HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-0067 Civil WILLIAM F. PRICE, III, and - IN THE COURT'OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PATRICIA J. PRICE, '
husband and wife, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs
:
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
:
JACK C. BEITZEL and CAROL :
BEITZEL, husband and wife, :
and JACOB L. LAMMEREE and :
MARCELLAA. LAMMEREE, husband :
and wife,
Defendants :
: NO. 67 EQUITY 1993
.IN RE: ADJUDICATION
~EFORE OLER, J.
DECREE NISI
AND NOW, this ~ ~ day of July, 1994, upon consideration of
Plaintiffs, complaint and Defendants, counterclaim, following a
trial and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the
Court finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on
Plaintiffs, complaint, and in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs on Defendants, counterclaim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
are directed to cease utilization of Defendants, property as a
source of water within 90 days of Defendants, payment to them of
the sum of $3850.00.
THE PROTHONOTARY is directed to enter this Decree Nisi as a
Final Decree upon praecipe of a party under Pa. R.C.P. 227.4(1)(c),
if no timely motion for post-trial relief under Pa. R.C.P. 227 1 is
filed. '
BY THE COURT,
Steven J. Weingarten, Esq.
Carol A. Steinour, Esq.
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Diane G. Radcliff, Esq.
3448 Trindle Road
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorney for Defendants
:re
WILLIAM F. PRICE, III, and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PATRICIA j. PRICE,
husband and wife, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiffs :
V.
: CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
JACK C. BEITZEL and CAROL :
BEITZEL, husband and wife, :
and JACOB L. LAMMEREE and :
MARCELLAA. LAMMEREE, husband :
and wife,
Defendants :
: NO. 67 EQUITY 1993
IN RE: ADJUDiCATiON
BEFORE OLER, j.
QPINION and DECREE NISl
Oler, j.
This case in equity involves a dispute between adjoining lot
owners in a subdivision. Plaintiffs, as owners of one lot, claim
certain interests in Defendants, tract.~ Defendants, as owners of
their tract, claim certain infringements upon it by Plaintiffs.2
Trial in the matter was held on Monday, March 14, 1994, and
Thursday, March 17, 1994. By agreement of counsel, the record was
supplemented by a deposition filed on April 25, 1994.3 Briefs were
submitted by counsel on May 9, 1994.
This adjudication in equity is made in accordance with
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1517(a).
Statement of Issues
~ Plaintiffs, complaint, paragraphs 26-38.
2 Defendants, answer with new matter and counterclaim,
paragraphs 56-57.
3 Deposition of Ernest C. Reisinger, March 30, 1994.
--1--
The issues to be determined herein are (1) whether, as
Plaintiffs assert, the use of Defendants, tract is circumscribed by
its description on a subdivision plan as a "private recreational
area"; (2) whether, as Plaintiffs assert, they have acquired an
easement by estoppel or irrevocable license to use Defendants, land
as a source of water; and (3) whether, as Defendants assert,
Plaintiffs, use of Defendants, land as a source of water may be
terminated.
C~hronoloqical Statement of Fact~
William F. Price, III, and Patricia j. Price (Plaintiffs) are
the owners of lot B-31 in a subdivision in Middlesex Township,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, known as Reis Acres Estates.4
Jack C. Beitzel, Carol A. Beitzel, Jacob L. Lammeree and Marcella
A. Lammeree (Defendants) are the owners of two contiguous,
unnumbered lots in the subdivision, bordering in part on
Plaintiffs, lot.5 Defendants, lots are described on the 1967
subdivision plan applicable to this section of Reis Acres Estates
as a "PRIVATE RECREATION AREA.,6 Plaintiffs, deed refers to the
said 1967 plan, and describes Plaintiffs, lot as bounded in part by
the "recreation area..7
The purpose of placing this designation on the 1967 plan was
4 Plaintiffs, Exhibit 2, Trial, Price v. Beitzel, No. 67
Equity 1993 (hereinafter Plaintiffs, [or Defendants,] Exhibit ~).
Defendants, Exhibit 3; Plaintiffs, Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs, Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs, Exhibit 2.
--2--
to denote an area of land being used by the corporate subdivider
for recreation of its employees and the employees of two affiliates
--specifically, recreation in the form of swimming pool
activities-8 The term was not intended to represent a dedication,
public or private, of the tract, nor, in the Court's view, did an
occasional use of the area by neighbors for activities such as
interment of pets and parking of vehicles indicate a common or
reasonable understanding otherwise.
