HomeMy WebLinkAbout91-1531 Civil · ,~rse~f and on : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
of her minor h~__behalf :
c"~uren: CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
TOREN j. HALL and :
KYRIE S. HALL, : PENNSYLVANIA
: CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff : - LAW
v. : NO. 1531 CIVIL 1991
:
JOHN p. HALL, :
Defendant :
: PROTECTION FROM ABUSE
OPINION PURSU_ANT TO PA. R.A.p. 1925
O/er, j., September 29, 1994.
At iSSue in the present appeal
to the Superior Court is an
Order of this Court denying Defendant,s petition for modification
of a protection from abuse order. Although the matter would appear
to be moot,~ the issues raised in the
herein, appeal will be addressed
Statement of Facts
The present protection from abuse case was commenced in 1991
by Sherrill R. Hall (Plaintiff), on behalf of herself and her minor
children Toren j. Hall and Kyrie S. Hall (Children), against her
husband and their father, John p. Hall (Defendant). As a result of
this initial filing, a protective order was entered on May 13,
1991. On February 27, 1992, the order was Vacated by agreement of
the parties.~
~ The protection from abuse order in question expired by its
terms on September 9, 1994. 0
the Order i b~.this ~eptember 9, 1993
Order of Court, July 20, 1994. r __o ~ready nearly moo~
~catlon, the matte j2~=_~lme of issuance '
See Docket Entries, Hall v. Hall, No. 1531 Civil 1991, May
13, 1991 (Bayley, j.), and February 27, 1992 (Bayley, j.).
A subsequent petition for protective order was filed by
Plaintiff on August 30, 1993.3 It alleged various incidents of
abuse on the part of Defendant, including the following:
Defendant's pursuit of Plaintiff in a car, the shoving and forcing
of Plaintiff into a house, a violent shaking of Plaintiff, the
subjection of Plaintiff to a series of punches, a bashing of
Plaintiff's headlights with a sledgehammer, and incidents of force
inflicted upon the Children.4 The petition resulted in the
issuance of a temporary protective order by the Honorable Edgar B.
Bayley on August 30, 1993, and the scheduling of a hearing for
September 9, 1993.5
Defendant filed an answer to the petition for protective
order, containing denials such as "[t]here was no punching,
although there was a 'poking,'" and "one headlight was broken by
Defendant when he found a number of unexplained letters ... [that]
made him think [Plaintiff] may be involved in a mental, if not
physical, adulterous relationship..6
3 Petition for Protective Order, August 30, 1993. In the
interim, it appears that another petition for protective order was
filed by Plaintiff in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. See Petition for
Protective Order, Hall v. Hall, No. 1531 Civil 1991 (Exhibit B).
This petition was withdrawn by Plaintiff. Id., paragraph 4(i).
Id.
Temporary Protective Order, August 30, 1993.
6 Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Petition for Protective
Order, filed September 9, 1993.
2
At the hearing on September 9, 1993, an agreement was
negotiated between the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, the
following Order was entered by the writer of this Opinion:
AND NOW, this 9th day of September, 1993, upon
stipulation of the parties, the following protective
order is entered:
1. The Defendant, John P. Hall, now residing at
1219 Willow Mill Road, Sherrie-John Manor, Mechanicsburg,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, is hereby enjoined from
having any ~irect or indirect contact with the Plaintiff
or their m~nor children, including but not limited to,
telephone and written communications except as herein
after provided, and the Plaintiff, Sherrill K. Hall,
presently residing at an undisclosed location, is
enjoined from having any direct or indirect contact with
the Defendant, except as herein after provided.
2. The Defendant is enjoined from entering the
Plaintiff's place of employment or the schools of the
parties' minor children.
3. The parties are prohibited and enjoined from
damaging, or destroying, selling or making any other
disposition of property jointly owned by either party or
owned solely by either party or any personal property
currently located at Sherrie-John Manor.
4. The parties are enjoined to stay away from the
residence where the other party is residing or any other
location that the party would in the future reside. The
Plaintiff may visit Sherrie-John Manor each Monday from
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. The Defendant agrees to be
absent from Sherrie-John Manor on those days and hours.
