HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-0650 Civil RICHARD S. MORROW, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
V.
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
:
THOMAS MAKAR and
JOYCE MAKAR, :
Defendants :
: 94-0650 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
~EFORE SHEELY, p.j., and OLER, J.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this Z~da~ of August, 1994, upon consideration of
Defendants, Preliminary Objections, as well as the briefs and oral
arguments presented on the matter, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendants, preliminary objection in the form of a motion
to strike paragraph 6 of Plaintiff,s Complaint is DENIED.
2. Defendants, preliminary objection in the form of a motion
to strike a portion of paragraph 13 of Plaintiff,s Complaint is
GRANTED.
3. Defendants, preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff,s Complaint is
DENIED.
4. Defendants, preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff,s Complaint is
GRANTED.
5. Defendants, preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff,s Complaint is
DENIED.
6. Plaintiff is granted 20 days within which to file an
amended complaint.
BY THE COURT,
J~ 'Wesley
Ian J. Blynn, Esq.
Suite 100, 150 Corporate Center Dr.
P.O. Box 98
Camp Hill, PA 17001-0098
Attorney for Plaintiff
Lisa Marie Coyne, Esq.
3901 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011-4227
Attorney for Defendants
:re
RICHARD S. MORROW, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION - LAW
:
THOMAS MAKAR and :
JOYCE MAKAR, :
Defendants : 94-0650 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
BEFORE SHEELY, P.J., and OLER, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
Oler, J.
At issue in this case are preliminary objections filed by
Joyce Makar and Thomas Makar (Defendants) to a complaint filed by
Richard S. Morrow (Plaintiff). For the reasons stated in this
Opinion, the preliminary objections will be sustained in part and
denied in part.
Statement of Facts
The facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint may be summarized
as follows: Plaintiff is Richard S. Morrow, a Cumberland County
resident~ and owner of an apartment building at 602 Herrin Lane,
Enola, Pennsylvania.2 Defendants are Thomas Makar and Joyce
Makar, Cumberland County residents3 and former tenants of
Plaintiff, under a written lease, at the said apartment building.4
Defendants did not pay the rent of $470 a months as specified in
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 1.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 3.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 2.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 4.
5 Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A.
the lease, and in addition "Defendants, or persons acting pursuant
to their direction and/or control did deface, destroy, demolish and
otherwise modify, without authorization or permission, the said
premises.
Due to "these delinquencies" and "a history and pattern of
late payments," Plaintiff served a notice of termination upon the
Defendants at their residence on December 11, 1993.v Defendants
refused to vacate the premises,8 and Plaintiff filed a
landlord/tenant action on December 17, 1993, with District Justice
Robert V. Manlove, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.9 In the action
Plaintiff sought possession of the rental unit and an award of back
rent and costs.~° Defendants filed a counterclaim for money
damages.~
On January 10, 1994, a trial in the matter was held before
District Justice Manlove.~2 On January 12, 1994, the District
Justice granted possession of the rental unit to Plaintiff~3 and
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 6.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 7.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 8.
The action was docketed at CT-0000622-93. Plaintiff's
Complaint, paragraph 9.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 9.
See text accompanying note 15.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 10.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 11.
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awarded damages on the counterclaim in the amount of $200 to
Defendants.TM Plaintiff appealed.~s
In the present action, Plaintiff's claim for relief consists
of the following: back rent totalling $1,654.54, costs incurred by
the Plaintiff, and any other relief that the court deems just and
equitable.~6
In response to the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's
Complaint, Defendants have filed preliminary objections,
referencing certain paragraphs in the Complaint. The paragraphs
referred to are as follows:
5. The Defendants were delinquent in their
rental payments and charges delinquency [sic]
which by December 11, 1993 totaled $836.28.~7
6. The Defendants, or persons acting pursuant
to their direction and/or control did deface,
destroy, demolish and otherwise modify,
without authorization or permission, the
premises known and numbered as 602 Herrin
Lane, Apartment #C, Enola, PA 17025.~8
13. In addition to breach of the leasing
agreement by failure and refusal to pay the
rental payments, timely or otherwise, the
Defendants are otherwise undesirable tenants.~9
Defendants have moved for a more specific pleading as to each
of these paragraphs. In addition, Defendants have moved to strike
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 12.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 12.
Plaintiff's Complaint at 3-4.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 5.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 6.
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 13.
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paragraphs 6 and 13 on grounds of impertinence and scandalous
matter. More specifically, Defendants contend that the complaint
lacks specificity as to time of alleged defaults in payments, as to
special damages and as to issues to be litigated. In addition,
Defendants contend that paragraphs 6 and 13 should be stricken
because they are irrelevant and bear cruelly upon the moral
character of Defendants.
STATEMENT OF LAW
General. In reviewing preliminary objections to a complaint,
the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as
true. Paz v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections, 135 Pa. Commw.
157, 166, 580 A.2d 452, 454 (1990). Furthermore, the Court will
sustain preliminary objections "only if clear and free of doubt."
Id.
Motion for a more specific pleadinq. With respect to a
preliminary objection in the form of a motion for a more specific
pleading,2° the sole question that is raised is "whether the
pleading is sufficiently clear to enable the defendant to prepare
his defense." Paz v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections, 135 Pa.