Plaintiffs purchased their lot in 1979 for $7,000.9 At trial,
they testified that they were told by a man who had succeeded to
the presidency and ownership of the corporate subdivider that the
tract in question was a private recreational area for use by the
Reis Acres community, and could not be developed. Somewhat
paradoxically, he also, according to their testimony, entered into
an oral arrangement with them whereby they were to fill in the
swimming pool on the property, in return for use of the property's
well. Unfortunately, this gentleman has since died.~8
Testimony on behalf of the Plaintiffs also indicated that they
spent $850 for a tank and pump, about $1500 for fill-in of the
pool, and about $1500 for water lines. They have had the benefit
~ Deposition of Ernest C Reisinger, filed April 25, 1994,
N.T. 9-10. '
Plaintiffs, Exhibit 2.
~0 With respect to this testimon , which
William F. Price. IIT ~_~_ ~ · Y was by Plaintiff
· . 4, u~enaan~s state i
presldent/owne~ ~ .... ~ - . n their brief that "~h
examination ma n~%~t sea ~ntw~s ~ available for or s~
· n Opposition to Plaintiffs, Request for an Injunction and in
· ~ ~u~mony ~na~m~ssiD±e... Defendants, Brief
Support of Defendants, Request for an Injunction, at 11 n.2.
-3-
of the use of the well since 1979, and have maintained the system
during that period, according to the testimony.
In 1990, Defendants purchased a 25-acre tract, including the
portion of Reis Acres Estates consisting of the two lots designated
"PRIVATE RECREATION AREA," for $75,000.~ A predecessor in title
had purchased this land with no actual knowledge of any statements
which may have been made by the aforesaid corporate president to
the Plaintiffs in 1979, but with actual knowledge that the term
"PRIVATE RECREATION AREA" on the 1967 plan was intended to mean
nothing more than indicated above.~2 A preliminary subdivision plan
prepared in 1991 with respect to Defendants, 25-acre tract suggests
that the area so labeled on the 1967 plan is to be among 10
building lots in a 12-lot subdivision.~3
Defendants have notified Plaintiffs that it is their intention
to conclude Plaintiffs, use of Defendants, land as a source of
water.TM In this regard, Defendants state that they have offered
to compensate Plaintiffs for the cost of improvements which
Plaintiffs may have effected.~5
On December 17, 1993, Plaintiffs filed the complaint sub
~ Defendants, Exhibit 3; Plaintiffs, Exhibits 1, 6.
~2 Deposition of Ernest C. Reisinger, filed April 25, 1994;
N.T. 9-10, 17-18.
~3 Plaintiffs, Exhibit 6. Two of the 12 lots are
"substandard.. and are to be conveyed to adjoining landowners. Id.
~4 Plaintiffs, complaint, paragraph 23; Defendants, answer
with new matter and counterclaim, paragraph 23.
~5 Defendants, answer with new matter and counterclaim,
paragraph 53.
-4-
judice against Defendants. The complaint asserts that "It]he
inclusion of the Private Recreation Area in the 1967 Plan created
a right of use or an easement in all parties, including Plaintiffs,
who purchased a lot pursuant to the 1967 Plan.-~6 On this basis,
an injunction against any conveyance of the said area by
Defendants, and/or its use in a manner inconsistent with the
private rights claimed, is sought.~7
The complaint also asserts that Plaintiffs "have acquired
either an irrevocable license or an easement by estoppel in the
Well on the Private Recreation Area..~8 On this basis, a similar
injunction against conveyance and/or inconsistent use is sought.~9
On January 19, 1994, Defendants filed an answer with new
matter and counterclaim. The counterclaim asserts that
"Plaintiffs, use of the well was pursuant to an oral, revocable
license,., and that the license has been revoked.20 In this regard,
an injunction against continued use by Plaintiffs of Defendants,
land as a source of water is sought.2~
Discussion of uestions of Law Involved
!niunction~. "An injunction is an extraordinary remedy which
Plaintiffs, complaint, paragraph 28.
Plaintiff,s Complaint, count I, claim for relief.
Plaintiffs, complaint, paragraph 36.
Plaintiffs, complaint, count II, claim for relief.
Defendants, counterclaim, paragraph 56 (incorporating
paragraphs 49-50).
2! Defendants, counterclaim, claim for relief.