5. Temporary legal and physical custody of the
minor children is awarded to the Plaintiff pending expert
evaluation of the parties and the children and further
Order of Court and subject to the visitation as herein
after set forth.
6. The parties agree to cooperate with counseling
of the children with Dr. Steven Lindenberg of Hershey,
Pennsylvania, or any other professional to whom the
parties agree and to insure that all scheduled
appointments, as recommended by Dr. Lindenberg, be kept
with both the children and the parties, (including the
10:00 and 11:00 appointments on September 10, 1993, with
Dr. Lindenberg) and further, that the parties agree to at
3
least two joint counseling sessions with them and Dr.
Lindenberg. All counseling costs are to be borne by
Defendant.
7. The parties agree to visitation between the
father and the children supervised by Dr. Lindenberg or
such other professional to whom the parties agree at
least once a week, a minimum of two hours each visit, all
costs of such visitation to be borne by the Defendant.
8. The parties agree that the children shall be
permitted to call their father twice a week on Tuesday
and Thursday between the hours of 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. or
such other date and times as the parties may agree.
9. The parties agree to appear before Judge Oler on
October 7, 1993, at 3:15 p.m. for a further hearing on
this matter.
10. Defendant shall pay the sum of $300.00 per week
through Plaintiff's counsel, pending further Order of
Court, the first payment due today.
11. The appropriate police departments will be
provided with a copy of this Order by counsel for both
parties. This Order shall be enforced by any law
enforcement agency where a violation occurs by arrest for
indirect criminal contempt without warrant upon probable
cause that this Order has been violated, whether or not
the violation is committed in the presence of the police
officer. In the event that an arrest is made under this
section, the party violating the Order shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before the Court that issued
the Order. When that Court is unavailable, the party
violating the Order shall be taken before the appropriate
district justice. (23 P.S. Section 6113).
12. This Protective Order shall remain in effect
for a period of one year from the date hereof, pending
further Order of Court.
A "Petition To Consolidate for Hearing Purposes" was filed by
Plaintiff on October 7, 1993. The petition sought consolidation of
a custody proceeding between the parties with the protection from
abuse matter, for hearing purposes. Defendant (now appellant)
opposed the requested consolidation. The Court entered an Order
denying the petition for consolidation.?
A "Petition for Contempt" was filed by Defendant on October 7,
1993. This petition alleged various infractions of the September
9, 1993, protective order on the part of Plaintiff, including
averments that Plaintiff "[1]eft the home in an unlocked condition
after her first visit with one door to the home wide open," and
that she "[a]ppeared at the home for her inspection with numerous
unknown persons, including her attorney .... ..8 Pursuant to an
agreement of the parties, an Order was entered deferring action on
the petition.9
At a hearing held on October 7, 1993, before the writer of
this Opinion, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the September 9, 1993,
Order, another agreement was eventually reached between the
parties. In accordance with that agreement, the Court entered the
following order:
AND NOW, this 7th day of October, 1993, upon,
consideration of the Protection from Abuse Petition filed
in this case, and in accordance with Paragraph 9 of the
Order entered on September 9, 1993, which provided for a
further hearing in this matter, it is ORDERED and
DIRECTED as follows:
1. The Order of September 9, 1993, will remain in
full force and effect except as specifically modified by
this Order.
2. Stephen Lindenberg, Ph.D., is to be designated
by the Court as the Court's expert. He will serve in the
Order of Court, October 7, 1993.
Petition for Contempt, October 7, 1993.
Order of Court, October 7, 1993.
5
role of ombudsman to provide continuity, supervision of
visitation and coordination of the mental health care of
Toren and Kyrie Hall, and should report to the Court
regarding these observations and developments in this
matter as directed by the Court from time to time.
Further, Dr. Lindenberg is empowered to guard against
either parent arbitrarily hiring or firing mental health
professionals or evaluators to guard against medico-legal
process trauma of the children.
