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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2011-5480 PHI FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : JASON G. HAYCOCK, : DEFENDANT : 11-5480 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S PETITION TO OPEN JUDGMENT OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT Masland, J., June 4, 2012:-- Plaintiff, PHI Financial Services, initiated this matter by filing a civil action in Polk County, Iowa (“Iowa court”) for breach of contract which sought a principal balance owed. (Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Response. Ex., 1. (hereinafter “Pl.’s Resp. Br.”)) On January 3, 2011, a default judgment was entered against the Defendant, Jason G. Haycock, in the amount of $13,448.69. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex., 3.) Then, on July 6, 2011, the Plaintiff filed a Praecipe to File Foreign Judgment in this Court. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. Ex. 4, at 2.) The Plaintiff simultaneously filed a Praecipe for a Writ of Execution. (Pl.’s Resp. Br., at 2.) On October 7, 2011, the Defendant filed a Petition to Open Judgment in this Court. (Defendant’s Petition to Open Judgment. at 1. (hereinafter “Def.’s Pet.”)) Following a hearing and argument, the Court now denies the Defendant’s petition. Defendant’s Petition to Open Judgment (“Petition”) alleges that the Defendant did not have notice of the suit filed against him and therefore the judgment should be opened. (Def.’s Pet., at 2-4.) While the Defendant’s spouse was properly served, the Defendant claims that the spouse failed to communicate that information to him. (Def.’s Pet., at 3; Pl.’s Resp. Br., Ex. 2.) The Petition further implies that this miscommunication was the result of a tumultuous relationship between the Defendant and his spouse. (Def.’s Pet., at 2-3.) Defendant alleges that immediately upon discovery of the civil 11-5480 CIVIL TERM action against him, and the resulting judgment, he retained an attorney—albeit with difficulty. (Def.’s Pet., at 4-5.) The Defendant further alleges that he was not aware of the civil suit and judgment until July 29, 2011. (Def.’s Pet., at 4.) The Pennsylvania Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“Act”) provides that a properly filed foreign judgment, . . . shall be a lien as of the date of filing and shall have the same effect and be subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of any court of common pleas of this Commonwealth and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. 42 P.C.S. §4306 (2012). A ONS TAT The Act is grounded in the constitutional obligation to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other states. Tandy Computer Leasing v. Demarco, 564 A.2d 1299, 1301 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). These provisions have been interpreted to mean that full faith and credit is to be given unless there is some overriding reason which would require the court to deny full faith and credit to the judgment. Id. In Tandy Computer Leasing v. Demarco, the court stated that “a lack of personal jurisdiction on the part of the court which originally awarded the judgment or a lack of due process on the part of that court are reasons why the principle of full faith and credit would be denied and the subsequent Pennsylvania judgment stricken.” Id. In the present case, the Petition requests this Court to open the judgment of the Iowa court. A petition to open a default judgment is equitable in nature. Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. 1997). A petition to open must establish: (1) that the petition was promptly filed after the judgment was entered, (2) failure to appear or file a timely answer must be excused, (3) and that a meritorious -2- 11-5480 CIVIL TERM defense can be advanced. Id. However, the analysis of these factors is terminated prematurely where “a party seeking relief in our courts on the basis of asserted invalidity (other than jurisdictional) of the judicial proceedings of another State should normally be relegated to the courts of that State.” Barnes v. Buck, 346 A.2d 778, 783 n.12 (Pa. 1975). Furthermore, the principles of interstate comity would indicate abstention by Pennsylvania courts in favor of the courts of the rendering state. Id. Our Superior Court has interpreted the rule from Barnes v. Buck, to mean that a Pennsylvania court lacked both the power and the jurisdiction to open a New Jersey default judgment which had been transferred. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Saltzman, 609 A.2d 817, 818-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).The court further held that only a court of competent jurisdiction in New Jersey could open the default judgment that had been entered in New Jersey. Id. Applying these standards, the law does not permit this Court to open the default judgment of the Iowa court. Only a court of competent jurisdiction in Iowa can open the judgment. The Defendant contends that the Iowa court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant and therefore this Court should be permitted to open the Iowa court’s judgment. Our Superior Court directly addressed this argument and held that “because a foreign judgment entered without jurisdiction is a nullity, thus void, it must be vacated and not opened, because to do otherwise would be to permit the trial court to proceed further in an action against a defendant over whom personal jurisdiction had not been obtained.” Commonwealth Capital Funding, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hosp., 620 A.2d 1154, 1156 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). Therefore, the -3- 11-5480 CIVIL TERM Defendant’s arguments over personal jurisdiction do not give this Court grounds to open the Iowa court’s judgment. In a case factually similar to the case at hand, our Superior Court granted the defendant’s petition to strike, when presented with both a petition to strike and a petition to open judgment. Tandy Computer Leasing v. Demarco, 564 A.2d 1299, 1308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). The court granted the petition to strike and thereby effectively vacated the foreign judgment. Id. at 1302, 1308 (noting that a request to vacate judgment would have been preferred to a petition to strike). In the present case, because the Defendant filed a petition to open instead of a petition to strike (Def.’s Pet., at 8.), we are constrained to deny the requested relief. In factually similar cases, when the defendants sought the proper relief, courts have granted that relief. See ABM Leasing v. Booth, 10 Pa. D. & C.4th 319 (1991); see also Churchill Corp. v. Third Century Inc., 578 A.2d 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In the latter case, the defendants sought an injunction to prevent the plaintiff from filling a default judgment in Pennsylvania. Churchill Corp., at 535. The court granted the injunction on the grounds that the foreign court lacked the necessary jurisdiction. Id. at 540. However, in the case at hand, the Defendant is not seeking to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of the default judgment entered against him. Instead, the Defendant is seeking to open the judgment to litigate the underlying merits. (Def.’s Pet., at 8.) Therefore, Churchill Corp. v. Third Century Inc. is not implicated and does not provide grounds for this Court to open the Iowa court’s judgment. -4- 11-5480 CIVIL TERM For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s petition to open judgment is deemed beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, and the following order will be entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ________ day of June, 2012, Defendant’s petition to open IS DENIED. judgment, By the Court, _______________________ Albert H. Masland, J. Jennifer L. Tis, Esquire For Plaintiff Wayne F. Shade, Esquire For Defendant -5- PHI FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : JASON G. HAYCOCK, : DEFENDANT : 11-5480 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT’S PETITION TO OPEN JUDGMENT ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ________ day of June, 2012, Defendant’s petition to open IS DENIED. judgment, By the Court, _______________________ Albert H. Masland, J. Jennifer L. Tis, Esquire For Plaintiff Wayne F. Shade, Esquire For Defendant