Commw. 157, 170, 580 A.2d 452, 456 (1990). In addition, "[a] more
specific pleading should not be required as to matters about which
the objecting party has, or should have, as much or better
knowledge than the pleader." Id. at 171, 580 A.2d at 456.
In general, when a party states a case in a
manner that fully advises an opponent of the
nature of the case and of the matters with
20 Pa. R.C.P. 1028(a)(3).
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which the opponent will be confronted at
trial, there is no need for a motion for a
more specific pleading; the opponent should
seek discovery if he or she needs more
information to prepare a response.
2 Goodrich Amram 2d §1017(b):24 at 268 (1991).
With regard to the specificity with which damages must be
pled, it has been said that
[d]amages should be stated so that defendants
are reasonably advised of their nature.
General allegations of indebtedness, lumped
charges and gross sums intended to cover and
include different kinds and amount of losses
and damages, are not sufficient, and the
complaint should, whenever possible, show how
the items of damages claimed are ascertained,
so that Defendant may file a responsive
answer.
4 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d §21:63, at 74 (1993).
With regard to the specificity with which time must be pled,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that resolution of the
issue depends on the nature of the complaint. Baker v. Rangas, 229
Pa. Super. 333, 324 A.2d 498 (1974). "If ... time is significant,
such as where ... the statute of limitations is possibly involved,
a preliminary objection in the form of a motion for a more specific
complaint is available. If this factor is not significant,
discovery offers an adequate remedy." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d
~1019(f):2 at 341 (1991). The existence in Pennsylvania of
extensive and liberal rules of discovery limits the scope of the
motion for a more specific pleading." 2 Goodrich Amram 2d
~1017(b):24 at 268 (1991).
Motion to Strike. With respect to a preliminary objection
seeking to strike impertinent matter, it has been held that "[t]he
5
right of a court to strike impertinent matter should be sparingly
exercised and only when a party can affirmatively show prejudice.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 40 Pa. Comm. 133, 138, 396 A.2d 885, 888 (1979). "To
be ... impertinent, a complaint's allegations must be immaterial
and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action."
Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 55
Pa. Commw. 312, 320, 423 A.2d 765, 769 (1980).
With respect to a preliminary objection seeking to strike
scandalous matter, such material has been defined as
"[c]onsist[ing] of any unnecessary allegation which bears cruelly
on the moral character of an individual or states anything which is
contrary to good manners, or anything which is unbecoming to the
dignity of a court to hear .... [O]ffensive material which is
essential to a plaintiff's case is not scandalous." 2 Goodrich
Amram 2d ~1017(b):14 at 258-59 (1991).
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
With respect to Defendants' contention that paragraph 6 of
Plaintiff's Complaint contains impertinent matter, it appears that
the allegations in question are material. Furthermore, with
respect to a showing of prejudice, Defendants have not met their
burden of proof.
With respect to Defendants' contention that paragraph 6 of
Plaintiff's Complaint contains scandalous matter, the Court is of
the opinion that the allegations in question are not scandalous in
nature. The averments in paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint are
6
germane to the cause of action and do not bear cruelly on the moral
character of the Defendants.
With respect to Defendants' contention that paragraph 13 of
Plaintiff's Complaint contains impertinent and scandalous matter,
it is the Court's belief that the description of Defendants as
undesirable tenants is unnecessary and reflects unfavorably upon
their moral character; therefore, the allegation that "Defendants
are otherwise undesirable tenants" will be stricken.
With respect to Defendants' contention that Paragraphs 5 and
13 of Plaintiff's Complaint lack sufficient specificity, it appears
that the allegations which remain are sufficiently clear to enable
the Defendants to prepare a defense. The Defendants have, or
should have, as much knowledge as, or better knowledge than,
Plaintiff would have with regard to the months when rent was or was
not paid. If Defendants are in need of more information, discovery
is an available resource.
With respect to Defendants' contention that paragraph 6 of
Plaintiff's Complaint lacks sufficient specificity, it appears to
the Court that the allegations in question are not sufficiently
clear to enable the Defendants to prepare a defense. From
Plaintiff's Complaint it seems that damages are being claimed for
physical injury to the rental unit, but no monetary figure has been
assigned to such injury and no specifics as to damage have been
provided.
In accordance with the foregoing, the following Order will be
entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 2~~ day of August, 1994, upon consideration of
Defendants' Preliminary Objections, as well as the briefs and oral
arguments presented on the matter, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendants' preliminary objection in the form of a motion
to strike paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint is DENIED.
2. Defendants' preliminary objection in the form of a motion
to strike a portion of paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint is
GRANTED.
3. Defendants' preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint is
DENIED.
4. Defendants' preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint is
GRANTED.
5. Defendants' preliminary objection based upon a lack of
specificity with regard to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint is
DENIED.
6. Plaintiff is granted 20 days within which to file an
amended complaint.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley O]'er~ Jr.,
8
Ian J. Blynn, Esq.
Suite 100, 150 Corporate Center Dr.
P.O. Box 98
Camp Hill, PA 17001-0098
Attorney for Plaintiff
Lisa Marie Coyne, Esq.
3901 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011-4227
Attorney for Defendants
:re
9