3. Mr. and Mrs. Hall shall acquire the services of
a child psychiatrist to further evaluate, diagnose,
develop a treatment plan and treat, if necessary, Toren
and Kyrie. Appointments should be made by Mrs. Hall.
Mr. Hall should be fully informed about the children's
appointments, diagnoses, treatment plans, et cetera. As
an example, any information from the psychiatrist shared
with either Mr. or Mrs. Hall should also be shared with
the other parent as close as simultaneously as possible.
Dr. Lindenberg is directed to be in regular contact with
the children's therapist to assure the Court that Mr. and
Mrs. Hall are cooperating with the children's treatment
and to assess the children's progress in therapy.
4. Mr. and Mrs. Hall are prohibited from
arbitrarily changing the children's appointments with
their therapist. They are prohibited from discharging
the children's therapist except for good cause and by
mutual consent.
5. For a two-week period beginning today, Mr. Hall
will be permitted to enjoy weekly, closely-supervised,
two-hour visitations with Toren and Kyrie. Following the
passage of those first two weeks, for the next two weeks,
Mr. Hall will be permitted to enjoy a three-hour
visitation, the first half hour supervised, the next two
hours unsupervised and the last half hour supervised.
For the next succeeding two-week period, Mr. Hall shall
be permitted to enjoy a four-hour unsupervised visitation
followed by a fifteen-minute debriefing of the children
by Dr. Lindenberg. For the next two-week period, Mr.
Hall shall be permitted to enjoy a six-hour period
unsupervised visitation followed by a fifteen-minute
debriefing with Dr. Lindenberg. For the next succeeding
two-week period, Mr. Hall shall be permitted to enjoy
eight hours of unsupervised visitation followed by a
fifteen-minute debriefing period. Unless something
occurs detrimental to the best interests of the children
caused by John Hall or if not in the best interests of
the children as determined by Dr. Lindenberg after
consultation with the children's psychologist,
psychiatrist or other treating therapist, the progression
6
of extended visitation shall automatically proceed as set
forth herein.
6. No multiple day or overnight visitations will be
ordered at this time. Every effort will be made to
permit Mr. Hall to enjoy visitation with the children on
the children's birthdays and on Christmas day.
7. Mr. and Mrs. Hall are directed to stop any
actions and activities that might alienate either or both
of the children from either of the parents. Both parents
are directed not to coerce or manipulate the children
into being an informant on the other parent's behaviors,
activities, actions, whereabouts and so forth.
8. Daily telephone contact between Mr. Hall and the
children is encouraged but not forced. Conversations are
to be limited to no longer than fifteen minutes with each
child. Unused time with one of the children is not to be
carried forward and be added to the telephone time with
the other child, nor should unused time be carried
forward in a cumulative fashion to future telephone
conversations. Telephone conversations between Mr. Hall
and the children are not to be tape recorded, nor is Mrs.
Hall to listen in on the conversations on an extension
phone.
9. Both of the parents are directed to maintain
valid driver's licenses, duly inspected and licensed
automobiles and appropriate automobile insurance, as
required by law, if they are to transport either or both
of the children in their respective vehicles.
10. Mr. Hall is to be involved in the decisions
relating to the children's health, safety, welfare and
religious instruction. He is also to have the
opportunity to meet with the children's teachers and
receive copies of their report cards. Both parents are
directed to equally divide their attendance at school
functions.
11. The first weekly visit shall be Saturday,
October 9th, 1993. Mr. Hall is to pay for all of the
visits of the psychiatrists and therapists.
12. Paragraph 4 of the Order of September 9, 1993,
is modified to read:
"The parties are enjoined to stay
away from the residence where the
other party is residing or any other
location that the party would in the
7
future reside. The Plaintiff may
visit Sherrie-John Manor each
Tuesday and Thursday from 1:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m. for a four-week period
beginning Tuesday, October 12th.
The Defendant agrees to be absent
from Sherrie-John Manor on those
dates and hours."
This Order was dictated in the presence of the
parties and their counsel and has been approved by them
in open court.
On December 29, 1993, the Cumberland County District Attorney
petitioned for a hearing on a charge against Defendant of indirect
criminal contempt. Allegations against Defendant, in support of
the charge that he had violated the protective order herein,
included the assertion that he had entered his wife's car and
removed items from it.~° A hearing on this petition was scheduled
for January 10, 1994.~ At the hearing, Defendant pled no contest
to the charge and was placed on unsupervised probation, ending
January 23, 1994.~2 By agreement of the parties, the protective
order was further amended in several respects; in addition, certain
stalking and harassment charges filed against Defendant were to be
withdrawn.~3
On April 7, 1994, Defendant filed another petition with the
Court, seeking modification of the protective order by the
~0 Commonwealth's Petition for a Hearing on Charges of
Indirect Criminal Contempt, filed December 29, 1993.
Order of Court, December 29, 1993.
Order of Court, January 10, 1994.
Id.
8
elimination of the Children from its terms.14 A hearing was
scheduled on this petition for June 10, 1994.
On or about April 22, 1994, Defendant's counsel notified the
Court that the scheduled hearing date would not be convenient. By
Order of April 22, 1994, the Court rescheduled the hearing for July
20, 1994, at 9:30 a.m., to accommodate the Defendant.
A full morning had been set aside by the Court for this
hearing and counsel were advised that this specific period of time
was available to them. In this instance, the parties were unable
to resolve their differences by agreement and, following a
conference in chambers with counsel, the hearing commenced at 10:15
a .m. 15
Defendant proceeded to present his case in support of
modification of the order. After about thirty pages of testimony
only one witness had been presented--a psychologist who testified,
inter alia, that he had "nothing to say about Kyrie,,,16 that "Toren
is giving me many examples of how his father verbally manipulates
and changes some of Toren's statements, and John's abusive words
will tend sometimes to confuse Toren,,,17 and that he was unable to
think of any substantial change of circumstances that had occurred
since the order in question was initially entered.18
Petition, filed April 7, 1994.
N.T. 3, Hearing, July 20, 1994 (hereinafter N.T. ~).
N.T. 17. Kyrie had not been evaluated by him.
N.T. 21.
N.T. 26.
9
Defendant then testified in support of modification of the
order. His testimony was to the effect that he was already
enjoying more liberal contact with his children than the order
allowed.~9 He testified without objection that Dr. Abram Hostetter,
Dr. Steven Lindenberg and Dr. Paul Conti had all concluded that the
Children should be eliminated from the order,2° that Toren wanted
to be eliminated from the order, and that Kyrie wanted to sleep
over at his house.2~ He stated that he found the order
"humiliating," and said, "[W]hat I agreed to months ago was simply
to get the opportunity to see my children .... ..22
After forty pages of testimony, the Court attempted to move
the hearing along by recognizing Plaintiff's counsel for cross-
.examination. However, Defendant's counsel indicated that he was
not finished:
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
BY MR. KRUG:
Q You've been counseled, and you've seen the
psychologists, Dr. Schneider, you paid for Dr. Conti and
Dr. Hostetter, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And do you recall the hourly rates of these
various doctors?
A Conti?
N.T. 36-39.
N.T. 34.
N.T. 39.
N.T. 41.
10
Q Besides Dr. Schneider. We already heard from
him.
A Dr. Hostetter charges $130.00 an hour. He's an
M.D. Dr. Conti charged $100.00 an hour. He's a
psychiatrist and M.D. Dr. Lindenberg charged $150.00 an
hour. He is not a licensed psychologist. For many of
his hours he charged $150.00; and for others, he charged
$115.00 an hour, including supervision time when I was
with my children and he sat there with other work on his
lap.
Q Do you think his bill is fair?
A No.
Q Do you think that bill should be disputed and
subject to a decision by some third party or arbitrator
of the court separate from this hearing so we don't have
to decide this today?
A Yes.
MR. KRUG: Thank you. Your Honor, if the Court
does want to hear more testimony on the issue of the bill
and why we dispute the bill --
THE COURT: I don't think that's an issue at
all today.
