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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-1427 Criminal COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF - : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM : : CHARGE: POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO JOSE MUNIZ : DELIVER COCAINE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT NOW, this ~ day of November, 1994, after careful AND consideration of Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Jonathan R. Birbeck, Esq. J.~e~ley Oler~., Sr. Assistant District Attorney Erich M. Diehl, Esq. Suite 201 105 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Defendant : rc COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF - : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. : NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM ~ - : : CHARGE: POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO JOSE MUNIZ : DELIVER COCAINE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J. In this criminal case Defendant is charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.~ For disposition at this time is Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence. The motion is premised upon the alleged illegality of a stop of Defendant's car. A hearing on Defendant's motion was held on Monday, October 31, 1994. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the motion to suppress will be denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Defendant and moving party is Jose Muniz. 2. On Wednesday, August 3, 1994, at about 5:40 p.m., Defendant's vehicle was stopped by agents of the Tri-County Drug Task Force as he drove into the parking lot of the Your Place Restaurant in Wormleysburg Borough, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 3. Defendant attempted to flee on foot and threw a plastic bag of alleged cocaine away as he ran. 4. Police recovered the bag of alleged cocaine and its ~ See Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, ~13(a)(30), 35 P.S. §780-113(a)(30). NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM contents were field-tested. 5. Earlier that afternoon police had arrested a certain named individual on drug charges at the Your Place Restaurant and were told by him that Defendant had arranged to deliver cocaine to him later that day at the restaurant for $1,000. 6. Police were aware that on two prior occasions Defendant had been the source of the individual's drugs. 7. The individual agreed to confirm the arrangement with Defendant by a telephone call to Defendant in the presence of the police, and he did so. 8. Police accompanied the individual to the restaurant to wait for Defendant's arrival; they were aware of what Defendant looked like and what kind of car he was driving. 9. When Defendant drove into the restaurant parking lot, police approached his car, and the flight and abandonment of the alleged cocaine described above took place. 10. Defendant was overtaken, arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a felony under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. DISCUSSION Statement of law. "Encounters with police may be classified as mere encounters, non-custodial detentions, custodial detentions and formal arrests." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa. Super. 337, 2 NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM 354, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 (1988).2 "The classificatiOn of the encounter determines the applicability and scope of the constitutional protections .... " Id. "An individual has not been arrested when he is stopped briefly for questioning. Thus, an officer may stop and briefly detain and question an individual if the investigating officer can point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant the belief that criminal activity is afoot. These brief investigatory stops are not considered to be arrests." 1 Wasserbly, Pennsylvania Criminal Practice §6.01 (1991). "A policeman who lacks the requisite level of information for probable cause is not required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." Id. §6.02. Even in the absence of probable cause, an investigating police officer may stop and briefly detain an individual, as long as the officer can point to specific and articulable facts, which, in conjunction with the natural inferences derived from those facts, warrant the intrusion.3 "An investigative detention, of course, may ripen into an arrest based on probable cause when police uncover additional information confirming earlier suspicions." 1 Wasserbly, 2 Non-custodial detentions "are also commonly referred to as Terry stops, traffic stops, investigatory detentions and intermediate detentions." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa. Super. 337, 354 n.5, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 n.5 (1988). 3 1 Wasserbly, Pennsylvania Criminal Practice §6.02 (1991). NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM ~ Pennsylvania Criminal Practice S6.02 (1991); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa. Super. 537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990). Probable cause is defined as "those facts and circumstances available at the time of the arrest which would justify a reasonable prudent man in the belief that a crime has been committed and that the individual arrested was the probable perpetrator." Commonwealth v. Harper, 485 Pa. 572, 583, 403 A.2d 536, 542 (1979). An arrest by police without a warrant upon probable cause is permissible in the case of a felony. Pa. R. Crim. P. 101. Application of law to facts. In this case, specific and articulable facts reasonably warranting the belief that criminal activity was afoot as Defendant drove into the restaurant parking lot included (a) his prior history as a source of the cooperating individual's drugs, (b) the individual's admission to police that he had arranged to buy cocaine from Defendant at the restaurant later that day, (c) the individual's confirmation of the arrangement by a telephone call to Defendant made in the presence of police, and (d) Defendant's appearance at the restaurant in accordance with the indicated arrangement.4 This factually- supported belief of police that criminal activity was afoot ~ Cf. Commonwealth v. Ogborne, 410 Pa. Super. 164, 599 A.2d 656 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 631, 606 A.2d 901 (1992); Commonwealth v. Echevarria, No. 2258 Criminal 1993 (Cumberland Co. May 26, 1994) (Bayley, J.). 4 NO. 94-1427 CRIMINAL TERM permitted them to make an investigatory stop of Defendant. In conjunction with the aforesaid facts authorizing an investigatory stop, Defendant's precipitous flight and his discarding of the plastic bag containing the alleged cocaine, represented facts and circumstances which would justify a reasonable, prudent person in the belief that a crime had been committed and that the Defendant was the probable perpetrator. Such facts and circumstances constituted probable cause for Defendant's arrest, and the felony nature of the crime made a warrant unnecessary. For these reasons, the following Order of Court will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~. day of November, 1994, after careful consideration of Defendant's Motion To Suppress Evidence, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion, the motion is DENIED. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Jonathan R. Birbeck, Esq. Sr. Assistant District Attorney Erich M. Diehl, Esq. Suite 201 105 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Defendant "~' '::rc 5