--5--
should be granted only with great caution.,. Cannon Bros., Inc. v.
D'Agostino, 356 Pa. Super. 286, 290, 514 A.2d 614, 616 (1986).
"The power to grant an injunction should be exercised only in very
clear cases .... . 18 P.L.E. Injunction S2, at 265 (1988). "A
court of equity will grant an injunction only where the rights and
equity of the plaintiff are clear and free from doubt and the harm
sought to be remedied is great and irreparable... Cannon Bros.,
Inc. v. D'Agostino, 356 Pa. Super. 286, 290, 514 A.2d 614, 617
(1986).
However, "[p]roperty rights are appropriate subjects of
injunctive relief, and will be protected against acts which will
result in great or irreparable damage, or which are continuous or
repeated... 18 P.L.E. Injunction S41, at 299 (1988). Indeed, "[i]n
the absence of an adequate remedy at law, a court may restrain the
sale, conveyance or other disposition of real property ..., where
the threatened or contemplated transfer is in violation of the
plaintiff,s rights~- Id. ~43, at 302.
Easements b im lication arisin from lot lans. "Implied
easements are recognized as existing in four situations: (1)
severance or partition of land among multiple owners whose portions
are traversed by a road or way, whose continued existence is
manifested by surrounding circumstances to have been intended ...,
(2) necessity of access, (3) sale of lot with reference to map or
plan of streets and alleys, and (4) description of land as bounded
by a street or way.'. Balog v. Marlow, 30 Pa. D. & C.3d 170, 178
(Somerset Co. 1980).
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As indicated, one of the rules developed in Pennsylvania is
that a sale of lots according to a plan which
shows them to be on a street implies a grant
or covenant to the purchaser that the street
shall be forever open to the use of the public
and operates as ... an irrevocable offer ...
of it to public use; and that the owner of any
lot in the general plan may assert the public
character of any street and the ri ht of
~lic to use it. The rights ~ g . t~e
[unus offered f ..... ~. ~, -.- stree=s
afc ...... uz uealca~lon] ... are --~
~c~ea Dy the failure of the .... ~-: ..... .~u
ac~ upon the dedication. · .... ~=~pa±~Ey to
Reed v. Reese, 473 Pa. 321, 330, 374 A.2d 665, 669 (1976), quoting
in part O'Donnell v. Pittsburgh, 234 Pa. 401, 410, 83 A. 314, 317
(1912).
This rule has been extended to apply to certain walkways shown
on a plan leading from public streets to a "park area," and to the
"park area" itself as shown on the plan. Reed v. Reese, 473 Pa.
321, 374 A.2d 665 (1976); see Davis v. Kahkwa Park Realty Co., 296
Pa. 281, 145 A. 815 (1929); Morrow v. Traction Co., 219 Pa. 619, 69
a. 41 (1908).
Such a rule, construing a plan on which areas of obvious
public usage appear as offering the same for dedication, is a
matter of practicality. In less compelling circumstances, however,
courts will resort more to interpretation than to construction in
determining the nature of a depicted area. See, e.g., Sedwick v.
Blaney, 177 Pa. Super. 423, 110 A.2d 902 (1955); Greenwood Hill
Civic Ass'n v. Woodlawn Farms Corp., 62 Dauphin Co. 276 (1952). As
a "general rule ... an easement by implication arises only where
that was the intent of the parties, as shown by the terms of the
grant and the surrounding circumstances... Nord v. Devault
--7--
Contracting Co., 460 Pa. 647, 651, 334 A.2d 276, 278 (1975).
Purchaser with notice of third- art claims takin from
~rantor without notic,,. "A purchaser with notice [of an unrecorded
third-party claim as to realty] may acquire a good title from a
grantor without notice [of such a claim]. Such purchaser takes the
rights of his vendor... 8 Thompson, Real Property ~4315, at 378-79
(1963).
The [general] rule that a purchaser, with
notice of some prior adverse claim to or
interest in the property, takes subject to
such interest is subject to the limitation
that, if a person with such notice acquires a
legal title to the property from one who is
without such notice, he is entitled to the
same protection as his vendor, as otherwise it
would very much clog the sale of estates ....
The rule is obviously necessary to secure to a
purchaser, without notice, the full benefit of
his purchase.
Id., at 379-80.