MR. KRUG: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: I'm not being asked to decide
whether his bill was reasonable or not. Mr. Lewis.23
On cross-examination, Defendant engaged in the following
exchanges, inter alia:
Q When Sherrie tried to call 911 one evening
after you smashed in her headlights, didn't you rip the
phone out of her hand and slam it down?
A I agreed with your characterization of events,
and if I had sufficient time to give the countervailing
circumstances, I'd be happy to answer that, but the
answer is, no.
23 N.T. 43-44.
11
Q was Kyrie watching as you smashed her
headlights?
A That is not an accurate statement.24
Q Have you ever made Sherrie get out of the car
and walk behind the car while you drove to punish her?
A I don't recall that. I recall years ago asking
her to get down on the ground and crawl next to the car
for 10 feet. I do recall that. Of course, I'm very
sorry about that.
Q That's a separate incident. Didn't you make
her crawl all around the outside in front of the
children?
A No, not in front of the children. This was an
angry exchange, and that was my way of attempting to
contain my anger physically, and I humiliated her by
asking her to get down and crawl on the ground.
Q Did she consent to do this?
A Yes, she did.
Q Just as she's consented to give you this
liberal visitation that you discussed?
A No. No, I think that this visitation is much
more informed .... 2s
Q You have punched your wife, have you not?
MR. KRUG: Objection. May I have a continuing
objection to this, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Certainly.
THE WITNESS: No, but I have --
BY MR. LEWIS:
24 N.T. 52.
~s N.T. 52-53.
12
Never?
A No, but I have -- punched her? What do you
mean by punched? Never have I knocked her onto the
floor. I have hit my wife. I have hurt her. And I've
never denied that, and I've admitted that to Abram
Hostetter, Schneider, Conti. That is part of my therapy.
Q Did you do this in front of the children?
a In some cases, yes .... 2~
After seventy pages of testimony, the Court had heard
testimony from only two witnesses, and most of the morning had been
consumed by Defendant's case. On a number of occasions throughout
the hearing, the Court, with little success, attempted to remind
counsel of the need for an expeditious presentation of their
issues.27
In opposition to Defendant's petition to modify the existing
order, Plaintiff presented the testimony of two grown daughters of
the parties and the testimony of Plaintiff herself. Kimberly Hall,
26, portrayed her father as a volatile and violent individual who
had, a few weeks previously, dumped a plate of food in her mother's
lap at a restaurant, in the presence of the Children.28 She
described him as "very scary."29 Heather Hall Friel testified in
a similar vein, stating, inter alia:
· .. When I was younger, there's a lot of
instances of where my father would threaten to keep me
home from school until I remembered the right way to say
N.T. 51.
See, e.g., N.T. 48, 51, 67, 91.
N.T. 73-78.
N.T. 77.
13
something. In other words, if he would say, put the
glass down and then pick up the sandwich, and I wasn't
paying attention, he'd say, what did I just tell you to
do? I said, pick up the sandwich. He said, no, that's
not exactly what I told you to do. And I couldn't
remember. He would then say well, until you remember,
you'll stand at the window with your nose touching the
window while the other children play, you know, those
types of things. It was everyone in my family.
So I would stand there, and occasionally he
would do the same type of thing but say, you will do
chores until you remember, and then I would remember.
And if it would be a school day, he would say, well, I'm
going to keep you home from school. And he would until
finally I couldn't remember. So finally he would, you
know, say didn't I say this?
I would be like, yes, that was it. And then
things would be all right again, and I'd be able to go to
school. And you know, just with my mother, there's -- I
repressed a lot of my childhood. It's easier that way.
But when I was -- there's a lot of instances where he
Would make my mom crawl around the front yard on all
fours because she forgot to -- we came back from a trip
-- and she forgot to feed the dog or leave the water out
for the dog while we all stood there.
