole~, Jr. ' j.
Michael Schwoyer, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
Austin F. Grogan, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender