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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-0966 Civil CAROL A. TREASTER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW WAYNE M. HOFFMAN, JR., : Defendant : 94-0966 CIVIL TERM CAROL A. TREASTER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION : v. : CIVIL ACTION - SUPPORT : WAYNE M. HOFFMAN, : Defendant : NO. 194 OF 1994 IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF and PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~!~ day of August, 1994, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Application for Special Relief and Plaintiff's Complaint for Spousal Support, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the application is DENIED and the complaint is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, J. sley Oler, ., 'j. · ' Theresa Barrett Male, Esq. Suite 500 10 South Market Square Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Keith B. DeArmond, Esq. 2800 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant Domestic Relations Office · re CAROL A. TREASTER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW : WAYNE M. HOFFMAN, JR., : Defendant : 94-0966 CIVIL TERM CAROL A. TREASTER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION : v. : CIVIL ACTION - SUPPORT : WAYNE M. HOFFMAN, : Defendant : NO. 194 OF 1994 IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF and PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. The present actions in divorce and for spousal support arise out of a relationship between the parties which began in the early 1980's. At issue at this time is an application for special relief filed by Carol A. Treaster in the divorce action against Wayne M. Hoffman, Jr., and a complaint for spousal support filed by Ms. Treaster in the support action against Mr. Hoffman. In each proceeding, Plaintiff's claim for relief is premised upon the existence of a common law marriage between her and Defendant. A hearing on the issue of the existence of such a marriage was held by the undersigned judge on May 2 and May 13, 1994. Because the Court finds the elements of a common law marriage to be lacking with respect to the parties' relationship, the application for special relief will be denied and the complaint 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 for spousal support will be dismissed. Statement of Facts Plaintiff and Defendant met on December 15, 1980,~ at a time when Plaintiff was married to another person and Defendant may or may not yet have been divorced from his spouse.2 Plaintiff lived with her husband at 2809 Rose Garden Boulevard in Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania,3 and Defendant maintained a residence at 1488 Simpson Ferry Road, New Cumberland, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.4 Plaintiff's husband moved out of the Mechanicsburg residence around April of 1981.5 Following this, according to Plaintiff, Defendant spent the majority of his time at her residence in Mechanicsburg;6 however, Defendant testified that he never moved in with Plaintiff at this address and continued to maintain his ~ N.T. 23, Hearing, May 2 and May 13, 1994 (hereinafter N.T. ). 2 Mr. Hoffman testified that he was divorced in 1979. N.T. 131. Ms. Treaster testified that he was still married when they met. N.T. 24. N.T. 24. N.T. 133. N.T. 24. N.T. 24. 2 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 residence on Simpson Ferry Road.7 Plaintiff's divorce was finalized on June 12, 1981.8 As part of her divorce settlement, Plaintiff had to sell the residence in Mechanicsburg, and subsequently purchased a house at 210 Ross Avenue, New Cumberland, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.9 According to Plaintiff, Defendant lived at the Ross Avenue address with Plaintiff, her daughter, and her son.~° However, Defendant testified that he never really moved in with Plaintiff at the Ross Avenue address, since he continued to maintain his Simpson Ferry Road home by cutting the grass, doing maintenance, and keeping the utilities operating.~ He conceded that he slept at Plaintiff's home, kept his clothes there, had his laundry done there, and ate his meals there.~2 Plaintiff remained in the house on Ross Avenue for approximately four years.~3 Thereafter, she, Defendant, and her children moved to the residence Defendant maintained on Simpson 7 N.T. 134. N.T. 27, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. N.T. 26. N.T. 27. N.T. 135. N.T. 153. N.T. 27. 3 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 Ferry Road.~4 Throughout this period, while the parties were purportedly living together, Plaintiff did the laundry, the cooking, the grocery shopping, the cleaning, and some yard work.~5 While living on Ross Avenue, Plaintiff paid all of the expenses, including groceries, because, according to her testimony, Defendant had his house sitting empty on Simpson Ferry Road and had to pay the utility bills for that property.~6 Upon moving to Simpson Ferry Road, Plaintiff continued to pay for the groceries and also made some payments toward the mortgage and utilities; however, after a couple of years, she lost the support payments for her son and was forced to cut back on expenses.~? Thereafter, Plaintiff paid primarily for the groceries, newspaper, and.cable TV.~8 According to Plaintiff, she and Defendant entered into a common law marriage on or about June 15, 1981.~9 Plaintiff felt that this was expressed verbally by Defendant's saying that "[h]e loved [her] and would always be there to take care of [her] and N.T. 28. N.T. 28. N.T. 28. N.T. 28-9, 68. N.T. 68. N.T. 23. 