He's pushed her down the stairs pregnant,
different things like that. So you knew my mom wasn't
going to be able to stick up for you, and my father would
make these threats and follow through. It's a very
controlled, very tense, very difficult environment.3°
Plaintiff testified, inter alia, as follows:
I have a problem with what's happening between
John and the children, and there are several reasons. I
can state them very quickly. Number one, I don't think
that John is responsible as a parent in the way he
respects his children. He uses them for his own means
most times, and using Toren here today is a classic case
of that.3~
30 N.T. 82-83.
~ N.T. 92.
14
At the expiration of the time allotted for the hearing, the
Court asked counsel if either was requesting that additional time
be scheduled for further testimony:
THE COURT: I think either counsel may have
wanted more of a hear~ on this case. Mr. Krug, Mr.
Lewis, do either of you request that?
MR. LEWIS: Well, yes, I mean, I've asked one
question of Ms. Hall. I don't see how -- I don't see how
I could obviously prevail with what little testimony
there has been now, and I understand about budgeting
time, but I did lose about 15 minutes in objections. I
mean, I don't think that we would need sufficient time,
but I'll be honest with you -- I mean serious amounts of
time -- but I probably had 50 more questions for John
Hall alone, and I just don't know how to convey our
feelings towards this without going into everything.
THE COURT: All right. So you're asking for an
additional period of time for the hearing?
MR. LEWIS: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Krug.
Mr. KRUG: I object to that.
THE COURT: You don't want more time? You're
not asking for additional time?
MR. Krug: Not only are we not asking for it,
we believe that we will be continuously prejudiced by the
existence of this PFA [in] the light of all the evidence
from professionals .... 32
The Court thereafter entered this Order with respect to the
issue of whether additional hearing time would be scheduled:
AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 1994, upon
consideration of the motion of the Respondent, Sherrill
K. Hall, for a continuation of the hearing to present
additional testimony, the motion is denied.TM
N.T. 95-96.
Order of Court, July 20, 1994 (first order).
15
On the underlying merits of the petition of Defendant to
modify the existing protective order to exclude the parties'
children from its scope, this Order was thereupon entered:
AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 1994, upon
consideration of the Petition of John P. Hall for
modification of the Protection From Abuse Order entered
by agreement of the parties on September 9, 1993, and
previously modified by agreement of the parties on
October 7, 1993, and following a hearing, the Court finds
that the circumstances which led to the previous Orders
entered by agreement of the parties have not changed, and
the Protection From Abuse Order previously entered and
modified will remain in effect. It is noted that this
Order will expire within a few weeks of today's date.34
On August 1, 1994, Defendant filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration Pursuant to Rule 1930.2." In the motion, Defendant
requested the following: (a) the elimination of the Children from
the existing protective order; (b) a hearing for additional
testimony; and (c) oral argument on the motion for reconsideration.
This motion was denied by Order of Court dated August 2, 1994.35
On August 18, 1994, with the protective order at issue set to
expire three weeks hence, Defendant filed a notice of appeal to the
Superior Court from this Court's denial of his petition to modify
the order. In a statement of matters complained of on appeal,
Defendant contends (1) that his constitutional right to due process
was violated by the Court's imposition of time constraints on his
presentation, alleging inter alia that "[t]he Court refused to
extend the hearing beyond a two hour session," and (2) that the
refusal to modify "ignored the overwhelming credible evidence."
Order of Court, July 20, 1994 (second order).
Order of Court, August 2, 1994.
16
Discussion
Violation of Defendant's due process riqhts. To some extent,
a certain amount of discretion has to reside with a trial court in
terms of the extent of proceedings before it. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth ex rel. Friedman v. Friedman, 223 Pa. Super. 66, 297
A.2d 158 (1972) (length of arguments); Commonwealth v. Birch, 532
Pa. 563, 616 A.2d 977 (1992) (cross-examination). "A judge is
necessarily vested with broad powers and has considerable latitude
in the conduct of a trial, since the ultimate fairness of a
judicial proceeding depends upon his [or her] wisdom and good
judgment." 38 P.L.E. Trial ~21, at 29 (1961).