~evocable and irrnvocable licenses; easement,s. In general,
oral permission to use one's land gives rise to a "mere license,, as
opposed to an easement. See Brown & Hamilton Co. v. Johnson, 251
Pa. 378, 381, 96 A. 823, 924 (1916). A license "is ordinarily
considered to be a mere personal or revocable privilege to perform
an act or series of acts on the land of another... Hennebont Co. v.
Kroger Co., 221 Pa. Super. 65, 69, 289 A.2d 229, 231, allocatur
refused, 221 Pa. Super. xliii, 289 A.2d 229 (1972).
Under certain circumstances, however, a revocable license to
use one's land can become irrevocable. Zivari v. Willis, 416 Pa.
Super. 432, 611A.2d 293 (1992); cf. DiGirolamo v. Philadelphia Gun
Club, 371 Pa. 40, 89 A.2d 357 (1952) ("easement by estoppel..).
--8--
Thus, "[a]fter extensive improvements have been made on the
faith of a license, the doctrine of estoppel precludes the
revocation thereof if the improvements are incapable of
reimbursement, or if the parties cannot be placed in status quo;
otherwise reimbursement is required as a condition of revocation...
22 P.L.E. Licenses S26, at 370-71 (1959).
Stated otherwise, a mere license will not be considered
irrevocable unless the licensee demonstrates, inter alia, reliance
upon it to a "detrimental,. degree - i.e., to a degree precluding
restoration of the status quo. Buffington v. Buffington, 390 Pa.
Super. 61, 75, 568 A.2d 194, 201 (1989). Furthermore, where "a
licensee has derived more value in benefits from use of the license
than he has expended in reliance on the license,,, even detrimental
reliance in this sense will not justify a holding that the license
has become irrevocable. Id. at 75, 568 A.2d at 201.
~ourt's Conclusions
In the present case, the description of two lots, now owned by
Defendants, on the 1967 subdivision plan for a section of Reis
Acres Estates as a "private recreation area" was not, in the
Court's view, equivalent to a depiction of public streets or parks
on a plan for purposes of a rule of constructive dedication of
public areas. Had the word "r'
p irate" not been included in the
description--had the area in question in fact been made available
to the whole community for recreation--a stronger argument could be
made that the plan was misleading to buyers and should be construed
against the subdivider as creating a dedicated community park
-9-
without regard to its intended meaning. These were not the facts,
however.
A more appropriate means of determining the effect of the
present description is an application of the general rule of
interpretation regarding easements by implication, whereby intent,
as shown by the terms of the grant and the surrounding
circumstances, is a relevant factor. In view of the private
purpose of the corporate subdivider in so designating the lots in
question, and the surrounding circumstances recited heretofore, the
Court concludes that the Defendants, tract is not limited as to
usage by its 1967 description as a "private recreation area." Any
misunderstanding in this regard expressed by a subsequent president
of the corporate subdivider, if relevant, would not be binding upon
a purchaser of the tract without knowledge thereof or the
purchaser,s subsequent vendees.
Oral permission given to Plaintiffs to use the lots now owned
by Defendants as a source of water constituted a revocable license.
Since Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the status quo can not
be restored, the detrimental reliance necessary to render the
license irrevocable upon principles of estoppel has not been
established. In addition, a strong argument can be made that the
benefits received by Plaintiffs from the license over fifteen years
have outweighed their expenditures in reliance upon it;
nevertheless, the evidence on this point is sufficiently
unresolved, in the Court's view, to permit the Court to condition
revocation of Plaintiffs, license upon Defendants, reimbursement of
-10-
their reliance expenses.
For these reasons, the following Decree Nisi will be entered:
DECREE NISI
AND NOW, this ~
day of July, 1994, upon consideration of
Plaintiffs, complaint and Defendants, counterclaim, following a
trial and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the
Court finds in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on
Plaintiffs, complaint, and in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiffs on Defendants, counterclaim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
are directed to cease utilization of Defendants, property as a
source of water within 90 days of Defendants, payment to them of
the sum of $3850.00.
THE PROTHONOTARY is directed to enter this Decree Nisi as a
Final Decree upon praecipe of a party under Pa. R.C.P. 227.4(1)(c),
if no timely motion for post-trial relief under Pa. R.C.P. 227.1 is
filed.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Steven j. Weingarten, Esq.
Carol A. Steinour, Esq.
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 1166
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1166
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Diane G. Radcliff, Esq.
3448 Trindle Road
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Attorney for Defendants
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