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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-0107 Miscellaneous COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF EX REL DAVID PRICE, : Petitioner : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V· · JOSEPH LEHMAN, COMMISSIONER, : JEFFREY A. BEARD, WARDEN AT : CAMP HILL, WILLIAM LOVE, : WARDEN AT HUNTINGDON : INSTITUTIONS and BUREAU OF : CORRECTIONS, : Respondents : 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDU~-! BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~day of July, 1994, upon careful consideration of Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and following a hearing, the petition is DENIED for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion· BY THE COURT, ' - y le~ Jr.,-~. Clifford D. Swift, Esq. Assistant Counsel Pennsylvania Department of Corrections P.O. Box 598 Camp Hill, PA 17001-0598 Michael A. Scherer, Esq. 17 West South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Petitioner :rc 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF EX REL DAVID PRICE, : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Petitioner : : V. : JOSEPH LEHMAN, COMMISSIONER, : JEFFREY A. BEARD, WARDEN AT : CAMP HILL, WILLIAM LOVE, : WARDEN AT HUNTINGDON : INSTITUTIONS and BUREAU OF : CORRECTIONS, : Respondents : 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDUM BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. This action was commenced by the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) by David Julius Price, Sr. (Petitioner),~ challenging the conditions of his confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his confinement in the institution's special management unit in disciplinary custody is illegal.2 For the reasons stated in this Opinion, the Petition will be denied. Statement of Facts Procedural history. In response to the Petition, the Court issued an Order on January 14, 1994, waiving the filing fee in ~ Petition for Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum; Hearing, May 12, 1994, N.T. 6 (hereinafter N.T. or Exhibit ). 2 Petition for Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, claim for relief. 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM Petitioner's case and appointing Michael A. Scherer, Esq., to represent him.3 On March 23, 1994, Mr. Scherer requested a hearing on the Petition, and by Order of Court dated March 24, 1994, a hearing was set for Thursday, May 12, 1994.4 On March 29, 1994, preliminary objections to the petition, asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and absence of a claim upon which relief could be granted, were filed on behalf of Respondents. By Order of Court dated March 31, 1994, a rule was issued upon Petitioner to show cause why the preliminary objections should not be sustained, the rule being made returnable at the hearing previously scheduled. On May 12, 1994, the hearing was held before the undersigned judge. Testimony and exhibits were presented on behalf of Petitioner and Respondents. On May 26, 1994, the hearing transcript was filed. Chronoloqical statement of necessary facts. Evidence at the hearing tended to establish the following facts: As a result of two robbery convictions in the mid-1980'$, Defendant received an aggregated state sentence of not less than four years and five months nor more than twenty years.5 According to Petitioner, his minimum sentence on these convictions expired on June 20, 1989, and Order of Court, January 14, 1994. Order of Court, March 24, 1994. N.T. 6-7; see Respondents' Exhibit 2. 2 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM his maximum sentence will expire on October 20, 2005.~ Petitioner's initial period of confinement in a state prison on the sentence was at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas (SCI-Dallas).7 In 1988, he was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh (SCI-Pittsburgh).8 In September of 1993, he was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon).9 In November of 1993, he was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill).~0 Within the state prison system, there are, for present purposes, three types of inmate custody: disciplinary custody (DC), administrative custody (AC), and general population custody.~ These are defined as follows: Disciplinary Custody -- [A status of confinement comprising t]he maximum restrictive status of confinement to which inmates found guilty of Class I misconducts may be committed. ~ N.T. 7. The correct maximum sentence expiration date may be January 20, 2005. See Respondents' Exhibit 2. N.T. 8. N.T. 8. N.T. 8. N.T. 8. Petitioner was also housed temporarily in a federal prison in late 1989 and early 1990 due to state overcrowding. See Respondents' Exhibit 2. ~ Petitioner's Exhibit 2. 3 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM Administrative Custody - A status of confinement for non-disciplinary reasons which provides closer supervision, control, and protection than is provided for in general population. General Population -- A status of confinement for all other inmates who are not in Administrative or Disciplinary Custody.~2 As explained by Arthur J. Auxer, III, a twenty-three year veteran of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and presently a unit manager at SCI-Camp Hill, disciplinary custody and administrative custody may be distinguished as follows: Disciplinary custody is a status that is achieved by receiving misconducts. Administrative custody is the custody that is provided after a person would be released from disciplinary custody status if, in fact, he was not returned to general population. Administrative custody would be utilized when the person is a threat to the safety and security of inmates, staff and/or himself.~3 Procedures relating to DC status are set forth in a policy statement issued by the Department of Corrections, designated DC- ADM 801.TM Procedures relating to AC status are set forth in a policy statement issued by the Department, designated DC-ADM 802.~s ~2 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Class I misconducts include refusing to obey an order and using abusive or obscene language to an employee. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. ~3 N.T. 41. ~4 Petitioner's Exhibit 4. DC-ADM 801 in its present form was issued on June 29, 1992, and was effective October 29, 1991. Id. ~$ Petitioner's Exhibit 2. DC-ADM 802 in its present form was issued on June 29, 1992, and was effective October 29, 1992. 4 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM With particular reference to SCI-Camp Hill, certain inmates are housed in a special management unit.~6 A special management unit (SMU) is "[a] special unit within designated Department of Corrections institutions designated to safely and humanely handle inmates whose behavior presents a serious threat to the safety and security of the facility, staff, other inmates, or him or herself.-~7 An inmate in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill is at a given time in one of five "phases," or stages of progression, ostensibly intended to lead to entry or reentry into general population custody.~8 An inmate in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill who is on DC status is in "Phase Petitioner's Exhibit 1; N.T. 32. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Petitioner's view of the purpose of the SMU is quite different. He testified as follows: · .. SMU is not about returning to the population. SMU is about keeping you in jail, all right? It's that way because -- for instance, Your Honor, I've been in holes for over eight and a half years, and I've watched guys progress through programs. If you're in administrative custody and you receive a misconduct and get thirty to sixty days, you do that time and you go back to administrative custody. At the SMU, if you get a misconduct and you receive thirty days, you have to start all over again. You have to start the program all over again. You do your thirty days, and you go back to four phase, three phase, two phase, even if you was on two phase when you got the misconduct. That, in itself, is a violation of habeas corpus by its nature. N.T. 18. 5 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM V," and the procedures applicable to such an inmate are consequently governed by DC-ADM 801.~9 An inmate at the SMU at SCI- Camp Hill who is not on DC status is in one of the remaining phases, decreasing in restrictiveness from Phase IV to Phase I.2° During his initial confinement in the state prison system at SCI-Dallas, Petitioner was placed on DC status.2~ By the time of his 1988 transfer to SCI-Pittsburgh, accumulated misconducts on his part had resulted in the imposition of DC status with an expiration date in the year 1993.22 Notwithstanding another misconduct at SCI- Pittsburgh, he was released from DC status a few months after his arrival, pursuant to a "contract agreement," which included a provision that a further misconduct would result in reinstatement of the balance of the previously imposed DC status.23 He acquired such a misconduct and was returned to DC status.24 By June of 1992, additional misconducts had extended the expiration date of his DC Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Such an inmate would be on AC status. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Respondents' Exhibit 2. Respondents' Exhibit 2. Respondents, Exhibit 2; see N.T. 11. Respondents' Exhibit 2; see N.T. 11. 6 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM status to January of 1995.2s Petitioner was thus on DC status while at SCI-Huntingdon,26 and has been on DC status since his transfer in November of 1993 to SCI-Camp Hill.27 His transfers in this regard have been from DC status at one institution to DC status at another.28 Since arriving at SCI-Camp Hill, Petitioner has accumulated further misconducts.28 In seeking an order from this Court "dismissing and discharging relator from this illegal confinement being forced on him," Petitioner maintains that under DC-ADM 802 inmates are to be transferred between correctional institutions on administrative status3° and that he was entitled to a hearing prior to being placed in the SMU at SCI-Camp Hill on D.C. status.3~ Such an order, he contends, would "enforce the laws that protect relator under the Respondents, Exhibit 2; N.T. 35. N.T. 33. N.T. 33. N.T. 24. N.T. 27, 35. The validity of the findings of misconduct in Petitioner's case, and the propriety of periods of DC status imposed as a consequence, are not the subject of this proceeding. 30 "I was supposed to be transferred, according to DOC rules, under administrative custody. This is what the 802 said, you're supposed to be transferred from one institution to another on administrative custody." N.T. 12. 3~ N.T. 13. 7 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM Constitutional Amendments..32 Respondents argue, inter alia, that constitutional rights are not implicated in Petitioner's inter- prison transfer, that DC-ADM 802 has no applicability to an inmate on DC status, and that no hearing was required prior to Petitioner's transfer.TM Statement of Law Habeas Corpus. "[I]t has been recognized that the most important purpose to which the writ of habeas corpus has been put is that of according a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint upon personal liberty." 18 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d ~98:1, 179-80 (1983). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1701 provides that "[a] petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of the petitioner's confinement in a criminal matter shall be filed with the clerk of court of the judicial district wherein the prisoner is confined." Constitutional law. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that, as a general rule, a prisoner is not entitled, as a matter of due process, to a hearing prior to a transfer to another prison within a state system. In so holding, the Court stated as follows: 32 Petition for Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, claim for relief. ~ N.T. 33. 8 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM [T]he Due Process Clause [does not] in and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. That life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules. Id. at 225, 96 S. Ct. at , 49 L. Ed. 2d at 459. That an inmate's conduct, in general or in specific instances, may often be a major factor in the decision of prison officials to transfer him is to be expected unless it be assumed that transfers are mindless events. A prisoner's past and anticipated future behavior will very likely be taken into account in selecting a prison in which he will be initially incarcerated or to which he will be transferred to best serve the State's penological goals. Id. at 228, 96 S. Ct. at , 49 L. Ed. 2d. at 461. State regulations. In accordance with this general rule, regulations of the Department of Corrections provide that "[n]o inmate shall have a right to be housed in a particular institution or in a particular area within an institution.'. 37 Pa. Code S93.11. Application of Law to Facts In this case, Petitioner was transferred from disciplinary custody status in one state correctional institution to disciplinary custody status in another state correctional 94-0107 ~ISCELLANEOUS TERM institution, without a hearing. In general, transfers between state correctional institutions without hearings are not constitutionally proscribed, even though more onerous conditions may prevail at the second institution. An examination of DC-ADM 802, relied upon by Petitioner for the proposition that transfers between institutions in Pennsylvania are to be on administrative custody status, and that a hearing was a prerequisite to his transfer to SCI-Camp Hill in Phase V of the SMU program, does not seem to the Court to support Petitioner's position. The policy statement does not indicate that transfers between institutions are to be on administrative custody status only, and the hearing procedures applicable to placement of an inmate on AC status do not apply to transfers of inmates on DC status. For these reasons, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this~day of July, 1994, upon careful consideration of Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and following a hearing, the petition is DENIED for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 10 94-0107 MISCELLANEOUS TERM Clifford D. Swift, Esq. Assistant Counsel Pennsylvania Department of Corrections P.O. Box 598 Camp Hill, PA 17001-0598 Michael A. Scherer, Esq. 17 West South Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Petitioner :rc 11