"Generally, all matters which relate to the orderly conduct of
a trial and are not regulated by the Constitution, a statute or a
court rule, are within the discretion of the court." Id. "The
trial court enjoys a broad discretion to control the course of the
proceeding." Posel v. Redevelopment Auth., 72 Pa. Commw. 115, 122,
456 A.2d 243, 247 (1983).
"An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment
.... " Fee v. Fee, 344 Pa. Super. 276, 279, 496 A.2d 793, 794
(1985). It occurs when, "in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-
will, as shown by the evidence or the record .... " Id. (citations
omitted).
It is believed that the record of the present case indicates
that the Court has been more than accommodating to both parties
17
with respect to the amount of time it has been willing to expend on
a single action on its docket. Without suggesting that the latest
exercise of Defendant to secure review of a protective order that
has expired is the product of a litigious nature,36 the Court does
not believe that Defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated, or the Court's discretion abused, by its attempts to
place some limits on the duration of the proceedings. This is
particularly so where the Defendant vigorously opposed the
scheduling of any additional hearing on the matter.
Disreqard of overwhelming credible evidence. The evidence in
this case shows that the Defendant is a person with a history of
volatility and outbursts of violence, whose most recent use of
~ See John P. Hall v. Gregory Lee Franciscus, No. 4830 Civil
1979; Summerdale Travel, Inc. v. John P. Hall, No. 3299 Civil 1979;
Robert P. Monaghan v. John Hall, No. 1094 Civil 1980; Glasgow,
Burrell, Hanemann, Inc. v. John Hall, No. 530 Civil 1980; John Hall
v. Harold W. Hilles, 4659 Civil 1980; Richland Travel Service, Inc.
v. John Hall, No. 2737 Civil 1980; Phila. Nat'l Bank v. John Hall,
No. 4748 Civil 1981; John Hall v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals, No. 657 Civil 1982; John Hall v. Fred S. James & Co.
Inc. of PA, No. 3122 Civil 1982; Fred S. James & Co. Inc. of PA v.
John Hall, No. 3622 Civil 1982; Morris Schwab v. John Hall, No.
1489 Civil 1983; TTM, Inc. v. John Hall, No. 87 Civil 1985;
Frederick A.M. Eshelman v. John Hall, No. 283 Civil 1986; John P.
Hall v. Patten Corp. Mid-Atlantic, No 3419 Civil 1989; William J.
Kuchler, P.A., v. John Hall, No. 12 Civil 1990; Deerfield Fed. S&L
Assn. v. John Hall, No. 347 Civil 1990; Leasefirst v. John Hall,
No. 1120 Civil 1990; Kastle USA, Inc. v. John Hall, No. 3245 Civil
1990; The Commonwealth Nat'l Bank v. John Hall, No. 3327 Civil
1990; Dana Commercial Credit Corp. v. John Hall, No. 57 Civil 1991;
Kelly Company v. John Hall, No. 91 Civil 1991; April & Maudsley,
P.A.v. John Hall, No. 318 Civil 1991; Borough of Carlisle v. John
Hall, No. 350 Civil 1991; Southern Ocean State Bank v. John Hall,
No. 902 Civil 1991; John Hall v. Commonwealth Dept. of
Transportation, No. 1341 Civil 1991; PA Power & Light Co. v. John
Hall & Sherri Hall, No. 2551 Civil 1992; John P. Hall v. Sherrill
Hall, No. 2853 Civil 1993; PA Power & Light Co. v. John P. Hall,
No. 579 Civil 1993; Camp Curtin Transfer, Inc. v. John P. Hall, No.
2300 Civil 1993.
18
force toward a family member occurred a few weeks prior to the
hearing herein, in the presence of the Children. The protective
order challenged in the present case was the product of Defendant's
own agreement, was the object of indirect criminal contempt by him,
was already on the verge of expiration at the time of the hearing,
was not rendered defeasible by a change of circumstances, and was
not unreasonable. Under these circumstances, the Court is unable
to agree with Defendant that it committed an error of law or abuse
of discretion by a disregard of t'he "overwhelming credible
evidence."
Kenneth F. Lewis, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Howard B. Krug, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner
:epj
19