4 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 [she] would always be there to take care of him."2° Additionally, Plaintiff testified that the parties discussed having a formal wedding ceremony; however, as related by Plaintiff, Defendant replied that he didn't feel a ceremony was necessary and "that you don't need a piece of paper to say that you're husband and wife.''2~ Defendant testified that, following his divorce, he said he would never get married again.22 With regard to any discussions about a marriage with Plaintiff, he did not recall any specific conversation but conceded that he probably said that he might get married some day.23 Defendant testified that words were never exchanged between him and Plaintiff, in the present tense, with the purpose of legally becoming husband and wife.24 He stated that he did not recall whether he had ever told her that they did not need a piece of paper, because for all intents and purposes they were married.25 According to Defendant, when he and Plaintiff were in public, N.T. 61. N.T. 26. N.T. 132. N.T. 135. N.T. 155-56. N.T. 155. 5 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 he would always introduce her as Carol Treaster.2~ Moreover, he stated that he never referred to her as Mrs. Hoffman.27 In the past three or four years, according to Defendant, Plaintiff broached the subject of marriage several times; however, Defendant testified that he replied that he would never marry again.TM According to several witnesses who testified for Defendant, he never held Plaintiff out to be his wife, and none looked upon the parties as husband and wife.29 Moreover, Plaintiff would often raise the subject of getting married in the presence of these individuals, but Defendant would always dismiss the comments with a "smart-aleck" or negative remark.3° In addition, there was testimony to the effect that none of the circle of friends with whom the parties associated considered them husband and wife; these persons usually referred to Plaintiff as Defendant's "live-in" or girlfriend.3~ A Montgomery Ward credit card issued in the name of Carol N.T. 146. N.T. 141. N.T. 141. N.T. 85, 92, 106-07. N.T. 83, 89, 91, 104. N.T. 96, 106-07. 6 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 Hoffman was introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6.32 The information needed to obtain the credit card was taken over the phone, with information on Defendant being elicited before information was elicited regarding Plaintiff.33 According to Plaintiff, Defendant knew that she possessed this card in the name of Carol Hoffman.34 However, it was the testimony of Defendant that he had never seen this card before and had never consented to Plaintiff's name being on the card as it appeared.3s Two purchase orders and a letter from Good's Furniture and Carpet in Camp Hill were also introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.36 These items were the result of purchases initiated by Defendant, with Plaintiff present at the time the purchases were made.37 The names as they appear on the purchase order are Wayne Hoffman, a space, and then Carol.~8 The letter is a thank-you note from the salesperson who sold them the 32 N.T. 34. ~ N.T. 34. 34 N.T. 35. 3s N.T. 142-43. 36 N.T. 29-31. 37 N.T. 145-46. ~8 N.T. 30. 7 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 furniture and is addressed to Mr. & Mrs. Wayne Hoffman.39 Plaintiff testified that it was she who identified herself as Carol Hoffman.4° Plaintiff has been living at the Simpson Ferry Road address for the past eight years.4~ In January of 1994, Defendant left this residence to live with a woman whom he had been seeing since August or September, 1993.42 Following Defendant's departure, Plaintiff was served with a "petition" from Defendant to have her evicted from the Simpson Ferry Road house.43 On February 28, 1994, Plaintiff filed a complaint in divorce, followed by an application for special relief on the same date,44 On March 15, 1994, she filed a complaint for spousal support. Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the evidence showed a desire on the part of Plaintiff to marry Defendant but a determination on the part of Defendant not to remarry; that it showed no exchange of words in the present tense between the parties spoken with the N.T. 31. 40 N.T. 56. N.T. 22. N.T. 23. N.T. 23. This was presumably a district justice complaint. 44 The Application for Special Relief requested exclusive possession of the home titled in Defendant's name, alimony pendente lite, and counsel fees and expenses. 8 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 specific purpose of creation of the legal relationship of husband and wife; and that it showed cohabitation of the parties over an extended period of time, but without a broad and general reputation of marriage. The Court specifically finds that the evidence showed no common law marriage between the parties. Statement of Law It is the general policy in this Commonwealth to accept common law marriage; however, common law marriages are "to be tolerated and not encouraged." In re Estate of Stauffer, 504 Pa. 626, 629, 476 A.2d 354, 356 (1984). "Our courts have regarded common-law marriage as a fruitful source of fraud and perjury and, thus, the law imposes a heavy burden on one who grounds a claim upon the existence of a common law marriage." In re Cummings Estate, 330 Pa. Super. 255, 265 n.3, 479 A.2d 537, 542-43 n.3 (1984); see Van Brakle v. Lanauze, 293 Pa. Super. 276, 280, 438 A.2d 992, 994 (1981). "When an attempt is made to establish a marriage without the usual formalities, a court is required to examine the purported marriage contract with great scrutiny." In re Estate of Dodge, 361 Pa. Super. 188, 191, 522 A.2d 77, 79 (1987); see Estate of Gavula, 490 Pa. 535, 541, 417 A.2d 168, 171 (1980); In re: Estate of Fayetta M. Clayton, 36 Cumberland L.J. 445 (1986) (Bayley, J.). In Manfredi Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 159 A.2d 697 (1960), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed the differences between a 9 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 statutory marriage and common law marriage, and set forth the elements of the latter. Marriage in Pennsylvania is a civil contract by which a man and woman take each other for husband and wife. There are two kinds of marriage: (1) ceremonial; and (2) common law. A ceremonial marriage is a wedding or marriage performed by a religious or civil authority with the usual or customary ceremony or formalities. It is too often forgotten that a common law marriage is a marriage by the express agreement of the parties without ceremony, and almost ~nvariably without a witness, by words - not · n futuro or in postea, but -- in praesenti, uttered with a view and for the purpose of establishing the relationship of husband and wife. Because it is often difficult to prove a common law marriage by words in praesenti, the law has created or raised a rebuttable presumption of marriage where two absolutely essential elements are conjoined and co-exist -- constant, as distinguished from an irregular or inconstant, cohabitation plus a reputation of marriage, which is not partial or divided but is broad and general. Constant cohabitation, even when conjoined with general reputation, are not marriage, they are merely circumstances which give rise to a rebuttable presumption of marriage. Manfredi Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 291, 159 A.2d 697, 700 (1960) (citations omitted). "An essential element for a common law marriage is intent to establish a marital relationship. Evidence of intent may consist of words uttered in the present tense for the purpose of establishing the relation of husband and wife. Cohabitation and 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 reputation of marriage do not alone create a marriage. They are only mere circumstances from which a marriage may be inferred and rebutted by other facts and circumstances." Canute v. Canute, 384 Pa. Super. 60, 63, 557 A.2d 772, 774 (1989) (lower court's finding of common law marriage held reversible error in spousal support case). "To create a common-law marriage," the Superior Court has stated, "there must be 'an exchange of words in the present tense, verba de praesenti, spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of.husband and wife be thereby created.' Because it is hard to prove such verba de praesenti, there is a rebuttable presumption of marriage where two essential elements exist: constant, not irregular or inconstant, cohabitation plus a broad and general, not partial or divided, reputation of marriage." Commonwealth v. McLean, 387 Pa. Super. 354, 364, 564 A.2d 216, 221 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 (1989) (citations omitted).4s The Superior Court has more recently enunciated the principles applicable to common law marital status in the following terms: In P~nnsylvania, a common law marriage is a marriage by express agreement of the parties without ceremony, and usually without a witness, and verba de praesenti, uttered with the purpose of establishing a relation of husband and wife. However, common law marriage will still be recognized without use of verba de praesenti, where the intention of the parties as expressed by their words, is that they were married. While cohabitation and reputation alone will not suffice to establish a common law marriage, they are relevant factors which a court may consider in determining whether the parties have entered into a common law marriage. Cannv. Cann, 429 Pa. Super. 234, 239, 632 A.2d 322, 325 (1993) 4~ Judge Bayley of this Court has expressed the rule as to common law marriage in Pennsylvania as follows: IT]he law requires words of intent to prove a common-law marriage although, where no such direct proof is available, the law permits a finding of marriage based upon reputation and cohabitation when established by satisfactory proof, because such evidence circumstantially proves that there were words of intent as reflected by the parties later conduct. Accordingly, if the circumstantial evidence of cohabitation and reputation is strong enough, it may support a finding that words of intent were uttered in a situation revealing the intention of parties to be married. In re: Estate of Fayetta M. Clayton, 36 Cumberland L.J 445, 450 (1986). - 12 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 (citations omitted). ADDlication of Law to Facts An application of the foregoing principles of law to the facts of the present case leads to a conclusion that the relief requested by Plaintiff must be denied. The absence of persuasive evidence of an exchange of words in the present tense spoken with the specific purpose of creating a relationship of husband and wife, and the absence of evidence establishing a broad and general reputation of marriage, militate against a conclusion that Plaintiff has sustained her burden of establishing the existence of a common law marriage requisite to her claims. For this reason, the following Order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this !($~ day of August, 1994, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Application for Special Relief and Plaintiff's Complaint for Spousal Support, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the application is DENIED and the complaint is DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 13 94-0966 CIVIL TERM No. 194 OF 1994 Theresa Barrett Male, Esq. Suite 500 10 South Market Square Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Keith B. DeArmond, Esq. 2800 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 Attorney for Defendant Domestic Relations Office 14